A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Kant Part Two “Critique of Pure Reason”.

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Reason, for Kant, is the search for the totality of conditions for cognitive Judgments, something that could never be achieved for the synthetic judgments , (judgments of experience or mathematical judgments). Insofar as experience is concerned, Kant has the following to say in his Prolegomena(p92):

“For experience never satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us further and further back and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution.”

And further(P. 96):

“The sensible world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws: it has, therefore, no subsistence by itself: it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to that which cannot be cognized merely as appearances but as things in themselves. In the cognition of them alone can reason hope to satisfy its desire for completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions.”

The search for the totality of conditions referred to above, however, is predicated upon the inquirer possessing three fundamental powers of mind, namely, Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. Reason has an important relation to the formation of a totality of forms of categorical judgments, i.e. the categories of the understanding:

“But Pure Reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can, therefore, do nothing without first determining the positions of each part and its relation to the rest. For inasmuch as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything outside of pure reason, so the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason, just as in the structure of an organized body the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole.”(Prol p8)

Philosophical knowledge, then, Kant continues, considers the quality of particular existence insofar as it participates in the universal in contrast to mathematical knowledge which “constructs” the universal in the particular in accordance with quantitative considerations. Mathematics constructs definitions from mathematical elements: a straight line, for example, is defined in terms of two points and the relation between them(the shortest distance). The mathematician then proceeds immediately to drawing a particular straight line in illustration of the principle(with the aid of an instrument: a ruler). The straight line can then be used in the construction of figures such as triangles. Straight lines of particular lengths are used to construct a particular triangle with a particular area that can be measured. It is as a consequence true that triangular spaces have a different quality to circular spaces but it must be recognized that this difference in quality is constructed in a way that the quality of the redness of rose can never be.

It is also true that were we to possess the sensible apparatus capable of giving us x-ray access to the inside of objects like roses we may never have been aware of the quality of colour. This fact, however, is not a sufficient basis from which to argue that the qualities of colours such as the redness of a rose are “constructed” upon the foundation of a mathematical primary underlying reality of a certain quantity (of Angstrom units). Kant insists that the mathematical construction is not a more reliable system of representation of the noumenal reality we know so little about(we can, according to Kant know that it is not mathematical, not spatial, not temporal). For Kant, the mathematician works in the world of the particular as organized by his mathematical notations. Kant also points out that given the fact that the philosopher is working solely in the arena of concepts and judgments, he has not the means of advancing our knowledge of the definition of a straight line except by categorising the form of judgment, e.g. The definition of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points is characterised by Kant as a “synthetic a priori judgment”:

“It would, therefore, be quite futile for me to philosophise upon the triangle, that is, to think about it discursively. I should not be able to advance a single step beyond the mere definition which was what I had to begin with. There is indeed a transcendental synthesis(framed) from concepts alone, a synthesis with which the philosopher is alone competent to deal: but it relates only to a thing in general, as defining the conditions under which the perception of it can belong to possible experience. But in mathematical problems, there is no question of this, nor indeed of existence at all, but only of the properties of the objects in themselves(that is to say), solely insofar as the properties are connected with the concept of the objects.”(Critique of Pure Reason A 718-9)

It is metaphysical and transcendental logic that allows the philosopher to theorise about the way in which we relate to the continuum of noumenal reality (by dividing it up with our philosophical concepts and judgments). This system of dividing reality up is very different from the mathematical method of division which fundamentally relies on quantitatively constructed concepts and a pure intuition that relates immediately to reality via the faculty of Sensibility. The constructed concept here functions rather like a schema of subsumption that allows a limited number of mathematical operations and calculations to occur. The mathematical logic we encounter here is not at the same level as the relation of universal concepts we encounter in the transcendental or metaphysical logic we use in the analysis of the structure of a judgment in which we say something about something. Kant points out in this context that:

“Transcendental propositions can never be given through the construction of concepts but only in accordance with concepts that are a priori.”(A 720)

Involved in this claim is Kant’s subsequent denial that the philosophical and mathematical methods overlap or have elements in common. The philosopher, Kant argues, cannot work with constructed definitions, axioms, and related demonstrations. In this context, Kant also points out that definitions of empirical concepts such as gold and water (where the extension of these concepts are not exactly circumscribed and forever open to modification by further empirical investigation) are problematic. Mathematical concepts , on the other hand, are circumscribable and refer to an object via the constructed definition.

Kant points out that Mathematicians are in agreement and disputes about their concepts do not occur. But there are disputes over whether for example, a particular system of concepts such as Euclidean geometry is consistent with the system of concepts we find in non-Euclidean Geometry. When they do not agree, however, it does not appear to be a tribunal of mathematical reason which can settle the issue as to which system, for example, best represents reality. Both systems are constructed and in the eyes of the philosopher, it might appear as if both systems are equally legitimate methods of dividing up the continuum of noumenal reality. Indeed the discovery that both systems have been “constructed” could only have been discovered in the tribunal of philosophical reasoning where matters such as this is settled. One could imagine, for example, evidence being submitted by Einstein(that space is “curved”) as part of the case for the legitimation of non-Euclidean geometry. For the Philosopher, however, this is a metaphysical judgment even if it is supported by a theory of gravitation where it is claimed that gravitational force “bends” Space and bends the light that otherwise travels in straight lines that are best measured by the Euclidean system of geometry. One of the verdicts of the tribunal of philosophical reason, in this case, might be that it is only the Space around objects exerting a large enough gravitational force that requires the concepts and operations of non-Euclidean geometry. This, however, in the end, fails to justify the use of the universal concept of “Space” in the judgment “Space is curved”. The Newtonian universe is certainly modified by Einstein’s theories but light still travels in straight lines unless caused to do otherwise by powerful gravitational fields: the Newtonian laws of motion thus stand and survive the case for the prosecution in the Philosophical tribunal of Reason.

The tribunal of philosophical reasoning, however, is more at home with defending its concepts and laws against general philosophical positions such as dogmatism and skepticism : it is more at home when handing down judgments on the importance of the idea of Freedom in a rational human life led in a rational society:

“Thus freedom will carry with it the right to submit openly for discussion the thoughts and doubts with which we find ourselves unable to deal and to do so without being decried as troublesome and dangerous citizens. This is one of the original rights of human reason which recognizes no other judge than that universal human reason in which everyone has his say. And since all improvement on which our state is capable must be obtained from this source, such a right is sacred and must not be curtailed.”(A752)

Kant is referring here, amongst other things, to the importance of the logical form of practical reason as distinguished from its empirical form which we encounter in our practical prudential judgments and actions where:

“the whole business of reason consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by our desires in the one single end, happiness, and in coordinating the means for attaining it. In this field therefore reason can supply none but pragmatic laws of free action, for the attainment of those ends which are commended to us by the senses: it cannot yield us laws that are pure and determined completely a priori and which are prescribed to us, not in an empirically conditioned but in an absolute manner would be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws, and these alone, therefore, belong to the practical employment of reason and allow of a canon.”(A 800)

“The Canon of Pure Reason” is the title of an important section of the First Critique and provides us with the metaphysics and transcendental philosophy that in turn enable us to answer the question “What ought I to do?” (given the theoretical knowledge we have of God, the immortality of the soul and our freedom). In this connection Kant also provides us with the beginnings of a Philosophical Psychology needed to further his critical projects:

“A will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason is entitled free will and everything that is bound up with this will, whether as ground or as consequence is entitled practical….. we have the power to overcome the impressions of our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up representations of what, in a more indirect manner is useful or injurious. But these considerations as to what is desirable in respect of our whole state, that is, as to what is good and useful are based on reason. Reason, therefore provides laws which are imperative, that is, objective laws of freedom which tell us what ought to happen although perhaps it never does happen–therein differing from the laws of nature which relate only to that which happens.”(A 802)

With the above transcendental justification and reference to the will, (the central concept of Philosophical psychology), the First Critique delimits and defines the scope and limits of the ought system of concepts that will provide the framework for Kant’s moral. religious and political philosophy. Pure Reason for Kant can be both theoretical and practical, but morality is a priori practical and only connected to the concept of happiness via the condition that we are ultimately worthy of such happiness. Kant calls the world in which rational agents and judges live, a moral world, a kingdom of ends in which each member of the kingdom treats other members as ends-in-themselves. Such members will enjoy happiness thanks to a divine guarantee by an intelligent God that distributes happiness to those worthy of it. This then provides the answer to the question Kant poses “What can we hope for?”. The kingdom of ends hypothesised by Kant is a systematic unity of ends(or totality of conditions) that is also in accordance with universal laws of nature.

Kant discusses the concept of Truth and claims (paradoxically, according to some commentators), that there are three degrees of holding something to be true: opining, believing and knowing:

“Opining is such holding of a judgment as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, we have what is termed believing. Lastly, when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge“(A822)

Opinion is, “merely a play of the imagination without the least relation to truth”. When we venture upon a moral action, on the other hand, Kant argues, we must know its validity(its universality and necessity). In relation to the more speculative theoretical issues of whether there is a God, or another life in another world, there is only moral certainty resting upon a moral sentiment(given the fact that God belongs to the noumenal world we know so little about and that his existence can neither be proved nor disproved)

Knowledge appears also to divide into fields or disciplines and these can be assembled arbitrarily, rhapsodically or architectonically in accordance with the demands of pure practical reason. There is, however, in Kant’s overall strategy an awareness of the presence of the ancients who beginning with Socrates favoured pure practical reason over theoretical reasoning. Here Kant probably has in mind the philosophical career of Socrates who upon reading Anaxagoras and realising “All is mind”, then turned his back on all forms of physical investigations in favour of the pursuit of the knowledge of the Good that we find portrayed as the foundation stone of the education of the Philosophers of Plato’s Republic. Kant is also familiar with the metaphysical system of Aristotle in which the theoretical and the practical dwell uncomfortably together in one system of Philosophy. Kant’s contribution to this debate is to identify two realms of metaphysics and two kinds of objects:

“The legislation of human reason(philosophy) has two objects, nature, and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature but also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems but ultimately in one philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals with that which ought to be”(A840)

This gives rise to the “division” between a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. The former contains the principles that lie behind our theoretical knowledge of the world and the latter the a priori principles that govern our actions. Kant warns about the confusion of these two modes of knowledge and also claims that these modes can be combined. He also warns us about confusing what is in our cognitive power with what is not, namely the a posteriori and the a priori: it is, in his view only the a priori forms of knowledge that can form the elements of pure science. In this debate, Kant refers to those sciences that proceed from concepts to intuitions and he also refers to Mathematics which proceeds from the construction of concepts to a priori intuitions. James Ellington in his essay “The Unity of Kant’s Philosophy of Nature” claims that Kant was not entirely clear about the workings of his architectonics. There is, however, no doubt concerning his clarity over the two modes of knowledge and what has been called Metaphysica Generalis in which only principles and systems of concepts are discussed and the system of Metaphysica Specialis in which rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology are placed. Rational physiology is further divided into two parts: physica rationalis and psychological rationalis. The term “rational” in these contexts refers to a priori elements which means that empirical psychology will find no place in this structure but given that it is applied philosophy it will figure as a part of the metaphysical system in which we find explanations of psychological phenomena.

In the last chapter 4 of”The Transcendental Doctrine of Method” entitled”The History of Pure Reason” Kant notes that in the infancy of Philosophy men began by reflecting upon that point at which most mature philosopher would like to end their reflections, namely with the idea of God and another better life in a better world and:

“That there could be no better ground or dependable way of pleasing the invisible power that governs the world, and so of being happy in another world at least, then by living the good life. Accordingly, theology and morals were the two motives or rather the two points of reference in all those abstract enquiries of reason to which men come to devote themselves. It was chiefly, however, the former that step by step committed the purely speculative reason to those labours which afterwards became so renowned under the name of metaphysics.”(A 852)

This magnifies the importance of the so-called “Socratic turn” from investigating the metaphysics of nature to investigating the metaphysics of morals. It also testifies to the greatness of the tradition of Aristotelian Philosophy that pursued both forms of metaphysics to their fundamental grounds. Kantian philosophy continued this tradition but gives Aristotelian metaphysics a “Kantian turn” by pleading for the primacy of practical metaphysics over theoretical metaphysics at least insofar as we finite rational beings capable of discourse are concerned. Kant, like Aristotle, recognizes an animal element of sensibility but follows the ancients in insisting that the fundamental purpose of rationality is to largely regulate the domain of the powers of psuche.

In this “History” chapter Kant divides the object of “all our knowledge through Reason” into two; sensualism and intellectualism. The former is illustrated with the thought of Epicurus who maintains that :

“reality is to be found solely in the objects of the senses” and all else is fiction. The intellectual school, on the other hand, declared that in the senses there is nothing but illusion, and that only the understanding knows what is true. The former position did not indeed deny reality to the concepts of the understanding, but this reality for them was “merely” logical whereas for others it was mystical. The former sensualists admitted intellectual concepts but admitted the reality of sensible objects only. Sensualists required that true objects should be purely intelligible and maintained that it is by means of the pure understanding that we experience intuitions unaccompanied by the senses– the senses in their view serving only to confuse the understanding”(A853).

Kant also refers to the origin of the modes of knowledge through pure reason and mentions in this connection Aristotle’s “Empiricist” position in which it is maintained that all modes of knowledge are derived from experience. Plato, in this discussion, is referred to as a noologist (part of the mystical school). In Kant’s view, neither of these schools have managed to correctly chart the boundaries or the limits of experience. Calling Aristotle an empiricist does, however, seem to be problematic given his remarks on the importance of the desire to understand and the role of principles in all processes of understanding. It is not absolutely clear that the intellectual forms of the mind are all tied as tightly to experience as Kant appears to imagine.

In the course of discussing the naturalistic(common sense) method and the scientific method, Kant claims that common sense is sceptical about the use of mathematical and scientific instruments and yet presumes to be able to establish the existence of sublime metaphysical truths with its limited means.

Kant then concludes the First Critique by claiming that the scientific method per se can be either dogmatically used as it was by Wolff or skeptically used as it was by Hume, but that the only viable Parmenidean road to the truth lies via the critical use of the scientific method.