

Ariadne's Thread connected as it is to a temporal span of time containing a beginning, a middle, and an end which terminates with emergence from the darkness into the light is a wonderful image of a Globalisation process and its progress to the Shakespearean and Kantian end of Cosmopolitanism. Time is an ancient concern and we need Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy to provide a framework for its philosophical characterisation. Aristotles 3 media of change(space, time, and matter), 4 kinds of change, 3 principles of change, four causes of change and three kinds of Science describing and explaining change, is taken up and elaborated upon by Kant during a time when we thought we might be emerging from the labyrinth and catching a glimpse of a better world and our true natures. The Enlightenment promise of the light at the end of the journey through the darkness, aided by the "spirit" of Hegel failed to deliver what was promised. "New men" appeared in the world we call "modern" and created an "Age of Discontentment" that carried us into the "terrible 20th century".



Michael R D James

The World Explored, the World Suffered

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, Emotion, Consciousness, and Action: Volume four



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Introduction: The Age of Discontentment

We have been in search of a name for the spirit of the “Modern Age” because “modern” according to the OED means “relating to the present or present times” and this is true of every age and cannot therefore rigidly designate the historical epoch beginning with the Philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes, and extending to the present times. So much hope is invested in the world and the times in which we live, that it does seem almost impossible to dash that hope to pieces by characterising our age negatively.

At the same time, we look back at envy to the Golden Age of Ancient Greece and the European Enlightenment. “Almost impossible” does, however, leave open the possibility of a negative characterisation of the Spirit of our Age. We are going to exploit this possibility, on the grounds of the thoughts of many great thinkers of this period. We include Freud in this group, and the designation we are settling for is, “The Age of Discontentment”. So much has happened in the centuries following the Enlightenment to, at least cast doubt upon the Kantian vision, that we will eventually reach a time which we could authentically call an “Enlightened Age”. This “promised land”, unfortunately, insofar as Kant is concerned, is a cosmopolitan kingdom lying 100,000 years in the future and all we have to comfort us on this journey through our modern waste-land is the knowledge of what Kant calls the “hidden plan”.

Heidegger’s reflections on one of the causes of our modern predicament relates to what he calls our “forgetfulness of being”, and he points to several factors including the Romanisation of Greek Culture and the Latinisation of the translations of key Greek terms. One major consequence of the forgetfulness of being was the quick and startling forgetfulness of the work of Kant. Hegel’s attempt to turn the Philosophy of Kant “upside down”, thereby inverting the image of the world on the retina of our culture, succeeded in sowing further confusion well into the 20th century (the century Arendt referred to as “this terrible century”).

In 1870, almost 40 years after Hegel’s death, Psychology divorced itself from Philosophy and went its own way in the name of Science and Consciousness, and we have throughout the volumes of this work attempted to follow the twistings and turnings of this “new discipline”. The “enlightened” work of Freud was the magnificent Titanic amongst the icebergs of this period, but like Kant, his influence too was short-lived. Psychoanalysis, as we know, failed to find a home in the University system in the way that Philosophy did during the time of Kant. The proliferation of disciplines in accordance with a “principle of specialisation”, which was anathema to the Kantian and Aristotelian projects, served to place a question mark over any discipline such as psychoanalysis that

derived its programme from three different kinds of science, e.g. theoretical science, practical science, and productive science. The Model for the Universities during the time of the Enlightenment was probably the commercial Guild system, functioning in accordance with the principle of specialisation. Subsequent development of what Heidegger referred to as this “technical organisation” of the University system, resulted in both Kantian and Aristotelian influences being diminished significantly over time.

The Post-Second World War period saw a brief revival of Humanistic Philosophy in Politics and Education, with the creation of that Kantian dream, the United Nations. In Britain, the influence of the later Philosophy of Wittgenstein allowed holistic projects to emerge such as the installation of “Philosophy of Education” in the University system. The aim of the UN was both the preservation of Human Rights but also Internationalisation (Cosmopolitanism). The mechanisms for attempting to achieve these aims, however, became increasingly influenced by Economics and Science, and the general methodology associated with these mechanisms was the manipulation and measurement of variables linked to probability and games theory. These mechanistic means have removed focus from the ends, but there have always been and there always will be scholars in Universities writing papers and books and thereby keeping the Greek and Enlightenment flame alive, allowing a glimpse of the road ahead. The “hidden plan” these scholars embody, is best imaged, not as a buried treasure, but as an underground stream bubbling to the surface in places, but largely making its journey to the sea underground far from the madding crowds of our civilisations and their discontents.

We began our investigation into Kant’s “hidden plan” in volume one of this series of works. We also referenced the “Battle of the Titans”, namely the Ancient Greeks and the more “modern” Romans as precursors to the more modern confrontation between the scholars v “the new men” of our post-Roman modern age of discontentment. In this age of discontentment we wish to embrace a term of Kant’s to characterise life in our modern civilisations, namely “melancholic haphazardness”.

We have witnessed the sedimentation of many layers of history since the Ancients, and these have disguised the journey of the thread of Ariadne toward the Light at the end of the Age of Enlightenment. In volumes one and two, we referred to the image of Janus, with one melancholic face turned toward the past, and an anxious face turned toward the future. We might well ask the question, “What is on the mind of the face turned toward the future?” Restoration of historical losses? Or the Oracle’s prophecy that “Everything created by humans is destined for ruin and destruction.”? Will the “Philosophy” of the “new men” (Bacon, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Adam Smith, Rousseau, the

logical atomists, the logical positivists, pragmatists, naturalists, Cecil Rhodes etc) prevail, and remain mainstream influences at the expense of the Ancient Greek, Enlightenment and Wittgensteinian thinkers?

We maintained in volume one, that the divorce between Philosophy and Psychology in 1870, was a revolution born in the bowels of one of the darkest periods of History, in which Aristotle's ideas were being overshadowed by Platonism, and then subsequently transposed by agents of the Church. The Aristotelian "spirit" re-emerged during the Renaissance but with the closing of all Philosophical schools in the 6th century AD, and the establishment of relatively new Universities in Europe, the platforms for cultural change were limited in number. With the diminishing authority of the Church, followed the increasing influence of science, that had very early on begun a flirtation with mathematics, that in turn would culminate in both great and mediocre things, e.g. Newton's "Natural Philosophy", and a commitment to a methodology of manipulating and measuring variables. The latter methodology naturally attached itself to the empirical investigations of Bacon and Boyle et al. To be clear, there is no contradiction between the Newtonian concentration on Principles of Physics in a context of explanation/justification, and the empirical methodological procedures demanded of contexts of exploration/discovery. These latter contexts were of course important for generating what Aristotle called "basic general terms", which are of importance in all forms of scientific exploration and discovery. It is important, however not to dogmatically dismiss either of these contexts of inquiry/explanation. Both are essential to the project of Justified, True Belief (Knowledge).

At the conclusion of volume one, Rousseau, on behalf of the new men, played the role of the critic of the "ancien regime" (bourgeois rationality-tradition?) using romantic and cynical ideas of vanity, shame, and envy ("amour propre"). Rousseau's hero was Robinson Crusoe, that lone desert island solipsist, whose main concern was firstly survival, and subsequently commodious living. The term "amour propre" was used mainly in connection with Rousseau's political reflections upon authority and government. Deception was the instrument of rule, Rousseau maintained. His reference points were Rome and Sparta, rather than the enlightened cynicism of Diogenes of Athens. Rousseau was a Counter-Enlightenment figure who also influenced Kant with his work on educating Emile. According to Kant himself, Rousseau taught him to respect the dignity of man, and perhaps also contributed to the shift from focussing upon theoretical rationality, toward emphasising the importance of practical rationality and its connection with philosophical psychology.

In volume two we reminded readers of the Roman interpretation of the symbol of Janus and a possible hypothetical Ancient Greek interpretation of such a symbolic mythical figure:

“The Greeks had no equivalent symbol but this does not testify to the poverty of their gallery of symbolic figures but rather to the rationality of their categories of thinking about reality. For the Greeks the presence of two faces and two sets of eyes may have signified the nervous animated gaze of a superstitious obsessive-compulsive image of the Roman Spirit.”(P.3)¹

Yet we also attempt to point out another interpretation of this symbolic figure: the dualistic form of Janus (his schizoid and bipolar aspects) could actually be used to represent the temporal bipolarity of History, in spite of what appears at first glance to be an incoherent spatial characterisation. What is being symbolised here, then, is one spatially defined object, and a temporal process, and the question that hangs in the air is whether an essentially spatial entity (even if it is a human being) can capture the essence of a historical process. Even very modern characterisations of time. e.g. Newton’s image of absolute time as “flowing like a river”, has its limitations because of the spatiality of the image. The Greeks attempted to personify time in the figure of Chronos, but this also led to paradoxical images such as Chronos “eating his children”. The difficulties with finding a symbol for Time was already becoming apparent at the beginning of conscious speculation.

In Volume two, however, we did discuss a symbol that might be able to function as a symbol of time:

“The closest the Greeks came to a popular portrayal of historical processes was the myth of Ariadne’s thread, which, insofar as it has a beginning a middle, and an end that stretches over different regions of space, can be conceived allegorically as a process of time that has a beginning, a duration, and an end. The story of the thread journeying from the darkest recesses of the dark labyrinth of the Minotaur to the light at the entrance of the labyrinth, carries the symbolic significance of the importance of the light of knowledge, and the freedom of man. Ariadne was the Grand-Daughter of Zeus, the God who inflicted a Freudian injury upon his father Kronos (Time). The only crime of Kronos might have been the crime of all fathers, namely, allowing their children to die when the thread of their life comes to an end. Tracing Ariadne’s thread back to its origin, not to a labyrinth, but rather to a Grandfather who defeated the Titans and was born of the union of the earth and the sky, suggests we have reached the limits of our imagination, a limit that has already been tested by some ancient myths.”(P.3)²

In Volume two we also suggested that Janus could represent the dialectical opposition of a thesis and antithesis, signifying the role of Rome in the splitting of the thread of destiny leading from Ancient Greece: one section of the thread leading to to new men descended from Rome and the other section leading to the Kantian Kingdom of Ends. There are, then, two future possibilities: either

the threads unite in a synthesis, or one of the threads ends prematurely whilst the other determines the destiny of our civilisations. At stake is either the ruin and destruction conceived of by the oracles, or the Kingdom of Ends as conceived of by Kant. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were the real architects of the Kingdom of Ends section of the thread that eventually reached Rome. Apart from the principles used by these three Philosophers to construct explanations and justifications in relation to the aporetic questions they posed in the face of the infinite media of change (space, time, matter), there were a number of ideas that naturally constituted the Greek consciousness of Being-in-the-world: e.g. arché, areté, diké, epistémé, phronesis, dunamis, eudaimonia, aletheia, physis, psuche, energeia, nous, ousia, and techné. These ideas combined with attitudes such as awe and wonder in the face of the media of change and resulted in an increasing awareness of the roles of the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. This was the composition of the thread that provided the necessary conditions for the appearance of Kant in the Enlightenment ca 2000 years later. By the time Kant emerges in this process, there was an awareness that had been growing since the time and works of Shakespeare, that the solution to the growing problems of Nationalism, could be harmoniously functioning Cosmopolitan Cities and Societies. Freedom, in Kant's Critical theory, also designated the freedom to dare to use ones reason, and challenge the assumptions behind, for example, the Treaty of Westphalia, which attempted to establish the sovereignty of nations as a political principle. Kant dared to use his reason to propose a Kingdom of ends in all his critical works, especially his "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view", in which he proposed that the Kingdom of ends would be populated by "citizens of the world". He also, in his essay on Universal History, dared to suggest the creation of a League of Nations or United Nations, in order to deal with the constant problem of imminent war between Nations. The statesmen of Ancient Greek times were acutely aware of the obstacles in the way of the "Perpetual Peace" they were striving to achieve. In the foreground of their consciousness were two oracular prophecies: "Everything created by humans is destined for ruin and destruction" and "know thyself". This suggestion relating to the importance of these prophecies to Greek thinkers, perhaps deserves more investigation by scholars. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were aware of these prophecies, and responded to the aporetic questions they raised by sophisticated theorising about the "Form of the Good", and the creation of philosophical methodologies such as elenchus and logic. Three dimensions of the Good emerged very early on, namely the goods of the external world, the goods for the body, and the goods for the soul. Of these three categories, it is clear that the goods for the soul took precedence as the highest Good man ought to strive after.

The Ancient Greeks were very aware that the best response to the prophecy that "Everything created by humans is destined for ruin and destruction", was to

focus on the natural effort and desire in man to build a strong character—to focus on the effort and desire of man to make something of himself. Man became a “causa sui”, very early on in Greek reflection upon the essence of human being. It was no easy task for man to make something of himself, given the tendency of civilisation to promote the goods of the external world and the goods of the body over the goods for the soul. Freedom, as an aspect of the goods for the soul, was of course, important for the Greeks, and the image of Plato’s cave conveyed the message of the importance of knowledge in the liberation of man from the darkness of his ignorance.

Volume two begins with Kant, and charts the course of Kantian Philosophy and its relation to Aristotelian Hylomorphic Philosophy in relation to the 4 questions that, for Kant, define the scope and limits of Philosophy: “What can we know?”, “What ought we to do?”, “What can we hope for?”, and “What is man?” The major shift that differentiated Kant from the scholastics and the prevailing Platonism of pre-Enlightenment times, was the Kantian concentration upon the importance of Practical Reasoning and Practical Philosophy. Kant, as we know, was also a staunch formal defender of Theoretical Reasoning and Philosophy, and its principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. We can easily detect the presence of the idea of *psuche* in Kant’s practical reflections and his account of the faculty of Sensibility. He also connects desire with life (*psuche*), but his account of the mind stretches beyond the faculties of sensibility and reason he inherited from the tradition of thinking of his times. He introduced a third faculty of the Understanding and Categories that were no longer mere Aristotelian categories of existence. Postulating instead, a number of categories of thought, (of thinking).

Kant also proved himself to be a political Philosopher par excellence, and we claimed that the concept of “Human Rights” owed his moral philosophy an everlasting debt. He established this concept as a *quaestio juris* rather than a *quaestio facti*, and the former arose as a result of his complex moral reasoning about freedom and its relation to our life-world.

Aesthetics was also an important area of concern for Kant, and we encountered ideas such as “the feeling of life” that appeared to be discussed in largely hylomorphic terms. The form of finality of an object is most definitely a hylomorphic idea of great complexity, and Kant’s discussion of this idea takes up the relation of the sensible faculty of the imagination to the reflective faculty of the understanding in the context of *psuche* and the formal principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Three other principles are, however, suggested by this account and will be used by Freud in his complex account of Instincts and their vicissitudes, namely, the energy regulation principle (ERP), the pleasure-pain principle (PPP), and the Reality Principle (RP). In this

discussion reference was made to the super-sensible substrate of the mind which of course reveals itself more clearly in moral contexts.

Volume two also discusses the so-called “mythology” of Freudian theory, namely “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, one of which is Consciousness and another of which is the mechanism of defence that exclude psychic contents from consciousness. Instincts were defined in Aristotelian fashion in both formal and final terms (teleologically). The complex interaction between levels of consciousness (preconscious, unconscious) and the agencies of the id, ego, and superego, was then charted in a large number of cases, where it was clear that we are dealing with *areté*, *epistémé* and *techné* and a number of practical sciences and productive sciences as well as theoretical sciences (as Aristotle conceived of them). Freud postulates that, apart from the above three principles regulating the activities of our minds, there are primary processes that are instinctual, as well as secondary more complex processes that account for the direction of the actualisation process. This process, in turn, determines the form of life of the human being, an animal, as Freud points out so acutely, who spends a long time in childhood. Freud’s view of consciousness then, is dynamic, and it mostly manifests itself in the activity of the secondary processes. There can, however, occur eruptions of primary processes in Consciousness in the form of hallucinations, and impulsive activity of other kinds. Freud claims interestingly, that his Psychology is Kantian and there is no doubting the truth of this claim, but perhaps he ought also to have acknowledged a debt he owed to hylomorphic Philosophy.

Volume two also reflects upon the Phenomenological Tradition in General, and Heideggerian Phenomenology/Existentialism in particular, and its startling claim that science as such is “sneaking away from Being”. This is certainly true of the Psychology that regards Consciousness as a private theatre with an audience of one, but it is also true of Psychology that limits itself to investigating psychological phenomena at the behavioural and sensory level (using an approach which claims that it is easier to observe and measure a reality carved up into events). Phenomenological views in general dismiss “simple science” obsessed with methodological concerns and basic general terms, but it is also the case that such views refuse to engage with the higher level of Principles conceived of metaphysically. Heidegger criticises such views and claims they too are associated with the forgetfulness of Being he complains about.

Volume two also discussed and evaluated the works of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Wittgenstein Husserl Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur, from primarily Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives. In this discussion the issue of a Cosmopolitan “End of Things” looms large, suggesting an important answer to the question “What can we hope for?”.

Volume three limited itself to discussing the ideas of Arendt, R.S. Peters, Piaget, Julian Jaynes and Jonathan Lear from the perspectives of Aristotle and Kant. The Introduction of volume three contained this claim:

“The Greek terms, *areté*, *epistémé diké*, *arché* and *phronesis* are the ideas the Greek philosophers used to constitute their world-view. At the time of their greatness, they thought Greece could rule the world with these ideas.” (P.2)³

The symbolic/mythical figure of Janus was conceivably intended by the Romans to be a war God, and perhaps also suggests the monstrous psyche that the “new men” of our European civilisation were intent upon creating. Volume three suggests that Janus transforms naturally into the Leviathan, which in turn is culturally transformed via the spirit of *techné* into the Juggernaut of War that would reduce much of Europe to killing-fields. After such devastation the only response of exhausted souls was perhaps to leave the earth for the moon and generally engage in “displacement” activities rather than the massive task of Restoration that was needed. It came, therefore, as something of a surprise, that there were individuals who possessed the energy to form the UN and create Educational systems that were designed to look upon war as a displacement activity. The Promise of the Enlightenment had been, for many, a great disappointment, and Aristotelian and Kantian ideas confined themselves to the corridors of Universities, far from the madding crowds. Freud to his credit saw what was coming in 1929, and afterwards kept largely silent about cultural matters at a time when his voice was sorely needed. The response of the new men to our new post-war situation was the creation of the Apollo mission, reminding us of Carazan’s nightmare in which the dreamer finds himself plummeting through space endlessly beyond the reach of human presence and light. Arendt’s response to these “new men” was to point an accusing figure at men like Cecil Rhodes who spent time wondering if the colonisation of the planets would increase his fortune. Rhodes, of course was just one of the long line of new men stretching from Descartes and Hobbes. For them “everything was possible” in spite of the fact that, for most of mankind, nothing appeared to be (politically, economically) possible any longer. During the terrible 20th century, at the height of the totalitarian period, human values were relegated to a relativised zone in which no principles applied. Even serious critics of totalitarianism, such as Arendt, continued to support Marxism for a considerable amount of time before finally deciding that the Marxist position in the end opposed the causes of both Justice and Freedom.

Volume three also discussed Piaget’s intelligence-based theories: theories that shared certain assumptions with Freudian and Kantian theory. The abstract operations stage which we all hope we will eventually arrive at sometime in our lives, appeared, however, to prize instrumental and hypothetical rationality over

the more categorical forms of reasoning. Unfortunately, Piaget's abstract operations were largely logical and mathematical, and the intelligent manipulation and measurement of variables received more attention than the more holistic idea of the personality.

Julian Jaynes provides us with a theory of the origins of both Language and Consciousness: a theory which is in accordance with many of the assumptions of hylomorphic theory. The theory has fascinating implications for dating the dawning of Consciousness, but it also provides an account of the origins of language over a much longer span of time dating back to the origins of the human race. Jaynes claims, in the context of restoring our understanding of religious symbols, that the idea we have of God, may originate from a bicameral brain in which language was once bilaterally represented and one hemisphere communicated with the other via a structure called the anterior commissure. For some reason, he argues, language became concentrated in the left hemisphere, and this transmission-of-voice-phenomenon disappeared, but still can be experienced by schizophrenics as they "hear" their delusional voices. It can be argued that, for the Kantian belief/faith system, God is an idea of the mind and this in itself is not a problem, Kant claims, since we can neither prove the existence or non-existence of God. God was an idea of reason subject to the principles of reason, but not the categories of the understanding. Modern misunderstanding of this idea has resulted in claims that God is dead or at least has absented himself from our lives (*Deus absconditis*).

Jonathan Lear has written very influential works on both Aristotle and Freud. He claims that during the latter phase of the Age of Discontentment, Psychology "has gone missing". Lear presents essentially Hegelian objections to the position of rationalism, thus making what he calls the "broad structure of reality" more "concrete". We argued that Lear's position may not have appreciated the full ontological reach of the logical principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

Volume four concludes this work and looks at the works of Cavell, Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and O Shaughnessy. The final chapters deal with the legacy of Aristotle and Kant in modern times, in the three regions of theoretical, practical, and productive reason.

Cavell is the author with the poorest claim to being a part of the restoration of Aristotelian and Kantian ideas to the University system. His defence of Wittgensteinian Philosophy in the face of modernist attacks launched by analytically-minded logicians was, however, magnificent, but his attempts to "psychologise" human interaction via ideas of "acknowledgement" and

“agreement” are less useful for the processes of cultural evolution that are moving us towards Cosmopolitanism.

His work “The World Viewed”, on the ontology of film, is certainly a milestone in modern Aesthetics and also contributes substantially to the philosophical evaluation of Modernism and its urinals, silent pieces of music, “weightless” sculptures and empty canvasses etc. Unfortunately, whilst Cavell sows many seeds there is also neglect of the weeds that emerge in his attempt to characterise the philosophical psychology required for ethical theories. His account sometimes appears to lead us into a Hegelian form of transactional ethics where dialectical logic and the context of exploration/discovery determine our descriptions-explanations of what is occurring in these transactions.

Anscombe’s contribution to efforts of restoration is more substantial, yet more enigmatic. We see no sign of Hegelian influence in her ethical reflections and this is probably due to the anti-Hegelian atmosphere at Trinity College Cambridge, created partly due to the influence of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. Anscombe claims that ethical categorical justifications were closely bound up with Religious justification and authority, and when the latter became problematic, so did the former. This, we pointed out was not problematic for the Kantian account, which merely de-centred the theoretical idea of God in favour of the practical idea of freedom, without questioning its value. We encounter here more of an emphasis upon political authority, and this probably contributed to the eventual installation of human rights on the agenda of political philosophy. Anscombe does, however, make many useful contributions to restoring the work of Aristotle, especially in her discussions on human life and History. She claims, in the spirit of Kant, that there is a very special kind of cause operating in the world and that cause is Man. The causality operating in History, she argued is derived from this human-causality. Our Social-Historical descriptions and explanations of necessity related, she claimed, to the intentionalities embedded in our institutions.

Anscombe’s ethical theory, however is both enigmatic and problematic because she initially claimed that the solution to all ethical problems must await the resolution of certain problems requiring solutions in the arena of philosophical psychology. She did, however, later retreat from this position. One of her more important claims, related to the role of grammatical investigations in the search for self-knowledge. Her argument that the self is *causa sui* was also coupled to certainty: the self was certain of itself in all its forms, she argued, and the knowledge involved here was of the non-observational kind. This suffices, she argues, to remove us from the arena of scientific knowledge, and situate us firmly in the domain of Humanistic studies. It is of course, in humanistic spirit, that Anscombe boldly claims that abortion is murder. Her arguments fall into

two categories: firstly an epistemological argument which points out that we “know” that a foetus that is being aborted is human, with the potential for a human life that we all to some extent enjoy, and secondly, we know that it is, already at the stage of the formation of the zygote, that this “matter”, without human shape, is alive and is human. These knowledge claims are sufficient for Anscombe to claim that abortion is the intentional taking of a human life.

Anscombe’s humanism shines like a beacon in the darkness of the 20th century when she does not hesitate to jeopardise her academic career by objecting (In the University Senate) to the award of an honorary doctorate to ex-President Truman (the “new man” who signed the order to drop two atomic bombs on civilian populations). Anscombe’s academic characterisation of value, however, leaves much to be desired. She claims that to value something means essentially seeing something in a certain light and as a gift of the holy ghost. There are, however, other reflections on value that can be seen to be elaborations upon an Aristotelian conception of value.

P.M.S. Hacker is clearly a scholar with both Aristotelian and Kantian interests and concerns, and this is demonstrated in his written intention to produce what he referred to as a “Philosophical Anthropology”. The context of much of his argumentation is the context of human value and humanism, in relation to the aporetic Kantian question “What is man?” (What is Human Nature?). With Hacker, value assumes a categorical role in our lives, and is not a matter of interpretation, of seeing things in a certain light. Rather, for Hacker, value operates as a principle or law governing both belief and action. In his work we encounter no irrational fear of metaphysics, neither is there any appeal to the “spiritualism” of the “holy ghost”. For Hacker, the goods of the soul, include the pursuits of the Truth, the Good, and Justice. He is also committed to the importance of grammatical investigations but they are always placed in a larger context of Aristotelian and Kantian categories of existence and understanding. Hacker situates his reflections upon Human Nature in a matrix of categories that include substance, causation, powers and agency. His interpretation of the writings of Wittgenstein noted the abandonment of the picture theory of meaning in favour of a commitment to the use of language in accordance with grammatical rules in a grammatical framework that is itself situated in a framework of categories.

Hacker basically agrees with Wittgenstein’s complaint about the prevalence of conceptual confusion in many academic disciplines, e.g. Psychology, and Neuroscience. In an investigation into the latter discipline he notes a long list of confusions that fall into the categories of dualistic errors (e.g. perception involved harbouring an image in one’s mind), and materialistic errors (memories are stored like substances in the brain). For Hacker, one of the functions of the

medium of language is to represent the essence of things, but also to represent things in their absence. Many of the confusions he uncovers are examples of what he refers to as the Mereological fallacy in which predicates true of the whole, e.g. a person, are attributed to a part of that whole (e.g. a persons brain or body).

Hacker, in connection with his commentaries on the works of Wittgenstein, points to the important transition from the earlier logical atomism to the later grammatical investigations where rules are considered to be “merely conventional”. This idea, he argues sometimes does not cover the logical weight of “norms of representation”, which, he argues are more rigid determinants of the essence of things than causality, because they preserve the universality and necessity of Socratic elenchus and Aristotelian logic.

There is, however, very little attention paid to Kantian critical Philosophy in spite of Hackers claim that his work on the meaning of the term “person” amounts to an account worthy of being called “Philosophical Anthropology”. There is also very little attention paid to the relation between Aristotelian and Kantian Philosophy.

Brian O’Shaughnessy (OS) is an analytic philosopher with broad interests in Continental Philosophy and Freudian Psychology. His writings on the topics of The Will and Consciousness remind one of William James, but he is by no stretch of the imagination, a simple pragmatist or radical empiricist. His works definitely carry the signature of the later works of Wittgenstein on Philosophical Psychology, placing Action at the centre of his theorising and moreover, claiming that such a focus is in accordance with the “nerve of the Age”(meaning presumably the 20th century).

OS regrets the passing away of dogmatic idealism but it is not clear which kind of idealism he is referring to, or whether he is against Cartesian and/or Berkeleyan idealism. He is certainly not in favour of Humes sceptical approach but he does not directly voice an opinion on the kind of rationalism we find in both Aristotle and Kant. He does, however, appear to accept the ontological distinction that founds Kant’s Philosophical Psychology or Anthropology, namely that between what man makes of himself and what nature makes of man. What complicates his position is that he also seems to accept that the actions of man can be conceptualised as events that can then be connected with other events via an analytical idea of “causation”.

We are provided with a phenomenological description of the action of reaching for an orange that clearly involves the will and less obviously a kind of non-

observational form of attention he calls circumspection. Observing one's hand in the middle of reaching for the orange would, OS argues, destroy the structure of the action. We can see resemblances here to the kind of account that Heidegger provides us with of ready-to-hand instrumentalities. OS claims that the attitude one brings to bear in the action is not one of interrogation which would be the case in a context where we were looking for something or exploring an environment. In reaching for an orange, rather, it is the case that we know what we are reaching for, and what we are doing.

OS provides us with a quartet of functions which he claims must be present in even primitive forms of consciousness, e.g. action, perception, desire, and belief. He instantiates this account with the example of a crab scuttling along a beach in search of prey. Whether OS, as a consequence, is committed to attributing a psychological form of consciousness as such to this very simple form of life, is uncertain, but he appears to believe that a primitive form of consciousness is operating in this dynamic phenomenon. It is, however, clear that the crab is causing itself to move. OS and William James have both concerned themselves with the Will and Consciousness, but it is the latter that is the most interesting commonality. James claims that Consciousness is not a something, a substance, for example, but rather a function (cf Freud's idea of a vicissitude). Thought, as a consequence, is also regarded in a similar way: it is a something but not a substance.

For both Aristotle and Kant, Thought appears not to be a something because it seems to fall into the category of potentiality rather than actuality. For Kant, thought appears to be an act that belongs to an agent with powers of various kinds. The matrix that supports the "I think", therefore, is a matrix of agency, action, potentiality, possibility and necessity: the ontological structure of this matrix is that of what man does, rather than the events that happen to man. For James, however, it is the category of actuality that is paramount, and in the end this results in appeals to actual structures of the brain in response to requests for the justification of his characterisation of Thought. This move for Hacker is a prime example of the Mereological fallacy.

James, does, however, provide us with a fascinating series of human life-forms which well illustrates the complexity of the definition of human nature as a "rational animal capable of discourse". He uses Time and social function as criteria of differentiation:

".....the tramp living from hour to hour, the bohemian from day to day, the bachelor building his lonely life, the father building for the next generation, the patriot builds for whole communities and coming generations." (Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. P.23)⁴

Unfortunately the ultimate justifications and explanations rely on mechanical language and behavioural stimulus-response theory in a fact-stating framework of actuality, rather than humanistic language embedded in the framework of potentiality, possibility and necessity. Both James and OS relate Consciousness to Attention, and define attention as a voluntary self-initiated activity. James' account, however, again collapses when he appeals to "nervous events" which he claims we are aware of in some obscure fashion. In this context James recommends the formation of Habits without taking up their relation to areté and epistémé, and without considering the relation of these habits to the good and the true. "Pure experience" and the "pragmatic method" do not concern themselves with any of these humanistic issues.

Aristotle's legacy to the modern world insofar as *Metaphysics* (first principles) is concerned, is a complex affair, and although Heidegger incorrectly blames Aristotle for initiating the phenomenon of the "forgetfulness of Being", we turn to Heidegger to interpret the activities of the new men of the terrible 20th century. The "new men" throughout the Age of Discontentment partly fell into the camp of "empiricism", e.g. Hobbes, Hume, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and all these figures were certainly purveyors of the ideas of "correctness" and "correspondence" which assumed a framework of "facts" "states of affairs", and "substantial complexes" whose parts could be disassembled like the parts of a broom.

Heidegger claims that the term "aletheia" (unconcealment), when it was Latinised as part of the process of the Romanisation of Greek Culture, emphasised correctness and intelligence and simultaneously paired these ideas with the term for what was "false" (in Greek, "pseudos"). The task of aletheia, as a consequence, became the negative task of avoiding what was false. Aletheia, thus became a technical (techné) issue rather than a knowledge (epistémé) issue. This, in its turn, set the stage for a subject-object distinction which ranged Being on the object side, and Thought on the subject side. Add to this state of affairs the problem of the technical organisation of the Universities: an organisation working in accordance with the principle of specialisation (inspired by the Guild system) and we can perhaps begin to see why the Enlightenment era rapidly drew to a close after the death of Kant and the emergence of Hegel. This state of affairs, over time, resulted in a modern proliferation of disciplines (e.g. neuroscience) which for the most part was in accordance with a perceived need for empirical rather than conceptual research. The context of explanation/justification involving thought and categorical judgements diminished in importance and scepticism won the battle with not just the dogmatists, but also with Philosophers like Kant, who were proposing a critical form of metaphysics. Universities, as a consequence have not been fully committed to a principles (arché) approach in Humanistic studies. For these

institutions, paradoxically, the quaestio facti becomes more important than the quaestio juris (norms of representation). The broader metaphysical view of the structure of reality and its relation to our faculties of sensibility, understanding, and reason, are lacking in the humanities of University Departments. Aristotle's unique contribution to the investigation of the relation of arché to psuche has been dissolved by an empirical retreat to the mathematical calculation of probability and correlation insofar as human affairs are concerned. Freud's theorising was the exception to this norm, after the separation in 1870, but his hylomorphic connection of the biological and psychological also fell away after his death in 1939.

Both Aristotle and Kant referred in their accounts to God. Wittgenstein claimed he saw life from a religious perspective and was fascinated by Tolstoy's interpretation of the New Testament, but we do not find theological speculation of the kind we find in Aristotle and Kant.

The empiricist reliance on Mathematics requires a use of the categorical framework of "event" and "cause" in relation to probability theory and Bayes' theorem (the probability of an event is determined by the information we have about that event). This requires a closed system of variables (a totality of all relevant variables/conditions) for any calculation to be possible. The concept of a language game is not quite a closed system but the rules of language are in some cases like the rules of chess where there is only a determinate number of moves available within the confines of the space available. This concept of a rigid-rule enables the empiricist to theorise about social phenomena involving rational agents, e.g. games theory. This was not Wittgenstein's intention and he would have found the prisoners-dilemma-game a problematic characterisation of the complex choices we make in ethical situations.

For Kant, God is a super-sensible something, about which nothing can be known. God is a being beyond the reach of our knowledge, but not beyond our belief. We can have faith in this being, and hope for a certain state of affairs connected to our idea of this being, and this, for Kant, is a sufficient ground for the justification of religion. The only two caveats Kant places on our relation to this being is, firstly, God shall not be anthropomorphised in our belief-system, and secondly, that the belief system shall not legitimate miraculous happenings that are in conflict with the categories of our understanding.

One of the unique characteristics of the telos of the Kantian action-system is his conception of the "Kingdom of Ends" which combines the ideas of what is sacred with what is just—thus combining the religious and the political. Morality is the bonding force of both these sciences that are grounded in the idea of psuche-grounded that is in our ability to understand ourselves ("know

ourselves”). The ideal of Human Rights emerged from this moral-religious-political matrix on the basis of the law of freedom and the categorical imperative.

Kant elaborated upon, and significantly improved, the complex accounts of the mind handed down from Aristotle. The cognitive power of Judgement complemented the Kantian tripartite account of the “parts” of the mind (Sensibility, Understanding, Reason). Kant’s Third Critique contains accounts of aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment. Judgment, in general, is characterised as the power of subsuming the particular under the universal, but aesthetic judgment is a power of speaking with a universal voice about the judging subject and the “play” of his faculties of imagination (sensibility) and understanding. In this situation the “matter” of the experience is a feeling of pleasure, or a feeling of life, and the “form” is the form of finality of the object of the experience, e.g. the experience of the beauty of the rose. Here we speak “as if” the rose is essentially beautiful but our appreciative activity is not directly connected to conceptualising the rose in terms of our interests in it: neither do we do engage in reasoning about the rose in an epistemic context. It is clear that there are hylomorphic aspects to this account that echo Aristotle’s concerns about the feeling of life (*psuche*). If, as a matter of fact, someone does not share my feeling, we do not accuse them of being irrational, but only of being insensitive. In the case of teleological judgment, on the other hand, there is an attribution of a *telos* or an end, especially when we are dealing with living organisms. This *telos* is an important part of the objects essence.

In the First Critique Kant introduces what he calls Transcendental Logic, to assist him in his study of the a priori origin of knowledge and the categories of the understanding/judgment. Transcendental Logic also connects interestingly to the special use of logic in relation to the a priori intuitions of space and time. It is very clear in these discussions that, for Kant, we are not dealing with activity in a context of exploration/discovery but rather with the “rights” (*quaestio juris*) to use a principle or concept in a context of explanation/justification. We are that is, not engaged in a search for “facts” or states of affairs to support a theory without principles. The question being asked here is “With what right is proposition X proclaimed to be True or Good?”

The use of Practical Reason is also an important theme in the First Critique, as is the characterisation of the Nature of Man in his later works on History and Anthropology. Man, argues Kant, needs a master but, paradoxically, does not want to be mastered. He wants to live in a community, but wishes to make himself an exception to the laws and regulations that bind the society together. Kant notes that there is also a considerable amount of antagonism directed at his fellows. This is not quite the picture of so-called pastoral idealism in which man

basks in the sunlight of everything that is good and true. In Kant's view the only reasonable response to man's condition is one of melancholy. This kind of position perhaps should be called "realistic idealism". Freud would later take up this thread of reflection and coin the name for our age in the title of his work "Civilisation and its Discontents".

Modern Psychological Theories such as those we find in the writings of Eysenck and Jung would, for different reasons, be rejected by Kant, firstly, because of the materialistic view of the Biological aspect of these theories and secondly, because of the form of dualism that lies behind the postulation of psychological traits.

The theory of Eysenck in particular, basing personality traits on the function of the sympathetic nervous system, testosterone and temperament, would have seemed to Kant to be an account that belongs in the field of what he called Physical Anthropology—the theory of what happens to man. This, for Kant, is on the wrong side of his ontological distinction that demands of Psychological theory an account from a "pragmatic point of view", which describes and explains what man makes of himself as a citizen of the world. Physical theories, of course enable one to reduce human action and interaction to events that happen, and this in turn enables researchers to believe that fields of human activity can be circumscribed in a closed system of variables that may be both manipulated and measured. The results of such investigations can then resort to probability or game theory to lend credence to results that seemingly either tell us what we already knew, or attempt to convince us of something patently false.

Conceiving of an action as an event that happens to man is, for Kant, then, an ontological error. The physical movement component of an action can, however be disengaged from the whole context, and placed in a causal network of variables which is best suited to explain what happens when a man accidentally bumps into someone in a queue. The man may have been pushed by someone else, and, of course, we need a causal explanation to determine who did what, but only because we could not attribute an intention to the man who pushed into the man in front of him. Kant's ontological divide gives rise naturally to an important distinction between reasons and causes, which belong in separated universes of discourse. The key consideration here is that the physical movement initiated by an action is self-created and "spontaneous": an "I" or a person stands out at the beginning of a series as an ultimate starting point, and reason stops at this point of agency. This is an "I" that can be praised or blamed for what it does: on the grounds of either not doing what it ought to have done, or alternatively, doing what it ought not to have done. The representational significance of the ought is such that it does not refer to a fact, but rather to a potentiality or possibility. The idea of freedom that clearly lies at the origin of

the logic of ought-statements is an idea of reason that is a priori and therefore independent of experience.

Wittgenstein was a key figure of the Age of Discontentment. His interest in conceptual and aesthetic questions and the abandonment of his earlier scientifically-oriented philosophy may well have been a result of his own discontentment with civilisation. In his posthumous work, "Culture and Value" he claims the following:

"The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It is not e.g. absurd to believe that the scientific and technological age is the beginning of the end for humanity: that the idea of Great Progress is a bedazzlement, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known: that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that humanity, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means clear that this is not how things are." (P.64e(1947))⁵

Wittgenstein goes on to claim that this form of discontentment was not possible one hundred years earlier, because the signs of the decline of humanity were not so apparent. As part of the process of shining the lamp of Diogenes into the face of our Civilisation, he points out that in schools, suffering has gone out of fashion, and the aim of everyone associated with them, is merely to feel good. It was also out of fashion for philosophers to have religious sympathies, and to contest the vision of the upside down world we live in. Arendt acutely picked out the phenomenon of the emergence of "new men" for whom "everything was possible". She also focussed upon the sentiment of masses of men for whom "nothing was possible anymore".

Our conclusion of "The end of all things" is biblical in intent but is also motivated by Freud's "Civilisation and its discontents". Heidegger's view of our modern predicament being related to "forgetfulness of Being" and his view of the threat of technology (Techné) also highlights our problematic relation to a battery of ideas including "logos", "aletheia", "physis" and Being in general. Secularisation is one consequence of this state of affairs and technical progress has proceeded hand in hand down our modern garden path unaware of the dangers that lie ahead.

Stanley Cavell in his work "The Claim of Reason" captures well one of the neuroses of civilisation, namely the problematic relation we have to each other, because of the sceptical view we have of each other. He rehearses a number of scenarios in which the moral of the tale is that we may never be able to know that the human we are confronted with, is fully human: he may i.e. be a biotechnical phenomenon invented and maintained by an evil scientist. These rehearsals are startling. We have a Turing-test for when we may call a computer

Conscious but we do not seem to have criteria for calling a human a human. This would have seemed an absurd claim during Greek or Enlightenment times, but it seems an almost inevitable discussion for the new men of modern times. We recall Descartes and his fascination with the hydraulically powered statues of the Park in Paris he visited, and we recall the transformation of Janus into the Juggernaut of war rolling across the killing fields of Europe, or flying over the unsuspecting civilian population of Japan.

There is much to be fearful of, and anxious about, in relation to coming to the end of the garden path, but the message of this work is that the discontents of our civilisation may grasp more of the truth about ourselves than the new men of our modern age. Whether they also grasp, and have faith in, the “hidden plan” proposed by Kant, is a question we leave hanging in the air. There are no criteria to establish the certainty of this hidden plan, but if we are certain, then the “End of all things” will be more Kantian than Freudian, more of a surprise than most of us can imagine.

Notes on the Introduction

¹ *The World Explored, the World Suffered: A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, Emotion, Consciousness, and Action: Volume two*, James M., R., D., (Mauritius, Lambert Academic Press, 2020, P.3)

² Ibid. P.3.

³ *The World Explored, the World Suffered: A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, Emotion, Consciousness, and Action: Volume three*, James M., R., D., (Mauritius, Lambert Academic Press, 2021, P.2)

⁴ *The Principles of Psychology*, James, W., (New York, Dover Publications, 1950)

⁵ *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein, L., Ed. von Wright, G., H., Transl. Winch, P., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988)

Chapter 1: Cavell and the Claim of Reason

The Wittgensteinian Philosophical Revolution connected to his later work was an event to behold, not because the Cambridge Philosopher provided the final solution to Philosophy promised in the early work but because he began to see the breadth and depth of problems in areas of Philosophy he previously thought irrelevant: not because he began reflecting in the name of Science and ended reflecting in the name of Social Science: not because he managed in either his earlier or his later work to provide more than an album of sketches: but rather because his later investigations shared some of the animus of Aristotelian and Kantian Philosophy. In regard to this last point we encounter a belief in, and use of, the logical principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason in what appears to resemble a hylomorphic and critical spirit. In this shift towards the region of the social sciences and the use of these principles in an appropriate spirit, Wittgenstein's later philosophy succeeded in removing the weeds of 20th century, namely scientism, logical positivism, logical atomism, naturalism, pragmatism, existentialism phenomenology, logical solipsism, mind independent realism, dualism, empiricism. In doing this important work he managed to produce a "clearing" in which the seeds of hylomorphic and critical Philosophy could be sewn again.

Stanley Cavell is one of the major American Wittgensteinian scholars who saw in the work of Wittgenstein a unifying influence insofar as the warring factions of analytic and continental Philosophy is concerned. There are many facets to Cavell's work but one of his more interesting claims is the wish to shift the focus of Philosophy from statements and facts, to judgements in general, and intuitional/experiential/conceptual judgments in particular. In a work entitled "The Claim of Reason" (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979) he claims the following:

"All I want from these considerations so far is a prospective attention to Wittgenstein's emphasis upon the idea of judgement. In the modern history of epistemology, the idea of judgment is not generally distinguished from the idea of statement generally, or perhaps they are too completely distinguished.... The problem is to see whether the study of human knowledge may as a whole be distorted by this focus. The focus upon statements takes knowledge to be the sum (or product) of true statements and hence construes the limits of human knowledge as coinciding with the extent to which it has amassed true statements of the world...The focus on judgement takes human knowledge to be the human capacity for applying the concepts of a language to the things of a world, for characterising (categorising) the world when and as it is humanly done, and hence construes the limits of human knowledge as coinciding with the limits of its concepts (in some historical period)."¹

It is difficult not to recall with regret, in this context, the opening salvo of Wittgenstein's early work, the "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus:

1.0 The world is everything that is the case

1.1 The world is the totality of facts not of things²

We noted in volume 2 of this work, in the opening essays on Kant, the role of, firstly, categories of understanding/judgement, and secondly, the search of reason for the totality of conditions of a phenomenon in knowledge claims. The focus for Kant is not on truth alone, but on a definition of knowledge that can be characterised in terms of the classical definition of Justified True Belief, a definition connected with the works of Plato and Aristotle. In Kant's work, concepts are obviously constituents of these judgements, but the Kantian account of concepts reaches far beyond the account we find in the later work of Wittgenstein which admittedly has both Kantian aspects and pragmatic /empirical aspects:

570 Concepts lead us to make investigations, are the expressions of our interests, and direct our interest."³

Kant famously claimed that without concepts, intuitions are blind. For Kant, concepts are the instruments of thinking that organise the manifolds of representations: concepts unify and differentiate intuitive representations. The telos of Kantian concepts is not merely to conduct investigations but also to combine with other concepts in the formation of judgements, or statements. This combination of concepts is controlled by both the Categories of the Understanding and the rational logical principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Using these concepts to categorise the things of the world is one conceptual function. Another function of conceptualisation is to use concepts in different ways, e.g. to characterise our actions, use concepts to characterise what happens to us and to characterise what we possess(e.g. the power to act, think, speak, reason). These are all Aristotelian categories of existence. Concepts are also used in accordance with Kantian categories of judgement and what for Wittgenstein is the language-game of the reporting of facts, for Kant is a judgement or statement in which something is being said of something via the combination of concepts. For Kant also, reason uses concepts in its investigations into the totality of conditions for any given phenomenon. These "conditions" are not criteria, but rather grounds, and these grounds will be in accordance with the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

The reference by Cavell to the focus on statements and truth rather than judgements and concepts appears to disregard the Aristotelian and Kantian rationalistic accounts of concepts, judgements, statements, and knowledge. Both Aristotle and Kant would have largely agreed with much of what was said in the above quote by Wittgenstein in which it is claimed that pragmatically, concepts can be used to both direct interests and **express** these interests. Both Aristotle

and Kant would also have agreed with Cavell and Wittgenstein in opposing the modern epistemological project. Wittgenstein's later philosophy takes up epistemological problems in terms of the grammatical **rules of language**, and in terms of a narrative dimension that was not present in his early Philosophy. Kant would probably have regarded these rules as being related to the above mentioned conditions for the application of concepts. It is not clear however, whether Kant would have shared Wittgenstein's commitment to the role of language in this context of explanation/justification. Kant might, that is, have shared Frege's view of the role of language in philosophical investigations:

"it cannot be the task of logic to investigate language and determine what is contained in a linguistic expression. Someone who wants to learn logic from language is like an adult who wants to learn how to think from a child. When men created language they were at a stage of childish pictorial thinking. Languages are not made to match logic's ruler(Letter to Husserl).

Wittgenstein's earlier picture theory of meaning and his statement that the limits of my language are the limits of my world raises questions relating to epistemologically-oriented accounts of language. The paradigmatic shift of Wittgenstein's later work involved moving from an attempt to link Logic and language directly, via a form of logical atomism, to the **use** of language and the **normative rules** governing this use. This of course leaves a question hanging in the air regarding metaphysics and its relation to Language. For Aristotle and Kant, metaphysics governs logical principles, and to the extent that logic is an important consideration in the use of language(All the statements of ordinary language are in perfectly logical order (Tractatus 5.5563)), there must be some relation between metaphysical conditions and language. Yet we do not find in either Wittgenstein's earlier or later work any mention of Aristotelian or Kantian metaphysics. We do, however, find the following in Zettel:

"Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language."⁴

This remark suggests that there is no essential quarrel between the Aristotelian and Kantian search for the totality of conditions of the phenomenon/phenomena being investigated. The following Kantian characterisation of Logic (quoted in volume 2 of this work) supports the claim that there is no essential difference between the Kantian and the Wittgensteinian view of logic:

"Logic, again can be treated in a twofold manner either as the logic of the general or as the logic of the special employment of the understanding. The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding. It, therefore, treats of the understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed. The logic of the special employment of the understanding concerns the rules of correct thinking as regards a certain kind of object. The former may be called the logic of the elements, the latter the organon of this or that science. The latter is commonly taught in the schools as a propaedeutic to the sciences,

though according to the actual procedure of human reason, it is what is obtained last of all, when the particular science under question has been already brought to such completion that it requires only a few finishing touches to correct and perfect it"⁵

The special use of the understanding may well be what we see Wittgenstein exploring in his grammatical investigations. This may also be (though it is doubtful) what Cavell is referring to, in his account of concepts and criteria. Whether these observations have any substance will largely depend upon whether the Kantian position would share the Fregean or the Wittgensteinian view of language. For Wittgenstein, grammatical rules do not determine the truth of a judgement, only whether or not the judgement makes sense. At the same time, Wittgenstein claims that grammatical investigations reveal essence (what is essential). On the other hand, Wittgenstein also claims that language itself does not have an essence and this might support the Fregean view that language has an essentially pictorial nature (as insisted upon by the *Tractatus*). This might also explain why, in Wittgenstein's later work, the account of language games and forms of life amounted to no more than an "album of sketches".

Science of course investigates the essences of many different **kinds of object** (events, actions, artifacts) and in this context the Aristotelian division of the Sciences into the theoretical sciences, practical sciences, and the productive sciences is still useful and relevant. Kant complemented this system with his division between Pure Reason, Practical Reason, and Judgement. We find, however, very few references to Aristotle or Kant in Wittgenstein's "album of sketches", apart from a curt acknowledgement that Kant's method (the special use of understanding) resembles the grammatical investigation.

Cavell interestingly fixates upon the Wittgensteinian idea of a criterion in discussing the role of a judge in the application of criteria to cases. This analogy of a tribunal is an interesting one. Cavell suggests in the context of this discussion that the judge does not make the law but only applies it. The tribunal is a forum in which criteria are used to establish what counts as evidence (truth conditions) for a claim, and what does not. Criteria are therefore in their structure normative, and this is reflected in the normative judgement "An X ought to be classified as a Y if it satisfies the criteria for a Y". This is the general form for a normative value judgement that is concerned with conceptual classification. An aesthetic value judgement can then be characterised thus: "An X ought to be classified as naturally beautiful if it meets the criteria of disinterestedness, not related to a concept, related to the form of finality of an object etc". In the ethical context an ethical value judgement might take the form of "An action ought to be classified in terms of the good if it is done with a good will".

In relation to the above Cavell states:

"Without the control of criteria in applying concepts we would not know what counts as evidence for any claim, nor for what claims evidence is needed." ⁶

We should remind the reader here, however, that the form of conceptual judgement being discussed by Cavell is object-specific, and the scope of the judgement is restricted to the "things of the world" rather than widened to include the relation of concepts to concepts in the categorical form of a judgement that is generally truth conditional (rather than merely one part of the judgement being criteria-dependent)⁷.

Cavell points out that as a matter of fact we agree in our judgements (thanks to criteria, he argues). Wittgenstein, we know, asks himself the Aristotelian question "Why do we agree?" and provides himself with a very Aristotelian answer, namely "Because we share forms of life". This justification for Aristotle, however, would in turn be an argument for his essence-specifying definition of being human: namely, "rational animal capable of discourse". Embodied in this definition is a hylomorphic commitment to a community that takes it for granted that our forms of life are both involved in processes of actualisation and thus organically "given" (not, for example, needing a social contract to exist).

Cavell also points to how Wittgenstein uses his conception of criteria to demolish all forms of logical solipsism:

"An inner process stands in need of outward criteria"⁸

This is not to say that an inwardly located sensation such as pain is to be regarded as nothing. It is not nothing, but rather something, about which nothing can be said (philosophically). This comment, when generalised, increases in significance, especially insofar as those first structuralist Psychologists were concerned. Wundt and many other Psychologists after him have regarded sensations as a building block of Psychological theory. Wittgenstein as we know claimed in his Philosophical Investigations that:

"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory) For in Psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by."⁹

Put simply in the context of the above discussion, the language game with pain is a game in which language is substituted for the cry of pain. Language functions, that is, as a signal for the people in my vicinity to do something. The expression of the pain is not an assertion that I am in pain. This is not to deny that a practical principle--the pleasure pain principle--could be formulated to explain human behaviour in general and pain behaviour in particular. This in turn means that pain is not a detail in our lives to be observed and conceptualised but rather some kind of principle (or part of a principle) to be understood. Why this is so, is explained by Wittgenstein in terms of an account of the natural history of the helplessness of the child. The child falls and scrapes their knee, crying inconsolably. The parent teaches the child to stop crying and instead say "I am in pain"--i.e. teaches the child to "think" in relation to the pain, using the Kantian "I" in an effort to distract attention from the pain.

Cavell is puzzled by the following "parable" of Wittgenstein's:

"If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse has come into being by spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust, I shall do well to examine these rags very closely to see how a mouse may have hidden in them, how it may have got there and so on. But if I am convinced that a mouse cannot come into being from these things, then this investigation will perhaps be superfluous. But first we must learn to understand what it is that opposes such an examination of details in philosophy."¹⁰

Cavell reflects upon this in terms of states of mind when, perhaps, it might have been more appropriate to relate the above to the claim that it is not objects that steer investigations, but rather concepts and principles. In the initial stages of a context of explanation we may begin this process by attempting to form concepts through the process of organising intuitions or representations, but once a concept is formed, the intuitions are subsumed and determined by the concept: they no longer steer a process in the context of exploration/discovery but rather participate in a process in a context of explanation/justification. Concepts in their turn, in this latter context of explanation/justification relate to categories and logic and it is primarily this constellation of intuitions, concepts, categories, and logic that determine the relation of judgements to each other.

Wittgenstein, interestingly, in his reflections upon the problems of Philosophical Psychology distinguishes between states and processes, thus introducing his own system of categories into his "album of sketches". The remarks made in this area are reminiscent of the Aristotelian account of virtue (areté) and its dispositional character:

"Expectation is, grammatically a state; like being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something....What, in particular cases do we regard as criteria for someone's being of such and such an opinion? When do we say: he reached this

opinion at that time? When: he has altered his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shows what gets treated grammatically as a state here"¹¹

""Understanding a word", a state. But a mental state?-Depression, excitement, pain are so called mental states....We also say "Since yesterday I have understood this word. "Continuously", though? To be sure one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less? and "When did you stop understanding that word?"¹²

Aristotle in his work distinguishes between capacities and dispositions. For Kant, understanding a word must be a power of our understanding, whereas feeling a pain is a power of the sensible dimension of our mind. The expression "I am in pain" is a substitute for a cry of pain, and is a signal or a criterion for you (because sentience is private) to help or sympathise. It is a signal, not to attend to the detail of my pain,(unless one is communicating with a doctor) but rather to attend to me, the bearer of the pain, perhaps with words of sympathy that help to distract attention from the detail of this uncomfortable feeling. This use of the word "pain" in the community is systematic, and reflects not just an agreement in judgements, but is an agreement in relation to human forms of life. Wittgenstein elaborates upon his idea of communal agreement by claiming that it includes agreement in definitions. Given his commitment to the role of logic in processes of understanding and his use of the idea of human forms of life, there is nothing in Wittgenstein that could serve as a basis to deny Aristotle's definition of being human: being, that is, a rational animal capable of discourse. In such a context perception or seeing something as something is a perceptual capacity that plays a role in the willingness to say "He is in pain". Cavell claims this is a moment of proclamation (Claim of Reason,P.34) in which we need to see his wince as pain behaviour (P.35). Wittgenstein situates this moment of proclamation in a wider context of predication when he claims:

"it is what human beings **say** that is true or false"¹³

What people say is, of course, expressed in propositions which are either true or false. Subsuming something (either an intuition or a perception) under a concept is not itself a propositional activity but obviously it is a condition of naming the experience which one is then going to characterise in a subject-predicate judgement using concepts. "He is in pain" is saying something about his scraped knee or stomach ache and the effects this pain is having upon him as a person. Pain-statements appear to fall between pure physical statements about physical objects such as a body e.g. "He is two metres tall" and statements about his soul "He is talented(can produce an album of philosophical sketches) but he is not a genius"(like Aristotle or Kant). The predicative moment of judgement is clearly a more complex moment in which something is asserted of something, producing a categorical judgement in accordance with a list of Categories Kant

outlined in his first critique. Cavell's account of these different levels of activity is different:

"Criteria do not determine the certainty of statements, but the application of the concepts employed in the statements."¹⁴

This reminds us of the function of a dictionary that does not teach us how to explain and justify the truth of a proposition but teaches us how to use a concept and perhaps justify that use.

Much of the later work of Wittgenstein is designed to combat the dogmatism and scepticism behind the furious debates we encounter in modern epistemological discussion, and in that respect Wittgenstein's later work shares much of the animus of the work of Aristotle and Kant.

Kant's philosophy is discussed by Cavell in an essay entitled "Austin and Examples" (Must We Mean what we say? (Cambridge, CUP, 1969)). Cavell claims here that Kant's Categories did not register the sense of the externality of the world and he also claims that, had Kant been more thorough in his account of the a priori intuitions of space and time, there would have been no necessity to postulate a world of things in themselves. Cavell further argues that Kant uses things in themselves to justify an idea of God, thus ignoring the specifically moral argument for why one ought to have faith in God.

It is interesting to note that in the above criticism Cavell conveniently ignores the Kantian account of practical reason: an account that takes us much further into the realm of the noumenal, further than any theoretical reasoning could, and it does so not by appealing to the idea of God, but rather to the idea of Freedom in answer to the philosophical question "What ought we to do?" God makes a brief appearance in this account but only as a means to connect the good in itself (leading a worthy life by following the moral law) with good in its consequences (leading a flourishing life). This is not the defensive appeal of a Descartes to a God to support his shaky reasoning about the Cogito, but rather a fulfillment of a Philosophical promise that stretches back in time to Glaucon and the demand made upon Socrates to give an account of justice in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. Kant, we have argued, was a rationalist who kept his philosophical promises. Cavell has also failed to register Kant's hylomorphic commitments. Matter for both Aristotle and Kant is mysterious as is God (primary form for Aristotle): both of these "ideas" have aspects of existence that lie outside our finite understanding. The origin, but perhaps not the entire nature, of our souls is also mysterious, demanding a complex hylomorphic account as far as Aristotle is concerned: an account that involves actualisation processes over long stretches of time. This process of actualisation gives rise to sentience (capacity for feeling pain, sensation) perception, judgement, understanding, and

reason. Principles (forms) direct this actualisation process and the task of reasoning attempts to grasp the totality of these principles or the totality of the conditions of existence of the soul, the world, and God. A task that might come closer to its completion in one hundred thousand years, when a cosmopolitan Kingdom of Ends is actualised. Cavell, in his criticism of Kant is also ignoring the metaphysical aspects of Aristotelian and Kantian Philosophy. In the context of this discussion he insists mysteriously upon a transcendental deduction of the thing in itself, about which nothing can be said. It is not clear, however, whether or not the thing in itself can be proclaimed in accordance with Cavells account of the proclamatory moment of judgement.

Cavell acknowledges that many aporetic philosophical questions might not be answered via an appeal to criteria:

"Am I am implying that we do not really know the difference between hallucinated and real things, or between animate and inanimate things. What I am saying is that the differences are not ones for which there are criteria: the difference between natural objects and artifacts is not one for which there are criteria. In such cases the role of origins is decisive, indeed definitive"¹⁶

There is not, however, any reference to the necessity of rational explanation in the justification of criteria. What does emerge from this discussion, however, is an admission that Austinian criteria are not sufficient to account for, or explain, the existence of anything, but can at best serve the more limited function of the identification or recognition of something, e.g. a goldfinch. Wittgensteinian criteria, on the other hand, Cavell claims, do not relate

"a name to an object but rather relate various concepts to the concept of that object"¹⁷

This means that the test of whether someone in fact possesses the concept of something, becomes far more complex. Any such test must involve investigating whether they are capable of a range of judgements and activities (e.g. acts of sympathy). But what, then about the concept of the soul? Is this the concept of the "I" noted in Wittgensteinian notebooks? We find this mysterious comment in the Philosophical Investigations:

"The human body is the best picture of the human soul."¹⁸

We also find:

"My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a person."¹⁹

Here there is a category distinction between the movements of an artifact, e.g. a machine, and the movements of a human being. We are clearly dealing here with a categorical disposition which Wittgenstein prefers to call an attitude. A

disposition, for Wittgenstein is not a mental **occurrence** because inward processes are in need of outward criteria. This attitude might demonstrate itself in a form of life in which we sympathise both with our action and with our words. This is something that can only be claimed metaphorically when dealing with artifacts like machines, e.g. "how are we feeling today?" said to a computer appears almost ironic, a kind of private joke.

One of the reasons why the album of sketches Wittgenstein produced, left its author with a sense of incompleteness, is that the distinction between kinds of living beings requires a hylomorphic account of psuche (life) of the kind given by Aristotle--an account supported by a metaphysical matrix that appears to lie outside the realm of Wittgenstein's concerns. We saw Wittgenstein, however, using the category of possession or "having" in his discussion of "pain". Even if it cannot be true to say that I know that I am in pain, we can claim to have, or bear our pains: this is the basis or the condition for saying that one is in pain. This is one example of a general relation to all sensations that belong to that dimension of our mental lives Kant calls sensibility. It is not clear, however, that our relations to our sensations are the most important part of our mental lives insofar as Psychological investigations are concerned. Psychology, for Kant, begins with the "I think" which in the young child heralds a new kind of awareness of himself, and everything around him. Do other people, then, know what I am experiencing only from what they observe of my behaviour? In relation to this question Wittgenstein refers to a complex relation between a persons behaviour and their state of mind. He claims that we know of the one via the other. The behaviour of depression, for example, reveals or manifests a depressed state of mind (PI P.179e) The full account of the essence of depression however, must be a wider question relating to origins and the telos of depression as a complex state of a person: a state intimately connected to his behaviour. In such an account, Freudian reference to mechanisms of mental activity involving the loss of objects we value, (involving the Freudian triangle of desire, refusal and wounded desire) will play an important role in providing an account of the sufficient conditions of this complex state. Any sensations that are part of this state must surely play a relatively minor role (the role of a detail) in the operations of the principles regulating these mechanisms.

When we reach higher levels of mental activity and ask more complex questions such as "Why the depressed man committed suicide", we are appealing to the regions of the mind Kant called understanding and judgement--a region Socrates unequivocally claimed is responsible for the "Knowledge of "The Good". Socrates' response to the behaviour of the depressed man would have been similar to his response to Medea who claims that he knows what crimes he is about to commit in his anger, but his anger is greater than his knowledge. On the account Socrates favours, Medea has not fully recognised the nature of the

Good. What this meant had to await Aristotle's more systematic account of *akrasia* in which the knowledge being referred to, was logically structured in syllogisms consisting of premises that need to be actively acknowledged by the agent. Merely knowing what crime one is committing, e.g. "murdering oneself" (if one intends to commit suicide) is not in itself sufficient: the knowledge must be actualised and active in the agent at the time of considering the act: i.e. the agent must not be overwhelmed by either anger or sorrow, states of sensibility that are capable of dragging our reason about like a slave. When full knowledge of murdering oneself is active, we become aware of the mechanisms that have weakened our ego (to the extent that it(the ego) is no longer able to protect the body of the person concerned). Kant's diagnosis of this state of affairs is to point out that the agent actually murdering himself (a situation in which the requisite knowledge cannot be active) is not conscious of the contradiction involved in using ones life to end ones life. The knowledge of these mechanisms will of course be strewn over the theoretical, practical and productive sciences, all of which are embedded in a matrix of hylomorphic metaphysics. For Aristotle, the principles (*arché*) involved in such contexts are not a series of album sketches or pictures at an exhibition. These are the principles we need to understand if we are to understand ourselves, the world, and God to the extent that we can, given our finite natures.

Cavell in his discussion of "Knowledge and the basis of Morality", cites on P.250 (Claim of Reason) Schopenhauers dark opinion on this matter. For Schopenhauer all attempts to lay a foundation for Morality consist of:

"stilted maxims, for which it is no longer possible to look down and see life as it really is with all its turmoil."²⁰ (Schopenhauer's "The Basis of Morality".)

What this actually means is not immediately clear but it is clear that it is meant as a criticism of Kant's moral law, given that this law was proclaimed by Kant to be the basis for morality and the foundation of ethics. For Schopenhauer, the man that thinks he knows the good, and leads a flourishing life as a consequence, is like a beggar dreaming that he is a king. Suffering is everywhere, Schopenhauer argues, it is the essence of life to suffer. This is an intuitive form of ethics that regards the moral law as an illusion. This is also an epistemological view of ethics, which demands that we explain rather than justify moral action. For Schopenhauer, the facts speak for themselves--suffering is everywhere, and this is confirmed by observation. He fails to understand that Kant's theory is a justificatory theory, not of what we in fact do, but rather of what we ought to do. Appeal to facts in such a context, is merely a variation of Thrasymachus' naturalistic argument against Socrates' value laden account of justice. This kind of naturalistic argument fails to see that the believer in the moral law could acknowledge all the relevant facts to be true e.g. that many people do not keep promises, that many people commit suicide, but

still logically believe that one ought not to make promises one had no intention of keeping and one ought not to murder oneself.

Cavell points out in the context of this discussion that it is disagreement over what we ought to do that makes people angry with one another, and he quotes Socrates on this issue. Indeed if anyone knew this fact, it was Socrates. And yet even while the state was unjustly putting him to death, he believed in this normative idea of the Good, which in turn allowed him to transcend the fact of his impending death. Cavell argues also, that we ought to believe in the possibility of rational disagreement about what ought to be done. Is this kind of disagreement possible? In his prison cell there were friends trying to persuade Socrates to "cut and run" as Lear put the matter in the previous chapter. Does Cavell believe that this is an example of a rational disagreement? Socrates' interlocutors failed to get Socrates' agreement: hoping he would choose to escape the injustice inflicted upon him. Does this hope alone sustain the claim that their argument was rational? This much is clear:

"We are often told that "there are"(meaning what?) certain moral "rules or principles"; but when these are formulated I find that I am unclear whether the assertions in question (e.g. "Promises ought to be kept," "keep your promises!") are rules or principles or "stilted maxims", and unclear whether I believe or am convinced of them."²¹

In the following passages Cavell then appears to settle upon a psychological account, in which agents with cares for, and commitments to, the attitudes of others, and certain forms of argument, constitute what is ethical. Moral persuasion becomes the mechanism of this transactional account in which moralists and propagandists share a commitment to the same mechanism. The rationalism of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Kant are conspicuous by their absence. So, if I say to someone "You ought to keep your promise to X" this, on Cavell's account, is a mode of presenting the action to be done and not the subject of a rational inference. This mode of presentation involves taking a position with respect to the content of the factual premises involved in the argument. If, then, the content of the above is "You ought to return the money owed" this, on Cavell's account, is the same content as "You ought to keep your promises". Also, on Cavell's account the modal imperative of the ought is a mode of presenting the reasons one would use to support these imperatives and:

"What makes their use rational is their relevance to the person confronted, and the legitimacy your position gives you to confront him or her in the mode you take responsibility for."²²

Legitimacy? Is it not the very point of the universal essence of the universal justification of the categorical imperative, that anyone with the right argument has the right to confront anyone with their argument? Of course, not just any argument will do, as Charles Stevenson claims in his work "Ethics and Language". Imagine, for example that one is confronted by an interlocutor who

produces a transactional argument of the kind we have encountered in Cavell's reflections and his/her opponent is persuaded by the legitimacy of the position and the mode of the argument. Is this sufficient to make the argument an ethical argument? Is ethics transactional? Is ethics a kind of game?

What we have been presented with above is a theoretical account of morality that attempts to chart the psychological conditions of the transactions that occur in an argument. In cases where the issue cannot be resolved, Cavell claims (P.326), what breaks down is not the argument but rather the transactional relationship, perhaps because one or both participants have mistaken the others cares and commitments: or alternatively, one or both parties fail to be persuaded. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Kant would all refuse the ethical validity of this transactional account. Psychology, we know, detached itself from Philosophy perhaps partly for the purposes of engaging in such transactional analyses. It would be a tragedy of monumental proportions if, after this grand divorce, ethics, the queen of Philosophy, would be reduced to a Psychology that ceased to search for causes of different kinds (including teleological causes) and satisfied itself instead with correlations between variables and the probability values of such correlations.

For Kantian Philosophy (waiting for the day of the feast when rationality invites the guests), the above account reminds Kantians of the presence of the ghost of Hegel at the feast of dialectical spiritualism attempting to synthesise antithetical concepts in a process that appears very transactional. One can of course label such a synthesis with the term "agreement" if one conceives of the process in terms of transactional partners, but the ethical categorical imperative does not tolerate antithetical transactional components. For ethics transactional synthesis is a kind of game that aims at agreement. To agree is to win the game and part of the agreement is the transactional act of agreeing to play such a game in the name of ethics.

Notes to Chapter 1

¹*The Claim of Reason*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, P.17)

²*Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein. L, Trans Ogden C.K., (New York, Cosimo classics, 2007, P29)

³*Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein, L, Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1950)

⁴*Zettel*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1967,§55)

⁵*Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans Kemp Smith N., (London, Macmillan, 1963, B76)

⁶*The Claim of Reason*, P.14

⁷ Ibid. P.14

⁸*Philosophical Investigations*. §580

⁹ Ibid. P. 232

¹⁰ Ibid. §52

¹¹ Ibid. §572-73

¹² Ibid. P.59

¹³ Ibid. §241

¹⁴*The Claim of Reason*, P.45

¹⁵ Ibid. P.63

¹⁶ Ibid. P.63

¹⁷ Ibid. P.73

¹⁸*Philosophical Investigations*, P.178

¹⁹ Ibid. P.178.

²⁰ Ibid. P.133

²¹ Ibid. P.257

²² Ibid. P.323

Chapter 2: Cavell--The World Viewed and Modernism

Cavell is one of the more serious critics of modernism in Art but his reluctance to engage with ethical universalism means that even his criticism is confined firstly, to the relation to history involved in the aesthetic situation, and secondly to the transaction between modern philosophy and traditional philosophy. His arguments in this context are dialectical:

"The essential fact of (what I refer to as) the modern lies in the relation between the present practice of an enterprise and the history of that enterprise, in the fact that this relation has become problematic. Innovation in Philosophy has characteristically gone together with a repudiation --a specifically cast repudiation-- of most of the history of the subject."¹

Puzzlingly, Cavell then argues that Wittgenstein is not a modern Philosopher:

"But in the later Wittgenstein (and I would now add in Heidegger's Being and Time). The repudiation of the past has a transformed significance as though containing the consciousness that history will not go away except through the perfect acknowledgement of it, and that one's own practice and ambition can be identified only against the continuous experience of the past"²

It is surprising, in the light of the above, that both Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics are not by any means perfectly acknowledged in Cavell's own account. He curiously places Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein in the same category of thinkers. He also places Dialectical Spiritualism (Hegel) Existential Phenomenology (Heidegger) and the Linguistic Philosophy of Wittgenstein in the same category as Kantian Critical Philosophy. This is, to say the very least, historically and philosophically problematic.

Cavell refers to Wittgenstein's claim that the traditional epistemological approach in Philosophy bewitches the intellect with its uncritical use of language: words, Wittgenstein claims, need to be brought back to their everyday use, they need to be brought "home". Kant, Hegel and Heidegger were all Professors in German Universities, and Wittgenstein was Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge at a time when it was felt that these institutions were drifting away from the concerns of everyday life. These institutions in themselves also constituted a zone of conflict between the secular forces of cosmopolitanism, and the traditional defenders of the faith. Kant, we should recall was ordered by the Emperor not to write on Religious matters. Ever since the closure of the Philosophical schools in the 6th century AD, Universities had inherited the hopes of the Aristotelians and Society, for both defending the system of existing values, and advancing knowledge in all the subject areas of the sciences. It was left to Kant to become the philosopher and the "force" that best fulfilled these hopes. Indeed, his third question "What can we hope for?" was a question which was asked in awe and wonder and questioned man's moral

nature, as well as at his theoretical accomplishments. Unfortunately Hegel, in his own words, turned Kant and consequently this hope upside down, partly by challenging the formal principles of rationality that echoed the Aristotelian heritage: a heritage that the University-system failed to manage consistently. Hegel, when viewed from an Aristotelian and Kantian perspective, continued the Modernist movement begun by Descartes and Hobbes. Both of these philosophers, (via the ancient positions of materialism and dualism), sought to deny the historical value of Aristotelian Metaphysics (First Principles). This was, to say the very least, a surprising historical development, given the fact that it was Aristotle's work that first dealt decisive philosophical blows to both these positions. Given the range of his writings, Aristotle, of course was not right about everything he reflected upon, but his hylomorphic metaphysics still contains the major decisive arguments against these positions. Recall that he founded the disciplines of Biology and Logic. Darwin in his writings many centuries later, felt compelled to acknowledge the achievements of Aristotle. Aristotle's work also represented one of the first methodological approaches to *psuche*: a form of investigation that firstly, included dissection of dead animals in order to examine organic and tissue structure, and secondly, longitudinal observations of the behaviour of these organisms in their natural habitats. Despite many claims to the contrary, Aristotle's work in Logic has not been surpassed by modern developments in logic, some of which elaborate upon Aristotles work in significant respects, and some of which fall well outside Aristotle's conception of Logic. Kant and Frege's work fall into the former category and the work of the early Wittgenstein and Russell, the latter category (and are therefore, for Cavell, part of the modern epistemological project). Neither Kant nor Frege's "Logic" overwhelmed the founders principles and rules.

In volume one of this work we discussed the Gestalt of the Romans, the god of War, Janus with his four eyes and two faces: we saw in this figure a symbol of anxiety portending the times to come. In volume two we fixated instead upon the image of Ariadne's thread leading us out of the cave of our ignorance.

The hope embodied in the institution of the university is, according to the 4 volumes of this work, that of attempting to manage the journey of the thread of philosophical tradition running from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant and possibly Wittgenstein into the future. The message of hope is the message of rationalism: a message that refuses to advance the causes of Hegel's dialectical spiritualism, the Existential/Phenomenological denial of rationalism, the dialectical materialism of Science and Modern Economic Theory, and Transactional Ethics: all of which share a project so anxious to deny rationalist metaphysics.

If Kant is correct, the thread of continuous tradition may have a one hundred thousand year journey ahead of it, and this, of course, may be a source of discontent for those “new men” who impatiently wish to leave the earth and colonise the planets of the universe. For the rest of us who are willing to undertake this Kantian journey, distractions are superfluous. On such a journey there will be change—i.e., modifications of hylomorphic and critical theory. This change in turn, will be in some respects much less dramatic than that of colonising the planets. On this journey the practice of abandoning an entire theory because there is a mistaken statement or assumption, is a modern practice which denies the value of thought and serious philosophising. The declared aim of dramatically turning another thinkers thought “upside down” (Hegel) is a declaration filled with a modern form of hubris: This practice has contributed to the result of the inversion of the values of morality. The beginning of the modern era saw a “new generation of men” with Descartes and Hobbes. They however, were not yet emboldened to such an extent and these thinkers contented themselves with relatively innocuous attempted criticisms of Aristotle. Descartes and Hobbes were content to merely lay the foundations for modernism.

Cavell in his reasoning about modern phenomena uses a dialectical approach to problem-solving in his transactional approach to Philosophical Psychology and Ethics. The question that needs to be raised in the light of the above, is whether the World of the Arts was also turned upside down by the activity of the “new men” of modern art. Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, published in the 1920’s was a typical attempt at a final solution to all the problems in Philosophy. It is not a well known fact that he attended for a short time the same gymnasium as another final solution propagandist, namely Hitler, who believed he had found a final solution to what he called “The Jewish Problem”, until he was forced to find a final solution to the problems of his own life, namely suicide. Wittgenstein, initially one of the “new men” of the Philosophical world, provides his final solution with the publication of the *Tractatus*, and then promptly leaves the university world for the profession of teaching in a school. After a period in his life that he did not feel was particularly successful and in which he was finally convinced that his earlier conception of philosophy had several serious flaws, he returned to University in an attempt, as Cavell puts it, to acknowledge history. At the point in time when he wrote the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein, like Descartes and Hobbes, was not well read in the History of Philosophy.

The Wittgenstein family were amongst the richest families in Europe, and upon inheriting his share of this financial empire, Ludvig gave his money away thus distancing himself from the “new men” of the economic and political arenas of the time (e.g. Cecil Rhodes, who probably was never plagued by the kind of dream that Carazan of the Kantian era was forced to experience).

Language is a medium in which firstly, pictures of states of affairs are presented and secondly, judgements composed of concepts and categories are constructed and presented as the work of knowledge or reason. The importance of this medium in Philosophy depends upon the extent to which Frege was correct in claiming the pictorial aspect of the medium to be childish and therefore unable to teach us anything about logic. Logic does, however use language in accordance with the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

In an essay entitled "Must we mean what we say?" Cavell explores the work of ordinary language philosophers and their focus upon the way in which language is used in everyday life. Ryle and Austin are discussed, and Cavell refers to the "explanation" of voluntary action:

"X (an action) is voluntary only in circumstances where one is suspicious about the performance of the action"

This is undeniably true in everyday circumstances. Saying, however, that in general a class of actions is voluntary if it meets this condition, is permissible, but we ought to note that this is an example of theoretical reasoning about a practical action, and for Aristotle all practical activities aim at the good. In practical explanations of action, there is knowledge that what one is doing cannot be compelled by a cause outside ones control. The complaint one often hears about such action qualifications, is that they formalistically abstract from the particular circumstances of the action. This is not the case with the logical reasoning of the syllogism. The major premise may well abstract from particulars but it is the task of the minor premise to connect to the particulars of the circumstances e.g.

Taking someones property without their knowledge or consent is stealing

P is the property of NN

In Aristotle, as we have pointed out, both propositions must be known and actively dispose the agent in the action-situation or action-circumstances toward performing the action. This is necessary if one is to draw the conclusion that taking P is an act of stealing. If the agent does not know both of these propositions, then in all likelihood the agent may not be stealing, if he thought he had the owners consent, or alternatively did not know that P was the owners property. Also, if an agent removed one of your donkeys from his field to send to the slaughterhouse, believing it to be his, he could be accused of negligence (-because he did not go closer to make sure) but perhaps not of stealing.

The major premise:

All ethical action is voluntary

is a well-formed proposition. So, when I say the above in support of the Aristotelian definition of what is ethical and what is voluntary, can I mean what I say? Certainly, this is what Kant meant to say. For both philosophers (Aristotle and Kant), logical relations existed between the above major premise and the minor premise of Jack promising Jill to pay the money back he borrowed from her. Cavell's discussion focussed upon the relation between the circumstances in which we say something and the content of what we say. He pointed out that this cannot be a logical or a necessary relation. "Circumstance" is defined by the OED as follows:

" a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or an action."

This suggests that, if we are dealing with a logical condition, the relation to what we say, must be logical. Similarly, if a fact, e.g. "All men are mortal", is connected to the event of the death of Hitler, does not a statement formulating this in propositional terms, e.g. "Hitler is mortal", follow logically and necessarily from "All men are mortal", and "Hitler is a man", (he is surely only metaphorically a monster--he would not, for example, meet the hylomorphic criteria for a monster, namely possessing different organs and a different shape).

Cavell also discusses the pragmatic implications of an action that might possibly follow from a claim of reasoning that results in the performance of a voluntary action. It is not certain, however, that this idea of a pragmatic implication is helpful in characterising the reasoning process involved. The relation between an action that I ought to do, and the reasoned conclusion that I ought to do the particular action in question, is surely something I mean to do, and it is so because I must mean what I say if my knowledge is expressed in the major and minor premisses of my reasoning about that action. Cavell agrees with this, but on the curious condition that the ought expressed in the judgements discussed are not merely expressions of private emotion or an emotional meaning (whatever that might be).

Cavell further discusses the claim S ("When we ask whether an action is voluntary we imply that the action is fishy"). This must be a particular judgement because we are talking about a particular action, and Cavell sees no reason not to classify such a judgement in terms of the Kantian synthetic a priori. It is difficult, however, to see how pragmatic implications or emotional meanings could enter into such a discussion except in terms of causality which is a determining mechanism and not a spontaneous and free choice of an acting self. Furthermore a synthetic a priori judgement works for any particular event

but it is necessary to point out that we cannot move from reasoning about a particular action to the generalisation that all actions are voluntary. There might, however, be a synthetic a priori judgement to the effect that "all ethical actions are voluntary". Kant refers to such actions as **deeds**. Kant would, however, agree that a will driven by instrumental actions, in accordance with an instrumental good will suffice to classify instrumental actions too, as voluntary. Whether this will suffice to regard all instrumental actions as ethical is more doubtful considering the second formulation of the categorical imperative in which we are specifically challenged not to treat persons as means to ends but only as ends in themselves.

The necessity of S, Cavell argues, resides in the fact that it is not clear what would count as a disproof of the claim S: the question of empirical evidence for S appears to be irrelevant to its meaning. Cavell then arrives at the following position:

"There is no way to classify such statements, we do not know what they are"³

Or alternatively there is no desire on the part of Cavell to explore the possibility of all actions being voluntary. This would place him in a rationalistic position he does not wish to defend.

Oliver Wendel Holmes in his work on "Common Law" (1881) considered whether there is any such thing as a voluntary act insofar as the law was concerned. His argument was based on the very astute Kantian sounding claim that "A physical movement of the muscles must be willed", if an action is to occur. On this argument, the law claims that mere **states** that may even be the product of illegal acts, e.g. being a drug addict because of illegal acts of taking drugs are not subject to the reach of the law. Being a drug addict is not in itself illegal, partly because there is no one identifiable act of will associated with being a drug addict (a **consequential** state **that has happened to** the drug taker) and partly because in the eyes of the law one cannot take one's humanity away by any act other than an act of suicide which removes life altogether. Becoming a drug addict for Kant is a matter of the will being corrupted by one's passions: one does not voluntarily become a drug addict except perhaps as a means of committing suicide, using one's life as a means instrumentally to the taking of one's life.

It comes, therefore, as something of a surprise that the law embraces rationalistic and metaphysical accounts of action in demanding that criminal liability is connected to a voluntary act principle, namely:

"There can be no actus reus (and thus no criminal liability) unless the defendant performed a voluntary action"⁴

The law recognises that voluntary acts can be both conscious and habitual. In the above article we find the use of the word "metaphysical". The discussion is indeed Kantian and rational. Cavell, in all likelihood, would reject both the metaphysical and rational aspects of the above discussion of action. But it may well be that it is this type of discussion alone that is capable of resolving the issues of the relation of necessary judgements to particular actions or classes of actions, Synthetic a priori judgements, insofar as Kant is concerned, are an important part of the science of metaphysics which is not as yet a complete science but nevertheless these judgements demonstrate the important cognitive function of reason in our thinking and in our lives.

The synthetic aspect of synthetic a priori judgements requires a relation to the world which Cavell discusses in terms of the relation of Language to the world. Cavell claims that, in learning what a word means, we are also learning what the thing is that we are applying the word to. He refers to the activity of looking up the meaning of the word *umiak* (a type of canoe) in the dictionary. Dictionary meanings tend to give us both definitions of the things concerned, plus examples of how to use the word. He claims correctly, that we bring both knowledge of the world and knowledge of grammar to the dictionary. This is part of his argument designed to demonstrate that the ordinary usage of the term suggested by the definition is **normative**. Normative statements also describe actions, Cavell claims (P.22). What follows upon this is not a metaphysical discussion of action, but rather a phenomenological investigation into S, and the most characteristic feature of action, namely, that it can go wrong. It is further claimed that if someone tells us that we ought to do something, they are, in so doing, presupposing the existence of a norm, but it is doubtful whether he means the norm of the voluntary act principle suggested earlier. This action of telling someone something, obviously of itself does not constitute the norm which is clearly a metaphysical issue for a Philosopher. It is unclear from the above discussion exactly what mistake Cavell is referring to, but he does maintain that the mistake is caused by a "disastrous conception of action"(P.24). The voluntary act principle discussed above is central to both Aristotelian and Kantian thinking in this area but no arguments have been presented against such a principle: no mention is made of the kind of mistake it, and principles like it are making. Cavell does in fact refer to Kant's Categorical Imperative and claims that although this appears to us in the form of an imperative it really has the form of what he refers to as a "Categorical Declarative" (a description-rule) (P.25). He poses the question "But suppose I do not want to be moral" and makes the naturalistic error of claiming that this is an argument for the principle being unable to physically guarantee moral action. For Aristotle we recall, if the ought premises are possessed and active, it follows that we ought to do the action, whether we actually do the action, is another issue given the obvious fact that there can always be a temporal gap between the conclusion of my reasoning

and the action. I might get hit by a bolt of lightning externally, or a chemical or emotional storm from within. Causation can obviously cast a shadow between the will and the deed.

Cavell wishes to relate norms to rules. This is problematic because the former are more like principles. A rule, Cavell argues, guides one to do something, but a principle guides us to do something well. There is no indication of this distinction in Aristotle, Kant or the discussion of the voluntary act principle. The source of this curious discussion may lay in Cavell's desire to connect ethics to games like the game of chess, where there are indeed rules of the game and strategies for doing well in the game. A game is a transactional activity requiring instrumental strategies of many different kinds, if one desires to win over ones opponent. The whole activity reeks of dialectical logic and this form of reasoning is also present in the economically motivated models that are operating in the dilemma presented to "The Prisoner" and his self interested calculations: calculations that have nothing to do with the kind of contemplation required in moral reasoning. There is no obligation to play chess, and no duty to play it well. Here it is certainly apt to pose the question, "But what if I do not want to play?" There is no possible world in which not wanting to play a game of chess constitutes a moral mistake. Rejecting the invitation to play does not in any way compromise the rationality of my judgement, or reflect upon my dignity as a person. Even if I decide to play and do not follow the rules, my opponents only recourse is to a hypothetical judgment of the form "If you have decided to play the game you ought to follow the rules!". A hypothetical obligation has been invoked which is true only of those who have made a kind of promise to follow the rules. The consequences of not doing so stay inside, or at the limits of the game. No real King or Queen will order my execution, no Knight will pursue me for the honour of side black. I have frustrated an expectation and have compromised my rationality, if, after having decided to play, I do not follow the rules. But there are no sentences, no suspended sentences, no fines. Symbolically, frustrating someones expectation is an important matter on the transactional stage of Cavell, but also on the cultural stage, where mimesis of action and circumstance initiate us into the serious business of life, provoke thought about mans fortune and fate, and perhaps prophetically suggest the end of a civilisation and the beginning of new states of affairs.

It is however, in the real tribunals of explanation/justification, that the affairs of men are really settled. In these tribunals, principles and laws regulate activity and thinking. If the law is metaphysical then in the law a chain of "Why?" questions occurring in the process of a legal tribunal will end in a principle, because principles have the status of a condition of phenomena related to other conditions forming the totality we refer to as "The Law". Given that the legal

concept of a "Right" emerged from Kantian moral Philosophy, as did the idea of Human Rights, it is not surprising to see some of the totality of conditions involved in metaphysical legal tribunals finding support in the Metaphysics and ethics of Aristotle. Neither for Aristotle, nor for Kant, however, is it the case that the term "voluntary" is best analysed by describing ordinary usage of the term in a statement perhaps about a particular voluntary actions (e.g., S). Particular statements have to be related to principles and furthermore be related in terms of the conditioned to the unconditioned. Metaphysical judgements relating to the essence-specifying definition of what a thing is, will of course be an important part of what is meant by the word for the thing concerned: they will be among the "circumstances" of the judgement (as defined by the dictionary and not Cavell).

In a later essay entitled "Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" Cavell compares Kant's remarks on the Deduction of the Categories with Wittgenstein's characterisation of his own investigation, as being directed:

"not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, toward the possibilities of phenomena"⁵

Cavell also quotes the following:

"We remind ourselves, that is, to say of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena...Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one."⁶

Cavell then points to what he believes to be the fundamental difference between Kant and Wittgenstein:

"For Wittgenstein it would be an illusion not only that we do know things in themselves but equally that we do not."⁷

It is clear for Kant that although the thing-in-itself cannot be known via the faculty of Sensibility, it can nevertheless be thought, as an ideal. A quick perusal of Kant's discussions of this matter in his First Critique, reveals that it is usually in the context of the role of intuition/Sensibility, that Kant argues the appearances of objects have only a metaphysical relation and not an epistemological relation to things in themselves. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of, ca 40 references to things-in-themselves, is in relation to appearances: challenging us not take appearances as things in themselves. The type of relation Kant is suggesting here, is very similar to that suggested by Aristotle, between a principle and the content it applies to. It would, of course, be logically problematic to take the content for the principle. The relation of Sensibility to the world does not, however, preclude the fact that we can **think** about things-in-themselves. This limitation placed by Kant upon the significance of appearances and phenomena also motivates the distinction between noumena and phenomena, because this limitation of a determining reference of noumena

by phenomena locates noumena in a realm of thought and objective reality. The world of senses provides us with phenomena and the world of the understanding provides us with the "possibilities" of phenomena (the conceptualisation of phenomena) in categorical terms, which is just another way of expressing the general fact that we are able to **think** about phenomena. In this process of thinking about phenomena, if I subtract everything phenomenal from this process, I am still left with the externality of space and spatial relations between things. All this I can know by understanding what is claimed in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Thought, according to the Transcendental Analytic, on the other hand, is a logical function, that takes no account of Sensibility and Intuition. The "I" of the "I think" is neither that of substance or cause. The consciousness of the "I" in terms of pure thought is a form of existence that is a corresponding internal form to that external form Kant discussed earlier. This form of consciousness is a consciousness of itself, and this is especially transparent in the spontaneity of the reasoning faculty: an a priori form of intellectual activity.

For Wittgenstein, the "I" is mysterious and the question thus arises whether the many methods Wittgenstein uses can adequately capture the Kantian "I think". Cavell, claims that Wittgenstein would believe that reasoning about the "I think", as was done above, is illusory. A Kantian response to this objection would consist in pointing out the metaphysical difference between the phenomenal I and the noumenal I (revealed, for example, in practical reasoning). Only metaphysical inquiry could reveal this difference between the I that appears, and the I that spontaneously thinks. The Wittgensteinian practice of imagining or constructing a language-game does not take us into this realm of being. Similarly, finding or inventing intermediate cases, inventing fictitious natural history, investigating a grammatically related expression, will all be useful for remedying confusions of various kinds. Yet, it must be pointed out that these different "therapies" do not appeal to principles of reason or logic in the way that Aristotle's metaphysics of the Philosophy of first principles does. Describing the possible different uses of language can only investigate the possibilities of phenomena to a limited extent, if one has already methodologically decided to exclude all forms of Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysical reasoning.

Cavell claims that self-knowledge is a major concern of the work of Wittgenstein. He claims that this topic has been almost systematically neglected in the works of Bacon, Locke and Descartes, but he fails to mention those two philosophers that have reflected the most about this topic, namely Aristotle and Kant. He claims that classical epistemology has been concentrating upon the knowledge of objects at the expense of the knowledge of persons.

The method of comparing and contrasting individual particular cases may be a good method of constructing concepts but this may not be very relevant to the **combining of concepts** to form judgements about persons. If actions are by necessity voluntary, as was suggested above, then making the statement:

"When we ask whether an action was voluntary we imply that the action is fishy"(S)

will not take us into reasoning about principles such as the voluntary-act principle. Having doubts about exactly how to categorise a particular action does not take us into the philosophical realms Aristotle or Kant highlighted as important. The kind of doubt that ought to be raised about particular actions is expressed in the question

"Was the physical movement we witnessed willed or not?".

If whilst standing in a queue, a man makes physical contact with someone else, deliberation about whether he willed his movement is deliberation about whether he acted intentionally. If it turned out to be the case that he was in turn pushed willfully by the man behind him in the queue, then we are only dealing with his movement under the category of something that happened to him, and not something he had done. We are not, that is, dealing with an act of will--there is no action here, not according to Wendell Holmes. Kant's ontology of willful action is clear. What we are dealing with in this case is a matter of something just happening to someone whether it be a question of external causation-a push--or internal causation-the passions dragging reason about like a slave. Apart from the initial willed action, what we see is not a chain of actions but rather a chain of events.

Knowledge of persons and Culture is contained in the account given by Wittgenstein. Many of Cavell's essays aim at claiming that Wittgensteinian methods aim largely at the modern epistemological project of analytical Philosophy.⁸ These methods serve as diagnoses of the "disease" of bewitchment of the intellect by extraordinary uses of language. Given Cavell's chosen perspective upon the work of Wittgenstein, it remains an open question whether the work is as much of a positive influence upon the History of Philosophy as we have maintained in these volumes. The Wittgensteinian "attack" on Analytical Philosophy (Logical positivism, logical atomism etc), and by implication, his attacks on naturalism, pragmatism, existentialism and phenomenology are in the name of his methods, and the attempt to bring language "home" to its ordinary use. None of these methods have metaphysical intent.

Cavell is particularly concerned with Aesthetic issues. In a famous essay entitled "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy", the issue of the translatability of

metaphor is discussed. He points out that, even though the meanings of metaphor are bound up with the words used in the metaphor, it is nevertheless obviously possible to paraphrase metaphors. Earlier in this work (volume 2) we discussed the particular metaphor, "Man is a wolf", and settled upon an analysis in terms of the conceptual components of the claim which includes the essence-specifying definition of man (rational animal capable of discourse). The above particular metaphor suggests or "uses" the animal essence of man to express the deep truth formulated by Aristotle, namely that man can be both the best of the animals and the worst of the animals. The essential relation between the concepts of man and wolf is that we therefore share some essential characteristics, but our essences are not identical: wolves are neither capable of discourse nor rational beings.

There are metaphors that are less hylomorphic, and perhaps more empirically inclined, e.g. "Juliet is the sun": if, that is, one accepts Cavell's paraphrase. Even this metaphor can be "deepened" if one considers the sun Platonically or hylomorphically, i.e. as a principle (Aristotle) or condition (Kant) of all earthly forms of existence. The paraphrase would then run as follows: "Juliet is the principle or condition of Romeo's existence." This paraphrase is largely borne out by the events of the Shakespearean play "Romeo and Juliet".

Kant's Anthropology is all about the metaphysics and political psychology involved in "being a person":

"The fact that the human being can have the "I" in his representations raises him infinitely above all the other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all the changes that happen to him, one and the same person--i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things such as irrational animals."⁹

The grammatical form of the "I" is in fact very Kantian. The first-person form in the statement "I promise" is relating an action to a particular being. Kant broadens this account into the more general role of a person in the culture they inhabit:

"The sum total of pragmatic anthropology in respect to the vocation of the human being and the characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to cultivate himself, to civilise himself and to moralise himself by means of the arts and the sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself passively to the impulses of comfort and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature."¹⁰

So, for Kant too, man can be the best or the worst of animals and his destiny hinges upon his rational capacity, which in turn depends upon a capacity for

active discourse. Culture ennobles man, Kant argues, (P.230). For Wittgenstein on the other hand it appears that the capacity for discourse is the primary consideration:

"the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life"¹¹

The reference to a form of life does, however, suggest Aristotelian hylomorphic theory but whether Wittgenstein wants to attach his argument for the importance of logic to rationality is not clear. Cavell in his essay on "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy", makes the claim that Wittgenstein's work brings us back to more natural forms of life and puts the souls back into our bodies (P.84). For Aristotle, the only way for our souls to be in our bodies that makes sense, is in the form of a principle responsible for all its forms of movement, and this would appear also to be the case for the positive articulation of Kant's Philosophical Psychology.

Modern Art, Cavell argues, involves us accustoming ourselves to a new and different form of life, and a "new world" (P.84). The question left hanging in the air in relation to these remarks, is whether this new world requires "new men" or an attempt to transform ourselves into these new men? Is, one can wonder, Modern Art, part of a wider process of expected transformation, a process that created the new men named Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau and Hegel?

The following were the major "tools" of the transformational process:

The changes in the form of operation of consciousness noted by Jaynes earlier in this work,

The dismantling of the influence of hylomorphic metaphysics,

The diminishing influence of sound (rational) religious belief (of the kind referred to by Kant in his work "Religions within the bounds of mere reason"),

The colonisation of all forms of discourse by the method and materialistic assumptions of Science,

Analytic Philosophy with its transformation of Ethics into a game of persuasion and its distaste for metaphysics of all forms,

The waning influence of classical art forms,

Rationalistic counter-influences included the persisting influence of Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy,

The political discourse supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based on a concept of Right derived from Kant's moral philosophy, and

The influence of the law and its rationalistic argumentation for principles and laws.

The growing political awareness amongst the masses of the importance of freedom and knowledgeable politicians.

Wittgenstein's declared wish was to provide us with a perspicuous representation which enables the disappearance of both philosophical problems and the problems of life. Cavell claims that this is Wittgenstein's re-conception of the world. The fundamental question is whether this re-conception requires the understanding of "new men", or whether his therapies and methods are designed to treat the bewitched thinking of the new men. We know in the cases of Descartes and Hobbes, the soul was taken out of the body in different ways, and the ancient assumptions of materialism and dualism emerged with renewed vigour.

In his essay "Aesthetic Problems" Cavell provides us with a story from the work of Cervantes that establishes the role of the context of exploration/discovery in the "test for taste":

"Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead which was supposed to be excellent, being old and of good vintage. One of them tastes it: considers it; and after mature reflection pronounces the wine to be good were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precautions, gives also his verdict in favour of the wine, but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgement. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom, an old key with a leather thing attached to it." (In Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste")¹²

Here is a transactional account of Judgement if there ever was one. Both experts are in a sense right, and in a sense wrong and the synthesis of their correctness reveals itself at the moment of "discovery", at the end of the exploratory tale. Taste related to sense, for Kant, could not be defended with a universal voice and always needed to await the "discovery" of something particular. Sensation in the taste of sense is not coupled to conceptualisation. Modern wine critics would, of course, seek to connect their experience to concepts via reference to origins of the grapes and the soil they grow in. These critics then speak of the "body" of the wine. Cavell appears to recognise the Kantian distinction between reflective aesthetic judgements and judgements related to the "taste of the senses". He claims that the latter are merely "pleasant" (P.88) and the former judgements are connected to the mode of "speaking with a universal voice".

Cavell does not, however, refer to the role of conceptualisation in this more universal response, fixating instead upon the synthetic event of "agreement". Such agreement may well be presupposed when we speak with a universal voice but only because of the essence-specifying definition of a concept which

Wittgenstein himself indirectly acknowledges when he admits that concepts are for use on more than one occasion. Wittgenstein also comments on universality of the concept in the following quote:

"What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance of a concept, are often extremely general facts of nature; such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality."¹³

The world is changing all the time (the wine is ageing and perhaps souring), but as Wittgenstein points out, if lumps of cheese put on scales were to increase and decrease in size whilst being weighed, the institution of weighing cheese would lose its purpose or point. Indeed, if all entities behaved in this way, our language-games over a broad area of activity would lose their purpose and point. Enduring entities over change is a principle of Aristotelian metaphysics. The conclusion we draw from this discussion is that there is often more to Wittgensteinian Philosophy than meets Cavells aesthetically-oriented eye.

In an essay entitled "Music Discomposed" Cavell discusses the issues of "New criticism" and "New Critics" who apparently suggest that criticism should confine its attention to the object itself (P.181). The poem, painting, building, statue itself should be examined and not the intentions behind the object, it is argued. If a work is the product of a voluntary act, as presumably it must be, then, on Oliver Wendel Holmes' account, it must have been willed. If it has been willed, then on Kant's account, it must be intentional.

Elisabeth Anscombe defines intention in terms of the question "Why did X do A?", and the answer given is a reason for, rather than a cause of, the action A. Reasons are not evidence, Anscombe argues, which entails that no inspection of the object of the action (even if it is a material object) can produce the reason. On this account one refuses any answer to the question "Why?" which entails that the movements at issue (being pushed in the queue) were happening to the man being pushed. Consciousness as such is not defining of intention, because the man being pushed can be fully conscious of what is happening to him. The man also, moreover, has to know that he has not willed this movement of his body. This knowledge, on Freud's theory, need not be conscious, but is rather a function of what he called the Preconscious system of our minds (where knowledge and the meanings of words are "located"). The kind of knowledge we are talking about here is characterised by Anscombe as non-observational. Given that observation is the only route we have to the discovery of evidence, it is clear that evidence cannot be relevant to the intentionality involved in the activity of the artist, (and the object produced as a result of it). Yet this activity requires the agents awareness of what he is doing, a non-observational awareness of the kind we can encounter in the intentional activity of speaking (in which I am aware of what I have just said, am saying, and am going to say).

Anscombe insists that this idea of intention is very complex and provides us with an example of a man pumping water into a house and poisoning the inhabitants. She cites Wittgenstein and refers to what she calls the history of the circumstances of the case, which of course would be an appropriate thing to do if the case was to land in a legal tribunal. Anscombe divides the case up analytically into the following possible forms, each moment progressively widening the circumstances:

1. Moving my arm up and down with my fingers around the pump handle
2. operating the pump
3. replenishing the water supply of the house
4. poisoning the inhabitants of the house

We have here 4 descriptions. The first is an intuitive description of a muscles contraction by an act of will. The next level moves to a conceptual description of what is being willed, which as a matter of fact is an answer to the question "Why?", being asked as a response to witnessing the first willed movement, e.g. "Why are you moving your arm up and down and...?" The next level, 3, conceptualises the case in terms of widening circumstances, and is also an answer to the question "Why are you operating the pump?". The journey of the water into the house widens the circumstances still further and the final end or telos of the action is given in description number 4. It would, of course, be impossible to agree to the description "poisoning the inhabitants of the house", if one did not agree to the descriptions of what one was doing in moments 1-3. The first three act-descriptions are means to an end, and for Kant instrumental reasoning governs the shift between these different moments. This instrumental reasoning process is governed by the principle: "to will the end is to will the means". This indicates that the connection of the means to the end must be conceptual or logical (practical logic). "Poisoning the inhabitants" is an end that is described in the following way by Anscombe:

"Thus when we speak of four intentions, we are speaking of the character of being intentional that belongs to the act in each of the four descriptions: but when we speak of being one intention we are speaking of intention with which: the last term we give in such a series gives the intention with which the act in each of its other act descriptions was done, and this intention, so to speak, swallows up all the preceding intentions with which earlier members of the series were done."¹⁴

It is, Anscombe argues, an error to characterise the content of the intention only in terms of the initial willing of the contraction of ones muscles because concepts are already conceptualising this intuitive knowledge. Anscombe cites Aristotle:

"In general, as Aristotle says, one does not deliberate about an acquired skill; the description of what one is doing, which one completely understands, is at a distance from the details of ones movements, which one does not consider at all."¹⁵

This was a point Wittgenstein made in relation to the sensation of pain, namely that the feeling of pain (this detail) is playing no role in the language game related to pain. The agent's description is a dispositional piece of knowledge rather than a detail. The material details of the case (the willing of muscle contraction) would not normally be decisive in a legal case relating to the poisoning of the inhabitants of the house. Imagine that, in the course of the legal process relating to the above example, it was discovered that there was poison in the water, but the water for some reason did not reach the house (there was a leak in the pipe). Circumstances such as knowing the water was poisoned would suffice under the law for a charge of attempted murder. This charge is based on the last three descriptions and the actor knowing that the water was poisoned. Anscombe discusses this possibility in terms of a mistake occurring in action (P.57), and not in any of the descriptive statements. We still use the intention to characterise the action. The man was not just operating the pump or replenishing the water supply of the house: he was poisoning the inhabitants. Anscombe elaborates upon this in the following way:

"Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers meant by **practical knowledge**? Certainly in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior and dictate what is to be saved, if it is knowledge. And this is the explanation of the utter darkness in which we find ourselves."¹⁶

One can wonder whether Anscombe meant that we are generally in the dark with Practical Philosophical issues or just in this particular case. She certainly felt us moderns to be in the dark about the concept of life, the abortion of a foetus, and the awarding of honorary doctorates to ex-President Truman. If the tribunal of legal proceedings were driven solely by the facts rather than the conceptualisation of the facts, it would suffice for the man accused of attempted murder to point to the hole in the pipe and thereby be acquitted of the charge. This, in spite of the fact that he knows he willed the destruction of the inhabitants (politicians) of the house. If the proceedings of the trial can recreate a sufficiently complex picture of the circumstances, we and the jury can also know what the man's intention was---the will is not a mysterious inner phenomenon. Anscombe also cites with approval Aristotle's normative reasoning pattern resulting in the conclusion "I ought to do X" (e.g. Keep my promise). As is the case with all Aristotelian logical reasoning the conclusion of the argument rests upon the truth of the premises (so the facts might play some role) and this in turn rests on the relation of the concepts that constitute the premises.

Anscombe believes that practical syllogisms involving ethical principles and concepts can only be sustained if supported by a philosophical psychology that

can explain, for example, Why we ought to keep our promises (Major premise). Surprisingly, Anscombe makes no mention of Kant's Philosophical Psychology, so we do not know whether she regards Kant's system of principles and concepts as fulfilling the function she proposes. People must want to do their duty she argues. Given the Aristotelian claim which Kant accepts, rationality is a potentiality that is a long way from being actualised in the species, so it is not clear whether Anscombe's claim fully understands the Kantian logical force of the ought. Kant, for example, maintains that practical conceptual knowledge is the cause (in an Aristotelian sense) of what its possessor understands. In this state of affairs the intention is the cause of both the object and the action.

Considering the above reflections it is indeed questionable if it is possible to carry out the program of "new criticism", namely, to attend only to the object itself. As Cavell rightly points out it would be problematic to use a theoretical view of intention that attempts to study intention in terms of the contents of the artists mind (it is, according to Aristotle and Kant, the principles we are searching for). Cavell focuses instead on the idea of meaning and claims that he is sure that we are meant to notice some aspects of the material work rather than others. He cites two scenes in Macbeth in which there is a knocking on a door directly after the murder of Duncan. This idea of Shakespeare necessarily meaning or intending this conjunction of scenes enables us to understand the play without consulting Shakespeare about his **particular** intentions.

Cavell also interestingly places the movement of the successive styles of art in a larger cultural context. He asks the important Kantian question of whether we can detect in this succession of events any progress. Cavell claims that this is certainly true of certain stretches of the succession:

"And a new style not merely replaces an older one, it may change the significance of any earlier style"¹⁷

In the above case one could interpret the above succession of styles in terms of the subsumption of one style under another, and one can also regard such a relation in practical logical terms-perhaps even in terms of the kind of intentional subsumption that occurred in the above individual chain of intentional descriptions--a chain proceeding from an action and toward a telos that might land in court. Without a commitment to rationalism, however, Cavell has no foundation for explaining or justifying the subsumption of one style under another. Cavell's remark does allow for an explanation of regressive ages such as the Age of Romanticism that succeeded the Classical era. The rationality of the classical age was temporarily subsumed under the emotional passionate age of Romanticism, and the criticism of this age of the classical age, focussed upon criticising the rationally based tradition of criticism. The classical tradition prized, for example, the lifetime history of an artists apprenticeship in his

medium. This was an important qualification for becoming an artist and building a reputation. "Modern Art", "New Art" for the "New Men" like Duchamps, required no apprenticeship in a medium, required only minimal work on "ready-made" objects (e.g. displaying a urinal in a museum) and also required a decoupling of artistic intention in favour of a revolutionary intention that begins with the focussing of attention on these "ready-made" objects. This "revolution" continues with a shift of attention away from the object, and toward the revolutionary posed question, "Is this object an art-object?" Fortunately in view of the minimal work involved on the part of the artist in producing the object, the question was not formulated in terms of the "work of art". The question, however, is clearly an open-ended exploratory question, with no clear answer. The overarching philosophical question, which Cavell does not raise in this context, is whether Modern Art is a continuation of the art of the Romantic period, where the focus was on feeling and passion (which Kant regarded as pathological). Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that Modern Art promotes both an anti-rational and anti metaphysical position. Cavell attempts to steer a middle path between rationalism and romanticism by focusing on judgment and language, rather than understanding and reason, in an attempt to situate the philosophical judgement at the intersection between intuition and concept rather than at the more overarching intersection between intuition-concept-reason. Urinals, empty canvases called "space", and "pieces" of music entitled "4 minute 33 second silence", are hardly in any sense transitional objects in relation to classical depictions of the human figure, building, walls and paintings that symbolise forms of life in accordance with what Kant called the form of finality of the object. The artist from the classical era, in contrast to his Romantic colleagues, is focussed not on the matter of sensation, but its form.

Adrian Stokes is a critic of classical art. In his critical writings he speaks about the mass-effect of the stone of a building upon an appreciator. This is an intended global effect of the material on the sensibility of the appreciator.

Kant would not have regarded an object such as Duchamps urinal as a work of art. It is even doubtful whether he would have regarded it as handicraft, if it was a mass-produced object. The activity of those involved in producing such an object is a mechanical type of rule-following, and this places this type of object, for Kant, in the realm of agreeable sensation. The appreciation of an art-object, on the other hand, according to Kant, does not occur at the level of the sensation. The act of appreciation is rather connected to estimating both the beauty of the object and the artists intention. The attempt of modern art, some have suggested, is not to invoke agreeable sensations, but rather to invoke a disagreeable "shock" and thus provoke a pseudo-philosophical discussion about Art. If this was the intention of the Modern Artists, it is certainly "sensational" in more senses than one. Controversy was the inevitable result even amongst

those artists that were firmly committed "Romantic period" artists, but especially amongst those artists inspired by the classical era. This world of shock and controversy was a far cry from the calm mass-effect of QuattroCento architecture, Giorgiones calm rendition of a Tempesta, and the contemplative mood of Michelangelo's "Times of the Day sculpture. The appearance of a urinal in the company of such objects encourages the accusation of "Fraud!" which Cavell points to as a typical reaction in this "new" form of life. Kant claims that production of fine art is the work of genius which is designed to produce a work of appreciation (not a sensational response or a response to a sensation, or a philosophical discussion). The work of genius often takes place in a medium and consists of an original use of that medium---consists that is, in a way of presenting an object that depends upon appreciating the original use of that medium. Kant describes this process in the following way:

".....the artist having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art, controls his work, and after many, and often laborious attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to him. Hence, this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed toward making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in the play of these powers."¹⁸

This is a perfect description of the process involved in the creation of a classical art object. The idea, suggested by Cavell, of viewing the Classical period through the eyes, assumptions, and world-view of the Romantic period, is indeed problematic, very like repression on the cultural level. The idea, that we should use the assumptions of Modern Art (are there any?) to criticise or characterise Classical Art, is absurd. We have elsewhere in this work argued that what is called by some the "Modern Age" really has no historical credentials to be entitled to the term "Age", containing as it does the following battles of the giants: Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Freud, and Wittgenstein. Three of the contests of importance are, Kant v Hegel, Freud v Science, Analytical Philosophy v the work of the later Wittgenstein. It is, namely, the case that it is not clear what the philosophical landscape will look like when these battles are over--whether for example, as we have proposed--the figures of Aristotle and Kant will emerge from the smoke of battle, or whether the destruction of classical norms and values will be completed and other figures emerge to install other world views, ideas and assumptions. The so called technological achievements of science of this Modern Period, including as they do the landing of men on the moon, and the construction and use of atomic bombs on civilian populations, do not qualify as achievements for any premature naming of the age in which we live. Much can happen in one hundred thousand years, the period Kant claimed was necessary to actualise the potentiality of rationality in the species of man.

Cavell in the essay "Music Discomposed" claims that one line of aesthetic investigation is to attempt to make sense of the idea of the role of feeling in Art. Whether he meant sensation or intuition here is irrelevant: sensations are situated in a causal network leading to a causal end that is difficult to conceptualise (cf. the earlier discussion of the sensation or detail of pain). Intuitions that cannot be conceptualised are blind (Kant). At the end of the essay Cavell, in a final attempt at the justification of the spirit of modernism, characterises the quality of sincerity in art as a feeling and the following bewildering claim is made:

"But I haven't suggested that sincerity proves anything in particular--it can prove madness or evil as well as purity or authenticity. What I have suggested is that it shows what kind of stake the stake in modern art is, that it explains why ones reactions to it can be so violent..."¹⁹

This is the risk of dialectical reasoning. One may be taken in by the thesis or the antithesis, however much the one position accuses the other of fraud: this battle to achieve a synthesis in a concept is not a battle of the giants but rather a battle of the dwarves on a smaller stage.

In the following essay entitled "A Matter of Meaning It", Cavell responds to criticisms from Analytical Philosophy: criticisms relating to his previous remarks on the nature of Modern Art. He sees no problem in the objection to his position that modern art works need to be part of a complex work-process. Indeed, he sees in modern art objects something novel that is of interest. He discusses Cato's sculpted "works" and claims that his coloured beams of iron are "placed": the colour of the beams disguises their mass, it is argued, leaving us with a particular sensation of "weightlessness". Cavell claims in the context of this discussion that these pieces of iron are no longer **things**. He is in no doubt that this is a modern work of sculpture, in spite of the curious admission that he no longer knows what sculpture is. He claims the following:

"It is a statement of the fact of life---the metaphysical fact one could say---that apart from ones experience, there is nothing to be known about it, no way of knowing that what you know is relevant, for what else is there to rely on but my experience?"²⁰

In the above example of Cato's "weightless" pieces of iron, the placing and the painting of the beams is decoupled from the work of the sculptor that intends to explore the properties of his material and the medium his material is a part of. Cavell mentions Monroe Beardsley's criticism of his concept of intention, which Beardsley finds obscure. We encounter once again a dialectical argument in which a thesis is confronting an antithesis. Berdsleys "thesis" is that the concept of intention takes us outside the work and Cavell opposes this with his antithesis that the intention takes us further into the work. Given the reluctance, however, of Cavell to connect sincerity with the intention of a genius that lies behind the originally created art-work as well as the rejection of the classical concept of

form, the focus inevitably rests upon "facts" of various kinds. What Cavell refers to as the facts of life/art are now:

"disgust, embarrassment, impatience, partisanship, excitement without release, silence without serenity."²¹

Added to the above must be grammatical facts that define this new "form of life". Cavell continues this discussion with a transactional description of situations in which an agent's intentions are obscure due to a lack of adequate knowledge of the circumstances-- an important element of understanding and establishing the agent's intention. Cavell is concerned here to highlight what he calls the "acknowledgement of intention" (P.233) a more psychological account compared with that kind of logical account we find in Anscombe's work on Intention. We find, for example, the following curious statement in Cavell's account:

"To say that works of art are intentional is not to say that each bit of them, as it were, is separately intended; any more than to say a human action is intentional is to say that each physical concomitant of it is separately intended, e.g. the grass crushed where I have stood"²²

Surely the artist has responsibility for every part of the art work: failing to unintentionally paint a piece of sky on one's canvas, is to be the artist of an unfinished work. Cavell wishes to replace intention with a notion of "meaning". In the above case the artist did not mean to leave a part of the sky unpainted and it is this "fact" that is the basis for declaring this work to be incomplete. This is a complex substitution which is not sufficiently argued for. There is again, toward the end of this essay, a confusing reference to games where Cavell claims intentions do not count. Games are transactional and what happens occurs in relation to rules. The only way to understand these elaborations is to see in them some kind of account of the new "form of life" that is being created by Modern Art and art activity. Different kinds of rules are being followed and thus a different kind of game is being played compared to that "game" (a term that would be too transactional for a classical critic) of classical art.

We can, without doubt, agree to the proposition that Modern Art is "dramatic" (this is an argument for modern art being a consequential development of Romanticism). The Wittgensteinian question is whether the participation of a part of a community in the modern game (involving a group of people that has culturally lost its way) is sufficient to give the activity validity. It does not yet allow us to see a path of progress from the classical to the "modern". At best this latter era, if it returns to the commitments of rationalism, might be seen as a period of transition rather than a straightforward regression.

In his work "The World Viewed" Cavell considers film to be the last bastion of traditional art: the only form that has not as yet succumbed to the self-questioning attitude of Modernism. Cavell poses the interesting question, "What happens to reality when it is projected and screened?". He argues that just as photographs present us with things themselves as evidenced by what we say in relation to them, e.g. "That is your grandfather", film with its photographic base shares some of the characteristics of photographs. Cavell also points to other larger issues such as:

"The unhooking of consciousness from the world interposed our subjectivity between us and our presentness to the world. Then our subjectivity becomes what is present to us, individuality becomes isolation."²³

This is, Cavell argues, a goal of romanticism, to restore reality and a sense of selfhood. He connects three historical events to this process: The Protestant Revolution, Shakespearean Theatre, and Cartesian Philosophy. These are, according to Cavell, cataclysmic changes mobilising forces that seek to escape the isolation of subjectivity. Cavell's response to this scenario of the terror of isolation is to seek a transactional-self, seeking acknowledgement.

The photographic base of film is a part of the medium those that work with film have to take into account. Cavell argues that the automatism involved in the processes of projecting and screening "accepts" the absence of subjectivity. Human agency has been removed from these automatic processes. Human agency does, however, help to shape the product via the creative activities of preparing for the filming (the writing of the script for the director).

The objects and the people projected upon our screen are real, even if they are not in our presence. The World we see, Cavell claims, is a world past, and this connects the mode of narration we are witnessing closer to myth than to fiction. The human somethings that appear on the screen of this historical imagination are not the characters we find in the theatre (Macbeth, Richard II) but rather types, such as "The Dandy", "The Tramp", "The Villain", "The family man" etc. We are faced, then, with a historical imaginative recreated magical world. We sit and view this world in the dark, unseen. This, argues Cavell is expressive of the metaphysical isolation we all now experience. Objects like trains and cars are dramatised in the presentation of them on film: Cavell names this process, photogenesis. This is a name for the process that transforms the reality of everything, including that of humans to human "somethings". Cavell calls these human somethings, types, but a better term for them might be in terms of the Aristotelian concept of "forms of life". The genre of the "Western" attracted such attention because it suggested an origin to the form of life we know as civilisation, manifesting as it did the tragic costs of the building of our societies,

not through discourse and rationality, but through the violence of the form of life we call heroic.

Cavell's psychological notion of acknowledgement is the modernist equivalent to Hegelian "Recognition", embedded in a transactional dialectical discourse and its telos. For Cavell, all knowledge is a mode of acknowledgement. The camera, being a machine and not a form of life interacting in the context of the world, is rather a kind of mechanical origin of experience (like the eye) that lies at the boundary of the world. The camera is to the world presented on film as the eye is to the visual field. We recall from volume one, the Cartesian fascination for magical automated beings that moved hydraulically. We recalled also the mechanical dissections of living unaesthetised animals by Descartes who did not seem to respond to their cries of pain. There seems a clear line of transformation from this scenario to that in which the camera (God's eye) is the source of everything in the world of film. This suggests that even God has become a machine, providing the means for the metaphysical solipsist to explore all the dimensions of loneliness. For Cavell, as we suggested earlier there is nothing beyond experience, no thinking form of life as construed by Aristotle and Kant. There is only a machine that may eventually pass the Turing-test for being God.

Notes on Chapter 2

¹ *Must We Mean What We Say?* Cavell S., (Cambridge, CUP, 1969, P.(XIX)

² Ibid. P.XIX

³ Ibid. P.16

⁴ Internet Connection: (<https://law.jrank.org/pages462/Actus-Reus-voluntary-act-principle.html>)

⁵ *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1950, §50)

⁶ Ibid. §90

⁷ Ibid. P.65

⁸ Ibid. P.74

⁹ *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Kant, I., Edited and Translated by Louden, R., B., (Cambridge, CUP, 2006, P.15)

¹⁰ Ibid. P229-230

¹¹*Philosophical Investigations*, §23, PI

¹²*Must We mean what we say?* P.87

¹³*Philosophical Investigations*, P. 56e

¹⁴*Intention*, Anscombe, G., E., M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1972, P.46)

¹⁵Ibid. P.54

¹⁶Ibid. P.57

¹⁷Must We Mean....? P.184

¹⁸*Kant's Critique of Judgement*, Kant, I., Trans Meredith J. C., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, P.174)

¹⁹Must we mean what we say? "Music Discomposed", P.212

²⁰Ibid. P.218

²¹Ibid. P.229

²²Ibid. P.236

²³*The World Viewed*, Cavell, S., (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, P.22)

Chapter 3: Anscombe and the Philosophy of the enigmatic

Professor Elisabeth Anscombe occupied the front and centre of English University Philosophy in a similar manner to the way in which Hannah Arendt did in the arena of Political Philosophy and the Philosophy of History in the US. The two figures were otherwise far from congruent. Arendt, for example, did not even consider herself a Philosopher, whereas Anscombe was probably the epitome of a professional Philosopher entrenched in the University System of England (Oxbridge). Arendt in her doctoral thesis wrote about St Augustine and the concept of Love. Anscombe is often regarded as belonging to the school of Analytical Thomism insofar as her Philosophy of Religion was concerned. We also know that her religious convictions permeated her life to an extent that we do not see in Arendt, the Political Scientist par excellence. Arendt, for example, was more fascinated by Rome than Athens. Both women, however were fascinated with the concept of evil in their respective ways. Arendt preferred to view the phenomenon in a worldly fashion, carefully charting the origins of Totalitarianism and the Minds of men like Eichmann. In so doing she arrives at the conclusion that the origin of evil lies in an inability to think about what one does. In the eyes of many this conclusion underestimated the scope and power of evil in the lives of human beings. Arendt's possible counterargument to this criticism was to suggest that her critics did not fully understand the power of thought.

Anscombe was less worldly in her criticism of evil whether on a personal or collective level:

"The "preservation of democracy", the possibility of free speech, and other such ideals which are valuable only as a means cannot weigh against considerations which belong to the essence of the moral law. The death of men, the curtailment of liberty, the destruction of property, the diminution of culture, the obscuring of judgment by passion and interest, the neglect of truth and charity, the decrease in belief and in the practice of religion--all these are the normal accompaniments of a war. We have, as we have seen, little enough hope of a just settlement to set against such prospects. And finally there is a widespread tendency to make what our country chooses to do, the criterion of what may be done, and to call this patriotism. So a war against totalitarianism produces a totalitarian tendency: not only are morals lowered, but the very theory of morals is corrupted".¹

This is Anscombe at her most categorical and the above words parallel much of what Kant said about the less destructive wars of his time before the era of the warring Juggernaut's that serve to define the modern period. This is the Anscombe from Oxford, who objected courageously to the conferring of an honorary doctorate degree on President Truman, (the man who gave the order to drop atomic bombs on civilian populations). In this objection we encounter also a categorical condemnation of the murder of innocent civilians. War, in her eyes, is no excuse for humans to act like animals. Humans have an obligation to

fight, if they absolutely have no other choice, in accordance with rules and conventions (e.g. the Geneva Convention). Civilians shall be given the opportunity to surrender and not be forced to forfeit their lives because of an unfortunate circumstance of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Geneva Convention was an international agreement in the spirit of the kind of International Organisation Kant envisaged in his work on Universal History. It placed the onus for the protection of innocent civilians squarely upon the shoulders of aggressors. In this essay we find an appeal to the moral law which is absent in other essays. We will not, however, find any such appeal to Kantian moral law in Arendt for whom Eichmann's superficial claim that the maxims of his action were in accordance with the categorical imperative sufficed, as far as she was concerned, to cast a shadow over Kant's moral Philosophy.

Arendt is the existential pragmatist, and Anscombe is difficult to classify given the above Kantian characterisation of the evils of war and Anscombe's obvious Aristotelian tendencies in other essays on the topic of Human Life. Her reflections upon Philosophical Psychology are more Wittgensteinian than Kantian, but as we have argued in earlier volumes, these kind of reflections reject dualist and materialist assumptions: a rejection which both Aristotle and Kant agreed upon. Anscombe's ethical reflections are in fact more Aristotelian than Kantian, but they also embody a Wittgensteinian commitment to analysing language usage: a commitment that was probably necessary to clear away the weeds of dualism and materialism in modern ethical Philosophy. Kant, we have argued earlier, was skeptical about turning to language as a court of justification for theories relating to belief and action, claiming as he did that even if it is true that we share the language we speak together, it is nevertheless also true that we can use this language both rationally and irrationally.

One of the differentiating factors serving to distinguish Arendt, the pragmatic existentialist, from Anscombe, the follower of Wittgenstein, is Anscombe's schooling in Analytic Philosophy. Her years in Cambridge placed her in the anti-Hegelian environment nurtured by Russell and Moore. Dialectical reasoning and its tendency to relativise truth and knowledge were anathema to the Cambridge school of Analytical Philosophy. Anscombe points to the possible origin of Hegelian anti-Critical Philosophy in an Ancient medieval thought. She invokes Plato:

"I can't help thinking that the Platonic substance, the idea or Form, is of importance in the tradition whereby intellect came to be thought of as immaterial substance. For that which could grasp those immaterial beings, the Forms, had itself to be immaterial: the soul, Plato said, is akin to the Forms"²

Anscombe also refers to an ancient argument which claims the soul to be immaterial on the grounds that thought is not an act performed by any physical

or bodily organ. Given that thought must logically be an activity, it must therefore be the act of some immaterial substance. Descartes, in his second meditation, constructs his dualistic position by firstly, maintaining that nutrition, locomotion and perception are properties of the soul, and secondly, by detaching thought and sensation from the body. Anscombe claims paradoxically that this position has its roots in Aristotelian thought but it is not clear what she means here, especially considering the fact that she concludes this reflection by maintaining that nutrition, locomotion, and perception are partially constitutive of forms of life possessing constellations of organs that are responsible for those forms of life. That the soul had a material substrate composed of organs was a central hylomorphic claim.

Anscombe claims that Descartes is performing a "trick". We have argued in previous volumes that "the new men" of Philosophy worked systematically and manipulatively to redirect the thread of philosophical tradition that flowed from the thought of the Greeks. Analytical Philosophy, Anscombe argues, responds to Cartesian dualism with the Hobbesian strategy of reducing the substance or principle of thought to physical substance: the only substance that can be observed and physically manipulated. The organ of the brain is postulated as the bodily part that acts in order to produce sensation, thought, and understanding: thus embedding life forms inextricably in a causal network of events of type cause, and events of type effect: these events are logically distinguishable from each other.

Anscombe charts the course of spirituality with the help of an examination of the grammatical structures of first person present indicatives. She claims that Descartes spiritualised the soul and helped to separate it philosophically from its physical origins. This, (even though Anscombe does not actively recognise it to be such), is an Aristotelian hylomorphic criticism of Cartesianism that is designed to reject the assumptions of both dualism and materialism. Descartes and Hobbes together neutralised Aristotelian hylomorphism and metaphysics, and revived the fruitless debate between the dualists and materialists. Kant would in his reflections once again bury this debate in Aristotelian spirit. Hegel and Science aided and abetted by some forms of analytical philosophy again revived these debates but in turn faced opposition by the later Philosophy of Wittgenstein and Anscombe. The resultant views (Hegelian and Scientific) of Philosophical Psychology made ethical argumentation of the kind we encountered in Anscombe's remarks in her essay on the Justice of War, almost impossible.

In her work entitled "Intention" Anscombe maintains that categorical ethics had previously been tied to the authority of religion, and its philosophical importance waned with the waning of this authority. The categorical

justification of ethics thus became problematic. There is, however, no attempt to relate her reflections to Kantian critical Philosophy, whether it be ethical, or in terms of the founding idea of freedom. This idea of freedom is a difficult idea to assimilate in religious discourse because it belongs more naturally in a context of the tribunal constructed by ones peers on the basis of Law, truthfulness and rationality. Moreover this tribunal has a purely humanistic history, having been constructed by generations of great-souled political leaders and philosophers.

Anscombe appears to agree with Wittgenstein in his belief that the only necessity that can be gleaned from practical reasoning is a form of necessity manifested in grammatical propositions. This retreat from the rationalistic tribunal of justification is partly a result of the conflation of an anti-Hegelian critique that placed Kantian and Hegelian Philosophy within the same pair of brackets under the concept of "Continental Philosophy". Anscombe does, however point out an interesting aspect of practical reasoning in the following quote:

"Necessity here has a sense little examined by philosophers, but given by Aristotle in his dictionary of *Metaphysics* (delta). Things are, in this sense necessary when without them some good cannot be got or some evil avoided. The pilot must navigate to preserve his ship: the cook must put salt in the potatoes to cook them well: A very likely must know what is just and unjust for him to do if he is to avoid acting unjustly.."3

This account of Aristotle is also congruent with the opening passage of his *Nichomachean Ethics* in which it is claimed that every activity of man including science and all areas of knowledge must (of necessity) aim at the good. Anscombe's reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* does not elaborate upon the assumption that the activity of practical reasoning is the activity of a rational animal capable of discourse. Neither does it emphasise or highlight the hylomorphic assumptions that found Aristotle's reflections, namely, that the Theory of Forms has been replaced by a Theory of Change which rejects the dualistic thesis that the forms exists in an independent reality which empirical reality "participates" in. The Theory of change categorically states that the form or principle of all forms of change emanating from psuche is "in" the organism and explains both what this organism essentially does and essentially is. The knowledge of this change is the concern of the different sciences which explain and justify the necessity and universality involved in the activity of the organism and the forms or principles guiding this activity. The practical necessity Anscombe discusses above is related to the formal and final causes of hylomorphic theory. The concept of "form of life" does not, however, figure centrally in her ethical and political discussions. Anscombe is neither a materialist nor a behaviourist, as is evident in her defence of Wittgenstein against such charges. Wittgenstein's Philosophy also avoids dualistic and

Hegelian tendencies with the aid of an Aristotelian idea, namely, "forms of life". The only space in Wittgenstein's account of activity (e.g. the ostensive definition of a concept) for the Hegelian idea of "Spirit" is the spirit in which any activity is done. Aristotle would argue, however, as Wittgenstein does not, that ways of acting relate to **principles** that regulate the particularity of different forms of life. For Aristotle the human form of life is related in an important way to the communication of principles or forms from human to human. These types of activity carry with it the responsibility for the communication of the so-called "basic terms" of any universe of discourse, e.g., the theoretical, practical and productive sciences. Anscombe's work on "intention" and her account of intentional action is in the "spirit" of Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, broadening as it does the idea of causality traditionally embraced by Analytical Philosophy. This spirit is manifested in her remarks on History:

"Let us end by considering the causalities especially involved in a history of a people's dealings with one another. When such dealings concern or constitute great events, important in the history of nations, they are the greater part of what we call "History", where this is treated as the name of a subject of traditional lore and of academic study, a special discipline. But public or private, great events or small, the causalities involved in them are much the same type. The first thing to note is: these causalities are mostly to be understood derivatively. The derivation is from the understanding of action as intentional, calculated, voluntary, impulsive, involuntary, reluctant, concessive, passionate etc. The first thing we know upon the whole, is what proceedings are parleys, agreements, quarrels, struggles, embassies, wars, pressures, pursuits of given ends, routines, institutional practices of all sorts. That is to say: in our descriptions of their histories, we apply such conceptions of what people are engaged in.....Given the idea of an engagement to marry, say, you can look for its causal antecedents..." (Human Life, P.107)⁴

There is much to unpack in the above quote. History, as an academic discipline, at some point in its development was presented in mythological form. Muthos, for the Greeks, retained important connections to aletheia and logos. Given the fact that mythology reached back to the origins of the universe and civilisation it was necessarily speculative and required an allegorical mode of discourse that applied concepts symbolically (requiring "interpretation by the discipline of "hermeneutics"--of the kind practiced by Paul Ricoeur). There was undoubtedly an intention to present the truth of these matters in the form of a true account. Aristotle's hylomorphic philosophy certainly assisted in the transformation of this symbolic allegorical mode of logos to a more descriptively oriented categorical mode of discourse. Anscombe's logos of intentional action provides us with a conceptual network that is not designed explicitly with hylomorphic philosophy in mind, but this approach does in fact chart some of the collateral territory of this domain of discourse.

History as a discipline also received some assistance in its transformation into an academic discipline from Kant's Metaphysical theory. Kant distinguished between Theoretical Reasoning where events are categorised for example into events of type cause, and events of type effect. Kant in fact focussed on a theoretical view of causation very different to the Humean linear account where investigators follow chains of linear causes and effects. Kant's theoretical search for the totality of conditions for any given phenomenon is, instead, related to a logical principle of sufficient reason: a principle which acknowledged the reality of multi-factorial causation arranged in a network of conditions. His account, in other words, aligned itself very closely with Aristotelian accounts of multiple-causation and probably also aligned itself with the separation of scientific discourse into the domains of Theoretical Science, Practical Science, and Productive Science.

Consequently, in historical accounts, we might encounter a search for conditions that reach back into the mists of time where the forms discerned are given substance by the wisdom of muthos. In such investigations we might also encounter descriptions made in the "spirit", or in accordance with the principle of "freedom", where the chain of explanation ends in a voluntary intentional choice of a historical actor or an institution. Kant pointed out that the broad texture of reality is such that one can conceptualise (describe/explain) the same phenomenon in both theoretical and practical terms. In the former we categorise the phenomenon as an event that has happened, in the latter we practically categorise the phenomenon in question in terms of Action. Anscombe's theory of Action assists in the construction of this practical characterisation: a theory that neither Aristotle nor Kant would fundamentally disagree with. Nevertheless we will not find in Anscombe any explicit commitment to the Metaphysics we find in either Aristotelian or Kantian theory. Anscombe, in her Introduction to the series of essays published under the title "Ethics, Religion, and Politics", raises an interesting doubt about her own approach in these essays:

"So far as general questions of moral theory have interested me, I have thought them closely tied up with problems of action-description and unresolvable without help from Philosophy of Mind. Some of these papers represent a struggle to treat all deliberate action as a matter of acting on a calculation how to obtain one's ends. I have now become rather doubtful about this." (Page IX)⁵

Her doubt most likely had its origins in her study of Aristotelian Philosophical Psychology rather than that presented in Kant's Practical works. Even if this is the case, there is nevertheless no explicit commitment to the Aristotelian Theory of Change and Theory of "Psyche". Indeed in her volume entitled "From Parmenides to Wittgenstein" Aristotle is discussed extensively in relation to specific aporetic problems in Philosophy, but without acknowledgement of the importance of the metaphysical network of media of change, kinds of change,

principles of change and causes of change embedded in the Theoretical, Practical, and Productive Sciences. The Practical sciences are, of course, connected to Action as conceived of by Aristotle, namely fundamentally connected to the telos or final cause (explanation) of "The Good". This is reflected in Aristotle's claim that the premises of a practical argument show or prove why the action is Good⁶. The major premise in arguments used in accordance with the kind of practical reasoning we encounter in the practical sciences will be more than merely a starting point (as Anscombe mysteriously suggests): rather the major premise will play the role of a principle or justification. In the ethical case, for Kant, the major premise will assume the practical truth and validity of the moral law. If, for example, the major premise or principle/justification is "Promises ought to be kept" and is amongst the totality of Kantian conditions which the principle of sufficient reason is seeking, the justification of the major premise will require support from the three formulations of the categorical imperative. The role of rational ideas such as "Freedom" and "The Good Will" in this type of propositional investigation will also be involved in various ways in tribunals of justification related to the major premise, "Promises ought to be kept".

The epistemic component of Action is often characterised in Analytical Philosophy in terms of "belief". Anscombe, however, does not fall into the camp of those analytical philosophers who seek to psychologise the concept of belief:

"Belief is the most difficult topic because it is so hard to hold in view and correctly combine the psychological and logical aspects. Beliefs are psychological dispositions belonging in the histories of minds. But also, a belief, a believing is internally characterised by the proposition saying what is believed. This is (mostly) not about anything psychological, its meaning and truth are not matters of which we should give a psychological account."⁷

Indeed not, for such a psychological account would fail to explain the role of good will and freedom in contexts of ethical justification. Objects of belief are of theoretical rather than practical concern and require a shift in the kind of justification required. This shift in turn is related to what Ricoeur referred to as the difference between archeological and teleological justifications (a distinction that in turn relies on different kinds of explanation).

Anscombe, in an essay entitled "Practical Inference", fixates upon the distinction between the objective and subjective elements of belief in a discussion of the expression "I want". She claims correctly, that this expression could never serve as a "good reason" because reasons, or the propositions expressing them, in practical inference connect not with psychological dispositions but rather with other propositions or reasons⁸ (P.144). The drive toward an end is the psychological aspect of the will. This drive or power is not an isolated element but is rather part of an integrated medley of other powers and dispositions

involved in the process of achieving the good ends of a good will. Such good will manifests itself in the action or actions necessary to bring about the end desired by the agent concerned. The "I will" is universalised by O Shaughnessy into "The Will". In ethical contexts such actions are driven by practical rationality or practical knowledge of "The Good". Necessity is involved in the form of the categorical imperatives that of necessity leads to doing what one ought to do in the name of areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time), which in its turn requires practical knowledge (including knowledge of the categorical imperative in at least one of its formulations). We argued earlier that ethical actions have several levels of characterisation that range from a descriptive level of making a promise, to an explanatory level of Principle (Promises ought to be kept) to the even higher level of the moral law that Justifies (Metaphysically and Logically) everything involved with the action and its object or achieved purpose. The Greek term Phronesis, in such contexts, is connected with the term "Sophia"--the theoretical rational part of the mind. This former aspect of the mind "counsels" the practical rationally aspect in relation to what ought to be done or chosen to be done and also in relation to the means to do what ought to be done. Phronesis is of course connected to the moral virtues of the great-souled man and Sophia is connected to the intellectual virtues of such men who love both the good and knowledge.

Anscombe praises Aristotle for being the first to formulate the concept of Practical Truth which obviously is an important part of the above discussion. She refers to Aristotle's claim that desire and choice are for the end of eudaimonia, and this requires the coordination of thought and desire (manifested especially in the disposition of decision making and deliberation) (P.152). She also acknowledges that Aristotle may be talking about "the will" in this discussion. In relation to this point she maintains:

"There is this special kind of cause operating in the world, and it is man" (P.153)

Desire, then, is a desire for both **Sophia** (wise understanding), an intellectual virtue, and **phronesis**, a moral virtue, both of which, according to Aristotle is necessary for a contemplative flourishing life (**eudaimonia**). Any action which is practically true, according to Anscombe must be in accordance with the description of what is involved in leading a flourishing life, something that can only occur in relation to a deliberative process of practical reasoning. This process of practical reasoning, for Aristotle, will contain at least one major premise expressing a principle of action, e.g. "Promises ought to be kept", "Justice ought to be done". Just as, in the latter case it is "The Law" that finally justifies that justice is done, so, in the former case, it is (according to Kant), the Moral Law of the Categorical Imperative (in its three formulations) that justifies the principle "Promises ought to be kept".

According to Anscombe, Moral Philosophy in Modern Times has been tainted by the collapse of the belief in religious authority. She discusses the uncomfortable relation that "moral earnestness" (as she expresses it) has to Religious and Secular authority:

"If you really want to corrupt people by direct teaching of ideas, moral earnestness would, in fact, be an important item of equipment. But I should also suspect that direct teaching of ideas is not, nowadays, the best way of setting about changing people: public action is much more effective. A good deal was done, for example, by arranging trials of war criminals on the bad side with judges from the good and victorious side making up their law as they went: this educated people out of old fashioned over-legalistic conceptions of justice...."⁹ (Human Life P.162)

Aristotle once said that his lectures on Ethics were not for those of the followers of his lectures under 30 years of age, because presumably their moral characters were not amenable to the moral actualisation process: a process involving the coordination of a number of practical and intellectual dispositions. Yet we found Socrates teaching geometry to a young slave. If that teaching had continued systematically, no doubt the slave would have become a geometer. For Plato this was an awakening of forms within the slave. Aristotle, however would have described this differently, as a matter of the transmission of principles or forms from the mind of the teacher to the mind of the student, thus contributing to the actualisation process that will assist in the formation of the slaves character.

This hylomorphic idea of being responsible for ones deliberations, decisions, and actions began to wane as the "new men" with their "new understanding" of Justice and The Good, began to influence Modern Society. Hannah Arendt's analysis of our modern human condition pointed to a division in society between those "new men" who thought "everything is possible!" and those who felt that "Nothing was possible". Both of those groups were expressions of the fact that the moral responsibility as conceived of by Greek Philosophy and Kantian Enlightenment Philosophy was eclipsed by a sociological view of causal networks that made man an instrumental manipulator or victim of these networks. Powering ones path through these networks like a Juggernaut seemed, in such circumstances, to be the only rational response to the challenges of the times.

Anscombe invokes a legal tribunal as holding out the last hope of defending the ancient idea of Responsibility and Good Judgement. For many, in a rapidly changing world with constantly changing conditions and standards, the only reasonable response was to create ones own standards, become a law unto oneself. Anscombe's response to our modern malaise is the surprising claim that nothing can be done to restore the moral concept of Responsibility, because:

".. it is not profitable for us as present to do moral philosophy: this should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking...the concepts of obligation and duty--moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say--and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense and "ought", ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible: because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives..."¹⁰ (P.169)

Anscombe raises a question in relation to Aristotelian ethics, asking why Aristotle does not discuss ethical Responsibility and Obligation. In the context of this discussion she also reduces the Kantian architectonic to what she describes as "legislating for oneself". She then attacks the universalisation aspect of the categorical imperative in the following way:

"His rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it."¹¹(P.171)

Firstly, it is not clear that the maxim is related to the description in the way Anscombe assumes. The polarity of the relation may in fact be reversed and the maxim or principle give rise to determining the appropriate description of the action. It is also unclear why the universalising of the description of a particular promise being made (in the minor premise of the moral argument) cannot be conceptually related to the universalisation contained in the major premise of the argument, namely "Promises ought to be kept". The above reflection by Anscombe is puzzling in the light of her earlier comments on the topic of practical truth. If Anscombe is correct in her doubt about the universalisation of the minor premise in the following moral argument:

"Promises ought to be kept"

Jack promised Jill he would pay the money back that he borrowed from her

Therefore Jack ought to pay the money back to her"

..then the above argument would not be expressing what she earlier referred to as "Practical Truth". Anscombe continues to reflect upon Kantian theory and discusses the question of whether lying is absolutely forbidden on Kant's theory. Should, for example, one be truthful with a murderer and tell him upon being asked where the person he is pursuing is hiding? This example is a curious one and almost appears to be constructed for the purposes of refuting the categorical imperative. Firstly, one can wonder how one knows in this case that we are being confronted by a murderer? Secondly, why should we accept that there are only two possible choices of action in such circumstances? Would it be contrary to the categorical imperative to say nothing in response to the question or to answer in a language the murderer does not understand (asking for example why the inquirer wants the information requested). Thirdly, if it is argued that one

ought to reveal the information because one is under threat or duress to do so, then the choice is no longer a free choice. In such circumstances, even if I reveal the information requested under duress and the murderer finds his quarry, is a murder the inevitable result? What if the potential victim incapacitates the murderer in the ensuing struggle or even kills the murderer? Shall I be held responsible in a moral tribunal for the death that ensues? Or is it rather the case, as Kant maintains, that the cause of the evil in this imagined situation is the agent, and the Principles of the maxims behind his action. The belief that my providing someone with information is part of the causal network leading to the murder is a correct belief, but it does not mitigate the murderers absolute responsibility for the action he wills. The form of explanation for this state of affairs does not divide the world up into causes and effects but rather seeks for a totality of conditions regulated by the principle of sufficient reason. The will is not a cause that is conceptually independent of events conceived of as "effects".

On the accounts of both Aristotle and Kant the murderer makes his choices, and ought to be held responsible for them. If I am blamed for revealing the deadly information surely the only grounds for such an accusation could be "You could have said nothing!". Such an accusation is not either in the case of law or morality, a matter of accusing me of being an accessory before the fact, but is rather an accusation of a lack of prudence on my part. The principle of prudence for both Aristotle and Kant was a power that emanated from the calculating part of our minds rather than a power of categorical deliberation on the part of a deliberating will regulated by a principle of sufficient reason.

Anscombe accuses Kant of not being aware of a hylomorphic distinction that is made in the description of the action of a murder. She cites a case in which one believes one is shooting a deer that one has been hunting but in reality one shoots ones own father. She refers to two kinds of object here, the formal object of the deer and the material object of ones father. It is difficult to imagine that Kant would not have been aware of a distinction that 99 out of 100 courts of the time would have recognised and would lie behind the obvious judgements of such institutions, namely that the agent did not intend to kill his father and was therefore not guilty of murder.

In such circumstances there may also be an investigation into whether the shooter took all the relevant precautions associated with the responsibilities of hunting and some other crime may well be judged to have occurred. It is important to realise that the mere accusation of the crime of "murder" does not suffice to categorically conceptualise the event described above as "Murder". Anscombe claims that the only description that best answers the question as to what was occurring in these circumstances is "X shot his father"--this being the material object of the act.

Does the verdict of morality and the courts mean nothing then? Surely after the post-mortem tribunal has occurred and the verdict of "accidental death" is delivered, this is also a permissible answer to the question "What happened? If the case goes to court and the son is found not guilty of murder, surely we can say "Yes, the son shot his father, but unintentionally." This is not to deny the validity of the third person observational judgement "He shot his father". He did not will to do that from a first person point of view but the observational judgment is true as is the judgement "He thought he was shooting the deer he was hunting". Anscombe admits that the deer is the "formal object". It is not clear whether she is conscious of the hylemorphic implications of the choice of this term "formal".

Formal explanations or "causes" for Aristotle take us closer to rational essence-specifying definitions than material causes or explanations: that is they take us closer to answering the question "Why did he shoot his father?": "Because he thought he was shooting the deer he was hunting." In this later shift we must see that involved in this movement is a move from a context of exploration/discovery to a context of explanation/justification. A further move within the context of Justification might occur if the defendant in this case claimed "I would never intentionally shoot the father that I love". The Categorical imperative is not operating at the conceptual level of the context of exploration in which one is deciding how to conceptualise a particular action. Once the action has been conceptualised, only then can we judge as to the goodness or otherwise of the action: this is an essential condition for the attribution of responsibility which presupposes the action was blameworthy or praiseworthy.

Anscombe appears to be conflating what is prudent with what is ethical especially when she discusses the very intellectual idea of Truth we find in Hume, which she claims can be expressed as follows:

"Truth consists in either relations of ideas, as that 20 shillings=one pound or matter of fact as that I ordered potatoes, you supplied them, and you sent me a bill. So it doesn't apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such and such a sum."¹²

It is nevertheless possible that the above relation (expressed by the above facts) which I have established with my grocer is sufficient to constitute a promise to pay the bill. Anscombe, does not, however, discuss the concept of promising but prefers to focus upon whether "brute facts" in the above quote are sufficient to justify the description "X owes Y so much money". The discussion occurs solely in the context of a limited concept of truth as is evident from the assertion that truth does not apply to any proposition claiming that one owes someone money. She does however discuss the injustice of not paying what one owes, and insists that a conceptual analysis of this situation must precede any ethical discussion--a conceptual analysis involving "philosophical psychology". She claims that the

"should" or "ought" related to ones need for potatoes are not to be construed in a moral sense. She further claims, somewhat paradoxically, that not paying what one owes has become associated with a moral sense of duty or obligation which in turn was determined by a law conception of ethics propagated by the influence of the Hebrew Torah upon Christianity.

Anscombe suggests that the concept of **hamartia** was used by Aristotle to refer to a tragic flaw in the heroes of Greek Tragedies. This concept of hamartia, according to Paul Ricoeur, was re-conceptualised by the Christians as "sin" which in turn became associated with the internal feeling of guilt that lies at the source of the activity of religious confession. One is guilty because one has sinned. Here we find ourselves at the end of a cycle of experience which expressed itself in Greek tragedy in the form of an objective tragic mistake (hamartia).

We have discussed several times previously the influence of the Latinisation of Greek terms in the translation process from Greek to Latin. What the Christian and Greek muthos have in common is that the term hamartia appears to be applicable in the domain of religious experience and both cultures would probably accept that the meaning of this term, in a religious context, is that of a rupturing of the bond between man and what he finds sacred. The Greeks refused to interiorise this objective state of affairs and preferred to exhibit the phenomenon in the spirit of *aletheia* (truth, unconcealment) on a public stage. For the Greeks the law that had been breached was not merely a private affair between oneself and ones God, but rather something to be manifested in a public arena in a context of catharsis (e.g. a tragic play or temple) in which both pity and fear are encapsulated in a larger context of understanding.

The Roman militaristic conception of "Law" was probably also present in the mistranslation of hamartia as "mistake" although this meaning was undoubtedly present in Greek usage prior to its philosophical/poetic transformation into a concept relevant to the ethical and religious idea of "The Good" (which has a categorical meaning not possessed by the more hypothetical meaning of "mistake"). What we witness in such a change is a transformation from something that was mythologically sacred to something that becomes philosophically "sacred", where the focus instead is on the good of a mans character and its relation to *eudaimonia*. The conception of law shifted from a divine context into a more humanistic context in which the good became embodied in great souled men such as Solon, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. All of these figures were involved in the very real and pragmatic world of the polis and its manifestly secular injustices. Solon's laws were designed to prevent the rich from exploiting the poor, and the poor from robbing the rich. Solon was convinced that both parties would benefit from obeying his laws. They

definitely emerged from a context of pity and fear but transcended this context by a context of justification, a context that would prove to be critical to the survival of the polis. Yet it is only with Aristotle that this bond between man and the sacred appear to be restored via a view of the polis that was less calculative and more philosophical: a view of the great-souled man who valued Philosophy, Science, the Arts, and the contemplative life.

Anscombe continues her discussion in terms of a critique of the is-ought question, insofar as it relates to her earlier discussion of "need". She fixates upon the concept of "what-is-good-for" which is somewhat puzzling considering Glaucons challenge in the Republic to provide a theory of the good that is both good-in-itself and good-in-its-consequences. The constellation of the focus on the facts and consequences also evokes the Humean concept of causality and its matrix of events of type cause, and events of type effect: a matrix that destroys the unity of the actions involved in an ethical activity. Anscombe also specifically argues that the transition from is to ought, on her account, does not carry what she calls the "mesmeric force" of a verdict of a tribunal which in its turn requires the presence of an attitude toward something that resembles "the sacred" (implied by divine law). By implication, her argument involves the claim that there is no longer any respect for the law of the kind we could find during the times and eras of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. One might, of course, argue that the respect we find in all three of the above philosophers is connected to divine law through their different philosophical conceptions of the divine and this might sustain Anscombe's objection. There is, however, a distinct atmosphere of secularisation in the Hylomorphic "Scientific" Philosophy of Aristotle. In Aristotle's work we encounter God technically represented as a "Primary Form" in a context of contemplation that regards knowledge as a kind of "holy ground". A very different conception to that superior being created by the fiery imaginations of poets and priests.

Respect for "forms" or "principles" is the focus of Kantian Enlightenment Thought. The tribunal of reason resembles the proceedings of a court of law in which divine beings are conspicuous by their absence. Anscombe misses this relation of morality to law in her reflections on Kantian moral Philosophy. Both arenas of human activity share common attitudes--respect for the law, respect for the moral law--and share common objects, e.g. respect for evidence and the due process of argumentation. Respect for the rights of both contesting parties is the political attitude that relates to both kinds of process. Confessions in such circumstances are less related to sensible objects of pity and fear, and more related to rational objects of decisive evidence, contributing to a correct verdict of the tribunal. The giving of evidence in court is inextricably linked to the Kantian conception of promising--"I promise to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God", but also linked to an emotional nexus

connected to *Deus absconditus*. Swearing an oath with ones hand on the Bible testifies to the symbolic presence of the divine in the tribunal. Such tribunals, however, have more in common with the secular trial of Socrates and the great-souled law makers of the polis. than with the figures and processes haunting the Temples of the time.

Anscombe praises Hume for his jettisoning of the moral-ought from ethical discussion on the grounds that without divine support, law does not have the required psychological effect. Aristotle is cited as an example of a Philosopher who did not appeal to any divine influence but was able nevertheless to establish the authority of his forms and principles via processes of argumentation. It can indeed also be argued that Aristotle transformed the dialogical presentation of Socratic Elenchus we encounter in the Platonic dialogues into exercises of logic requiring only very abstract tribunals of reasoning in which The Good was expressed in terms of Laws embedded in a system of ought premises. Anscombes invocation of Hume (one of "the new men" of the modern era) actually reduces the force of the meaning of the term, "law" (to bind someone), and the social bond of the law, to the more popular notion of a rule which carries no force of an imperative to command obedience and duty. Rather, the rule hypothetically "counsels" that if you wish to drive to Cambridge, you ought to follow the direction of the arrow--thus leaving it up to you to change your mind and drive to Oxford instead. Aristotle would not have accepted such a utilitarian conflation of rules with laws. On his account, if you do not accept the major ought premise of a moral argument, you risk being regarded as irrational. He would have been dumbfounded by our modern tendency to use is-arguments (people contradict themselves in discourse) to undermine the logical force of ought arguments (One ought not to contradict oneself in ones discourse). In moral contexts, virtues are related to ought-premises that express principles of justice. The argument of Glaucon that laws are only obeyed because man is afraid of the consequences and that an invisible ring would justify all forms of illegal behaviour, would have been viewed with contempt by Aristotle (as it was similarly viewed by both Socrates and Plato).

Kant has a similar view to Aristotle of the law-like nature of moral ought-statements. He expresses this in his discussion of Promising, an account that cannot be undermined by the simplistic argument that promises as a matter of fact are not kept. A broken promise, for Kant, is perhaps the most important occasion for the use of the major premise or principle, "Promises ought to be kept". If confronted with the philosophical question "Why?", the answer would contain reference to one or more of the formulations of the moral law. A promise broken in such a context of justification cannot affect or change the form or principle expressed by the true proposition "Promises ought to be kept". On the other hand the keeping of the promise not only brings about the truth that

promises are kept but also brings good into the world. These are two of the reasons why promising has been one of the building blocks of our civilisations and why we still promise to tell the truth via the oath we take in the court room. Reducing promises to the consequentialist quid pro quo world of the contract is a transactional move that neither Aristotle or Kant would have approved of. The contract, at is very best, has a role in the tribunal of justification as evidence that a promise was made, and such evidence presupposes the philosophical meaning of the principle.

Anscombe claims that ethics must rest upon a theory of Philosophical Psychology that explains the psychological aspects of action. It is not, however clear whether she realises that such an account of ethical action is only a part of the totality of conditions Kant is in search of in the name of the logical principles of sufficient reason and noncontradiction.

We do not find any account of the binding force of the law in Anscombes theories: the law does not appear to bind agents to an action, or indeed, does not appear to be a bond that one is "duty-bound" to honour. Her reading of Kant in this context is problematic:

"Kant's major influence has been that of emphasising the motive of duty.....what ought to be done or ought not to be done is somehow derivable from the categorical imperative, "Always act so that you can consistently universalise the maxim on which you act",It leads to a contrast between doing something for the motive of duty and doing it with enjoyment---the more you like doing something, the less of a purely moral agent you are"¹³

This is a very poor interpretation of the complexity of Kant's moral theory, which quite clearly, in the name of a summum bonum, relates the happiness of the flourishing life to the worthiness of a virtuous agent who does feel compelled by areté and phronesis to do what he ought to do (his duty). The agent does this freely as if he were a legislator in a kingdom of ends. This account accords well with the Aristotelian account. Indeed all the virtues require the use of reason in the mode of the "ought" and there is no contradiction in the phenomenon of a man gladly doing what he ought to do (neither in Aristotle nor in Kant).

In conclusion, Anscombe in many respects manifests in her writings many aspects of Aristotelian hylomorphic Philosophy and it may be that her criticisms of Kant rest upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the close relation between hylomorphic and critical philosophy. Anscombe may well be a victim of her fascination for the empiricism of Hume, and as a consequence she fails to see the power of the rationalism we find in both Aristotle and Kant. Wittgenstein never produced a moral theory so we do not know whether any theory of his would have sought to emulate Anscombes desire to cleanse ethical theory of the

moral "ought". In this desire she identifies herself with all "the new men" of philosophy since Descartes.

Notes Chapter 3

¹*Ethics, Religion and Politics*, (Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. 3), G., E., M., Anscombe, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, P.81)

²*Human Life, Action, and Ethics*, Anscombe, G., E., M., (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2005, P.4)

³*Ethics, Religion, and Politics*, G., E., M., Anscombe (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, P.9)

⁴ *Human Life*, P.107

⁵ *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*, PIX

⁶ *Human Life*, P.114.

⁷ *Human Life*, P.138

⁸ Ibid. P.144

⁹ Ibid. P. 162

¹⁰ Ibid. P.169

¹¹ Ibid. P.171

¹² *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*, P.22

¹³ *Human Life*, (P.195)

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Chapter 4: Anscombe's Philosophical Psychology

Elisabeth Anscombe's work is not easy to characterise. It is clearly influenced by the later work of Wittgenstein but it also manifests a resemblance to the work of medieval scholars working in the Neo-Aristotelian tradition. The Greek idea of "psuche" underlies some of her reasoning about our human nature. There is also clear reliance on the classical principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason in her treatment of philosophical arguments. The presence of a spirit of Aristotle, is, then, clearly present in her writings but there is a question-mark hanging over her relation to Kantian metaphysics. There is also a clear and concise commitment to the Wittgenstein methodology of examining the intricacies of the grammar of our language which can be found in the writings of Aristotle, but not in Kant, who thought language to be nothing but a medium for the presentation of ideas without any commitment to their truth or rationality.

In an essay entitled "The Intentionality of Sensation", we are presented with Anscombe's views on Logic and Language but her relation to Metaphysics remains unclear. "Sensation" is, of course a key concept in Psychological Theory, and Anscombe submits the concept to a logical and grammatical critique. In connection with this discussion Anscombe discusses the changes in meaning of the terms "subject" and "object". One common sense approach to the meaning of the term "object" is to think of it as denoting:

"the objects found in the accused mens pockets"¹

Objects are, at the very least, sensory-motor entities that naturally insert themselves into spatial contexts of perception and manipulation. They can be the abstract entities of thought discussed by scholastic thinkers and they can also be the entities discussed by Freud under the category of "object of desire". Anscombe approaches the discussion about the nature of objects strategically via reference to the grammatical idea of an object. Here the question "What?" dominates the discussion. "What did John give Mary?" is a question asked in a grammatical parts of speech lesson, whilst analysing the sentence, "John gave Mary a book.". Anscombe points out in this discussion that we are not dealing with a piece of language and here she does not mention, but is clearly relying on, the Wittgensteinian claim, that the concept of the essence of "objects" is provided by grammatical remarks and investigations. Anscombe, like Wittgenstein is eager to steer a course that does not sail too close to the island of metaphysics. She claims that the direct object is not merely a part of the structure of a sentence but also "provides us with" (pictures?) the object (the book). In Philosophy, a book is a physical thing, an artefact, and a cultural object communicating thought for various purposes. In grammar the term "book" is classified or categorised as a "noun", Wittgenstein claimed that much of ones language has to be understood (mastered) before one can understand

fully the use of a term, whether it be a noun or a proper name. From an Aristotelian point of view spoken words are affections of the soul which in turn are likenesses (pictures?) of what they are affections of. The written language of a book, on the other hand, symbolises these spoken words, though we should note with Ricoeur that the logos of a book is that it explodes the dialogical face-to-face context. Many Hylomorphic Aristotelian powers, capacities, and dispositions are implied by Aristotle's claim that the subject -predicate structure is analogous to the thought structure of thinking something about something.

The term "symbolon" is a designation of the expressive power of voiced sounds in relation to affections of the soul. For Aristotle the complete meaning of a sentence is its logos and may require hermeneia or interpretation, whether it be a declarative, an interrogative, an imperative, or a sentence expressive of wants or wishes. For Aristotle this hermeneutic activity cannot occur at the level of the name/noun. It is the verb that brings additional mental powers into the picture via its reference to time and of being an indication of something said about something. It is this latter indication that allows the true and the false to emerge as an element of logos in the declarative case. The imperative case also allows the good and its opposite to emerge in the relation of actions and intentions to the agents of these actions and intentions. Aristotle, of course, added another dimension to this discussion, when he claimed that Being is said in many ways and articulated his 10 categories of existence which Kant felt was rhapsodic (possibly because it appeared to be merely a prologue to his own categories of judgements). Wittgenstein, for his part, at least in his later work, fixated upon the expressive function of language and spent much time exploring the philosophical consequences of the role of language in philosophical thought. Anscombe's account appears to regard the object of the book as having an intentional existence, a form of existence that has a complex logical relation to the material existence of the object referred to. On the other hand, objects related to actions (e.g. giving), have a clear and obvious relation to the action. This relation is not as clear and obvious when it comes to thought. Upon being asked "What are you thinking?" and being told "I was thinking of Winston Churchill", no one, for example, will ask if this is possible given the fact that he is dead. This possibility of referring to non-existent objects becomes more controversial if one answers instead "I was thinking of Apollo" or "I was thinking of Zeus". These "objects" may never have existed in the way in which Winston Churchill did. All names can be described, e.g. "The sun-god" or "The son of Chronos". Neither the names nor the descriptions (of Apollo and Zeus) have any obvious relation to present or past sensory-motor experience, even if they can be brought to life in the sensory dream-like scene of the imagination. In these latter cases there is no possibility of consulting relatives of Apollo or Zeus, reading their letters, documents that they have signed, or documents containing facts about them (as one can in the case of Winston Churchill). Zeus and Apollo

may well be literary creations (fictions) and no less important for being so. The meaning of these names terminate, therefore, in the use of their names and descriptions in literary documents. Anscombe also takes up the issue of the worship of fictional objects such as "the sun-god" in the light of her discussion of the hylomorphic distinction between formal (intentional) and material objects. The sun-god worshippers are clearly not worshipping "a gravitationally bound body of hydrogen and helium gas made self luminous by an internal process of nuclear fusion". What then are they worshipping? The role of the sun in their lives, both real and imagined? Zeus in particular was imagined to be a standard bearer of wisdom, courage and self control--a sort of demiurge of the ethical values in the moral space of humankind, acting in the mysterious ways in which supernatural agencies act.

So, if to the question "What are you thinking about?" I respond "I am thinking about Zeus, the son of Chronos", there may well be an epistemological question to raise concerning whether there is a material object of my thought, but this does not, for Aristotle, disturb the logos of the thought, because there is certainly an intentional object located in the realm of ethical discourse that is the subject matter of the discourse. Anscombe does not appear to attribute too much significance to the epistemological concern that may be raised about the status of fictional intentional objects. This might be because this is of no import for the connection between the being of a subject of discourse and the rules connected to the categories of grammar. In this universe of discourse there is no validity to the distinction between subjective and objective entities as construed by science and analytical philosophers.

Why, one can wonder, does the subject-object distinction focus upon a putative primacy of the material object locatable by sensory-motor encounters and locatable in a space-time continuum? Intentional objects such as the debt of five pounds that Jack owes Jill appears not to be a sensory-motor object or locatable in space (open to ostensive definition). Instead what we appear to be dealing with is a transactional exchange of money and a promise to repay the money. These are indeed sensory-motor activities locatable in a space-time continuum but it is the promise that appears to be the most important element of the transaction, conferring as it does the obligation upon Jack to repay the debt. When he does so, it is not the physical money, but the act of repayment that is the element that makes the promise meaningful. The honouring of the obligation is also connected to the truthfulness of the promise and actualises Jack's intention.

The act of the promise, and the act of the repayment fall under both the aspect of the true and the aspect of the good. For Aristotle both aspects are connected to Logos. It is not clear that Anscombe would go this far in her account of what is

happening in the case of the incurring and the discharging of the debt. The above account transcends the kind of account she gave in an earlier essay² relating to a grocery bill for potatoes. In this essay she speculates upon the relation of the intention to discharge the debt and its relation to brute facts such as delivering some potatoes and the institution of buying and selling. Here we are clearly in the realm of the hypothetical imperative: "If you buy potatoes, the act suffices to generate a debt that you have an obligation to discharge". There is, in this context an implied promise to pay the money, given the facts. Were I to refuse to pay, and this matter ended up in court, the case would consist of a rehearsal of certain brute facts such as whether I intended to buy the potatoes and whether they actually came into my possession. In this case where no explicit promise has been made, its truthfulness will not be an issue. The transactions themselves will determine the judgement of the case.

For Anscombe, the intention is the pivot of the generation of the debt, and this is not an interior private matter, but an external public matter that is justified in terms of the hylomorphic distinction between the material and the intentional object of the action in question. Truth is an important part of this account because the intentional object is "given" by the description which the agent or a judge and jury would accept as truly describing ones intention, e.g. "I shot at a moving dark object in the foliage believing it to be the deer I was stalking". Given the fact that my father was shot, the other facts obviously have to bear this description out. It has to be clear what was mistaken for what, and the universalisable element in this process is, that anyone could have made the same mistake in just these circumstances. The focus here is obviously upon a particular action in particular circumstances, and this was neither the case for Aristotelian nor Kantian moral Philosophy.

The problem with Anscombes account is that it would appear that the philosophical account of the promise or the debt appears almost instrumental, a matter of following a rule in a way that can be compared with following the rules of chess. For both Aristotle and Kant, the term Logos is related to categorical necessity, a type of necessity connected with the attempt to generate the goods for the soul, in which we treat each other as ends. This is a different matter to treating another person as means to personal ends. Treating people as ends in themselves, manifests a type of necessity related to the general attitude toward being both the potential legislator of a law or principle, as well as being subject to this law or principle.

The emphasis Anscombe places on intention is a descriptive emphasis and it does not appeal to the necessity specified in the Kantian Categorical Imperative in which it is asserted that it is our duty to act so that we are able to universalise the principle lying behind the maxim (the intention) of our action. It is this

appeal to duty that in fact suffices to generate the expectation that we have a right to be treated as an end in ourselves and not as a means to some other persons or institutions needs. This is the metaphysical realm of moral law: a realm far removed from the transactional accounts where appeal is made to "following rules" in moral situations.

It would seem, then, that neither the categories and processes of the external physical world nor the categories and processes of normative moral activity and judgement are easily translatable into the categories and processes of grammar: but all three categories and processes are characterisable in terms of the Greek idea of "logos", even if parsing sentences is a rule-following activity, resembling the game of chess more than the moral creation and discharging of a debt by means of a promise. The grammatical and linguistic investigations of Wittgenstein have philosophical substance, because they are grounded in the Aristotelian notion of forms of life, but even these failed to provide satisfaction for Wittgenstein, who described his own work in the "Philosophical Investigations" as an "album of sketches". Pointing out, however, to his analytically minded colleagues, that the language-game we play with imperatives is different to the language game of reporting, was an important milestone in loosening the grip the "new men" (followers of Hegel, followers of Science, and Analytical Philosophy), had on the throat of our cultures.

These new men dedicated themselves to the questioning the validity of intentional objects of worship, claiming the demise of the notion of "form" that philosophy inherited from Aristotelian and Kantian Philosophy. Worshipping is an activity embedded in a general attitude of reverence and awe for "forms" or "principles". The disappearance of this activity is clearly linked to the disappearance of this contemplative attitude and the powers of mind connected to it. Worshipping of the sun is intentional to its core and is so partly because it is an activity embedded in a system of ought-concepts and principles that has an important relationship to a source of light and life that has helped to shape all life-forms of the planet.

Anscombe claims that perception also has an intentional aspect in which objects are given in sensory experience. The description of what is seen plays a very important constitutive role insofar as the identity of objects of perception are concerned. In perceptual situations it is also the case that the object phrase can be taken materially and indeed this might even be the primary use of the verb "to see". The secondary use of this verb is also important, e.g. "He who sees must see something" (Plato). This something can be a physical external object but also a formal intentional object. In the latter case there does not have to be a material or physical something to be seen. Anscombe interestingly situates perceptual activity in a wider context of aiming at something such as a dark

patch (figure) against a background of lighter foliage. Shooting at the object and subsequently finding out that I have shot my father, is the example used by Anscombe to distinguish between the intentional object aimed at (dark patch against background of foliage) and the material object (my father). The intentional object is given via the question "What were you aiming/shooting at?". This is a particularly illuminating discussion of a distinction important to the law in its consideration of whether any crime has been committed in the performance of this action in relation to the "material object" of my father. So, I aim at this dark patch and shoot, and it turns out to be my father's deer stalker hat. I have undoubtedly shot my father irrespective of what intentions I may have had. If I land in court over this mistake and am asked the question "What were you aiming/shooting at?", my truthful answer will pick out the intentional object of the act. My defence is obviously that it was not my intention to shoot my father because I did not know that it was him I was aiming at. This highlights the importance of knowledge for the correct attribution of intention to an agent or an action.

Anscombe also raises the question of inner perception and asks whether there is any such thing as an inner perception of myself, in which I become aware of myself, become conscious of myself. Kant, we have argued, claimed that prior to spontaneously using the term "I", the child relates to himself via the medium of feeling. The use of this personal pronoun announces, Kant argues, the dawn of thought in the user, announces the beginnings of the use of a higher mental power. How does Consciousness fit into this account? Animals, for Kant, are conscious beings but are not able to reach the level of self-consciousness achieved by the higher level of thought referred to. Kant is, in the context of this discussion, presenting a personality theory as well as a cognitive theory relating to the battery of cognitive powers, capacities, and dispositions that a "person" possesses. These powers, capacities, and dispositions, build a circle of conditions that are in a logical relation of mutual implication. O'Shaughnessy has the following contribution to make to this discussion:

"When we speak of "persons" we have in mind beings endowed with a distinctive set of properties, consisting mostly of capacities such as thought and reasoning, but also in the knowledge of certain fundamentals like self, world, time, truth."³

In this account, there is an incipient commitment to many of the assumptions of hylomorphic Philosophy, in particular to the bodily conditions that support this circle of relatively abstract conditions. For O'Shaughnessy this circle evolved into existence with the assistance of principles and laws of sexual and natural selection over very long periods of time. All forms of life have the principle of *psuche* in common, driving actualisation processes through different stages of development. The essence-specifying definition of the human form of life, namely, rational animal capable of discourse, undoubtedly implies reference to a

form of self consciousness. Kant referred to this aspect of the human form of life in transcendental terms, to an "I" that thinks truths, to an "I" that knows both the world and itself. We should recall in the context of this discussion that the Ancient Greeks believed that the search for self-knowledge was the most difficult kind of investigation. Wittgenstein and Anscombe contributed to this kind of investigation by claiming that the Philosopher could use the medium of language to assist in this search.

Anscombe's contribution to the task of condensing a cloud of the Philosophy of self consciousness into a drop of grammar in the quest for self-knowledge is firstly, to classify the term "I" as an indirect reflexive pronoun (what Paul Ricoeur calls a "shifter"). Grammatical analysis reveals that this grammatical category does not share the properties of proper names or demonstratives. In this investigation, the idea of truth is used, but these truth conditions are not inextricably tied to the technical concept of reference. Rather, there is in these reflections more than a passing resemblance to Aristotelian reflections upon language conceived in terms of thinking something about something. For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure is characterised in terms of a subject being designated and then something is said about that subject, thereby creating that synthesis Heidegger called a veritative or truth-making synthesis. The subject for Aristotle is tied to his ten categories of existence that provide a context for this synthesis. Aristotelian "forms" or principles also help to determine what he calls the *logos* or the account of the sentence. Should the sentence contain the subject "I", a Kantian extension of this analysis would refer to the operation of thought and the idea of a something that is a cause of itself (not an even caused by something else). This *causa sui* is not then directly accessible to the exploratory operations of observation and introspection.

The Wittgensteinian notion of the self being at the limit of the world and not an object or entity in the world, ought also to be considered in this discussion. As a *causa sui*, the self in its relation to the world is analogous to the relation of the eye to the visual field it "causes". The eye is clearly no part of that visual field. The kind of causation involved is formal-final causation as outlined in Aristotelian hylomorphic theory. The difference between these accounts is that in the case of the eye it is natural, if one is a biologist, to also immediately ask why-questions relating to the material and efficient causation of this organ and arrive at the Darwinian theory of evolution (its principles and laws).

In an essay entitled "The First Person", Anscombe seeks to combat the view of many logicians that the term "I" names an entity in the same or a similar way in which proper names name an individual located phenomenally in space and time. She rejects immediately the Cartesian notion of an ego that can coherently doubt the existence of its own body and also the Cartesian idea of consciousness

being certain of itself in all its forms. She refers instead to St Augustine's account of the mind knowing itself in its thought and of its being certain of its own being (De Trinate, Book X (De Civitate Dei)). Anscombe explores the nature of self knowledge by reference to the psychological verbs connected to:

"thoughts of actions, posture, movement and intended actions"⁴

Because:

"only those thoughts both are unmediated, non-observational, and also are descriptions which are directly verifiable or falsifiable about the person."⁵

Description, of course, is an important element of discourse. In terms of action, description of what one is doing, is of primary importance for Anscombe. Description in this context is connected to the interrogative activity of questioning, e.g. "What are you doing?"--"I am standing here"--"Why?"--"Because I am waiting for X to come". The former question on Anscombe's account is perhaps what she means by posture and the latter means to inquire into a persons intentions. The former question is definitely requesting a description, but the latter appears to be requesting an explanation with a logical connection to the description of what one is doing: perhaps there is also a logical relation of the explanation to the body and its way of disposing itself in relation to its world. Augustine's account refers to the mind, and the concept of mind we encounter here is more Platonic than Aristotelian. If this is a correct reflection then, we are probably involved here with a problematic dualistic relation of the body to the mind. On the Aristotelian account "forms" inhabit the body as they do all matter, but only in the way in which the soul "inhabits" a body by providing us with the principle of all the movement and activity of the body. But what then am I doing by saying or thinking "I am standing here"? According to Wittgenstein's later work I am drawing attention to myself in this act of discourse in much the same way as I do when I am in pain, groan, and perhaps say "I am in pain". In neither of these cases is it true that I am attempting to name or identify anything. The substratum of my sayings and thinkings in these contexts is grounded in learning or being initiated into the technique of language, a technique that enables one to make true statements about ones state or condition. The result of this learning is that we can say or think things that were not possible prior to the learning process. So, the grammatical notion of an indirect reflexive pronoun is a way of speaking or thinking about oneself that helps to illuminate the mysterious operation of an entity that can will itself to will, or in other words "causes" itself to actualise various powers or capacities. Anscombe ends this essay by claiming that self-knowledge is knowledge of the (human) form of life that one is, and that of course is no simple matter to characterise correctly. Neither is it a simple matter to acquire this kind of knowledge.

When we are drawing attention to ourselves, this activity is less like pointing to oneself and more like waving to someone else to attract attention. This is a form of activity not shared by other life forms. The wave is a gesture that begins discourse and the words "I am in pain" may well be related in this respect to the gesture of the wave. Here it is not the reference of the word "I" that is at issue but rather its use--a use which the grammarians categorise as the work of an indirect reflexive pronoun. The Kantian "I think" may well be drawing attention to the activity of thinking, which in this case is the combining and differentiating of representations at the same time as drawing attention to the operation of mental powers and capacities that constitute the activity of the understanding. The activity of the understanding is clearly distinguished from the activity of the faculty of Sensibility (affection, perception, imagination) in the critical Philosophy of Kant. The faculty of reason is the third of the faculties of Kant's personality theory, or "theory of persons". Kant delegated the concrete investigation of these faculties and their relation to each other to the discipline of Anthropology which divides Psychological investigation into two ontological types, namely what the world makes of man, and what man makes of himself. The former is the concern of what Kant calls Physical Anthropology and the latter the concern of Pragmatic Anthropology. The I that thinks obviously plays a larger role in the latter ontological type of investigation. For Aristotle, the search for self knowledge probably extends over a number of mental powers and capacities explored by a number of disciplines spread over three forms of science: theoretical, practical and productive.

In Kant's critical Philosophy there is very little role for Cartesian first person certainty in relation to the knowledge we have of ourselves. The truth that Kant extracts from the Cogito argument is that the spontaneous use of the term "I" signifies the dawning of a kind of thinking directed at truth and knowledge and the role of consciousness in this account is obscure. For Wittgenstein, the claim that human beings are conscious and knowledge-bearing animals are grammatical remarks. My attitude towards a person, Wittgenstein states, is an attitude toward a soul. An attitude is not an experience, but rather part of a power or capacity. Such an attitude is obviously tied up with an "I think" that provides us with forms of representation that in turn provide us with "pictures" or narratives related to the being of a human psyche. It is important to remember that in our grammatical investigations, we are not dealing directly with phenomena but rather with what he calls the "possibilities" of phenomena (i.e., the concept of the phenomenon). There is no place for observation or perception (an activity of Sensibility) in such investigations, because the issue here is not that of identifying a phenomenon, but rather one of understanding a phenomenon. In such a context of explanation/justification rationality or the operation of reason is a better tool than that of the sensory-based imagination

insofar as both Aristotle and Kant are concerned. It is not clear however, that rationality is the primary tool of understanding for either Wittgenstein and Anscombe.

It is possible, it has been argued, that human beings can be imagined to be automatons. Critics of this position have doubted whether this kind of characterisation contributes to the understanding of the human form of life. Life, it has been argued, is a necessary condition of consciousness, and machines can not be conceived to be alive. Perhaps doubting that one has a body as Descartes recommended is the beginning of creating a science fiction scenario in which one cannot differentiate machines from human beings. The Aristotelian idea of a soul as a principle or set of principles motivating the human form of life appears to do much to clear away the philosophical smog surrounding this issue. This idea of the soul as a principle, is also a central element of Kant's investigations into the logic of metaphysics and its relation to experience and thought. For Kant, however, the drop that condenses from the Philosophical cloud of Aristotelian hylomorphism, is the good will, causing itself to act freely as part of an interrogative attitude of awe and wonder at the size of the universe and the moral law residing within. For Kant, the "substance" of our soul was neither something nor something about which nothing could be said. The soul was a "form" manifesting itself in all forms of conscious and mental activity in the faculties of sensibility, understanding and reason. O'Shaughnessy's contribution to this discussion comes in the form of the claim that:

"self-knowledge is a functionally active necessary condition of both rationality and self determination or "freedom". In short I surmise that self knowledge operates causally at a relatively deep level in the setting up of the circle of developed traits."⁶

Presumably the above reflection also has implications for our relation to others, as part of the account of the attitude we have towards other persons that Wittgenstein provides us with. O'Shaughnessy cites the translucence of the Cartesian cogito and the Freudian unconscious (a vicissitude of instinct) as important testimony for the proclamation of the significance of self-knowledge or self-consciousness in relation to the circle of conditions underlying our human form of life. He discusses the limited insight we have into the workings of our mind when we are dreaming.

In the dream we may well believe that we are seeing a figure in a white shirt approaching but the limitation consists in the fact that we are unaware of the fact that this seeing is an imagining. In waking life, O'Shaughnessy argues, there is natural insight into the mind which manifest itself in the fact that if we see a figure in a white shirt approaching, we know that we are seeing this phenomenon and not imagining it. We know of the existence, character, and

content of our mental processes non-observationally, it is argued. This extends the range of psychological verbs relevant to our self- knowledge beyond the range suggested by Anscombe. O'Shaughnessy further argues that self-consciousness of this kind is necessary for grasping consciousness of the world under the aspect of the truth. Seeing lightning strike a tree, on this account, immediately and naturally leads to the belief that "lightning has struck the tree". This is even the case with the use of the indirect reflexive pronoun "I". I know that I am standing here non-observationally, in the same way in which I know "I am hungry". The child, O'Shaughnessy argues, knows that he is hungry because he knows that it is true that he is hungry. Animal forms of life and consciousness lack both an understanding of language and an understanding of its categories and truth conditions. We, humans, on the other hand desire understanding of the form of "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth". Consciousness "aims at the truth" not in terms of external observation and correctness, but rather in terms of *aletheia*, in terms of the revelation of the nature or essence of things. The truth of "I am standing here" or "I am hungry" is not then a matter of impressions I am having, which refer to something else or some object. Anscombe argues that the impressions I experience are not cognitively "correct" but rather possess a self evident incorrigibility. She argues that my sensation of the secondary quality of colour is an appearance-concept,⁷ and we know of this concept because of the function of colour language which operates in accordance with the following rule:

"Colours that keep on looking the same to the same eye against the same backgrounds, and in the same light and orientation are the same."⁸

An attempted justification for this rule is given by the example of doctors matching blood samples with a colour chart to determine the degree to which the blood examined is anaemic. Anscombe argues that this kind of judgment is not objectively certain, but is nevertheless subjectively incorrigible. She notes interestingly, that we are in the realm of Aristotelian "proper sensibles" but fails to note the Aristotelian distinction between the different kinds of change implied by perception and thought respectively. Sensible changes registered by perception relate obviously to particular sensible objects whereas thought relates to more generic intellectual objects. The judgement "This red here" is obviously a very different kind of judgement to the categorical essence-specifying judgement "Colour is a function of the interplay of light and darkness." The former judgement is obviously related to the occurrence of an event in the context of exploration/discovery and the latter refers to no particular event, but rather to a category of experience in the context of explanation/justification: a context in which principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason play decisive roles in the truth of the judgement. Matching a blood sample to a colour chart is obviously a perceptual activity at a level higher than the "This red here" judgment, but it is not a judgement requiring

the kind of contemplation Aristotle claims is present in rational thinking. On the other hand, determining whether and how a colour is a form of electromagnetic radiation, does require contemplation in a context of explanation/justification. A different region of the mind is required for determining universal truths about objects. All that may be required in the case of "This red here" kinds of judgement may be an opening up of the windows of the soul and the receiving of impressions of particulars. In such cases we let nature take its course with the possible help of the sensible power of attention.

Memory is a higher form of sensible function which Locke regarded as a vicissitude of consciousness. For him individual memories determined the identity of individual human beings: Nestor was Nestor in virtue of his individual memories. The continuity of these memories and their relation to each other guaranteed the identity of Nestor but does not suffice to guarantee (without the presence of other conditions) the fact that Nestor was a rational animal capable of discourse. That Nestor's form of self consciousness is regulated by the three hylomorphic Freudian principles (ERP, PPP, AND RP) is more concerned with the being of Nestor than his identity. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* confirms this account or Logos of Nestor's being with the opening remark that "All men desire to know". A condition for this striving is that there is both a form of life and a consciousness that is striving to both understand the world and itself under the aspect of the truth and the good. Nestor fits these conditions being a person with knowledge of the world, other people and the organic form of the City. This knowledge was understood by the Greek mind via areté, arché and diké.

Notes on Chapter 4.

¹ *Metaphysics, and The Philosophy of Mind*, G. E., M., Anscombe, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981)

² "On Brute Facts" in *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*", Anscombe, G.,E.,M., (Blackwell, Oxford, 1981)

³ *Consciousness and the World*, O Shaughnessy, B., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, P.103)

⁴ *Metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Mind*, P.35

⁵ *Ibid.* P.35

⁶*Consciousness and the World*, P.103

⁷*Metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Mind*, P.47

⁸Ibid. P.47

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Chapter 5: Anscombe: The Cambridge Platonist

Anscombe, we have claimed, is an enigmatic philosopher. Sometimes she appears in the guise of the Catholic medieval scholar logic-chopping her way to conclusions. Sometimes she appears in more "modern" guise, conducting so called grammatical investigations in relation to the very modern concerns of Philosophical Psychology and Epistemology in the spirit of Modern Philosophical Logic.

We have argued in earlier works for the idea that it is only Ariadne's thread that can lead us out of the labyrinthine cave of our ignorance. The question to raise in relation to Anscombe's work is the following: "Where should we place her work in relation to a thread that divided our civilisations into two". Ought we to place her work alongside the Philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes and the "new men", (Hume Rousseau, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx, the early work of Wittgenstein, and Russell)? In her defence, she certainly sides with the work of the later Wittgenstein, which, we have argued, created the logical space for the restoration of the Philosophers of the Greek and German Enlightenment manifested best in the works of Aristotle and Kant. Yet we have also pointed to an anti-metaphysical or a-metaphysical scepticism in Wittgenstein's work that prevents us from classifying him as a rationalist. Anscombe, to some extent, shares this animus. Her work, however, appears sympathetic to the metaphysics of Platonism that many medieval scholars embraced. The preference for the work of Plato over the work of Aristotle is evident in her assertion that Plato is the Philosophers Philosopher. In this claim she clearly has the work of Aristotle in mind and this is puzzling given the fact that one of the key concepts of Wittgensteinian philosophy is the very Aristotelian sounding idea of "forms of life" which is a hylomorphic idea that Plato would have difficulty embracing in his earlier metaphysical systems. Platonic forms do not relate naturally to the categorical Aristotelian idea of psuche or soul. Anscombe refers to Plato's relation between the soul and the forms, via the interesting idea of "like knows like". The key role for Plato's eternal unchanging forms was to provide a philosophical tool to investigate the Heraclitean idea of panta rei (reality is in flux and subject to continuous processes of change). The forms of "The Republic" were certainly less like Aristotelian "principles" than Plato's later conceptions. The identification of the forms of the Republic with "substance" and "kinds of substance" is a reasonable interpretation. Indeed we encounter this move from substance to principle even in the developing work of Aristotle.

Aristotle claimed that Being has many meanings. This is not merely a thesis concerning the plurality of substances or kinds of object in one realm of Being, but also an argument for a plurality of principles over the whole domain of Being. The "like-knows-like" principle is still understandable on an Aristotelian

account. For Aristotle it is principles that best explain the reasons for change. In volume one of this work we characterised Aristotle's overall position in the following way:

"For Aristotle, the world-creating forms occur in the media of change (space, time, and matter) and they find their explanation in a theoretical matrix of 4 kinds of change, three principles, and 4 causes."¹

The forms of life (psuche) manifest their essence in universal life-determining powers, which combine and integrate with each other to produce, for example, the human essence which Aristotle captures in his essence-specifying definition of rational animal capable of discourse. Principles also both constitute and regulate a domain of changing reality in ways that are presented in three different sciences using the above 4 kinds of cause/explanation. The powers of sensibility, understanding and reason, all interact in various ways in our acts of perception, conceptualisation, and reasoning. Given the complexity of this account it is therefore surprising to find Anscombe designating Plato as the Philosophers Philosopher.

In Anscombe's essay "The Origin of Plato's Theory of Forms", reference is made to Mathematics. The dialogue of the Meno is discussed and it is acknowledged that Mathematics as a discipline contains only a "dream" or an "image" of the forms. Wittgenstein's contribution to this debate is to fixate upon one of Plato's criteria for the forms, namely, that one must be able to predicate the form of itself, e.g., The form of the good must itself be good. Wittgenstein in the spirit of Russell and Mathematical logic contests this property on the grounds that the class of men is not a man (Russell's paradox). We cannot say of the Greenwich standard yard that it is one yard long in the language game we play with non-metric measurement. It is, rather, the final context of practical justification for disputes arising about whether something is one yard long or not. The language game clearly distinguishes, then, between the context of exploration/discovery (measuring something) and the context of explanation/justification. Whether this is a sufficient argument to generate a paradox over saying that the Greenwich yard is one yard long is an open question. The Greenwich standard yard is certainly shorter than the Paris standard metre and does not the fact that we call this length (on the grounds of a norm of representation or a principle), a yard, serve to distinguish it from a metre? This is certainly a good illustration of the like-knows-like principle suggested by Plato, and if it flies in the face of mathematical logic and the theory of classes so much the worse for mathematical theory. This principle, indeed, might be a good indicator of the metaphysical limitations of Mathematics recognised by Plato, but not by Russell.

Anscombe also claims in relation to the slave example in the Meno, that mathematics cannot be taught. She apparently asked a 9 year old child the same questions Socrates asked the slave of the Meno, and was given the same answers. The principles of logic obviously played a role in the questioning process, and it does not seem to be paradoxical to suggest that one is not taught the principle of contradiction or the principle of sufficient reason, but rather that the understanding of these principles appears to "dawn" upon one in the same way in which the Kantian "I think" dawns upon the young child. What is not acknowledged in Anscombe's essay is that both Plato and Aristotle agree upon the overall role of mathematics in logic and metaphysics, which is that Mathematical reasoning works **towards** the establishing of a principle in exploratory fashion via the manipulation of mathematical variables. This is to be contrasted with Philosophical reasoning which occurs in the context of explanation/justification where the reasoning **proceeds from** a principle toward the manipulation or understanding of a reality that is constituted or determined by that principle. Our standard example of this position is that of the proceedings of a court of law where we are, for example, working from the principle "Murder is wrong" (against the law) toward the judgements "X is a murderer", "X has committed murder" or "X is innocent of the charge". The court room procedures contain, of course, an exploration of the evidence, but it is important to note that this is not an exploratory scientific activity designed to establish whether people murder each other, but rather activity whose form is determined by our knowledge of the law. There would, for example, seem to be nothing to connect the preceding judgments relating to X, and the sentence or innocence verdict, into a unity, except the law. The law too, it has to be admitted at some point came into being--it was passed--and this may have involved a process of exploration that was driven by the principle or form of justice. A form which for Plato would have had to possess the characteristics of being both good in itself and good in its consequences. One of the key consequences of this "form" is that everyone ought to get what they deserve, e.g. a judgement of guilty, where that is appropriate, and an appropriate sentence or a judgment of innocence and the restoration of ones freedom, where that was appropriate.

As mentioned above the unity of these legal proceedings are reminiscent of the kind of conceptual unity of the "I think" that Kant discussed under the heading of the relationship of the faculty of Sensibility with the faculty of Understanding/Judgement. Representations were unified and differentiated in an act Kant called the "unity of apperception"--an act that resulted in the forming of a concept. Anscombe, in an essay entitled "Plato, Soul and the Unity of Apperception",² claims that Plato appeared to propose two theses which appear at first glance to be antagonistic, namely, that the soul is a unity, but that it can also be divided into parts. Plato claims that there is no contradiction between these theses as long as the parts retain some kind of logical connection to the

unified whole. The "parts" Plato proposes are the appetite, spirit, and reason. These parts coexist in a hierarchical relation in which the highest power of reason is the power that produces the harmony in the soul. On this account it is acceptable for someone to give in to the temptations of appetite as long as a measure of self control is exercised and we are not narcissistically consumed by the "thousand headed" monster of desire. Anscombe ignores this aspect of Plato in her essay and chooses to focus instead on the epistemological issue of the relationship of the different sensory systems to each other and the kind of knowledge we have of this activity:

"Plato introduced the topic called " the unity of apperception" in his Theaetetus. There Socrates asked Theaetetus whether we see **with** our eyes or rather **through** them: whether we hear with our ears or through them. Theaetetus answers "through", and Socrates commends him for his decision, saying how odd it would be "if there were a number of senses sitting inside us, as if we were wooden horses, and there were not some single form (soul or whatever we ought to call it) in which all of them converge, something **with** which, **through** the senses as instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible."³

What is being obliquely referred to is the relation of the body to the soul. There are many ways to interpret the above text. The Aristotelian interpretation, which it is not clear that Anscombe intends, is a hylomorphic interpretation in which the form organising the matter, is like a principle organising change in a realm of Being. Anscombe's emphasis, however, appears to be instrumental, and therefore does not quite capture the interesting Aristotelian conception of a power that is aware of itself and capable of opening onto a world and disclosing the Being of the world. The principle constituting this power has been dubbed the Reality Principle in earlier volumes: this principle helps to reveal both **that** things are and also **why** they are as they are. P.M.S. Hacker calls this a "two-way-power"⁴. This interpretation stretches the Platonic idea of like-knows-like to its limits. Yet the Platonic idea of a physical realm of reality "participating" in the realm of the forms remains coherent. The major difference between the Platonic Theory of Forms and the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory is that the latter is tied to the idea of forms of life physically rooted in a system of tissues, organs and limbs. The body that is formed by this system, on the other hand, is also regulated by other principles, e.g. the Energy Regulation Principle, and the Pleasure-Pain Principle. These two principles contribute to what Ricoeur called the effort to exist or what Darwin called the survival of the organism. Our existence is certainly at stake insofar as the efficient operation of these two principles is concerned. It is the quality of life, on the other hand, that is at issue with the operation of the Reality Principle. Ricoeur refers to this aspect of our lives in terms of "the desire to be". These three principles, we noted in earlier works formed the foundation of Freudian Psychoanalytical theory. This theory appealed to the rationalism of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. Anscombe systematically avoids Aristotelian and Kantian forms of rationalism in her

interpretations of Wittgenstein's work, preferring instead a more Platonic interpretation. Hacker chooses in contradistinction to focus on Aristotelian concepts in his interpretations. Plato's reference to the sensory powers, however, is less instrumental than Anscombe supposes as is evidenced in the following quote:

"if I am right in my understanding of the matter, the difference between the legs and the sense organs is that the legs do walk and are not instruments by means of which the soul walks: the eyes on the other hand, do not see but are instruments by means of which the soul sees"⁵

Are organs, instruments, one can wonder? Instruments are normally regarded as extensions of our organs or limbs, e.g. the telescope and the hammer. Organs are embedded in other systems of instrumentalities that can repair damage as and when it occurs: instruments on the other hand require external agents if they break and cease to perform their function. It appears as if Anscombe is falling prey here to the reductionist tendency to divide reality into independent causes and effects--the soul being the cause and the eyes being the effects. This is certainly not in accordance with the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory of the unity of the body and the soul. Wittgenstein makes two claims that are relevant to this discussion. Firstly, he maintains that our attitude towards a person is an attitude towards a soul. This ought to be considered alongside another claim he makes, namely, that the human body is the best picture of the soul. Is this an Aristotelian hylomorphic theory or is it more Platonic, as Anscombe appears to suggest? Anscombe in her writings criticises Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning, by claiming that a picture is ambiguous, and the picture of a boxers stance, for example, could illustrate both how one ought to stand and also how one ought not to stand. A number of questions immediately present themselves. Firstly, If the soul is a principle of movement and rest, as Aristotle proposes, can one have an attitude toward a principle? The only kind of relation we appear to have towards principles are the theoretical attitude of understanding them or the practical attitude of respecting them. If Wittgenstein means to suggest, with this pair of statements, that we ought to respect other persons, then he places himself in the Kantian territory he seeks to avoid. Secondly, his claim that the body is the best picture of the soul has a phenomenological ring to it. Phenomenology we know seeks to investigate the essences of things but the mere citing of the body without specifying whether it is moving or at rest invites a hermeneutic theory of interpretation which "reads" the expressions of a body or "interprets" its physical expression or activity in accordance with some attitude. But what attitude is that? The attitude of respect again suggests itself. What rules of interpretation does this attitude use in its investigative activity? The problem with the Wittgensteinian idea of following a rule is that the concept of a rule for Wittgenstein seems to belong in the context of games such as chess. Rules certainly determine how I move pieces on a board. But is strategically controlling the centre of the board a rule or a principle? Stanley Cavell has

drawn an important distinction between following a rule that allows us to play chess and playing in accordance with a principle that determines how well we play a game of chess. This latter activity in Greek minds would be associated with the term *areté* (doing the right thing at the right time in the right way). *Epistémé* (knowledge of principles of chess such as restricting the options of the opponents pieces by controlling the centre of the board) would also be involved. It is not quite clear how the notions of attitude, picture, and rule (embedded in an "album of sketches") can do the same kind of work as the ideas of *psuche*, *areté*, *arché*, *epistémé* embedded in a complex hylomorphic theory.

Anscombe is very categorical in her philosophical investigations into human life (its origin and extinction). She unequivocally, on more than one occasion, via the media, claimed that abortion was murder. Her primary argument was an epistemic argument. In cases of human abortion, she claims we know it is a human life in the womb that we are extinguishing. Human conception does not give rise non-human forms of life. This knowledge, for Anscombe means that we are intentionally taking a human life if we perform an abortion. Human life she claims has a fundamental value or is an end-in-itself. There is, however, an important question as to exactly at which point in time in the developmental process human life emerges. She points to the zygote stage in this process: This she claims is the first new unified cell and we can already call this cell human because it has the individual human tissue, organ, limb system inscribed in its DNA. These in their turn will give rise to the distinctive powers of being human that are constitutive of human *psuche*. Anscombe, however chooses to discuss this matter in terms of a "new substance" that has been created:

"I was once a sperm and an ovum. That is the sperm and the ovum from whose union I came were jointly I. The objection to this is just that the sperm and the ovum were not one substance. That is, on a count of individual substances they came out at two until they have formed one cell. I do not mean that each cell is a substance: most are only parts of substances. That they are so is proved by cell differentiation which soon begins to happen as they multiply by dividing. Cell differentiation is for the sake of the kind of structured organised living material whole that gets formed through it."⁶

So, the zygote is a new human substance, and any human intervention which brings about the extinction of its life is an act of murder. This, in spite of the fact that the animal life of movement and sensation is not yet present at this stage of the developmental process. Anscombe uses the epistemic argument here too and claims that we know that both self-caused movement and sensation will occur at later phases of development. What we are provided with, on Anscombe's account, is the criterion of identity for the zygote that eventually actualises into the form of a human individual. She argues that even if it is true that the zygote can give rise to twins, triplets etc, this is no argument against the form or essence of the human zygote. There is an analytical focus on the notion of

substance but there are also traces of Aristotelian hylomorphism: the latter type of reflection, however, appears to stop at the threshold of Aristotle's Rationalistic metaphysics. It must be admitted that she has a powerful argument, but it is unfortunately embedded in an "instrumental" context in which the most effective counterargument is claiming that a woman's body is her "possession", hers to do with what she pleases. On such a counterargument this possessive woman is free to dispose of parts of her body as she wishes. Engaging with this particular debate in the way in which she does is part of her refusal to engage with the metaphysics that could support her argumentation in a context of explanation/justification. The above idea of freedom (to possess one's own body) would be highly questionable on any Kantian interpretation of this rationalist idea of reason. The role of principle in this discussion is not clear, probably because of the focus on both "substance" and "instrumentalism". It is not clear that Anscombe can successfully defend her categorical position on abortion and also adhere to her interpretation of Plato's "unity of apperception" argument. The hylomorphic interpretation of Plato's argument is that the form or principle of the soul is constitutive of the human body which has obviously been brought about by physical principles associated with material and efficient causation. The way in which these physical principles (Energy Regulation Principle, Pleasure-Pain principle) operate, is similar to the way in which the law of gravity acts upon an arrow shot into the air that finally returns to the earth. We use principles not to describe, but to explain changes in the many realms of Being we are dealing with. The principle, that is, provides the unity of all representations and the propositions relating to these representations. Construing the principle of psyche as substance is misleading. Anscombe, in defence of her position, claims that Plato regards the form as immaterial substance. Whether it is this that Plato has in mind when he maintains that the soul is like the form, is not entirely clear, but it is certainly a possible interpretation of the content of some Platonic dialogues. Plato's thought, we know, developed over time to include even a criticism of his own theory of forms which some commentators have claimed moved him closer to Aristotelian positions, away, that is from the idea of form as substance and toward the idea of forms as principles.

The key metaphysical idea of psyche as a form of life for Aristotle was that life is a principle of motion and rest in all life forms. Kant's metaphysics added to this the notion that life forms were self-causing entities, i.e. entities capable of bringing about change in the world. Neither in Aristotle, nor in Kant's case is it appropriate to think of the relation of the soul to the body in instrumental terms, e.g. as a pilot in a ship. A better descriptive picture of this relation is to be found in phenomenological Philosophy where the concept of "the lived body" is articulated in various ways, e.g. in Merleau-Ponty's work "The Phenomenology of Perception". In this work we find the claim that my hand does not lie beside the cup on the table but rather "inhabits" the environment it is in. The cup and

the table belong in a context of instrumentalities that is different to the "lived space" the hand inhabits. My hand is not merely at the end of my arm waiting to be used but rather helps to constitute the field of instrumentalities that contains the cup, the spoon, the candle, and the table. The hand is part of a body-image best conceived of non-substantially, and non instrumentally, in terms of a constellation of principles of physical activity. Underlying this image is of course the Aristotelian hylomorphic material matrix of tissues, organs, and limbs. For us, the principal organ of this matrix has become the brain, but whilst this organ is certainly a necessary condition for human life, it is not sufficient to explain all human forms of activity. The organs as a whole provide both the physical conditions necessary for activity and representation, but they are first order functions that form the matrix of second and tertiary order functions. It was William James in a work entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?", who proposed that consciousness was not any kind of substance but rather resembled a function. Consciousness is, of course, importantly connected to representation, and its relation to representations resembles the relation of the eyes to the visual field. For Kant, sight was to the eyes, as thinking was to the mind, which for him housed both conscious and unconscious functions. It is surely clear, in the context of this kind of discussion, that the brain is not an instrument to be used just because it is part of my body. For Anscombe, the woman's relation to her womb is similar to the intimate non-instrumental relation of sensory-motor activities to the brain. The relation we have to the idea of freedom is also very different to the way in which it is represented by the instrumentalists. For the Greeks, for example, free choice was bound by the condition of areté which bound the agent to doing the right thing in the right way at the right time.

Aristotle, we know believed that abortion before the 40th day was acceptable, (a period of time in which neither spontaneous movement nor sensation was present in the collection of cells we find in the womb). After the 40th day, Aristotle would have objected to taking the right to live of this little human in the womb, away. Even within the time frame of 40 days there had to be good reason for the termination of the life of the life-form within the womb. Such reasons could include, for example, not being able to physically support a certain number of children or to take a second example, reason to suspect a serious physical deformation. Aristotle, on the basis of these reflections, then, may well have agreed with Anscombe that we certainly **know** at an early stage of the actualisation stage we are dealing with a rational animal capable of discourse. In Aristotle's time, abortion cannot have been a risk-free procedure so perhaps there were additional arguments against performing this procedure. Aristotle would, however, have agreed with the epistemic argument presented by Anscombe. For him it was the essence of this form of life to actualise into a being that reasoned and conversed in the agora. Whether Aristotle would call abortion "murder" is not at all clear. Anscombe is perhaps in this respect more

extreme in her position than Aristotle would have been. Anscombe's position entails seeing the human in a platelet of shapes that has neither an animal, nor a human shape. Her argument for this would probably be that we know that this platelet of cells will eventually roll up into a tube that will be the material basis of the human spinal cord.

This judgment, on the basis of potentiality, suffices for Anscombe to pass judgment in accordance with the moral attitude she referred to earlier. Whether this attitude is consistent with the Aristotelian idea of *psuche* as a principle of movement or rest, a *causa sui*, is not clear from her account. It is Kant that introduces the idea of *causa sui* into the discussion of the human form of life, and it is Kant that also claims that the act of taking one's life when committing suicide, is a practical contradiction (using life to take life). In this context we ought to note that we do not in the case of performing an abortion speak of "committing" abortion, but Anscombe nevertheless insists on using the term "murder" to describe what is happening here. Murder is, of course, a crime that is "committed".

Anscombe is recognised by many commentators to be an analytical Philosopher, but given the poor record of these philosophers insofar as contribution to the fields of ethics and politics is concerned, her everyday practical position on these fronts shines like the beacon of a lighthouse in the darkness. We recall that when ex-President Truman was to be awarded an honorary degree by Oxford University, Anscombe stood up in a formal assembly to denounce the proposal in English (rather than the customary Latin--the language of Academia). Her objection was of course grounded upon Truman's decision to drop two atomic bombs on civilian populations. On her political account, being at war, requires respect for those who have not actively chosen to fight in the war: ignoring the freedom of these people to carry on leading their lives as normally as they can and dropping weapons of mass destruction on them is a crime against humanity. This accords with the Kantian view of war which saw the activity to lack meaning. Kant claimed that there were two kinds of argument against the activity of war: firstly, it is wrong because one can know via reason that it is both morally and instrumentally irrational. Secondly, it is wrong because one can know through experiencing the concrete consequences of such activity that it is entirely pointless. Kant points out that, in spite of the fact that both reason and experience are opposed to this activity, the antagonistic nature of man prevails and we are periodically thrown into this cataclysmic abyss. Anscombe's objection to Truman's degree was therefore Kantian. There is, however, a very interesting essay contained in the work "Human life, Action and Ethics" entitled "Knowledge and Reverence for Human Life". In this essay Anscombe appears to argue analytically for "two kinds of knowledge" that we can possess, namely what she calls mysteriously "indifferent knowledge" and another form of

knowledge she calls "connatural knowledge". The decisive category involved in the characterisation of these forms of knowledge is that of value. In the first form of knowledge we are concerned with knowledge whose truth is indifferent to value and the second form we are concerned with knowledge whose truth is intimately connected to value. The essay cites Hume's notorious assertion that "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions". At first it looks as if Anscombe wishes to contest this assertion but subsequently there is a retreat from any form of rationalism and a tentative advance toward a form of knowledge which is related to value in virtue of being connected to our inclinations or attitudes:

"inclination itself is a sort of perception of the meanness of acting even without the judgement being formulated"⁷

Reference is being made here to both "seeing the action in a certain light" and the "unity of apperception". In a later passage Anscombe continues:

"Connatural....it belongs to a just way of looking at things, and it cant be called a good of fortune. The spirit of such knowledge is what is called a gift of the Holy Ghost: the light of it a light to enlighten everyone who comes into the world. I do not mean that everyone actually has this light in his mind, for it may have been extinguished or never allowed to come on. It may be there as a mere glimmer whose sign is the understanding of the human language with all its multifarious action and motive descriptions, its machinery for accusing others and excusing oneself."⁸

It is not clear what Anscombe means by a "gift of the Holy Ghost" and it is also not clear what the sign connected to the understanding of language might be unless this is a reiteration of the point that language enables one to see things in a certain light. The metaphor of a light in the mind ("dawning?") suggests the light is more important than its signs in the language. She elaborates upon this train of thought by referring to the "inclination" toward a good will. Such an inclination apparently arises as a consequence of acquiring the habits of a lifetime and experiencing the suffering of a lifetime. Curiously, however, Anscombe claims that this kind of knowledge is theoretical, contrary to the Kantian account in which knowing the worth of a human being is certainly not merely a theoretical matter. Anscombe, at the very least, owes us a more detailed discussion of the kinds of knowledge involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. One can wonder here whether, and how, a mere "inclination" toward a good will could ever suffice to pass judgment upon a murderer: whether and how "inclinations" could ever result in the imperatives of duty Kant refers to.

For both Kant and Aristotle the only possible defence a murderer could have for killing someone is that this someone deserved to die. This obviously cannot be said of the little human being inside the womb. The arguments for, and against,

abortion are familiar territory for Anscombe and she is well aware that she owes an answer to the question relating to how one can avoid the Aristotelian scenario of conceiving too many children. Sexual abstention is her answer, and this fits well with the Greek virtue of self control. For Anscombe, in an essay entitled "The Dignity of the Human Being", sexual abstention is the only dignified response to the temptations of sexuality and its possible consequences. She appeals here to freedom of choice and the free will but also to reverence for the creations of God. Her final judgment on our current attitude toward abortion is summed up in the following quote:

"I have observed something of the celebrations of VE day, celebrations of the victory of the allies over Nazi Germany.... "Fools!", I thought. You talk of being armed in spirit against possible future threats of evil. You seem all unconscious of living in an actually murderous world." Each nation that has liberal abortion laws has rapidly become, if it was not already, a nation of murderers."⁹

The judgment is severe but it has its argumentative ground. It is surprising, given the categorical nature of this judgment that the only metaphysics (Kantian metaphysics) capable of justifying such a possible severe judgment is not actively embraced by Anscombe. It is not even clear whether Anscombe can be called a rationalist, retreating as she does to talk of "inclinations" and "attitudes" which appear to be more appropriate to sensible contexts of exploration /discovery than rational contexts of justification. Her appeal to "Description" and "seeing things in a certain light" appear to confirm the above diagnosis. This is puzzling because she clearly uses the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason in her deliberations, but her reluctance to discuss either Aristotelian or Kantian metaphysics in relation to her argumentation must amount to a rejection of these forms of rationalism. The closest she comes to embracing some of the concepts of rationalism occurs in an essay entitled "Practical Truth". In this essay she refers to Aristotle's discussion of decisions arrived at in practical contexts yet requiring a form of reflection Aristotle calls "deliberation". She quotes a passage from the Nichomachean Ethics:

"So that, since moral virtue, i.e. virtue in actions and passions, is a disposition of decision making, and decision is deliberative will, this means that for decision to be sound the reasons must be true, the will right, and the same thing must be named by the one and pursued by the other."¹⁰

Practical thinking, she adds is :

"truth in agreement with right desire"¹¹

The thoughts in this essay, however, do not quite mesh with the thoughts we encounter in the essay entitled "Knowledge and Reverence for Human Life" in which we pointed out she refers to "connatural" knowledge (knowledge

intimately related to value) as a "gift from the Holy Ghost". The humanism of Aristotle stands in stark contrast to this account. Throughout Aristotle's work we find reference to the difference between lower level capacities and higher level dispositions. The terms *areté* and *arché* especially occur in these latter contexts. The *Nichomachean Ethics* must be, for Aristotle, one of the key documents of Practical Science, containing all the forms of explanation and justification relevant to the kinds of change we encounter in the arenas of action and passion. This work begins with its basic assumption that all forms of human activity aim at the good. Knowledge, of course, according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, is a good in itself and this must be a universal and necessary truth because "All men desire to know". Knowledge in the *Metaphysics* is defined in terms of the principles of what he calls "First Philosophy". These principles attempt to provide us with a totality of conditions that help to constitute essence-specifying definitions such as "rational animal capable of discourse". Sound practical choices are obviously decisive in the matter of whether such an animal will lead a flourishing life or not. The *telos* of such a rational animal is, in Greek, *eudaimonia*, which in turn is a consequence of living in accordance with the notions of *areté*, *arché*, *diké*, *epistémé*, and *phronesis*. This battery of terms indicates that we are dealing with so much more than mere inclinations or attitudes. *Eudaimonia* was, for Kant, the *summum bonum* of human existence, a state of existence that rests upon the above charmed circle of Greek ideas and dispositions.

Anscombe, in her essay on Spinoza, once again approaches tentatively, and with caution, the practical idea of freedom, reflecting upon Aristotelian hylomorphism. The title of this essay sounds Kantian: "How can a man be free?" but she focuses upon the Aristotelian idea of the production of truth. She points out that this idea in modern Universities causes a sense of outrage:

"Admittedly, the idea of production of truth does not seem to fit very well. My own experience has led me to outrage philosophical audiences by maintaining that I can produce truth. E.g., I may say "I am going to stand on this table", and then I produce truth in what I said by doing that. People protest "You cant talk like that. Truth is eternal. If you do stand on the table, it is always true (before you did it) that you would stand on the table when you did". I understand this impulse about truth. Nevertheless in such a case I do make something true, which I had said I would do."¹²

When the primacy of action is the issue it is the *telos* of the action that becomes the constitutive function of the particular truth describing the activity "standing on the table". Particular truth belongs in the context of exploration/discovery in which material and efficient causation is regulated by final causation (the why of the action). Particular truths have particular relations to particular sensory-motor systems and it is probably only particular truths that are "produced" in the sense referred to by Anscombe. One cannot "produce" essence-specifying truths

such as "Man is a rational animal capable of discourse". Such truths are not in any sense "instrumental" (hypothetical) but are rather categorical or unconditional truths. The categorical imperative is an example of the latter kind of truth relating to Action and the Will, e.g., "So act that you can will that the maxim of your action be a universal law." Such a categorical unconditional imperative cannot be indifferent to Truth, and must be capable of occurring as a major premise in a practical syllogism. One of the purposes of this class of syllogism is to demonstrate the categorical characterisation of a good will, which is a will that operates both within the domain of categorical understanding (being self-causing, *causa sui*) and in accordance with ideas of reason such as freedom (so important in the realm of ethical virtue).

Anscombe in the above essay does not refer to *areté* but rather to the Greek concept of *eupraxia*. This may be appropriate given we are dealing with particular truths relating to action. The more universal and necessary idea of *eudaimonia* is not taken up in her discussion. She merely claims that *eupraxia* 'relates to a general idea of "doing well" which she claims is an objective of rational life. *Eupraxia* is obviously a concept that belongs in the productive sciences relating to *techné* rather than in the realm of practical science and the conceptual system constituted by *eudaimonia*, *areté*, *diké*, and *arché*. The will and action is obviously relevant in both domains but a will regulated by hypothetical imperatives is a different matter to the will acting categorically. In other words there may be a world of difference between "doing well" and flourishing (*eudaimonia*).

Notes to Chapter 5

¹ *A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, Emotion, Consciousness, and Action*, James, M., R., D., (Mauritius, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2019, Volume one, P.76)

² *From Plato to Wittgenstein*, G., E., M., Anscombe, (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2011)

³ *Ibid.* P.25

⁴ *Human Nature: The Categorical Framework*, Hacker, P., M., S., (Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, P.107)

⁵ *From Plato to Wittgenstein*, P.25

⁶ *Human Life, Action, and Ethics*, P.42-3

⁷ Ibid.P.60

⁸ Ibid.P.62

⁹ Ibid.P.72-3

¹⁰ Ibid.P.152

¹¹ Ibid. P.152

¹² *From Plato to Wittgenstein*,P.92

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Chapter 6: P.M.S. Hacker—The boundaries of sense, neuroscience and Human Nature

Hacker's Wittgensteinian approach undoubtedly contains both Aristotelian Hylomorphic and Kantian Critical elements. His work entitled "Human Nature: A Categorical Framework", is an account that aims to produce a perspicuous representation of the aporetic problem of Human Nature in the spirit of "Philosophical Anthropology". In this work Hacker clearly demarcates the arena of concern connected to scientific investigation from the arena of concern connected to Philosophical inquiry and reflection. This latter activity obviously critically involves a perspicuous representation of the concepts we use to characterise/explain/justify ourselves and our activities.

Concepts when combined in propositions/judgements that have an explanatory/justificatory function are categorical, and to that extent they are not merely recommending that we see a particular phenomenon "in a certain light", but demand that conditions for making these judgments are intimately tied to essence-specifying concepts. Categorical judgements can be universal or particular. Universal categorical judgements would be classified as Principles in Aristotelian Hylomorphic theory, irrespective of whether they were theoretical statements made in the spirit of justified true belief or whether they were practical judgments made in the spirit of the Good and the Just. The Goods of the soul (rather than the goods of the external world and the goods of the body), were obviously intimately related to Truth and Justice.

There is, of course, a fundamental difference between the statements "This rod is one yard long" and "All rods have a length". In the former case we may need to justify the particular truth with particular activities, and in the latter case the justification becomes, in the words of Hacker and Wittgenstein, "a grammatical justification" (Kant would have called such a universal truth synthetic a priori). What is clear is the difference between the two forms of explanation/justification. In the case of the Universal judgement "All rods have length" there would be no trip to Greenwich or reference to Greenwich, neither would there be any observation or manipulation of elements of my environment, or description of the results of such activity. Hacker argues that "All rods have a length" cannot be descriptive of any possibility because the contradiction of this proposition is not a description of a possibility. Hacker's position here is that "All rods have a length" is a "norm of representation"¹. A norm of representation for Hacker characterises the concepts of "rod" and "length" in relation to each other and embedded in categories of substance and quantity. The rod is a kind of substance that can be both observed and manipulated (measured) mathematically. The constitutive concepts we use to characterise human nature, on the other hand, belong in a different matrix of categories

which include substance, causation, powers, and agency. Out of these categories emerges the rationalism that governs our thought about agents and their powers. This kind of thinking will, according to Aristotle, be governed not by rules but principles.

It was Wittgenstein that opened up the logical space for Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Kantian reflections by stating that many disciplines, including Psychology, suffer from Conceptual Confusion. The origin of this claim was made in Wittgenstein's early work on "The Picture Theory of Meaning", to be found in his "Tractatus". This theory, according to Hacker in his book entitled "Insight and Illusion" (1989),² was inspired by Hertz's investigation into the logical nature of scientific explanation. Hertz in his work "Principles of Mechanics" provided a "Picture Theory" of his own which claimed that the point or telos of science was to anticipate events or happenings in nature, the data of such science was the knowledge of past events, the method was theory construction and the mode of reasoning to be used was deductive. The theory is composed of pictorial conceptions that must match the facts or states of affairs they picture. Any theory that meets these criteria will be best able to detect conceptual confusions (contradictions). Frege also probably contributed to Wittgenstein's position with his claim that ordinary language with its subject-predicate structure was disguising the correct logical form of judgement which was a truth functional form composed of the truth value of arguments.

The final abandonment of this "Picture Theory" came when Wittgenstein realised that facts are not spatio-temporal occupants of the world standing and waiting to be described/explained. Instead what needs to be described, he now argues, is the use of language with understanding. Understanding here is not a psychological process but rather a power to use language in accordance with grammatical rules in a grammatical framework. Conceiving of an **ability** as a psychological **process** or **state** was one of the conceptual confusions that led Psychology astray.

The divorce settlement between Philosophy and Psychology in 1870, left Psychology with a questionable definition, namely "The Science of Consciousness". which, when subjected to confirmation by the experiments of Wundt resulted in a schism between the activity of science and the concept of Consciousness. This schism was caused by paradoxical results from a series of experiments involving sensation/perception.

Gestalt Psychologists, such as W Köhler attempted to explain away the resultant confusion by claiming that Psychology was a "Young Science" and to be compared with the state of affairs which once prevailed in the early years of the development of modern Physics. The methodology of Physics required that qualitative observations be "translated" into quantitative measurements and

manipulations of "variables". This kind of procedure was embraced by the behaviourists that made it a part of their mission to diminish the integrity of the direct qualitative experience of the subject (an experience that included expectations and reactions to "demands"). Köhler experimented with apes but he soon found that adherence to the strict methodology and language of science prevented him from adequately describing the behaviour of his apes: he seemed to be forced to go beyond the data given in order to make sense of the behaviour. In these descriptions we find psychological terms such as "want" and "believe".

Later research by neurophysiologists would suggest the complete elimination of all so called "subjective" terms originating from generalisations, demanding only "pure" quantitative and causal terminology linked with the Energy Regulation Principle (ERP) and the "reaction" of neurones in the brain to stimuli. More careful researchers, influenced by Gestalt theory, adhered to a weaker position in which analysis included reference, not to causality, but to "correlations" between neural activity, and so called "subjective" experience. Yet even if it was the case that "subjective" experience was not always "eliminated" in a "reduction", the generalisations connected with this research certainly focussed upon patterns of neural firings in the sensory motor systems (in accordance with both the ERP and the PPP (Pleasure-Pain Principle)). The philosophical aspect of the intentionality of the experience was not investigated. The final justification rested on the activity of the neurones in the material substrate of the brain: patterns or groupings of perceptual stimuli were then "connected" either by causality or correlation to firing patterns of neurones. The prevailing assumption was that theoretical science ought to provide us with the paradigm of investigation and explanation even in the analysis of practical action-related contexts. This was of course prejudicial to both the logic of practical reasoning and the aims of the architectonic of practical science as conceived by both Aristotle and Kant.

Hacker and Baker in an early work entitled "Language, Sense and Nonsense" (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984) pointed to the above "prejudice" and its consequences:

"The crucial question to be faced is whether law, morals and etiquette, games, logic, mathematics, and (the case that concerns us) language are an appropriate subject matter for theory-building and theoretical explanation of the form involved in physics. Certainly rules and normative phenomena associated with them give rise to a multitude of questions, puzzles, and difficulties. Observing unfamiliar normative behaviour immediately generates questions that seek for an interpretation of the behaviour. The observer strives to understand the **meaning** of what he sees and hears."³

Normative behaviour is by definition behaviour that is not explorative (trying, that is, to discover the rule of the behaviour in the spirit of the hypothetical). It

is rather categorical behaviour/action that knows its own justification. When I restrain myself from doing something I know to be wrong, I know unconditionally that it is wrong (My restraint is not hypothetical--designed to find something out, or waiting for something). This knowledge in a court room is the test of sanity, e.g. knowing that murder and robbery is wrong. This kind of categorical awareness of arché is practical and not theoretical. The discussion above, however, fails to recognise this Aristotelian/Kantian distinction between the theoretical and the practical. "Observing unfamiliar normative behaviour" is therefore a curious formulation and may be confusing theoretical behaviour with practical behaviour. We called attention in earlier volumes to the fact that observation of an activity is driven by an interrogative attitude directed at the external world.

Anthropologists studying primitive societies approach the objects of their study with this attitude. We, on the other hand, who have grown up and live in our familiar societies, approach behaviour with a more reflective attitude, e.g. "Ought X to be doing A". Here we are reflecting upon the goods of the soul indirectly, and directly upon the worth of the agent engaged in doing A. In this kind of reflection the principles of morality are not being "discovered" but are a condition of asking a higher level practical question of justification. Here the "meaning" of the question can be articulated firstly, in terms of the maxim of X's action, and then subsequently (upon being asked for a further justification) in terms of reference to a higher principle/justification. Using one of Elisabeth Anscombe's examples: if one is male and married and sexually tempted by a choir boy, the maxim of such an agent's action is hypothetically driven by the principle of self-love which can be expressed thus, "Whenever my sexual desires for an object arise I am strongly attracted to that object". Agents functioning in accordance with the PPP, have no qualms about acting out in accordance with such a principle, which Kant would claim is the principle of self-love in disguise (Freud might claim the agent has narcissistic tendencies in such a context). The reason, insofar as Kant is concerned, for this maxim failing to fall into the class of ethical-categorical statements, is that it cannot be universalised in accordance with the formula of the categorical imperative. There is, that is no avoiding the claim that the choir boy is being used as means to a selfish/narcissistic end.

The tendency of some Philosophers to view the rules of language in the same way as Kant views the moral law, of course raises the question as to whether there may be some kind of category-mistake occurring here--a mistake similar to that referred to by Stanley Cavell in his work "The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy" (Oxford, OUP, 1979), when he differentiated clearly between rule of chess that allows the move Kn to QB4, and a principle that justifies the move, e.g. the principle of controlling the

centre of the chess board, thus limiting the options of ones opponent. Both the rule and the principle are normative, but the meaning of "normative" is distinct in these two cases. Rules, of course, specify what ought to be done under the hypothetical "If you want to play the game". Principles, on the other hand, specify what ought to be done in a categorical spirit. Principles also demonstrate that they dwell in another realm of meaning in that they presume both the knowledge of the basic rules of chess, and the more abstract knowledge of chess-strategy. The primacy of the importance of knowledge of the principles of chess is demonstrated in the intention with which we put the "Why?" question in this context, e.g. "Why did you move your Knight?". Answering such an inquiry with "I am following the rules of chess" will show that I have misunderstood the nature of the inquiry. A similar point can be made in relation to the rules of language. In this context Why-questions relating to assertions are often best answered by justification in terms of principles or categories:

E.g. Why did you claim that we are different to animals?

Answer A: Because animals do not engage in discourse in the agora

Answer B: Because we argue with each other in such discourse using our knowledge of principles.

In such a context focussing upon **the rule** for the use of the term "animal" will not take us into the higher reflective realm of explanation/justification. The linguist focuses on this lower level of activity in the spirit of "modern science". Baker and Hacker comment on this state of affairs in the following way:

"But the linguists "grammatical theory" is a calculus of rules. Its applications produces theorems not hypotheses and it neither has nor could not have (until it becomes a theory of performance) any room for factual initial conditions. To this, it will, of course be replied that the grammatical theory predicts that a given sequence is grammatical, and this is confirmed or confuted (just as in physics!) by experience, viz, the grammatical intuitions of the speaker. But this is wrong. The grammar entails that a sequence is according to its rules, licit or grammatical."⁴

The authors then elaborate upon this claim of the theoretical linguist:

"His investigations, he contends, go deeper than those of the psychologist. He outstrips the Philosopher in conceptual clarification."⁵

The above, the authors claim critically, is a tale full of sound and fury signifying nothing (P.315).

What this discussion illuminates is a commitment to a reductionist program which reduces linguistic phenomena to various pragmatic conditions.

Reductionism, in many respects fails to appreciate the fact that "causation" in the form of explanation/justification runs in two directions: bottom-up from social to moral, and top down from the so called formal and final causes (forms of explanation), to lower-level material and efficient causes. In Psychology, the lower level explanations are genetic and biological, and the higher levels that are often "eliminated" by the lower level explanations are perhaps what is of most interest in psychological investigations. On Aristotle's view, a higher level explanation/justification is embodied in the definition of a person as a rational animal capable of discourse. We suggested in volume 2 of this work, that Freud combines the principles of ERP, PPP, and RP in an architectonic structure ranging from the lower levels of the biological (ERP, PPP) to the higher psychological levels that regulate our belief and action systems. Knowledge is obviously important to rational animals capable of discourse and there can be knowledge of many different kinds of thing at different levels of abstraction, e.g. the rules of chess v the principles of chess. A good game of chess is more likely to be related to principles than to rules. Given the kind of architectonic account that seeks in Kantian fashion to unify the totality of conditions of our Being-in-the-world into one system of epistémé, appeal to the theoretical, practical, and productive sciences is obviously important. Given the above assumptions one can be forgiven for seeing in reductionism, some form of category mistake (a kind of irrationality).

Hacker prefers the term "conceptual confusion" and points to Wittgenstein's claim that the attempt to "reduce" arithmetic to logic illustrated the kind of conceptual confusion we encounter in a variety of disciplines with "psychological" concerns. Given the shifts in meaning of the term "psychological", and given Kantian consent to two kinds of inquiry into the phenomena of *psuche*, the program of reductionism appears problematic. One kind of inquiry is based upon the synthetic a priori truth, "Every event has a cause", and one kind of inquiry is based upon the logical principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Kant's complex architectonic is the foundation of all disciplines, not of the Mathematical Logic of Russell and Frege, but of the philosophical logic of Aristotle and the above two Aristotelian principles. It is, in fact these two principles that make sense of the top down movement in mathematics from concepts to intuitions. For Kant it is the categories that allow us to construct a table of principles or rules for the objective employment of the categories:

E.g. All intuitions are extensive magnitudes (synthesis of space and time) (P.197)

Experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions (P.201)

That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience is possible, actual and necessary. (P.239)⁵

The above is part of the Kantian matrix that subsumes rules under categories. Given this matrix it is difficult, if not impossible, in philosophical investigation, to detach concepts from their categorical framework and talk merely of conceptual confusions as Wittgenstein does. Hacker, on the other hand, especially in his later work (e.g. *Human Nature: A Categorical Framework*) is sensitive to the importance of the categories of understanding/judgement. These Kantian categories and tables of principles/rules must also be subject to the metaphysical principles of logic, namely the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. This Kantian framework or matrix in turn helps to constitute the context for the division of the mind into the faculties of sensibility, understanding and reason. This division obeys the Platonic imperative that "parts" or faculties must retain relations to the characteristics of the "whole" which, in this case, is the person. In Kant's case the metaphysical principles apply throughout the architectonic structure all the way to the bottom which is composed of the functions of sensibility where sensation and perception occur relative to the categorical and metaphysical aspects of the architectonic.

The Aristotelian architectonic or matrix of 3 media of change (space, time, and matter), 4 kinds of change, 3 principles of change, and 4 causes of change embedded in the reflective structures of his three branches of science, namely theoretical (including metaphysics and therefore the discipline of logic), practical and productive, is compatible (from a Kantian point of view) with the Kantian architectonic/matrix. The latter however differs to the extent it is an elaboration (in Aristotelian spirit) of the Aristotelian position.

Hacker is an important representative of the late-Wittgensteinian position which helped to criticise dualism, materialism, pragmatism, naturalism, logical atomism and positivism, thus creating the logical space once again for Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Kantian positions to re-emerge in mainstream philosophical debate. Ancient and Enlightenment commitments to the kind of rationalism that forms an important relation to experience, and various principles of organising experience, were reaffirmed. Hacker was part of the Wittgensteinian "turn" away from a narrower conception of science with commitments to reductionism, materialism and dualism, and toward a more social/humanistic broader conception of reality more in line with the views of Neo-Aristotelians and Neo-Kantians. There were also, however, significant differences between the concerns of the later Wittgensteinians and these Neo-Aristotelians and Neo-Kantians. The focus of concern for the Wittgensteinians was on the critique of language and its grammatical structure: a structure that is more concerned with the sense of language rather than its truth function, even if the former was an important condition of the latter. This characteristic was

behind the insistence that the investigation was not a theoretical exploration aiming at a theoretical discovery: grammar, Wittgenstein insisted is not a theory about anything.

The pendulum of reaction to Hegelian dogmatism had obviously swung too far when it embraced forms of anti-rationalism and scepticism in relation to the programs of Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics.

In a work entitled "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" written together with M R Bennett, a neuroscientist, the conceptual confusions associated with neuroscience are examined by Hacker and Bennett. The focus in this work is upon the theoretical temptations of materialistic and dualistic arguments and positions. In a Foreword, authored by Dennis Noble, this issue is addressed:

"The central appeal of this book is to throw off the remaining legacy of the Cartesian confusions, first expressed as a duality of mind and body, but lately expressed as a duality of brain and body. The authors show that, although the first required belief in a non-material substance, while the latter is wholly materialistic, many of the conceptual problems are the same"⁷

The authors define the task of neuroscience in the following way:

"to explain the neural conditions that make perceptual, cognitive, cogitative, affective, and volitional functions possible"⁸

So-called "conceptual questions" do not fall into this empirical domain where the investigations are primarily situated in a context of exploration/discovery in which the intention is to collect data and move to a more abstract level of generalisation. Concepts are generalisations and assume a fixed meaning, and relatively determinate content, which introduces a commitment to explanation and justification. When the focus is on individual concepts and their relations, categories form part of the matrix for the inquiry. When Principles are the focus of attention, the principles of logic (noncontradiction, sufficient reason) are the points of reference leading us from premises to principled assumptions or conclusions. The authors claim that conceptual questions concern our "forms of representation"⁹ (P.2). This appears to be an acceptable characterisation if the inquiry is explorative, but it ought to be pointed out that the move to the level of generalisation requires the involvement of categories of understanding/judgement. It is important also to note here that at this level the inquiry is not purely rooted in phenomena (moving from the solution of a problem to a new problem). Inductive inquiry assumes the use of concepts whose structure and content is clearly and distinctly understood. The authors, in this connection, refer to the brain research of Adrian, Eccles, and Penfield, which they characterise as brilliant, but riddled with conceptual confusion. The central

confusion, it is argued is over the following characterisation of human nature which the above researchers fail to grasp:

"Human beings possess a wide range of psychological powers which are exercised in the circumstances of life when we perceive, think, reason and, feel emotions, want things, form plans and make decisions. The possession and exercise of such powers define us as the kind of animals we are. We may inquire into the neural conditions and concomitants for their possession and exercise....But its discoveries in no way affect the conceptual truth that these powers and their exercise in perception, thought and feeling, are attributes of human beings, not of their parts---in particular not of their brains. A human being is a psycho-physical entity, an animal that can perceive, act intentionally, reason and feel emotions, a language-using animal that is not merely conscious but also self-conscious--not a brain embedded in the skull of a body"¹⁰

Aristotle's essence-specifying definition of a human being is "rational animal capable of discourse". This is embedded in an architectonic/matrix of the media of change (space, time, matter), kinds of change, principles of change, causes of change, all monitored and reflected upon by the productive sciences, practical sciences and theoretical sciences. This matrix is then at the conceptual level expressed by the Greek concepts of *areté*, *epistémé*, *arché*, *techné* and *phronesis*. The element of consciousness is, of course, of more concern for modern science than it was for either Aristotle or Kant. Given the Kantian imperative of reason to search for the totality of conditions of everything conditioned, the above largely descriptive list of characteristics of being human would appear to be acceptable to a Kantian Philosopher.

Thinking in its fully actualised mode is thinking about something. Both what is being thought about and how it is being thought about, must be possible, actual, and necessary for Kant. It is in this fully actualised mode that we encounter so-called conceptual judgements that in theoretical contexts aim at Truth and in practical contexts aim at "The Good". Both forms of reasoning are logical and can therefore embed themselves in sound argument structures. This means that in the case of practical judgements, the premises have to be True even if the primary purpose of the reasoning is to determine what action ought to be done.

The reductionist strategy of modern Science (dictated by its methodological obsession) is committed to the appeal to material and efficient conditions (causes/explanations). This approach changes the subject of thought and ends by "eliminating" or "explaining away" the explanandum. Colour may well be materially and efficiently electro-magnetic radiation, and stars similarly, may be essentially defined in terms of "Gravitationally bound body of helium and hydrogen made self fluorescent by the process of nuclear fusion." Yet it is not the material conditions of colour or the efficient causation that helps to produce light that is at issue when we stand in awe and wonder looking at the night sky or a sunset. What underlies these phenomena is not the object of attention.

In the descriptive quote above relating to human nature, we notice a lack of reference to Principles, although there is a clear intention to present the essence of being human. These Principles have emerged from Aristotelian, Kantian, and Freudian investigations. We should recall, in the context of the discussion of Hacker and Bennett's work, that Freud was one of the early brain researchers, and in his Unpublished "Scientific Project" he discussed three categories of neurones in the brain: Phi, Psi, and Omega neurone systems. He related these categories of neurones in various ways to the Psychological functions of perception, memory and consciousness. Freud, as we know, ended up burning this work as part of his "Socratic turn" away from the external world, and toward the world of thought as characterised by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. Freud made his mistakes (and admitted to them) during a period of 50 years of writing, but he cannot be accused, as he was, by Neo-Cartesians of contradicting the idea of Consciousness. From the point of view of an Aristotelian and Kantian account of the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason there was no contradiction (if one excludes Freud's earlier "reductionist" writings). There is in Freud, no reduction of Consciousness to the Unconscious, but rather a teleological/formal explanation of Consciousness as a vicissitude of Instinct (in Aristotelian terms Consciousness might be regarded as an actualisation of the human potential of the human life instinct). The "Categories" of the potential, the actual and the necessary is the framework for Freudian reflections upon the nature of Consciousness, The Pre-Conscious, and the Unconscious as topographical systems. The Category of "Agency" is then superimposed upon this topographical structure via the "systems" of the Id, Ego and Superego. This Architectonic/Matrix is then constituted and regulated by the ERP, PPP, and RP. and it is also by its nature intersubjective and objectively related to the structures and systems of Civilisation and its Cultural activities. Freud names two of his categories of Instincts, Eros (the life instincts) and Thanatos (death instincts), and this testifies to the Greek spirit of his reflections. Ananke appears in this spirit and there are clear references to the Delphic prophecies that "All things created by man are destined to ruin and destruction", and "Know thyself". Freud was hoping of course that his own work would do something to mitigate the pessimism of the first message and hinder the descent of humanity into the abyss of destruction, and perhaps it did partly succeed in this by restoring both an Ancient and Enlightenment Spirit in our Culture. Kant's Critical Philosophy was relatively quickly neutralised in its influence by the enduring spirit of Hegelian Philosophy. Freud's Philosophical Psychology was also destined for negation by the modern spirit of Science inherited from the Cartesians committed to mind/body dualism, and English Empiricists committed to an anti-rationalist program. These "Modern Scientists", or "new men", as we have called them in earlier volumes, viewed the world through the lens of variables to be observed in order to be manipulated in a largely technological spirit (*techné*).

Hacker and Baker identify a long list of conceptual errors in Psychology, that are taken to be facts by neuroscientists, e.g. that perception involves harbouring an image in ones "mind", that memory is always of the past, that memories can be stored like substances in the brain in the form of neural connections, that inquiries into the instinctual realms of sex, hunger, and thirst are inquiries into "typical" emotions.

Much is made of the idea of a perspicuous representation by Hacker and Bennett, and the controlling image of this idea appears to be that of "uno solo ochiata"--grasping a view of the world vaguely characterisable as a "picture" or "world-view". These are terms from the later writings of Wittgenstein and they are static image-like terms that perhaps are more "mathematical" than dynamic, to use a Kantian distinction drawn from his third critique. These terms certainly sit uncomfortably with the more dynamic Aristotelian idea of "form of life" that Wittgenstein also embraces. A picture can of course be synoptic, and like Giorgione's "Tempesta" capture the essence of mans rationality in an image, i.e. by showing how man is calmly situated in a busy and threatening environment.

Language for Wittgenstein, Hacker, and Bennet is a medium for change--the principles/rules are grammatical and there are kinds of use, e.g. interrogative, descriptive, and imperative. Language also has moods and tenses, but perhaps the most important feature of its essence, insofar as its relation to reality is concerned, is to represent the world in its absence. Its dynamism is a vicissitude of both sensory-motor, and thought operations. A word is a stand-in for reality in the realms of discourse and thought. Discourse brings distant places and spaces, the past, and the future into the agora. If there are language-games being played in the agora, they are perhaps less important than the rational world view the visitors to the agora expect of each other. Games can be won or lost, but there is a feeling that much more is at stake than personal wins and losses in the dialectical interplay of thesis-antithesis in such discourse. Socratic elenchus was designed to restructure this dialectic via the rational use of an early form of the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Winning and losing debates (techné) subsequently took second place to areté measured by arché, diké and phronesis.

One of the most important definitions of psuche claims that life is the first actuality of a natural living body that has organs. The Latin translation "anima" does not quite capture the full Greek intentions of this term, and renders it more substantial and confined to the modality of actuality. Life, in the light of this translation, became substantialised in the form of ones breath or ones blood which, in the one case when it ceased, marked the end of life and in the other, also marked the end of life when enough of the substance of life-blood was shed. Here the senses were sufficient to establish death with the minimum of

knowledge. For the Greeks, life was a vicissitude rather than an actuality and the controlling framework of thought was developmental in accordance with the modalities of possibility and necessity. Forms and principles entered into this dynamic scene and their task was primarily to explain or justify changes such as the end of life. Logic was paramount in this process---something had to remain the same throughout the change if it was to form the subject term of our discourse. The Latinisation of Greek transformed this something into an actual substance, materialising it in a way not intended by the Greeks. For the Ancient Greek Philosophers the most important aspect of this something was not its matter but rather the principle organising that matter. The powers a being possesses were, for them, obviously important to the essence of this being--the power of life--the power of discourse, and the power of reason. These are the powers of a human form of life, a form of life that is organised hierarchically with the lower powers being related in complex ways to the higher powers by principles (ERP, PPP, RP). The ERP rests on the functions of the organs and the limbs which in turn both partly constitutes, and is subject to, regulation by the PPP, which in its turn partly constitutes and is regulated by the RP. The highest level of existence, for Aristotle, was that of contemplation-- a state in which the Reality Principle (RP) demands rationality of all the vicissitudes of ones life: an aim mirrored in more abstract and complex manner by the organised discourse of all the sciences (Productive Science, Practical Science, Theoretical Science). It is worth remembering in the context of this discussion the Freudian early reliance on the hierarchy of brain functions proposed by Hughlings Jackson in relation to his studies on Aphasia. The Freudian "turn" of course, involved a turning away from studying the neural substrate and toward studying the conditions necessary for the human being to be mentally healthy. The Psychic apparatus presented in the famous Chapter 7 of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams"¹¹ retains clearly the trace of the influence of Hughlings Jackson but at the same time it also points the way forward to the Freudian "turn" where principles rather than substance will dominate both concept-formation and theoretical and practical justifications. In Freud's last wave of theorising nothing is "reduced" to anything else, nothing is "eliminated", and what we now find is the presence of principles in a hylomorphic and critical framework. Recall here Freud's own claim that his Psychology was Kantian. Freud was throughout his career combatting Cartesianism and its commitment to Consciousness via a certainty grounded in scepticism. This scepticism, we need to remind ourselves, urged us to meditate far from the madding crowd of the agora and in the process think away our own physical bodies. Descartes approached Aristotelian Philosophy in the same spirit of scepticism, and accused him of dogmatic rationalism without fully understanding the complexity of the hylomorphic framework. The Cartesian form of certainty that emerged was certainly a dogmatic form of rationalism that a Freudian might become suspicious of, considering the facts relating to Descartes own earlier mental-health problems:

we know that Descartes suffered at least one mental breakdown in his youth. The removal of the body from the realm of the Cogito left Descartes with a form of dualism which in the opinion of many was inferior to the form of dualism we encounter in Plato. Both were rationalists, but it is not unreasonable to assume that Platonic Rationalism was more sympathetic to hylomorphism than Cartesian rationalism was.

Hacker and Bennet, in their discussion of Aristotle, discuss the nervous system in relation to the Aristotelian idea of *sensus communis*. Aristotle we know had no idea of the exact function of nerves in the brain. Hacker and Bennet note the functions of temporality and the ways in which imagination and memory organise time and images into a unity¹²

There is also reference to Cicero's account of the lost works of Aristotle in which the mind is regarded as a fifth element of the universe (complementing earth, air, water, and fire). This fifth element had the function of thinking and is also in a state of eternal motion. The Greek term "**endelecheia**" is referred to in this context, and its meaning is contested amongst critics, but it in all probability refers to the power of nous, the active intellectual aspect of *psyche*. Hacker and Bennett claim that the term is the same as the term "*entelecheia*", which connects the general term **energeia** to the developmental and actualisation processes.

With Descartes (the combination of scepticism and an epistemology resting upon God for its justification), thought and thinking was transformed into consciousness. Unfortunately the dominant category Descartes used in his reasoning about consciousness was that of substance. The Primary premise of Cartesian reasoning begins with the axiomatic claim that the substance of the mind is immaterial. Thinking, is, of course, an activity rather than anything substantial. Activities are logically linked to agents--there cannot i.e. be dancing in the street without anyone dancing in the street. The "I" on the Cartesian position is an immaterial substance, and eventually forced Descartes into defending his position by agreeing that thought (immaterial substance) and extension (material substance) interact in the material matrix of the brain. An alternative way of conceptualising the "I think" is in terms of "I can" where the "I" at the source of the activity is a "lived body" (Merleau-Ponty). This "lived body" or "form of life" for Freud was best characterised as a vicissitude, or a function (William James) or an operator (Julian Jaynes).

It is, of course, a person who thinks and not a brain or a body and to deny this fact is to commit what Hacker has referred to as the Mereological Fallacy. This fallacy involves attributing a predicate true of the whole to a part of the whole, e.g. a predicate true of a person is used to claim that the same predicate is true of his brain or his body. Hacker and Bennet then draw up a long list of authors who

have used this form of fallacious argumentation. The list includes names such as Sperry, Crick, Edelman, D Marr, J.Z. Young, Le Doux, C. Blakemore, Helmholtz, and Damasio. Many of these authors claim in various ways that neurones have knowledge or intelligence.¹³

Sensation is obviously a form of consciousness that has a close connection to the body. Wittgenstein, in his later work, focuses upon pain and the language game associated with it. To say "I am in pain", he argues, is not a descriptive claim as many have maintained but rather an expression of the speakers pain (sometimes in the form of an exclamation). This expression is learned perhaps as a substitution for the primitive cry of pain. In both cases I am directly conscious of the pain. In the case of reporting someone else's pain I am not in the same non-observational way, aware of his pain, but rather in a sense observing his suffering and in so doing, I take his expressive behaviour to be a call for attention and appropriate forms of social activity that aim at alleviating the suffering. Wittgenstein argues that I cannot be said to know that I am in pain because I "notice" or "observe" the pain in myself. Rather, as he puts it "I have my pain" (a form of non-observational awareness). It is also important to note that I am not here naming my pain in expressing it. Naming requires criteria and such criteria are necessary, of course, when it comes to the third person use of pain. Saying "I am in pain" becomes for the observer, a criterion for saying "He is in pain". Similarly, in the case of "I intend to have a shower", such an utterance is a criterion for saying "He intends to have a shower". Here the idea of moves in a language game certainly appears as an illuminating way in which to avoid conceptual confusion involved in assimilating the third person use of a psychological predicate to the first person use. But a sceptic may interject, "What if he is not telling the truth?". Wittgenstein does not explicitly say this, but playing such a language game assumes truthfulness. As a language-user playing this kind of language game, I also am aware that particular agents (not everyone) are, for certain particular reasons, not to be trusted, and in such cases it is best to see what they do before believing that they are in fact in pain. This however is a convolution of the language game and not a central defining feature. We learn that sometimes there can be "mitigating circumstances". If someone is known to be a pathological liar it is only prudent to not believe what one hears but rather see what he does over a longer period of time.

Intention is of course future-directed and the primitive expression of this language-game is founded upon the expression "I am going to..." (have a shower). The game ends when the agent expressing the intention does what he intends to do. There are in these games no appeal to inner observation or introspection, no search for a sensation, no search for a characteristic experience of pain, or intending or wanting. There is merely activity, in accordance with an underlying maxim of "I can" (express my pain, intentions, wants). The responder also

responds in the spirit of "I can", e.g. by sympathising, helping, etc. Activity is the dominant category, and the concepts of areté and entelecheia embedded in a hylomorphic or critical framework are part of the matrix forming the condions of the above forms of life.

Many philosophers of mind have fixated upon the term "mind", and substantiated it in various problematic ways. Hacker consistently points out that the agent of activity is the person, the "I", and if we wish to use the term "mind" as a synoptic means of referring to the intellectual and moral powers of the person, there is no problem with doing this, as long as one does not fall down the rabbit hole of attempting to solve the pseudo-problem of the relation of an immaterial substance of mind with the material substance of body. Persons have brains, minds cannot have brains, and brains cannot have two "selves" interacting (corresponding to the neuronal interaction of the right and left hand sides of the brain). Indeed there is every reason to doubt that there is such a thing as a self, which is an inner owner of experiences. **The person** owns his experiences and the inner-outer polarisation may not be the most appropriate conceptual representation of the relation of a person to his experiences. The Kantian "I think" has no such problematic implication. Kant with this expression is indicating the ability one possesses to conceptualise ones experiences: an ability that is, according to Hacker, an expression of a two way power plus the ability to use personal pronouns and other person-referring expressions. Saying "I am in pain" after having learned to use the concepts of "I" and "pain" is a ground for other persons or "I's" to say of me, "He is in pain". The "I" Hacker claims, is an essential condition of the whole language game. Hacker appears here to be in agreement with the Kantian more schematic account of the child learning to use the word "I":

"The first person pronoun is one piece in a complex game in which the other personal pronouns and person referring expressions are other essential pieces. Like the king in chess it is the pivotal piece for each player, but without the other pieces one cannot play the game."¹⁴

Self-Consciousness is thus not a state but rather connected to an ability to think of oneself. The mastery of all first personal pronouns and psychological predicates in the first person case, are learned together with criteria related to the observation of other persons: criteria are necessary to master third person usage of psychological predicates. This means that the usage of first person predicates are criterionless. We recall that Kant's schematic account of this phenomenon referred to a stage of using language where the child uses its name to express its wants etc: "Karl wants ice-cream". For Kant, the advent of the usages of "I" "You", "Me", "He", "She" etc, transforms the consciousness of the child to a self consciousness that involves the ability to take a reflective step back and psychically distance oneself from ones actions and beliefs. This reflective step back, is also a step into the territory of the context of explanation/justification. One can, for example, after a period of learning, ask of ones own beliefs "Are

they True?": and also ask of ones actions "Are they Just?". Self-Consciousness, then, is a complex vicissitude of Consciousness. The space of self-consciousness, according to Hacker and Bennett, is created partly by a disposition to say that "I am in pain", and thereby the disposition to think that one is in pain. This space is the space in which the activities of explanation and justification arise. Reasons are asked for, and given, and understood in the demand for Truth and Justice. It is in this space, for example, that one can become conscious of ones motive for doing something (an important aspect of "knowing oneself"). Such knowledge is vitally important for knowing ones efficacy and worth as an agent, and this knowledge is an important aspect of the operation of the Reality Principle in ones life. Ones knowledge of oneself may not of course necessarily be shared by others, and this is part of ones Stoical appreciation of the role of Ananke in human affairs. The Goods of the Soul are known by the phronimos who knows himself, and these far outweigh the goods of the body, and the goods of the external world: an attitude well reflected in the Christian warning that one may gain the whole world but lose ones soul in the process.

Hacker and Bennett correctly point to the importance of the role of language (discourse) in the actualisation process of becoming self-conscious. They also point to the unfortunate tendency of many thinkers to focus on the theory of language rather than the practice or mastery of language. Psychological concepts are of course not merely theoretical technical concepts, but rather concepts that stretch over the domains of all three sciences (productive, practical, and theoretical). Rules are practical activity-related entities. When, for example, I am uncertain of someones motive in doing something this is not only a theoretical uncertainty, even though I am in a sense in search for the Truth--my search is also related to the practical sphere of activity and action. The authors in making this point maintain correctly that, "Science is not the measure of all things"¹⁴. In purely theoretical scientific investigations, if a term fails to to explain what it intends to explain, it can be jettisoned. If the term concerned was a central term of the theory, indeed the whole theory may be jettisoned. This cannot happen with psychological concepts, according to Hacker and Bennett, because they are partly constitutive of the human life forms they characterise. Suffering, intending, and wanting do not merely reveal what we are experiencing but play a role in our becoming or being the kind of form of life we are.

Hacker and Bennett claim to be writing under the banner of of analytical Philosophy, and this is a reasonable claim given the omnipresence of the Philosophy of the later Wittgenstein (a reformed analytical philosopher?). The boundaries of sense, rather than the division of the world into referential facts is the new North Star. Clarification of concepts alleviate the effects of the virus of conceptual confusion. Not just the use of language but its mastery (areté), becomes an important part of the new methodology. Hacker and Bennett agree

that there are different forms of analytical Philosophy but they fail to engage with our principal question in this work which is, "What roles can hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy play in the future of Philosophy?" There are aspects of both forms of philosophising in Hackers largely Wittgensteinian account but the question of its relation to both rationalism and Metaphysics remains unanswered.

Hacker in his work "Insight and Illusion" supports the view that there is a "family resemblance" between the Kantian and the later Wittgensteinian positions when he says:

"Both Kant and Wittgenstein shared a conception of philosophy as concerned with the bounds of sense... both sort to curb the metaphysical pretensions of Philosophy".¹⁵

This, however, merely forces us to once again question why there is a failure to engage with forms of rationalism and metaphysics we find in Aristotle's and Kant's works.

Notes to Chapter 6

¹ *Human nature: A Categorical Framework*, Hacker, P.,M.,S., (Oxford, Blackwell, 2007)

² *Insight and Illusion*, Hacker, P., M., S., (Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1986)

³ *Language, Sense and Nonsense*, Hacker and Baker (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984, P.308)

⁴ Ibid. P.314

⁵ Ibid. P.314

⁶ *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Reason*, Translated Kemp Smith N., (London, Macmillan Press, 1929).

⁷ *Philosophical Problems of Neuroscience*, M., R., Bennet, Hacker P.,M.,S., (Oxford, Blackwell, 2003 P. XIV)

⁸ Ibid. P.1

⁹ Ibid.P.2

¹⁰ Ibid P.3

¹¹ *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud, S., The Penguin Freud Library Vol.4, Translated Strachey, J., (London, Penguin Publishing, 1976)

¹²*Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*, P.18

¹³ Ibid.P.69

¹⁴ Ibid. P.348

¹⁵ Ibid.P.374

¹⁶ *Insight and Illusion.*

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Chapter 7: Hacker: Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and Metaphysics

Wittgenstein was also an enigmatic figure. Mercurial brilliance combined with a Viennese pessimism that rivalled Freud's, confounded his Teachers and fellow- students alike at the contemplative centre of Excellence in Cambridge. In notes taken by some of his students (Some notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein) Wittgenstein is reputed to have claimed:

"My type of thinking is not wanted in the present age. I have to swim so strongly against the tide. Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing"¹

An Insightful comment. We have, in these volumes, claimed that the work of Wittgenstein marks a departure from the thread woven by the "new men" (Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Adam Smith etc): a departure that aligns itself with the thread of tradition leading from Aristotle to Kant and on to a Cosmopolitan future, thousands of years in the future. This image of swimming against the tide of contemporary Philosophy may in fact provide Wittgenstein's answer to the question we posed concerning why, he and his followers, refrained from engaging more directly with the rationalism of Hylomorphism and Kantian Critical Philosophy. That the starting point for Wittgenstein represented in his earlier Philosophy was a form of mathematical intuitionism may also provide part of an answer to our question. We ought to recall that he came to England to study Engineering and also we ought to recall his fascination with Mathematics, a fascination that brought him to Cambridge to study with one of the the authors of Principia Mathematica.

We know also that Wittgenstein was struggling to put his later thoughts into writing. Hacker claimed that the mastering the form of the Philosophical essay or paper did not come easy to him:

"to be forced to think sequentially is torture for him"²

So, Wittgenstein instead, relies on a numbering system and continual editing and re-editing of remarks (he probably made in connection with his lecturing), to present the intuited connections between his thoughts. In his early work Wittgenstein believed that how Language relates to the world cannot be represented in Language, and that, therefore, the limits of my language are the limits of my world. In his early work he also appears to believe that Mathematics does somehow provide us with truths about the world and his theory of meaning in the Tractatus is primarily referential and directed at Reality conceived of as a totality of facts. On this view (which he later characterised in terms of the Augustinian view of language) he believed that, to grasp the meaning of a sentence, was equivalent to grasping what the sentence describes. These dominating thoughts marginalised all other forms of

discourse: interrogative, imperative, expressive, etc. Augustine's view, Wittgenstein argued, was connected with a Philosophical Psychology that viewed the mind as an immaterial medium in which inner events occur. Learning a language, according to Augustine, was a matter of learning how to associate words with objects, so that words then struck a note on the keyboard of the imagination. "Correlation" of words with objects becomes then, the central feature of learning a language. This might have been an implication of Wittgenstein's early view of the solipsistic linguistic soul that mysteriously "injects" meaning into language. For the later Wittgenstein these "objects" become a part of language: become "linguistic samples" that are used in a language-game. They have now become a part of language because they have become part of the process of communication: part of the form of life and telos of language.

The Aristotelian concept of "form of life" that we find in Wittgenstein's later writings, Hacker argues, may have originated from Spengler, who claimed that language cannot be reduced to "utterances" or "events", but is rather embedded in a culture or human form of life. Involved in such a view, is the claim that words and concepts no longer "mirror" or "picture" our life, but rather stand in the middle of it as part of the hurly burly of human activity-- human activity that includes people expressing their pain, asking each other questions and commanding each other to do things. Many different forms of language occur in such a form of life. This reflection of Spengler's influenced Wittgenstein to transform inner mental acts and activities into more publicly accessible human intercourse. In Wittgenstein's later work, it is this concept of "form of life" that plays an important role in the justification of psychological and linguistic activity. The idea of "picture" is also jettisoned on the grounds that a picture of a boxer positioned in a stance, for example, has not clear meaning until we know its intended use and context, e.g. this is how you ought to stand in attack mode, or, this is how you ought not to stand in defence mode. We now find Wittgenstein, in his later work, turning toward psychological explanations and explanations of language-meaning that refer to the natural history of being human rather than solipsistic psychological/atomistic judgements embedded in commitments to science and positivism. Hacker refers to Wittgenstein's comment, §199, in his "Philosophical Investigations":

"To understand a sentence is to understand a language"³

Language is now regarded **sub specie humanitatis** in terms of a pattern of activities that constitute complex forms of life that have a particular natural history, and the general telos of communication. The limitations of condensing the use of a name into a mere relation to the external world, now becomes obvious to everyone. The idea steering Wittgenstein's thought at this point, is that the meaning of a word is best accessed by "recalling" its use. So a fictional

name such as "Gandalf" has meaning, but not in relation to anything in our natural history, because the name has never been allocated to a living human being. It suffices however to differentiate Gandalf from real people like Napoleon that no longer exist, but also from other fictional characters such as Bilbo.

Does this new conception of Language have an essence-specifying definition? Wittgenstein specifically says (and this point is endorsed by Hacker), that every explanation of something does not require an essence-specifying definition of that thing. In several places, Wittgenstein also points to the difficulty of providing a synoptic view ("uno solo ochiata") of what otherwise looks like a motley collection of language games. He speaks of the similarity between these "activities" in terms of a "family resemblance". This however does not mean that we cannot explain/justify these language-games/forms of life. The final justification--the final answer to the final "Why?" question-- is, "This is what we do!". At this point, as he puts it, our spade is turned, and there is no further explanation/justification. Language-games may all differ but speaking a language is a fundamental power involving many other powers which we all possess and these are rooted as much in our natural history as in our human nature.

The question that needs to be put once again is whether these Wittgensteinian reflections by Hacker are consistent with Aristotelian and Kantian Rationalism. In Hackers later work "Human Nature: A Categorical Framework", the title makes it clear that there will be, as far as he is concerned, a positive answer to this question. We wish at this point to explore the extent to which Wittgenstein is engaged in the same kind of project as Aristotle and Kant in the domains of Philosophical Psychology, Epistemology, and Metaphysics.

The Tractatus is clearly at odds with much of what Kant stands for in the name of Science and Metaphysics, even if parts of it were inspired by Schopenhauer. In this work we are presented with, in Wittgenstein's own words, a solipsistic, metaphysical self, that injects meaning into language. This is clearly a position that Kant would have raised doubts about in the name of what he regards as clearly delimited boundaries of pure reason, and what can and cannot be thought. Wittgenstein claims in the context of this discussion that "The limits of my language are the limits of my world."³ (5.6). This is one of the grounds for his claim that logic does not describe the world but rather "shows" the scaffolding of the world: a scaffolding about which nothing can be said. In other words, language is a means of representation and its nature is such that we cannot meaningfully represent this state of affairs in language. Both the World and the "I" are mystical elements of the account we find in Tractatus. Phenomenally there is no "I" because it stands at the boundary of the world in

much the same way in which one will not find the presence of the eye in the visual field. Similarly, **that** the world exists is mystical but we do know somehow (it is claimed) that it is the totality of facts or states of affairs. Both of these abstract and mystical positions were to be abandoned in the later work. We pointed in volume 2, Chapter 17, P.239, that the Copernican Revolution in Wittgenstein's shift from the earlier to his later position may have been partly caused by a lecture given by Brouwer (the so called father of mathematical intuitionism). In this lecture Brouwer spoke about the primacy of the will in Schopenhauerian terms. The importance of the role of action in the activity of calculation with numbers and counting, was argued to lie at the source of mathematical intuition. For Wittgenstein, there subsequently dawned a new understanding in which justifications, even in Mathematics, must occur not **sub specie aeternitatis** but rather **sub specie humanitatis**. This may have been the key step in a process which would move Wittgenstein closer to Kantian Critical Philosophy. This move toward action also brought with it a re-conception of the role of human judgement in human arenas of activity. The focus is now upon "good judgement" about what we do when we follow grammatical rules: intuition becomes a secondary phenomenon in such an account.

We pointed earlier to Hackers mistaken view of Kantian synthetic a priori judgement. For Kant it was obvious that different objects and different principles required characterisation in terms of the special rules of the understanding (to be distinguished from the more general rules of logic). Practically oriented judgements, for Kant, are also attended by different "categories of judgement" relating to "Agency" and "Community". Aristotle too would have distinguished between theoretical judgments relating to substance and practical judgments relating to "Having", "Acting" and "Being affected".

Wittgenstein's new method also rips us out of the context of exploration/discovery, and we then find ourselves in a context of explanation/justification in which Socratic recollection is the methodological animus that replaces analysis into simples. The new method rests upon the Platonic/Aristotelian ground of action and good judgement, and agreements in judgments. Actions and Judgements are "recalled" and not discovered. In a murder trial, for instance, we do not discover that murder is wrong but rather recall the judgement that murder is wrong and we also recall the accusation of the accused by the state prosecution at every phase of the trial. "Murder is wrong" would in Wittgenstein's terms be a "norm of representation" in this context: a rule of the proceedings which we need to remind ourselves of. Many have pointed to the "conventional" nature of court proceedings and also Wittgensteinian Philosophy. There is a claim in Wittgenstein that in dealing with grammatical remarks we are dealing with "conventions", but this needs to

be viewed in the light of the following interesting claim in the work "Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics":

"Conventions which are not causal, but stricter, harder, more rigid, are always conventions in grammar."⁵

So, the "conventional" law against murder is "harder" and more logical than the law of gravity, which is a causal law. Similarly, turning to Psychology, the "Principles" ERP and PPP have causal aspects and must therefore be regarded as less logical and rigid than the Reality Principle (RP). The Reality Principle, for Freud, certainly imposes the kind of necessity upon the judgements and actions of humans, resembling the kind of necessity Kant claims the categorical imperative imposes upon us. The categorical imperative is the moral law that regulates Socrates and his "knowledge" that murdering others is wrong. We know, Kant argues, both rationally and non observationally, that murder is wrong, and because we know this we are duty bound by this knowledge. Here we are bound by a rigid logical necessity. Calling this phenomenon "conventional" is acceptable if the term preserves the force of the universality and necessity of Socratic elenchus and Aristotelian logic. For all Philosophers committed to the power of ethical argumentation, practical contradictions such as using ones life to take another life unlawfully, devalues ones worth to such an extent in other peoples eyes that it is to be avoided at all costs: the ultimate price for murdering someone is of course ruin and destruction for oneself. Treating people as ends in themselves, in the Kantian system, is more than a recommendation (which some claim is the mark of a "convention"), and is part of the long civilising process that leads finally to a kingdom of ends. The term "Conventional" has the meaning it has, since Hume, of being less of a justification for a judgment or action than the term "Natural" which was a term associated with "law". In Wittgenstein's eyes it achieves more of the status of a bond, e.g. "The Geneva Convention" may not be a law, but it carries the full force of a categorical imperative in the chaotic conditions of War.

Hacker, in his early work, "Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein" points to the Kantian synthetic apriori truth, "Every event must have a cause" and claims that this is not a truth about the world but rather a "rule" or norm of Newtonian Physics and its systematic description/explanation of Nature. Kant is well aware that Physics is a discipline on the frontiers of exploration and discovery of the physical universe, and that the "law" of cause an effect is an indispensable tool for these "explorations". Once found, the cause itself can then be subjected once again to this law, and the search continues up until that point when we arrive at the terminus of possible observation, and then we can either postulate an uncertainty principle, or a "First Cause" (that as a matter of fact actually contradicts the law of causation). This provides the whole enterprise of science with an air of uncertainty, and this has led many into

different forms of retreat ranging from firstly, science is not after "The Truth", but only particular truths, or secondly, scientific theory provides us with "models" which we can jettison as soon as a better model presents itself. Kant would not subscribe to such scepticism, given his commitment to a *Metaphysics of Material Nature* in which he outlines the general conditions under which the categories can be applied to material nature. This endeavour has both quantitative and relational aspects. The latter law "every event must have a cause", reworks any sequence of subjective impressions into an objective order in accordance with Aristotelian "efficient and material causes": a process involving *a priori* forms of intuition. For Kant there are three kinds of laws operating in his architectonic conception of science: firstly, those arising from generalisations accumulated in experimental situations, e.g. rocks when thrown describe a curvilinear parabolic path back to earth. Experience generates these kinds of laws which requires the assistance of mathematics for complete description and explanation. The application of mathematics requires, as far as Newton was concerned, the ideal postulation of a constant, e.g. every object continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by some outside force. This is obviously an ideal intuition required by mathematics if it is to be applicable.

In the two other kinds of laws neither ideal postulation of "constants" (uniform motion, uniform state of rest, straight line) nor experience-based experimentation are present. The "transcendental law of efficient causation" according to Kant is formulated thus:

"All things change in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect"

This is neither an idealisation nor a generalisation grounded in experimentation. Here the unity of apperception ("I think") plays an important role. This, in its turn, is also a different law to the *Metaphysical* law that "All change must have a cause" (which includes the "Internal" cause" of desire that propels a lion towards its prey.) The Kantian architectonic is obviously more systematic than the architectonic of science we find in Aristotle, and it is therefore simpler to compare Wittgenstein's position to the Aristotelian position. The atomistic /analytical conception of "cause" is that logically, the cause, is distinct from the effect: we are dealing with two distinct events here. This is a very different kind of answer to the question "Why?" compared to that question we ask in relation to an agent when we ask him why he believes or judges "Murder is wrong". In this latter case, the judgement, and the justification, belong logically (in the context of practical reason) together, in one argument that uses the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. On Wittgenstein's account we could point out that we all agree with such good judgement because we "know" (non-observationally) what is right and what is wrong. If, for example, a murderer stood up in court and sincerely claimed "Murder is right" (not the particular murder he committed, but murder in general) he will probably be subjected to a

psychological investigation before sentencing. He is not merely saying something false, but rather something nonsensical. There may well have been investigations prior to the trial, and even events during the trial, that are designed to **explore** the possibility that the murderer is innocent of the charge. Everyone accused is presumed innocent until found guilty in a due process. Such investigations will be in accordance with the judgement, every event must have a cause. These are physical, forensic investigations that are exploratory, requiring either physical or observational evidence. The question we pose is the following: which of these two types of investigation is best conceived of as "psychological"? Kant would argue that both types of investigation could be conducted in relation to human activity of the kind we find in the courtroom proceedings. He called one type of investigation "Physical Anthropology". This deals with "events" that happen to man, and this kind of investigation occurs best in the conceptual framework of substance and efficient causation where the focus is on a physical rather than a conceptual connection. The second type of investigation occurs best in a framework of Agency, Action, and Aristotelian final and formal "causes" (aitia= explanations). Kant calls this second type of investigation "Pragmatic Anthropology", and describes it in terms of what man makes of himself and his world. There is a metaphysical difference between these two kinds of investigation that related firstly to the ontological difference between "events" and "actions" and secondly to the differences between material/ efficient causation and formal/final causation. In the latter we are dealing with the idea of reason Kant refers to as Freedom, and in the former, we study how the categories of the understanding organise experience. There is, that is, in the one case of Physical Anthropology a reliance on the method of observation that assists us in transforming the matter of appearance into experience where concepts are formed in the realm of the unity of apperception ("I think"). Examples of concepts that are formed in this kind of investigation are given in Kant's work "Metaphysical foundations of natural science". Motion, for example, is "explicated" in the following terms:

"matter is the movable insofar as it can as such be an object of experience"⁶

Theoretical Ideas of reason are also involved in the formation of the concept of absolute space that is required to make sense of motion that occurs in a straight line: this motion occurs in accordance with the forces determining the position and composition of matter in the universe, namely the forces of attraction and repulsion. Material and efficient causation are the forms of explanation /justification used in relation to events that "happen" in experiences whose knowledge is then determined by observations. When one moves to the realm of the "pragmatic" and what man makes of himself, we move not just into the realm of agency which causes itself to act by desire and freedom, but also into a realm in which cause and effect (action and consequences) are conceptually linked.

Both Hacker and Wittgenstein seek explanations and justifications in this categorical realm where the end of a flourishing life (eudaimonia) is a fundamental constitutive factor of much that is "happening".

It is not a simple matter to claim that Psychology/Anthropology should have both Physical and Pragmatic aims. This is clearly recommended by Kant and we can also see the outlines of this ontological distinction in the work of Freud. What happens to one in ones childhood and infancy can have serious consequences for the actualisation of ones potentiality to become fully human: thereby possessing the powers necessary to make something of oneself and ones world. Freud's case studies are adequate testimony to this fact. To lead ones life fully and consistently in accordance with the Reality principle, is no easy task, and requires a large number of enabling conditions that Freud is referring to in his theorising. We know that Freud was one of the few Psychologists Wittgenstein spent time reading, speaking at certain times of being a disciple of Freud. Like some disciples he was of course critical of the master. In particular he presented a criticism of Freud's "determinism" which is not wholly clear. Freud certainly appealed to Principles, but these were not characterisable in terms of material and efficient causation requiring the collection of experimental evidence. We should recall in the context of this discussion Freud's destruction of his "Scientific Project". The ERP and probably the PPP were certainly principles regulating the activity of children and the patients Freud treated, and one can without contradiction say that in many cases we are dealing with what "happened" to these patients (Physical Anthropology). The psychoanalytical proceedings, however, like the above court proceedings, were largely governed by the Reality Principle, and the failure of the agent to make this principle constitutive of the kind of life they "choose" to lead. Psychoanalysis, then, has theoretical, practical and productive elements. Therapy is designed to install (in the spirit of techné) the Reality Principle in the lives of his patients. Is this determinism, (given the emphasis in psychoanalysis on the maxim "the truth will set you free")? Freud's idea of "causation" was undoubtedly tied to the Greek concept of *aitia*, which also means "explanation", and there is no doubt that Freud was not manipulating the will of his patients but rather strengthening it for a future, better, hopefully flourishing life. In this endeavour everything had meaning, including "dreams", which he defined as wish fulfillments following both the ERP (the wish to continue sleeping) and the PPP (the desire to experience pleasure and avoid experiencing pain and anxiety). Wittgenstein complains about this "explanation" or explication of dreams but his criticism, again, is not wholly clear. There are transitional states between waking and sleeping when experiences in the form of images occur, and for some of these it would be difficult to explicate these in terms of the Pleasure-Pain Principle, but I can see no objection to regard these as types of "dream". These images may be caused by the wish to sleep that is largely regulated by the ERP.

Many different kinds of dream are recorded in Freud's "Interpretation of dreams". Those that he describes in the transitional states between sleeping and waking appear to resemble hallucinations caused perhaps by the very specific wish to carry on sleeping when there is an active attempt by a part of the system to awaken. The "dream" of missing a step, whilst descending steps and awakening in connection with this dream, is an example that may be thought to be caused by the impulse to awaken, but an alternative "interpretation" would refer to the creation of the image as part of the wish to sleep. These latter kinds of dreams are not usually associated with REM dreams which usually occur in the steady state of a sleep that is not deep, but neither is it in the dynamic state of awakening. Freud's thoughts in this work, it needs to be said, stands on the cusp of his "turn" toward the more philosophical kind of theorising that we find in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. What is clear is that whether we are experiencing images in the process of falling asleep, or whether we are in the process of experiencing images whilst awakening, the best description of this activity is that this experience and process is "happening to us". In spite of the putative counterexamples of lucid dreaming these activities are not subject to our will. The Category of "Wish" for Freud is, therefore, Psychologically regulated by the ERP and PPP. I "have" my dreams in a similar way to the way in which I "have" my pains (sensations are by definition not will-active phenomena (to use a concept of O'Shaughnessy)). Images are constituted of sensations. Even in the case of my saying to myself "I am going to wake up now", and then doing so, there is still room for doubting the description of what is happening here, if I claim that I have willed myself to wake. The wish to stay asleep for a moment longer may well have given rise to the "image" of my saying these words. The dream-scene does not occur in a spatio-temporal continuum where the world and my expectations mesh harmoniously. On the contrary my expectations seem to change randomly as do my surroundings, but there are probably ERP and PPP explanations behind these changes. Wittgenstein complains about the Freudian insistence that there must always be some explanation to the "changes" he is witnessing. We also find Wittgenstein complaining in the notes taken by his students entitled "Conversations on Freud", that he doubts the veracity of the claim that anxiety is a repetition of the birth trauma. He re-describes this position as an appeal "to something that happened long ago". Birth is an "event" that "happens to us". In a psychologically oriented organism where the death instinct (a phenomenon connected with a compulsion to repeat) can be represented in a memory system which, according to Freud, never forgets anything (at least if an experience is registered by the psi neuronal system and a physical/chemical change occurs). In such a context it surely is not unreasonable to attribute the more traumatic forms of anxiety to this origin. There may be objections to this explication that Wittgenstein has in mind, but he does not present them, and it must therefore be said of this objection that, as it stands, it is at the very least incomplete. There

are Aristotelian considerations to bear in mind too: the "trace" of other earlier animal forms are to be found in the physiological development of our bodies in the womb. The life and death instincts obviously reside in this physiological matrix, and any explication of such a "hidden" process must necessarily be speculative.

In Freud's works we are dealing with a cross-over of three forms of Aristotelian science: Productive (therapy), Practical and Theoretical, and a cross-over of two different kinds of Kantian "Anthropology" (Physical and Pragmatic). The discipline of Psychology as it presented itself after its grand divorce from Philosophy in 1870 has suffered from "conceptual confusion" for most of its history, if Wittgenstein is to be believed. We have in these volumes mapped out the development of its key concepts. Freud may be an exception to this criticism, if Wittgenstein's criticisms are incorrect or incomplete. Freud did not, however, succumb to the demons of materialism or dualism in his later waves of theorising.

Wittgenstein shares with Kant the conviction that Reason cannot be the only court of appeal for all contexts of explanation/justification. He sees, that is, a logical space for a special use of understanding/judgement which can be accessed by grammatical investigations. Concepts for Wittgenstein, and for Hacker, are explicated in terms of the rules for the use of the word expressing that concept. There are remarks on ethics in Wittgenstein but there is no specific commitment to separating the metaphysics of morals from the metaphysics of material nature, as there is in Kant. We know that, for Wittgenstein, the worth of a person was an important issue which he dealt with both religiously and privately. This stands in contrast to the major metaphysical Philosophers, Plato, Aristotle and Kant, where religious reflection was specifically integrated into their metaphysical positions. There are indications that Wittgenstein believed that grammatical investigations alone would not be able to give a perspicuous representation of what religious people have faith in, and in this respect his position resembles the Kantian position which maintained that belief in God is not an epistemological matter but rather a matter of having faith in the theoretical ideas of God and the soul. There is a feeling that even in Wittgenstein's later work that what he could not speak about he would consign to silence.

In his lectures on Religious Belief recorded in the notes of his students Wittgenstein says:

"These controversies look quite different from any normal controversies. Reasons look entirely different from normal reasons.....the point is that if there were evidence this would in fact destroy the whole business."⁷

He goes on in these lectures to object to the anthropomorphisation of the idea of God when we are being taught the use of the word "God". He insists however that this concept of the divine is understood by those who can consistently answer questions put to them in different ways. He, like Kant, also dismisses supernatural phenomena produced in evidence for the existence of God. It becomes clear in these conversations that the "form of life" of a "religious" man like himself, is the decisive "ground" for his belief system. Religious people who lead their lives "as if" there is going to be a day of Judgement is, Wittgenstein argues, sufficient reason to believe in the validity of their belief system. Neither Wittgenstein nor Kant would agree to the counterargument that there is any contradiction in organising ones life in this fashion. Such a form of life, for Wittgenstein, was a consequence of human natural history. In this form of life, a certain form of anxiety is a result of the death instinct receiving representation in such a natural history (which in its turn gives rise to a seeking after safety and comfort). The repetition of both this anxiety and the response to it, namely, believing in God, might then also involve believing in the power and efficacy of the life instinct, and it is this element of our psychic apparatus that provides us with the hope to transcend all compulsions to repeat old traumas. Freud is an interesting author to refer to in this debate, because he is regarded by others as an atheist in spite of indications in his work to the contrary. He describes himself as a Kantian Psychologist, for example. Freud certainly saw in mass religious movements something pathological and delusional, in particular when it came to the blind acceptance of authoritative influences. He "interpreted" this behaviour in terms of an infantile longing for a father figure: a desire for safety and comfort. Saying, however, that religious belief/ judgement /action falls into the category of "wish-fulfilment" does not necessarily carry the same critical weight. Freud claims that religion promises a happiness it cannot deliver, but both Aristotle and Kant realised that there is another dimension to the hope for happiness than an actual flourishing life. There is, namely, the knowledge that ones form of life is such, that one is worthy of happiness on ethical grounds (areté, duty). Wish-fulfilment need not necessarily be tied to the form of anxiety connected to early trauma. For Wittgenstein, as we noted, the connection between early trauma and late delusional activity was too speculative. He clearly believed that the source of this form of pathological activity does not necessarily have to lie so far back in ones history.

Elisabeth Anscombe was herself a Catholic who pointed to the relation between the collapse of religious authority, and the collapse in the belief of the importance of virtue and duty. Kant, whilst not being an atheist, in his writings regarded God as a theoretical idea of reason, and there is the suggestion that this idea is more fragile as a source of Good than the practical idea of Freedom. Indeed we find in Kant a withdrawal from the idea that the source of our idea of the Good is in the theoretical idea of God. This might be the case even if this

idea is the source of the Good-in-itself: but this claim lies outside the bounds of knowledge. What appears to lie within the bounds of our practical knowledge is the practical wish/hope that God will provide us with a flourishing life if we are worthy of it. Indeed the primary argument for the existence of God presented by Kant, is that enlightenment believers believe in the humanistic ideal that if the good-in-itself is present in their lives in the form of good judgement and good deeds, good consequences will follow (eudaimonia--a flourishing life). There is in, other words, in Kant a necessary (logical) conceptual (grammatical?) connection between the happiness of a flourishing life and the life of virtue and duty.

There is also in Kant an account of a **hypothetical** form of practical thinking that produces a hypothetical idea of God as a possible cause of my safety and comfort. Here the categorical thought that God is a good in itself, is absent, and the principle of self love is the putative "good-in-itself" that such religious believers embrace. Extreme forms of this self-love (narcissism) may indeed be the consequence or "effect" of early trauma. The principle of self-love, for Kant is not a good-for-the-soul. Such a narcissistic imperative for Freud is a causal determinant of the form of life one leads, and here one can certainly use the Kantian psychological ontological description of "something happening" to the agent, rather than the description of an agent freely choosing their destiny.

Wittgenstein may share much of the Kantian animus insofar as his account of religion is concerned, and we should add that he denied being a religious man but claimed that he could see everything from a religious point of view. Secondly, he found Tolstoy's work "What I believe", to be a very interesting and satisfying account of the role of religious writings in a religious life. Thirdly, the dedication chosen for his work "Philosophical Remarks" reads, "To the Glory of God". So, in conclusion, for Wittgenstein, and perhaps also for Hacker, Religion was not a soft "conventional" choice that has been made in the natural history of human being, or a pathological deviation in man's actualisation process. Religion is rather a grammatical choice taught to me by my elders in a categorical spirit of "The Good"-- a choice that will help me to determine the goods for my soul, the goods for my body, and the goods of the external world. If Religion is conventional, it is so in the way in which concepts are conventional. Rules must be followed in the use of concepts. It is grammar that tells us the essence of things/objects: tells us, that is, the category of the object conceptualised. This in, Hacker's view is one of the seminal achievements of the later Philosophy of Wittgenstein. The special rules of the understanding that Kant refers to, is, according to Wittgenstein, to be investigated grammatically in accordance with his Critique of Language. In his earlier work Wittgenstein claimed that logic "showed" us the scaffolding of the world. In his later work he is more cautious and we are provided with an "album" of grammatical sketches which condense

clouds of Philosophy into drops of grammar, but this leaves the answers to many aporetic questions open, especially in the arenas of ethics and religion.

Wittgenstein argues that we are taught the meaning of the word "good" via explanations relating to why something is good--explanations given to us by our elders. He insists that we cannot give an essence-specifying definition of "the good" because there are a "family" of meanings involved. In this respect this idea resembles the idea of "language" where the terminus of his account rests with the family resemblance of language games. This point was illustrated in his analysis of the name of Moses. Russell's analysis had claimed that one description or a conjunction of descriptions will give us the "meaning" of a name. Wittgenstein questioned this account and claimed that concepts and names are not determinate in this way and even the name of Moses is constituted of a family of meanings. Saying that "Moses does not exist" for Wittgenstein can have many different meanings. This does not however, entail that all terms possessing this kind of indeterminacy have no meaning. The meaning of the terms "God" and "good" are given in the explanation of these meanings and these are the same explanations we were taught when we were taught the meanings of these words.

Hacker in several places in his various works, points to the importance of not arbitrarily imposing one grammatical form upon another, e.g. not imposing the form of the thing named upon the "I". Believing that "I" is a name generates conceptual confusion in the hands of what he calls "rational psychologists"⁸. This is the kind of "metaphysics" Wittgenstein aims to dismantle with his grammatical investigations. Hacker in this work points out that Wittgenstein maintains that:

"We are concerned here with the Kantian solution of the problems of Philosophy."⁹

This suggests that these two Philosophers to some extent share a *Weltanschauung*. The consequence of the conceptual confusion of these "rational psychologists" is the creation of a "picture" of the mind as an inner theatre where performances occur, where scenes are displayed. This is one aspect of the substantialisation of the so called "immaterial substance" Descartes conceived of. On such accounts knowledge, understanding and imagining are inner activities rather than publicly manifested powers, abilities, and dispositions. Many other mental phenomena also become "contaminated" with such a view of the mind. Curiously, in spite of their considerable differences and disagreements both Empiricists and Cartesian Rationalists embrace the above "picture", assisted by both Science and some forms of Analytical Philosophy.

"Pain" is a state of consciousness that comes and goes, the first person account of which is learned by replacing ones groans and pain behaviour with the utterance "I am in pain!". Here no name is being used to pick out an actor in the inner theatre. When this model is not just generalised to sensations but also to the will and action, we are in danger of misunderstanding completely the roles of various mental powers, capacities, and dispositions in the human form of life. In his Notebooks (P.89e) Wittgenstein had correctly pointed out that the will is not a phenomenon. Hacker clarifies this on P.308 of his work:

"For an experience is a phenomenon, which an act of will--following a rule, doing thus and so for the reasons such and such--is something we do--not something we observe."¹⁰

Here we note the full force of the Wittgensteinian "turn" from the solipsist of the Tractatus touting an account of intuition requiring a linguistic soul injecting meaning into propositions, toward the Cultural Philosopher carefully distinguishing between many meanings of Being (Aristotle), and many categories of Being (Kant). If the mind was a private theatre of parading phenomena that are "observed" or "introspected", there could not, on Wittgenstein's account, be the agreement in the judgements we publicly manifest. To demonstrate this, we have Wittgenstein's private language argument, which claimed that if everyone possessed a beetle in a matchbox in the way in which we possessed "phenomena in our minds", there would be no means of determining whether everyone had the same beetle in their matchbox or a different one. This of course is a standard objection to the solipsistic position. Some modern Philosophers have thought of this beetle as Consciousness. Hacker reflects on this problem in the following way:

"For are living beings, animals and human beings, not physical objects? And how can a mere physical object be conscious (Cf., PI§283)? I experience my own consciousness one is inclined to say, but how can I transfer this experience to objects outside myself? How can physical bodies in a physical world have something as alien to physical phenomena as consciousness? And if one thinks as many philosophers and psychologists do, that it is the brain that is conscious this exacerbates the mystery. For how can mere matter inside the skull be conscious?"¹¹

Hacker's proposed solution to the problem:

"The first step toward clarity is to remind ourselves that it is only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being that one say that it is conscious or unconscious (PI§281). We do not attribute consciousness or lack of consciousness to stones, tress or machines--not because they are insufficiently complex in structure or physical constitution but because they are not living creatures that behave like us in circumstances in which we attribute consciousness to each other."¹²

The above are clearly grammatical investigations of the term Consciousness". The above is also an explanation of what Consciousness means. Hacker also refers to the remark below from Wittgenstein's "Zettel":

"Consciousness in another's face. Look into someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it"¹³

Wittgenstein continues this line of reasoning with:

"Grief one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion."¹⁴

In other words, there are public criteria for the attribution of consciousness to other beings. There is no "inferring" from behaviour to Consciousness--the connection however is conceptual. The facial expression is not a symptom but rather part of the context of exploration/discovery. These remarks demonstrate a wider emphasis upon the concept of Action. It is, in other words, what people say and do in particular circumstances, that is important for the ascription of psychological predicates. These activities do not logically entail the judgement made about them, but they are nevertheless logical criteria. Behaviour is also a logical criterion for that most private of events, namely being in pain, which is of course not an action but rather something that happens to one. Saying that one is in pain on the basis of observing the behaviour of pain or hearing the words "I am in pain" is as certain as 2 times 2 equals 4 (Philosophical Investigations P.224), Wittgenstein argues.

Consciousness is, however, intentional. It is about the world whether that access occurs via perception or conception. It is surely correct to argue with Kant that it is representational. Intuitive representations, however, are different to conceptual representations which are more complex and fall into the categories of understanding/judgement. Wittgenstein's account looks suspiciously pragmatic but it would be wrong to regard it as a pure behavioural account. It does leave one wondering whether it was correct to abandon the epistemological quest to examine the relation of Consciousness to the world in favour of a more active conception of Consciousness that is engaged in saying and doing things.

O'Shaughnessy is of the opinion that the relation that Consciousness has to Reality could not occur without the presence of some form of knowledge in the mind. For him, as is the case with Freud, Consciousness is a vicissitude of human life systems-- a vicissitude that is not a singularity but rather evolved into existence via the various processes of evolution (natural selection, sexual selection). The higher ontological state of Mentality, in its turn, is a vicissitude of self-conscious being. For O'Shaughnessy (cf Freud) the final end of consciousness is motor activity but this presupposes knowledge of the good of

the activity. Plato, we know in the Republic, regarded knowledge of the Good as the most important form of knowledge. O'Shaughnessy claims, however, that this knowledge rests naturally upon an orientation in the world that is fundamentally of an epistemological nature. His argument is as follows:

"The property of intentionality, of being directed or "about____" which characterises mental phenomena generally, characterises the experiences that are analytically necessitated by the state consciousness. This property carries the implication that a conscious subject must know something of the World in which he finds himself. How could a person have experiences with determinate content if he knows nothing of the world towards which they are directed. A self consciously conscious subject--more, anything that is the bearer of a self conscious type of mind--must be acquainted with certain general properties of the world; for example, with the character of the overall framework, the rules of individuation and explanation that prevail in the World."¹⁵

This quote has a Kantian atmosphere about it that we shall explore in a later chapter. We shall also explain in the next chapter the extent to which P M S Hacker subscribes to the above characterisation of Consciousness.

Notes on Chapter 7

¹*Acta Philosophica Fennica* 28 Ed. J Hintikka (North Hill, Amsterdam ,1976), P.25

²*An Analytical Commentary to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Vol I*, Baker, G., P, Hacker, P.,M.,S.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1980).

³*Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1950)

⁴*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Ogden C., K., (New York, Cosimo Classics, 1922)

⁵*Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe G., E., M.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, P.88)

⁶*Philosophy of Material Nature*, Trans Ellington J., W.,(Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing, 1985, P.118)

⁷*Wittgensteins Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Edited by Barrett, C.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1970, P.56)

⁸*An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, Baker G., P., and Hacker P., M., S.,(Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, P.228).

⁹ Ibid. P.231

¹⁰ *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969)

¹¹ *Analytical Commentary*, P.234-5

¹² Ibid. P.235

¹³ *Zettel*, Wittgenstein, L., Trans by Anscombe, G., E., M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1967), §220

¹⁴ Ibid. §225.

¹⁵ *Consciousness and the World*, O Shaughnessy, B., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000), P.6

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Chapter 8: Hacker: Human Nature

Hacker's work "Human Nature: The Categorical Framework" is an attempt to widen the perspective of his earlier grammatical investigations into that area of Philosophy Aristotle described as "First Philosophy". The first part of the title "Human Nature" obviously reaches back to the Hylomorphic conception of man as a "rational animal capable of discourse": a definition implying a synthesis of living matter and organising principles. The second part of the title "The Categorical Framework" echoes one of the major concerns of Kantian Critical Philosophy, namely the crucial role of the Categories in contexts of description and explanation. The combination of these two concerns flags this work as belonging in both the Classical and the Enlightenment genre of Philosophical Projects. Whatever its ultimate intention, it assists in the cultural task of reestablishing hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy on the stage of "Modern" Thought.

Hacker wishes this work to be in the name of establishing a "Philosophical Anthropology"¹ (P.10). Part of his concern is to construct the above discipline with the aid of a grammatically established framework. The major categories of the investigation are "Substance, Causality, Agency, and Power". There is a greater degree of commitment in this work, firstly, to metaphysics and secondly, to a limited version of rationalism. Non-empirical investigations into language-use in everyday and theoretical contexts is the chosen methodology. The aim is both to describe and explain, but there is an interesting classical reference to the Socratic insistence that we philosophers are only midwives in a process of recollection or recall of what we already know. The focus of these investigations are highlighted in the following:

"we are interested in the concepts of agency, mind, body, person, consciousness, self consciousness, and so forth."²

Hacker also clearly wishes to distinguish between the above form of philosophical investigations and scientific investigations, between the forms of rationally and empirically-based knowledge. This Project of Philosophical Anthropology surprisingly, however, pays scant attention to Kant's "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View", claiming that there are only two great paradigms for this discipline, namely the Platonic dualistic paradigm and the Aristotelian biologically/logically inspired hylomorphic paradigm. Psuche is rightly identified with the principle of life and levels of principle (correlating with forms of life) are not specifically named, but are implied by the following:

"What is distinctive about the human soul is that it incorporates not only the vegetative powers of growth, nutrition, and reproduction, and the sensitive powers of perception, desire

and emotion, but also the uniquely human rational faculties of the will and intellect. The soul is not an entity attached to the body but is characterised in Aristotle's jargon as the "form of the living body"³

The above quote delineates the physical/anthropological grounds for a hierarchical differentiation of different "principles" in a complex life-form such as the human being. These principles are of course operationally present in Aristotle but not named as such. They are: the Energy Regulation Principle (ERP) which constitutes and regulates all physiological activity of tissues, organs, and limbs, the Pleasure-Pain Principle (PPP) which regulates the behaviour of attraction and repulsion to objects of experience, and the Reality Principle (RP) which regulates all behaviour, cognition, emotion, and consciousness in a person. A person, according to Hacker, is the moral/legal vicissitude of the biological/psychological human being. The Powers of a man are obviously related to more than one principle. Desire, in the form of appetite relates to both the ERP and the PPP. The power of reasoning relates principally to the RP but is regulative of Desire.

How these powers relate to the will and its striving activity finds articulation to a great degree in Freud's later work. The agency of the Ego, for example, whose primary areas of concern in life are to Love and to Work, operates over the biological/psychological domain of protecting the body from damage and danger (ERP, PPP) up to the more intellectual concern with the moral law (RP), and the more strategic "work" of integrating the superego into the Ego. The agency of an integrated ego, for Freud, is the key to a healthy person-ality. Its concern is not merely with the demands of the superego but also the demands of the id and the external world. The ego, then, strives to work in accordance with the RP in relation to both our belief and actions systems: the ancient concerns of the Truth and the Good are the overarching concerns of these systems that are committed to Civilisation via the activities of discourse and Reason. Surprisingly there is no reference to Freud in this work of Hacker's.

Hacker pays much attention to the way in which the Cartesian concept of **res cogitans** redefined thought and marginalised the biological aspects of mans existence, and he points to the empirical commitment to materialism as manifested in the reflections of Hobbes, La Mettrie, D'Holbach and Diderot (P.25). The Kantian synthesis of Cartesian Rationalism and Empiricism is, however, completely bypassed in this description of the historical development of "Modern" Philosophy. He attributes to Wittgenstein the successful refutation of Cartesianism, overlooking the fact that Kant had previously directed decisive critical arguments at the Cartesian position. These Kantian arguments against both materialism and dualism have largely been overlooked by British Philosophers because of the suspicion that Kant was a "German idealist". This is a curious omission especially given the title of Hackers work, "The Categorical

Framework" and Wittgenstein's praise for the Kantian approach to metaphysical problems.

Hacker begins his "investigations" into the category of Substance by pointing out the central importance of "purpose". He argues that Science demands a determinate unambiguous system which is not necessary for the classification systems we use in everyday discourse. For example, in the case of ordinary everyday discourse it may not matter if we have no clear and distinct criteria for distinguishing "trees" from "shrubs". This lack of clarity would not be acceptable in many scientific areas. Hacker wishes to claim that rigorous classification of particular substances is necessary for the later activity of explanation, and this might be true but it neglects to take into consideration explanations of the kind "All life forms are mortal" which require an understanding of the relation of concepts to each other, rather than a relation of a concept to a particular. Insofar as ordinary everyday discourse is concerned there is clearly a sense in which the concepts of "trees" and "shrubs" are generalisations for use on more than one occasion, but the presence of a minimal middle ground of uncertainty does not prevent the concepts from having a purpose and representing significant sectors of this form of life. In such usage, however, it is important to note that usage is more concerned with description than explanation.

Hacker approves the Aristotelian account of Substance and points to the various distortions of this Category of Existence (logical category) by Descartes (largely in the name of Science). In this discussion of Substance we are also provided with some insight into why the Kantian account is neglected. It is clear in Hackers reflections on this issue that the extent to which Critical Philosophy is committed to Aristotle's hylomorphic account is underestimated. This oversight might be connected to a belief that Substance is best conceived of in terms of "particulars" (a position adopted in Aristotle's early work on the Categories). The focus upon what is termed "special ontology" of the later work ("Metaphysics") was marginalised on the above interpretation of Aristotle. On this latter account "substance" is one kind of Being, and Being is the major area of concern for an account of "General Ontology" that regards "Substance" as related to "Prime Matter" (about which nothing can be known except that it remains what it is throughout a process of change). Prime Matter lies on a continuum that reaches through "forms" to the Pure Form of God which is one terminus of explanation/justification. "Substance", for both Aristotle and Kant, then, is a theoretical category to be distinguished from other categories such as "Agency" and "Power", both of which are practically oriented categories, carrying their own "meanings of Being" and related to rationality in very different ways. A reason why a being is as it is, is a very different kind of reason for a form of life that is in the midst of a process of becoming what it can be by

means of the use of its agency and powers. It also needs to be pointed out that there is no great difference between the Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of substance, especially if one bears in mind the distinction between special and general ontology. Substances interact very differently if they are animate living substances with powers of life and consciousness. This interaction can of course be characterised in terms of an ontology of event subsumed under the category of causation but this kind of explanation does not answer all the aporetic questions that can be raised about this kind of interaction.

Hacker points to the interesting fact that the Greek "**aiton**" was translated into the Latin "**causa**" which he claims is connected with "guilt", "blame" and "accusation". This may be an interesting translation of the use of "aiton" that is related to the interrogative "Why did you do X?" in a context where it is obvious that the questioner was clear over what was being done, but did not approve of what was being done. There are many meanings of "aiton" that are not connected to contexts of guilt, blame, and accusation. For Aristotle this term could also designate the material and efficient explanations (aitia) of what is happening and why. Asking, for example, why the tree burned upon being struck by lightning is, according to Aristotle, requesting a material explanation of what happened, e.g. "The tree burned because it was made of wood". Similarly, upon encountering a burning tree (if one had not witnessed the lightning strike), posing the question "Why?" expects the answer "Because it was struck by lightning": this is an efficient cause/explanation. This leaves one wondering how the Latin translation of "aiton" namely, "causa", dealt with such meanings.

The complexity of translation from Greek to Latin was compounded by, firstly, the Scientific rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics by Descartes and Hobbes, and secondly, the Humean account of "causation", (specifically directed at the rejection of the rationalist position which enabled seeing the cause-effect relation in terms of one global necessary change). The Humean account of "causation" encouraged regarding causal change as an interaction between two contingently related events which are logically independent of each other. Hume as we know accused rationalists of "projecting" necessity into what he claimed were essentially contingent relations in reality: a state of affairs that he diagnosed as a consequence of expectations that are contingently associated in the mind. He appears otherwise to have argued in his Treatise that if there was a necessary connection between these two events, it would lie beyond our powers to discover such a connection. Hacker points out that this account was rejected by Kant, who, like Aristotle, appreciated that the relation of global necessity was not projected but rather categorically "thought" in our judgements about events that are related in accordance with our categorical judgements.

For Kant, as for Aristotle, the Categories were powers the understanding possessed to organise reality, and these categories were appealed to in particular in contexts of explanation/justification. These categories were "independent of experience" and were regarded as a priori forms of thought by Kant. The Kantian idea of the thing-in-itself or noumenal reality was "ideal" in the sense of not being empirically determined by experience. It was also part of a polarised continuum between Prime Matter and Primary Form that bracketed what was empirically real in our experience. The so-called formal and final causes /explanations, are tied logically to the ends of rationality (nexus finalis), whereas efficient cause/explanation are tied to real events in nature (nexus effectivus). In the former nexus the parts of the whole are reciprocally cause and effect of their "form". When power and agency are situated in this realm of ideal ends the context changes from a context of exploration/discovery to a context of explanation/justification.

In Aristotle's hylomorphic theory the tissues, organs and limbs of an animal are part of a **nexus finalis** and it is this structure that constitutes them as parts of a being that is a self-organising entity. One can atomise the parts of a whole if one wishes to, and investigate their properties in order to accumulate facts that may or may not be relevant to the concept of the whole organism we possess, e.g. the properties of the tissues of human beings provide us with facts about rational animals capable of discourse but such facts about tissue composition, relating to the ERP, will have little to do with the rationality and discourse elements of the above essence-specifying definition: these latter elements are principally constituted and regulated by the PPP and the RP. According to Kant in his "Analytic of Teleological Judgement":

"Organisms, are, therefore, the only beings in nature that, considered in their separate existence and apart from any relation to other things, cannot be thought possible except as ends of nature. It is they, then, that first afford objective reality to the conception of an end that is the end of nature and not a practical end....they supply natural science with the basis for a teleology..."⁴

A better defence of hylomorphic Philosophy would be difficult to find. Kant goes on to claim that the above teleological principle cannot rest on empirical grounds of observation and experimentation. He presents us with a dialectical exchange over the power of reason in relation to the empirical mechanisms of external nature. In his introduction to the solution of the above antinomy, Kant writes:

"We are wholly unable to prove the impossibility of the production of organised natural products in accordance with the simple mechanism of nature. For we cannot see into the first and inner ground of the infinite multiplicity of the particular laws of nature, which, being only known empirically are, for us contingent, and so we are absolutely incapable of reaching the

intrinsic and all sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature--a principle which lies in the super-sensible..."⁵

Kant underlines the above argument by claiming that natural laws and mechanical explanations would never suffice to explain the origins of a simple blade of grass. Reasoning about this state of affairs leads us to the threshold of the super-sensible realm of noumena which our human minds cannot comprehend fully, neither by intuition nor by the categories of the understanding, nor by the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. The world as a totality refuses to show its **origin and essence** to human beings. Appealing thus to a single category, namely causation, as science does in such discussions, is therefore, otiose. Kant does not in any way intend to diminish the importance or underestimate the value of mechanical explanation via material and efficient forms of explanation. Indeed he uses this form of reasoning to provide us with a pre-Darwinian hypothetical theory of evolution:

"It would be as if we supposed that certain water animals transformed themselves by degrees into marsh animals, and from these after some generations into land animals. In the judgement of plain reason there is nothing a priori self contradictory in this. But experience offers no example of it."⁶

In this context Kant also refers to the role of teleological explanation in this reasoning process. The origin of the above processes is mother earth:

"Yet for all that he is obliged eventually to attribute to this universal mother an organisation suitably constituted with a view to all these forms of life, for unless he does so, the possibility of the final form of the products of the animal and plant kingdoms is quite unthinkable."⁷

What is the nature of this attribution? It is clearly not a matter of Humean "projection" given the presence of rational argumentation throughout this section of the Third Critique. Projection is a power of the imagination. The psycho-physiological power of the imagination is discussed by Kant in a section on dream activity:

"For when all the muscular forces of the body are relaxed dreams serve the purpose of internally stimulating the vital organs by means of the imagination and the great activity which it exerts--an activity that in this state generally rises to psycho-physical agitation....Hence, I would suggest that without this internal stimulating force and fatiguing unrest that makes us complain of our dreams, which in fact are probably curative, sleep, even in a sound state of health, would amount to a complete extinction of life."⁸

This is a Freudian reflection: a reference to the life instinct and the wish to sleep. Freud thought so important in his theory of dreams. Imagination, is, of course, an inner power regulated by the ERP and PPP and this distinguishes the imagination from reason which is a two way power related to the RP--a power which is directed outward and conscious of itself.

For Kant, man as the only being possessing understanding and rationality, is therefore entitled to be regarded as the "lord" of Nature. These powers enable man to willfully set ends for himself and employ nature as a means to such self determined ends. The ultimate end of such activity is Culture (P.94). Part of the essence of cultural activity involves the Greek idea of liberating man from his unnecessary desires. Cultural processes of this kind for Kant, however, requires postulation of a cosmopolitan totality in which nation-states submit to a discipline of international law and order: a state of affairs in which war is irrelevant and diplomatic activity strives for a "perpetual peace". The capacities for discourse and rationality obviously play an important role in the establishment of the rule of phronesis, that is the aim of the phronimos. In a Culture the civilising activities of skill regulated by areté as well as esoteric activities aiming at the goods for the soul together help to constitute that Culture.

Kant also points to the tension that exists between lower level ERP and PPP activities relating to the survival of the species and the more "cultural" activities (regulated by the RP) involved in actualising the potential of rationality in humanity (P.97). Such an actualising process uses discourse as a medium and in this medium we can speak sometimes with a universal voice about our desires and feelings of pleasure and pain. Kant elaborates upon the tension between life and Culture:

"The value of life for us, measured simply by what we enjoy (by the natural end of the sum of all inclinations, that is, by happiness), is easy to decide. It is less than nothing. For who would enter life afresh under such conditions? Who would even do so according to a new self-devised plan (which should, however, follow the course of nature; if it also were merely directed to enjoyment?....) There remains then nothing but the worth which we ourselves assign to our life by what we not alone do, but do with an end so independent of nature that the very existence of nature itself can only be an end to the condition so imposed. "⁹

These are, the three constitutive phases, to which are attached three regulative mechanisms articulated in the above reflection: life, the enjoyment of life, and the contentment associated with leading a worthwhile life. There is also the suggestion of the presence of a theoretical attitude involving the comprehension of Nature as an end-in-itself. This attitude is tied to a super-sensible principle that in turn is connected to an attitude man has toward himself (as noumenon):

"Now we have in the world beings of one kind whose causality is teleological, or directed to ends, and which at the same time are beings of such a character that the law according to which they have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them themselves as unconditioned and not dependent on any thing in nature, but as necessary in itself. The being of this kind is man, but regarded as noumenon."¹⁰

The chain of beings existing in nature as inorganic states of affairs stretches past organic forms of life of various kinds up to the terminus of man for Kant. Kantian metaphysics to some extent regards God as a *Deus absconditis* in relation to this natural chain, but the divine being is omnipresent as a factor in our ethical reasoning about the good flourishing life. "One gets what one deserves" is an ancient Socratic reference to the consequences of *diké* (justice), and this element is present in the Kantian account in the form of a purely ethical judgement rather than as a religious fear of Judgement Day.

Hacker's position on the issue of man the noumenon, is ambiguous. His view of teleology is clearly Aristotelian with a Wittgensteinian twist, maintaining that discourse and thought manifests a concern for what things are for, and does so in a way that provides these elements with the status of what is real. In this discussion Hacker criticises the above Kantian account of the teleology of Nature on the grounds of maintaining that it forms part of a Design argument. Hacker claims that the Darwinian appeal to mechanism of nature undermines teleological explanation and thereby any appeal to an architect of Nature. This is a puzzling claim given the earlier "theory" of evolution presented by Kant and also the following:

"if the name of natural history, now that it has one been adapted, is to continue to be used for the description of nature, we may give the name archeology of nature, as contrasted with art, to that which the former literally indicates, namely an account of the bygone or ancient state of the earth--a matter on which, though we do not hope for any certainty we have good grounds for conjecture. Fossil remains would be objects for the archeology of nature, just as rudely cut stones, and things of that kind would be for the archeology of art. For as work is actually being done in this department, under the name of a theory of the earth, steadily though, as we might expect, slowly this name would not be given to a merely imaginary study of nature, but to one to which nature itself invites us."¹¹

We can see from the above reasoning that there is no rush to an argument from Design for God or a creator. In fact there is an open-mindedness on this question that is quite unusual for a pre-Darwinian thinker:

"But now it is an open question, and for our reason must always remain an open question, how much a mechanism of nature contributes as means to each final design in nature."¹²

If Kant is a hylomorphic Philosopher as we maintain, then, the essence or nature of a thing is best explained or justified by reference to the notions of "form" or "principle". Primary Form, or God, obviously lies beyond the full comprehension of human understanding and reason, and for Kant this part of the noumenal realm must be the most difficult to access via theoretical reasoning and its categories of judgement/understanding. Resting at non-primary forms or principles is, however, possible for us who use the categories and principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Hacker points out that

contrary to popular opinion, Darwin did not eliminate teleological explanations of nature (P.193). He also points out, however, that Darwin did intend to eliminate all forms of design explanations. Given what we know biographically about Darwin's life and times, and his initial reluctance to publish his work during his lifetime, for fear of religious repercussions, we may remain sceptical about this claim by Hacker. Darwin described himself in 1836 as a "orthodox Christian". Also, towards the end of his life we find him denying that he has ever been an atheist or ever denied the existence of God:

This would have been a fair description of Kant's relation to both Natural History and God. We should pause to mention in this context, however, that the ancient Greeks also felt uncomfortable with postulating natural creative powers on the part of the gods, allocating all such materialistic activity to the demiurge whose powers are clearly inferior to those of the superior beings of the gods. Hacker, would appear, therefore to be unnecessarily exaggerating the differences between the accounts of Kant and Darwin. Hacker also problematically rejects using the term "cause" for teleological explanation. He states the following position:

"Citing it (efficient causation) explains not by identifying a cause, but by pointing to an end."¹³

Hacker is here clearly succumbing to the temptation to reduce Greek terms to their (problematic) Latin translations. Different kinds of explanation are, for Aristotle, different kinds of cause. All the different kinds of cause are answers to the question "Why?". "Why did the tree burn?"--"Because of the lightning strike on the tree". "Why are you cutting the tree down?"--"Because I wish to use the wood for my fence". Both of these responses to "Why" questions are "Reasons for" the phenomena that need to be explained. The relation between the fact and the reason is logical or rational. The question "Why?" also appeals to the understanding and the capacity to categorise phenomena in a context of processes of actualisation. In the case of material and efficient forms of explanation there may be an ontological commitment to "Events" in order to explain changes in the world but universalisation of such forms of explanation is limited. Event designations also presume a framework of something remaining constant throughout the process of change and appeal to principles therefore seems necessary. In contexts of human action it is human agents with a battery of intellectual and moral powers and dispositions that bring about various kinds of change. Conceiving of change in such a framework entails that one cannot logically separate the product of an agents power (e.g. a completely built house) from the process of producing the object (the building process). From this point of view the building of the house and the end-product of the house are one and the same in logic (Logos). When we are considering an agents moral dispositions we are talking about a different kind of non-

instrumental, categorical power, but the logic remains the same with the reservation that building houses may be civilisation-building activities, whereas on the other hand, doing what one ought to do because it is one's duty aims at a state of future social existence that is "Cultural", e.g. A Kingdom of Ends lying one hundred thousand years in the future. Of course, we are not slaves being dragged about by such an idealistic vision but rather feel a sense of worth in making our small contribution to this "Cultural Project". This project is, for Kant, the telos of mankind:

"Have we any ground capable of satisfying reason, speculative or practical, to justify our attributing a final end to the supreme cause that acts according to ends?...such a final end could be nothing but man as subject to moral laws, maybe taken a priori as a matter of certainty; whereas we are unable to cognise a priori what are the ends of nature in the physical order and above all it is impossible to see that a nature could not exist apart from such ends."¹⁴

This supreme cause is not necessarily a creator or a designer (craftsman) but rather the supreme condition of all that is conditioned. In other words, for Kant, the supreme being is a Moral legislator and not a craftsman like the demiurge. This is as close as Kant comes to a proof for the existence of Deus--a moral proof that appeals to the principle that man is subject to moral law. This kind of proof is not the concern of theology. There is, in Kant, continual and consistent references to man striving for moral perfection and we see this also in his account of the Sublime. Standing in the presence of a powerful waterfall, Kant argues, we are at first overwhelmed by the magnitude or power of this natural phenomenon only to recover from this experience via the power of thought that involutes the awe and wonder we experience onto ourselves--onto our moral nature. This tendency is also present in our experience of the beauty of nature:

"in all probability it was this moral interest that first aroused attentiveness to beauty and the ends of nature."¹⁵

For Kant, it is the practical use of reason that is the royal road to the supersensible realm of noumena and God. From a theoretical point of view we must content ourselves with not knowledge but faith in the existence of Deus. From a practical reasoning point of view the rational idea of Freedom transcends the theoretical ideas of God and the immortality of the soul. These two theoretical ideas form the focal points of the "science" of Theology.

For Hacker the practical use of reason is a power that a person possesses to actualise the potentiality that defines the human form of life. In this context Hacker discusses the categorical judgements of the potential, the actual, and the necessary. His discussion is very Aristotelian but it does not recognise the important distinction Aristotle draws between capacities (lower level dispositions) and higher level dispositions. Aristotle tends to use the term

disposition to designate virtue-related activities. Hacker discusses the concept of disposition in relation to the major ontological difference that exists between organic and inorganic beings:

"It is striking that, unlike distinctively human dispositions, an inanimate substance may, and most commonly does, possess natural dispositions which are never actualised. Obviously not every poisonous substance (thing, or partition or specific quantity of stuff) poisons anything, not every brittle substance breaks, and not every soluble thing dissolves."¹⁶

Hacker goes on to claim that insofar as human potentialities are concerned it is the case that, human dispositions are theoretically achievable and practically actualised, e.g. the capacity for discourse is necessarily actualised in the human form of life, as is theoretical and practical reasoning. An animal's prime concern is life (to survive). We do not know what capacities and dispositions are important for the gods, given the fact that we do not encounter them in the world, or think as they do. The telos or disposition for rationality, although a distant goal, contains the idea or form of the Good, which (according to Aristotle's work the *Nichomachean Ethics*) the human form of life strives for. In the context of this discussion Hacker makes the important point that many human powers are so-called two-way powers. These powers are tied to the Freedom to choose to discourse or to reason and thereby to actualise an essential human potentiality (P.95)

Rivers may flow and watches may tick but these activities are not actions or deeds. The active powers of inanimate substances are not self-initiated. The kinds of explanation we encounter in relation to the powers or capacities of inorganic forms usually fall into the classes of material and efficient causes. Watches that tick on until they stop are obviously to some extent dependent for their most important function on human beings to wind them up, unplug them, or change/charge their batteries. Watches have been designed by human beings to perform the functions they do. As a consequence of this "human" connection we say of them that they "tell the time". The appeal to a designer of the whole universe may well be a category-mistake that involves the imposing of this craftsman analogue upon more natural organic and inorganic processes. This kind of attribution, indeed appears to be a case of "Projection". The attribution of the form of the good upon all human activity that we find in Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, would not appear to be an imaginative projection but rather a rational attribution of a super-sensible form to organic forms of life of a human kind. This super-sensible form is superior to that of the form of a demiurge which embodies a subordinate instrumental principle.

Hacker, in his discussion, does not refer to the Kantian categories of the potential, the actual, and the necessary, nor does he invoke super-sensible rational principles but prefers instead to characterise these matters in terms of

grammatical investigations into what we say and do. Hacker points to the obvious fact that we cannot see the powers of a thing when they are not being actualised, and he also refers to three kinds of confusion that he attributes to this fact: scepticism about the existence of powers, reduction of powers to their actualisation, and the reification of these powers (P.99). The first two confusions are encountered on a regular basis in the work of scientists in the fields of Anthropology/Psychology and Ethics: the scientific obsession with observation, measurement and observable causal transmission contribute to these confusions. In the above realms of concern we often encounter this viewing of the relation between a power and its actualisation as a causal relation between two kinds of substance rather than that of the relation between a principle and its application.

Hacker also refers to the confusion caused in reducing a power(principle, conceptual entity)to its vehicle (body, brain etc). This is confounded by an unfounded agency attribution, e.g. the brain becomes the agency behind the power. Hacker calls this confusion the mereological fallacy. According to Hacker two way powers belong to every capacity that is subject to voluntary control of an agent.

O'Shaughnessy in his work "Consciousness and the World" discusses one form of these two-way powers, namely Perception:

"For Perception is the epistemological bridge conducting us to the phenomenal occupants of the World (with the sole exception of our self and mind). It is the "royal road" to physical reality, indeed to the World in its ultimate ontological form. ...If Physicalism is true, then a self conscious being is a part of physical reality which epistemologically is in touch with a special part of physical reality, namely its own mind...then only in perception does consciousness make epistemological contact with Reality in its true or ultimate (i.e. physical) form"¹⁷

Hacker claims that Perception as a power has both voluntary and involuntary aspects. Seeing, feeling, and hearing "happen to one" in accordance with the Kantian ontological schema and this category of activity is not subject to the control of the will. Observing, looking, scrutinising, gazing, peeking, watching, listening etc, on the other hand, are ontologically on Kant's schema what we make of ourselves and our world, using a repertoire of two-way-powers amongst which are to be found judgement, understanding and reason: these powers are paramount in forming the relations to the goods of the external world, the goods of the body, and the goods of our soul. One can of course regard Perception epistemologically, describing its activities and explaining its mechanisms in isolation from these powers. If this "analytical" procedure is followed the relation of perception to thought will, in such a case, be purely theoretical and object-directed. The side of the mountain, its shape, and surface radiate light to the eye, and in such a mechanical process a number of processes relating to the colours perceived "happen". Of course, the presence of the mountain announces

itself and as a consequence many practical tasks may suggest themselves to consciousness thereby activating the will and desires rooted in our practical understanding of what is possible and necessary.

Hacker criticises the Cartesian strategy of extending the concept of thought to sensible forms of experience that include sensations, perception (seeing a mountain) and mental images. Now whilst there is an interesting relation between sensibility and understanding and sensibility and the will, it may be important in our theorising about these relations to emphasise the differences between these faculties of the human mind. The Neo-Cartesian "picture" of the mind was the consequence of what remained when both Descartes and Hobbes dismantled the metaphysical structures of Aristotle in preparation for the advance of the Juggernaut of Science and Economics that would later flatten the Philosophical landscape. The Greeks would probably have referred to the prophecy of their oracles to describe what happened in the name of "Modern Philosophy", and in doing so would undoubtedly have taken up the differences between *techné* and *epistémé*, between *Thanatos* and *Eros*, between *diké* and *Ananke*.

The English term "Consciousness" with its emphasis upon sensible forms replaced the concern with intellectual forms and intellectual objects. We argued in previous volumes that Kant attempted to stop the Juggernaut in its tracks only to be subsequently marginalised by Hegelian and Marxist Philosophy on the one hand, and materialism, pragmatism, and existentialism/phenomenology, on the other. One of the consequences of Neo-Cartesianism and its conflation of the sensible and the intellectual, was the claim that one can look into one's own mind in the spirit of an explorer and discover its contents. Some called this process introspection. This concept was the direct result: it involved not appreciating the differences between perceptual and intellectual forms, between experiences and the principles that constitute and regulate experience. Introspection was then tied to the issue of Self-Knowledge, and Hacker makes the salient point that it was not the intention of the Ancient Greek Philosophers to use any inner monitoring process to grasp the meaning or objects embedded in the stream of conscious states and events. Understanding and Reason (Categories and Principles) are obviously involved in all intellectual work. It is also important to remember that this intellectual work takes two forms that are manifested in two different realms of metaphysics: the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals. Sensibility obviously plays some limited role in both these domains. In the work of coming to know oneself (self-knowledge), the conceptualisation of sensible intuitions will be important, as will the categorisation of these intuitions. The process will also involve principles that constitute and regulate these concepts and categories. Intellectual work of the above kind is undertaken methodically in the activities of *elenchus*, dialectical reasoning, and transcendental and

metaphysical reasoning of the kinds we encounter in the works of Aristotle and Kant. Hacker criticises introspection from a grammatical perspective:

"There is no such thing as my seeing that I see something or perceiving that I hear, smell, taste or feel. I can no more look into my own mind than I can look into another's, and we often have more insight into the mind of another than into my own. The perceptual metaphor bound up with "introspection" is misleading....We confuse the ability to say how things are with us with the ability to see how things are with us."¹⁸

Saying is not seeing but is rather a case of acting, giving expression to something that needs to be said. In saying how I feel or think about things, I manifest or show my feelings or thoughts in relation to others. Such utterances are then grounds or conditions for any conceptualisation or judgement made about the expression. For Hacker the concept of introspection was a consequence of Cartesianism and its rejection of Aristotle's more coherent Philosophy of mind:

"The Cartesian mind is an aberration. It was offered as a more correct representation of human nature and the principles that guide explanations of human thought, feeling, and action than the Aristotelian notions it displaced. In fact, it is not. And it has foisted on us a wholly inadequate framework for the representations of human nature."¹⁹

It is possibly true that the domain of reflection we currently refer to as "Philosophy of Mind" was born in the Cartesian matrix of description and explanation which proceeds from a materialistic interpretation of substance. Out of this matrix, Consciousness, introspection and an immaterial concept of substance emerged. The mind became an agency which flies in the face of common sense (which insists that only a person can be an agent that is responsible for its deeds). Hacker is in no doubt that the Aristotelian hylomorphic matrix is a better context for discussing the concept of mind: a context in which the life form we call human, gives rise and expression to, a number of powers, abilities and dispositions that actualise in the course of such a life. Hacker puts the matter succinctly when he claims that *psuche* (life) is not merely a part of our life (P.254).

Consciousness is obviously a vicissitude of life and thereby must be a power that we humans and perhaps some animals possess (O'Shaughnessy). Thought is a higher level vicissitude of both life and consciousness and there may be a sense in which one interpretation of the Cartesian argument "*Cogito ergo sum*" is defensible as part of both Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of Thought. This interpretation requires regarding the "I think" in the formal way in which Kant suggested in his accounts of firstly, the unity of apperception and secondly in his account of how thought dawns upon a young child learning the language of the "I". This, Kant argues in his "*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*", prepares the child for further vicissitudes of life and Consciousness: prepares the

child for exercising the capacity for discourse and the disposition to reason in various ways about his world and himself. Hacker appears to appreciate the Kantian position relating to the characterisation of the role of thought and the formal role of the self in the higher forms of the thinking process. He does not, however, appreciate the Kantian distinction between the empirical and the noumenal self, which he claims may violate the principle of noncontradiction. The noumenal self is both unknowable in a theoretical sense, but can be accessed in the context of thought in relation to the moral law. On the Kantian account noumenal reality cannot be known, but can be theoretically thought in the sense of "thought without contradiction". The question arises of course as to why Kant wishes to draw this distinction between knowledge and thought. God is also an issue in this discussion: as an idea of theoretical reason, God cannot be known, but can be thought without contradiction in both contexts of theoretical and practical reasoning. Kant refers to the commitment relating to this form of thought in terms of "faith": one cannot know that God exists, but can have faith that God exists. Similarly there would appear to be less difficulty in accepting the idea of faith in the existence of a noumenal self striving to actualise the moral law. Hackers reluctance to engage in these kind of metaphysical discussions may be partly explained by the tendency of many British Philosophers of the time to place Kant and Hegel in the same category of "German idealism". Hegel, we ought to recall in this context described his own philosophical endeavour in terms of "turning Kantian Philosophy on its head". There is a fundamental difference between these two Philosophers. Hegel could never be recognised as a Critical Philosopher given his commitment to the constitutive role of dialectical reasoning about aporetic questions: questions which require resolution by the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

Descartes was a mathematician attracted by the scientific possibility of reducing the world to a totality of variables and causal relations. It is not therefore surprising that in Cartesian reflections upon the life of the body there is no understanding of the concept of psuche as presented in Aristotelian Hylomorphism. Descartes' "experiments" upon live animals--dissecting them without anaesthetics-- testifies to a practical lack of moral concern with animal life forms. A live body, for Descartes, merely moves because there is a mechanism responsible for such movement. His youthful experience of the animated statues of the Royal Gardens in Paris may have contributed to a belief in telekinesis, as the prime mover of live movement. The idea that life "moves itself" would have been problematic for the Cartesian theoretical matrix. The causal mechanism of telekinesis was of course connected to the brain on this account--that part of the brain where mind and the physical world meet, namely, the pineal gland. The body, of course cannot think but it is sensitive, responding to, and expressing sensations of various kinds. And yet there must be some

sense in which this bundle of live processes and states can give rise to the vicissitudes of consciousness and thought, and the brain plays no small role in both the attribution of sensibility and thought to the person or agent who feels and thinks. The relation of the person to his feelings and thoughts may require different accounts. I have my feelings and thoughts but the first is a power of the body and the second is a vicissitude of a power of the body.

Is language, then, a power of the body or vicissitude of such a power, namely thought. It seems to stand at the threshold. We do speak of the language centres of the brain and we also know that without a certain level of actualisation of the power of language in discourse connected to the learning of language (Helen Keller) there is no "I" that thinks. The mind-body problem appears as an aporetic problem unless it is embedded in a hylomorphic or critical matrix of Principles and Concepts.

Phenomenology, we know was inspired by Cartesianism and to that extent it can prove to be a useful partner in the mind-body discussion, especially if it retreats to the lived body in a *Lebenswelt*. The phenomenology of Husserl and Sartre were more clearly identifiable as Cartesian positions but Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, deferred more to Heidegger than to his teacher Husserl. There were Cartesian elements in Merleau-Ponty's (MP) seminal work "Phenomenology of Perception" but there was also in MP's earlier work an acknowledgement of the importance of an Aristotelian structure of an ascending/descending hierarchy of principles of ontological forms. John Wild in his introduction to MP's "The Structure of Behaviour" makes the following assessment of the work:

"The French thinker is just as clear as Heidegger that the world in which we exist cannot be reduced to the objective variables and functional relationships which physical science reveals. The life-world has a meaningful structure of its own which must be approached in a very different way if it is not to be radically reduced and distorted. But the perspective of physical and biological sciences also reveal distinctive orders and structures which the philosopher needs to understand. In a way that reminds us of Scheler, Merleau-Ponty shows, without accepting any traces of vitalism, how a higher order is founded on a lower and in a sense contains it, but at the same time takes it over and integrates it into new structures which cannot be explained by those that are taken over."²⁰

The tension hinted at in the above reflection is that of the seeming contradiction between the characteristics of the body as observed, and the body as lived in its "Being-in-the-world". Before the catharsis of the work of the later Wittgenstein there was a tendency to characterise man's life in terms of Hegelian Spirit, in terms of a vital psychism that appeared to have only mystical and dialectical defences. The argument of M-P is that this realm of the life-world needs to be characterised in terms of meaning that refers to a basic level of experience of which science is the "second-order expression" (Phenomenology of Perception).

This is part of the famed "Phenomenological Reduction" and it has more in common with Cartesianism than Aristotelian Hylomorphism.

The Phenomenological rejection of Kant's transcendental and metaphysical Philosophy prevented investigation into transcendental and metaphysical ideas and principles that formed the conditions of experience. Phenomenology, we have been told, seeks to describe and not to explain, and to that extent the essences it reflects upon need to be more concrete than the abstractions of principles and laws. There is, for example, nothing in the phenomenological method that can adequately characterise the moral law or ideas such as freedom. Phenomenology connects this latter idea to the concrete choices an individual makes. It cannot conceive of a noumenal "I" moved by an idea of freedom in the realm of Reason.

In Kant we find an acceptance not just of the abstract rational idea of freedom but also an acceptance of the order and structures of Science. Kant criticises the mathematical assumptions of Newton's laws but accepts the attempt to organise experience from a transcendental/metaphysical perspective. In his Preface to "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" (Kant's Philosophy of Nature, trans Ellington J., W., Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), Kant makes his Aristotelian position clear:

"Every doctrine, if it is to be a system, i.e. whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called science."²¹

"Natural Science properly so called presupposes metaphysics of Nature: for laws, i.e. principles of the necessity of what belongs to the existence of a thing, are occupied with a concept which does not admit of construction because existence cannot be presented in any a priori intuition."²²

This last paragraph aims to dismiss the mathematical attitude in the process of the formation of principles or laws. Kant does not, however deny the importance of Mathematics in the measuring of what is observed and in characterising the functional relationships uncovered in physical investigations. When it comes to the investigation of the thinking being and his capacities, dispositions and powers he does however, deny the role of Mathematics:

"But the empirical doctrine of the soul must always remain even further removed than chemistry from the rank of what may be called a natural science proper. This is because Mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and their laws, unless one might want to take into consideration merely the law of continuity in the flow of the senses internal changes"²³

Aristotle expressed this law of continuity in the form of three principles in his hylomorphic system: that from which a thing changes, that toward which a thing changes, and that which is preserved throughout the change. These principles

may of course lie among the totality of conditions necessary for mathematical activity but they are in and of themselves not mathematical.

In Wittgenstein's later methodology, and Hacker's elaboration upon this aspect, the concept of meaning obviously plays an important role simply because of the presupposition that something has to make sense in order for it to be either true or false. Grammatical investigations in this context aim at mapping the boundaries of sense for our various forms of discourse. In these Philosophical Investigations there is no trace of any Hegelian influence as there is in M-P's work where the influence of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind" and its dialectical Philosophy of the ambiguous is clearly present. Perception without the presence of Conception to organise what one sees was also ambiguous for the later Wittgenstein. We can experience something and then conceptualise what we have experienced in various ways, e.g. see something as either a duck or a rabbit. This is a variation of the Kantian war-cry that intuitions without concepts are blind. Neither Kant nor Wittgenstein would agree with putting the world as conceived by science in brackets in the explorative search for descriptions of basic forms of experience. For both Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy, experience is organised by concepts, categories and principles and the commitment of reason to provide the totality of conditions of "conditioned" experience.

In the opening to his work "The Structure of Behaviour", M-P describes a luminous spot moving along a wall in a dark room, dragging the attention of the perceiver with it. This, he claims, cannot be correctly described by science because it will decompose the experience into elements that will then be coordinated in a matrix of functional relationships. This system of external relations will forever overlook the internal intention and meaning which are constitutive of this experience.

Wittgenstein's later work was also fascinated by the first-person experience of a person, but in Kantian spirit he claims that in simple kinds of experience such as pain, this intention and meaning is "something" about which nothing can be said. It is not a "substantial" thing but it is not a "nothing" either. Some forms of science would characterise the experience of the moving spot or the pain as a reflex, a response "caused" by a stimulus but it would consistently refuse first person references to an intention and meaning. M-P goes on to argue that in the subsequent cleavage of argument a rift appears between what is subjective and what is objective, and he further claims that this is not a useful distinction. M-P might be right in this judgement but all his fascinating work on the phenomenon of Perception leads us to the same terminus Wittgenstein arrived at, namely that without situation in a conceptual framework the "experience" never takes us beyond what may be claimed is the "Philosophy of the Ambiguous" (Alphonso

De Waelhens--Foreword to the second edition of "The Structure of Behaviour" (trans Fisher A.,L., Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1963)). For the Neo-Kantian Philosopher M-P's reflections would be explorative excursions into the Sensible Mind insofar as this part of the mind was incorporated by the Vicissitude of Consciousness.

Sensibility for Kant is a power a person possesses. Hacker concludes his work "Human Nature: The Categorical Framework" with an important reference to Kant's Metaphysics of Morals:

"The concept of a person is central to our thought about ourselves, our nature and our moral and legal relations... "A person", Kant wrote, "is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws." "Whereas", he added, "psychological personality is merely the ability to be conscious of ones identity in different conditions of ones existence". Self-Consciousness and awareness of ones diachronic identity, in his view, are pre-conditions of being a person, but they are not sufficient conditions."²⁴

Hacker praises this approach and notes that the Latin origin of the word (persona) means "mask". The theatricalisation of life we moderns have experienced in relation to discussions about Consciousness and Thought marked a shift from reflecting upon mans virtuous ethical nature: a shift to man in the process of becoming something, playing different "roles" in society. In Volume One we referred to Boethius who refused to associate the notion of a person with this role-playing persona. Boethius insisted upon regarding man as an individual substance possessing a rational nature. The reference to "substance" was perhaps unfortunate given its association with scholastic misinterpretations of the texts of Aristotle.

Hacker refers to grammatical confusions that aided and abetted the subjectivization of the concept of "person". He notes that third-person ascriptions of psychological predicates are done on the basis of observation in accordance with communally established behavioural criteria. First-person ascriptions, he also noted, are criterionless. What arises from this process of subjectivisation is the "picture" of a mind as an inner theatre which the subject has privileged and private access to. This, according to Hacker exacerbates the confusions abounding in relation to this popular "picture". Descartes, then, further compounded this confusion by claiming that there can only be mechanical-like causal connections between the inner and outer mind and body elements of a person. It would not be long before the body was conceptualised as being nothing but a bundle of mechanisms and processes no different to those of a watch. The only difference being the presence of a control centre such as the brain. The use of the word "I" rapidly became ambiguous (it was termed a "shifter" by linguists) referring sometimes to a body and sometimes to a mind. Materialists reacted in their characteristic manner by retreating form

subjectivism to the fortress of "neurones in the brain", a temptation that we saw even the great Freud succumbed to, in his earlier reflections.

Hacker notes in his chapter on "The Person" that these incoherences were:

"brilliantly criticized but not satisfactorily remedied by Kant."²⁵

There is no trace however of an acknowledgment that part of what Kant was attempting to do was to revive hylomorphism and its view of forms of life and at the same time, deny the modern concept of a person propagated by the "new men" inhabiting "modern" civilisation. The concept of psyche is critical to any theoretical determination of the concept of a person. Neither Aristotle nor Kant, however, believed theoretical reasoning to be of primary importance in Hylomorphic or Critical Philosophy. The critical consideration for both philosophers was to characterise the human form of life in its practical dealings. The actualisation of this process of becoming something, led to a virtuous rational flourishing life in accordance with the Platonic ideas of Justice and The Good. In the contexts of such concerns theoretical rehearsals of brains in vats and brain transplants is modern (not Shakespearean) theatre, and they have an air of wild science-fiction confabulations that literally astound the critical faculties of understanding and reason.

Hacker ends his account with a list of descriptive characteristics of human beings that appear to have both Aristotelian and Kantian sources:

"Human beings are living organisms of a given type. We are language-using, culture creating, self conscious creatures that have a mind and a body.... Being self moving creatures with cognitive and volitional two way powers we can voluntarily act, take action, and engage in activities... Being rational we can reason and act for reasons. So we have intentions, plans and projects that we pursue. Having a language our cognitive powers endow us with the ability to retain the complex forms of knowledge that we can and do acquire. So we possess an autobiography--we can tell the tale of our life as we remember it."²⁶

Hacker concludes by pointing out that the concept of a person is not a substance concept as is the concept of a human being. He adds:

"To be a person is not to be a certain kind of animal of one kind or another with certain kinds of abilities. The nature of a person is rooted in animality, but transformed by possession of intellect and will."²⁷

Wittgensteinian grammatical investigations have led us to the above significant description of the rational animal capable of discourse. The metaphysics implied by this description has both Aristotelian and Kantian aspects but perhaps it would never have been presented without the presence on the philosophical scene of the enigmatic mercurial man from Vienna, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Notes to Chapter 8

¹*Human Nature: The Categorical Framework*, Hacker, P., M., S., (Oxford, Blackwell, 2007)

²Ibid. P.16

³ Ibid. P.23

⁴*Kant's Critique of Judgement*, trans Meredith J. C., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), P.24

⁵ Ibid. P.39

⁶ Ibid. P.79

⁷ Ibid.P.79

⁸ Ibid. P.29

⁹ Ibid.P.97-8

¹⁰ Ibid. P.99

¹¹ Ibid. P.90 ftnt

¹² Ibid. P.73

¹³ Ibid.P.197

¹⁴ Ibid. P.112

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 129

¹⁶ Ibid. P.94-5

¹⁷*Consciousness and the World*, O Shaughnessy B., (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2000)

¹⁸*Human Nature*,P.246

¹⁹ Ibid. P.247

²⁰*The Structure of Behaviour*, Merleau-Ponty, M., Trans by Fisher, A., L., (London, Routledge, 1962)

²¹*Kant's Philosophy of Nature*, Trans Ellington J., W., (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), P.467-468

²² Ibid. 469-70

²³ Ibid. P. 471

²⁴*Human Nature*, P. 285

²⁵ Ibid. P.301

²⁶ Ibid. P.311

²⁷ Ibid. P.313

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Chapter 9: The Will—a Good Analytical view

O'Shaughnessy is an analytical Philosopher with broad ranging interests in the realm of non-analytical and continental Philosophy: a realm that includes the thoughts of Freud, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Sartre, Spinoza, Kant, the later Wittgenstein, Descartes, Kierkegaard, Aristotle and Aquinas. This broad ranging interest, however, is grounded in Analytical Philosophy and we shall attempt in this chapter to situate O'Shaughnessy's thought in relation to Aristotelian Hylomorphic Philosophy and Kantian Critical Philosophy.

O'Shaughnessy, however, does not, as many Analytical Philosophers of the past have done, conflate the activities of Science and Philosophy, although there are ontological commitments that align these two concerns in ways unacceptable to both Aristotle and Kant. There is certainly no attempt to seek refuge in mathematical logic and logical atomism in order to justify his alignment of the above elements. Indeed, his concern is with how a particular resolution of the mind-body problem will impact upon the problem of the relation of physical action to the Will. In his characterisation of these issues we find surprising and refreshing references to the Freudian Project:

"The prevailing metaphysical conceptions of human nature in nineteenth century European thought tended on the whole to involve the assumption that the mind, no less than the body is a natural and indeed living phenomenon. This was, for example, an unquestioned tenet for Freud who charted the development of the mind of the entire human species as one might the growth of a particular plant."¹

The presence and influence of the Greek/Aristotelian notion of *psuche* is unmistakable in the above reflection. O'Shaughnessy continues his Freudian reflections by elaborating upon the relation between mental activities such as "internalisation" and the bodily function of feeding. Melanie Klein and her Freudian theory of object relations in relation to the Platonic theme of "The Good" is also taken up in the context of this discussion.

The picture of the mind as containing action-driving forces that are essentially impulsive and that perhaps need regulation is part of O'Shaughnessy's brilliant analysis of the mind-body problem and the relation one has to one's own body. These problems were thrown down like a gauntlet by Descartes in his anti-Aristotelian reflections on Thought and Existence.

On this account, the will appears to be both operating on its own, and being used by its owner in a complex operation that aims at a world partly constituted by a priori forms. The will, O'Shaughnessy argues is an "ego-affirmative phenomenon" (P. XXII), using once again the language of Freud against the background of Aristotelian hylomorphic Philosophy. It is important to note in

this context, however, that both Aristotle and Freud would have been more committed to a principled approach which in Freud's theory took the form of three principles: the energy regulation principle (ERP), the pleasure-pain principle (PPP), and the reality principle (RP). This latter principle demanded a relation to the world and oneself which constitutes the human form of Being-in-the-world.

One of the responses to Cartesian bi-polarism (dualism) was a naturalisation of the mind and the emergence of the organ of the brain as the domain where different kinds of substance interact. One of the problems that flowed from Cartesian idealism was a mechanical view of life-forms that transformed the "phenomenon of life" into something "technical" (techné). This disturbed the Aristotelian continuum of being, a continuum that moved from inorganic forms, to plant-life, to animal forms of life and thereupon to the rational animal capable of discourse. Mechanical principles and biological/psychological principles were being conflated in the Cartesian account. We ought to recall in this context that the mind-body problem did not naturally emerge as an aporetic problem for either Aristotle or Kant because neither philosopher made the mistake of viewing the mind as a kind of substance.

For both Aristotle's later work and for Kant, the mind is constituted by concepts and principles (noncontradiction, sufficient reason). There is no ontological one-sided commitment to the world seen through the eyes of a causal network of events, processes and resultant states. Such a world would be an impersonal world without human agency, human desires, human beliefs, human intentions, and the freedom of the will. There is no attempt in the work of either of these philosophers to reduce complex powers and phenomena to simpler events, processes or states.

O'Shaughnessy claims that the obsession with the mind-body problem has tended to overshadow other important philosophical questions such as "What is the epistemological relation of a person to his body?" The relation, it is asserted, is not an observational form of awareness but is an awareness or consciousness of some non-observational kind. We know Freud regarded Consciousness as a vicissitude of Instinct and this relation might provide food for thought for how to account for the relation between desire and the will: could the will be a vicissitude of more primitive desires? We have in earlier chapters pointed to the importance of Hughlings Jackson in the work of Freud, especially his reworking of a higher lower hierarchical system of neurones into higher and lower regions of the human psyche. Instead of beginning at the materialistic end of the life-continuum, Freud began at the level of the representations of the instincts, e.g the life instincts (Eros) and worked his way up from feeding to the higher mental processes of learning and acquiring knowledge. Later in his career he

also boldly suggested an important role for the death instinct (Thanatos) in the affairs of human beings: thus aligning himself with the ruin and destruction prophecies of ancient Greek oracles. The knowledge of the consequences of the workings of these instincts, we know from Aristotle, would be assembled in the canon of sciences contained under the broad headings of Theoretical Science, Practical Science, and Productive Science. The genius of Freud's Psychology is that it extends over the boundaries of all three sciences, thereby illustrating the complexity of the challenge of the Delphic oracle to "Know thyself". The emphasis of both Aristotle and Kant on Metaphysics and Practical Science, and the importance of the telos of the flourishing life (eudaimonia), that is to say, the freedom of the agent to act in accordance with areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time)---points to the growing significance of Action and Will in any account of human nature. O'Shaughnessy argues that this focus necessarily takes us into a realm of meaning, and the Philosophy of language, and this accounts for the Wittgensteinian ring to many of his arguments, especially those related to privacy and the picture of the mind as an "inner theatre" of events, processes and end-states. This Wittgensteinian approach seems to encourage using the language of "events" and "processes" in the mental realm. This in turn licences philosophical investigations into the relation between bodily action and the role of the inner theatre. Given their commitment to the principles of Reason and the concepts of the understanding neither hylomorphic nor critical Philosophy would sanction referring to a mind constituted of concepts and principles in terms of concrete inner events. The concept of "event" for them would belong to discourse grounded in methodical observation. For Kant it would be possible to conceptualise the observation of physical action in terms of events and subsequently launch a search for the material and efficient causes of these events, but this would constitute a theoretical account of something whose essence is best represented in a priori terms of Agency, faculties or "powers" of the mind and "ends-in-themselves". Without such a categorical framework, Kant would argue, the appearances of life would not make any practical sense.

O'Shaughnessy prefers an empirical idea of freedom to the a priori term Kant uses. We are free, O'Shaughnessy argues, in agreement with Wittgenstein, to unite any intuition with any other intuition to form a concept and this then does not commit us to anything other than an investigation into the use of the linguistic term. Wittgenstein, however, omits the Kantian restriction of the Categories that limit this freedom by the boundary of a categorical mistake which would definitely result in the confusion of the categories of theoretical reasoning with practical reasoning. O'Shaughnessy discusses the Sartrean notion of character determining our choices in action contexts, and argues somewhat in the spirit of Wittgenstein that the development of character is as open-ended as the choice to change the use or meaning of a word. No personal history,

O'Shaughnessy argues, guarantees a particular future or character-outcome. Neither Aristotle nor Kant would agree with this position. The starting point of any investigation of humanity must, O'Shaughnessy argues, use the royal road of physical bodily action. Action for both Aristotle and Kant was the central focus of the practical sciences, but both would insist that the forming of good habits of action were necessary for the formation of a virtuous character. O'Shaughnessy wishes to attempt to establish that there are what he calls *de re* necessities attached to action which Philosophy attempts to articulate, but it is not clear that the logical necessities he is out to elucidate, fall into the domain of practical reasoning, which may be more concerned with justification than explanation, at least insofar as Kant is concerned.

O'Shaughnessy voices regret over the passing of what he called the Absolutes of the dogmatic idealists (does he place Kant in this category?) in favour of the sceptical nihilists inspired by the followers of Hume, but he does not mention the Kantian contribution toward the retention of the truths of dogmatism and scepticism in the formulation of his Critical Philosophy. Instead he congratulates Wittgenstein for introducing the theme of a language-using form of life into a discussion that was rehearsing ancient philosophical dilemmas. We should recall in this context that Wittgenstein's later position was meant to correct his earlier commitment to both a logical atomism and a sceptical solipsism that postulated a solipsistic act of projection of meaning into dead signs. The animal form of life with its obsession in relation to survival, certainly highlights the importance of bodily action in a world where only the fittest of the species survive. This is a very different scenario to the universe of discourse where beliefs are exchanged under the condition of truthfulness and perhaps also discussed rationally in terms of their worth.

O'Shaughnessy presents us with a view of the psychical apparatus reminiscent of that which we find in Chapter 7 of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams". The model presented is an input-output schema modified by precipitates of analytical Philosophy-of-mind-discussions. Sensation, Perception, and Knowledge, feed into Desire, Intention and the output "mechanism" of bodily action. Environmental stimuli and responses lie outside the "model" of the psychic apparatus and form part of the schema. The model is a model of the activity of any life form (*psuche*):

"Significantly, the direction of psychological causality in this diagram is anti-clockwise, from inner to outer, from awareness to bodily action. One great half of this *primaevally* bare and simple mind seeks to perpetuate the other half which proceeds to transform the environment--which in turn repercussions within. Thus the rudimentary of the knowing half must be to generate events in the willing half which utilise the cognitive contents of the knowing half, for all that is known in this primitive context is either acted on or else treated with the practical response of indifference."²

The above schema is to be applied to all animal forms of life and when applied to the human form of life, all that is needed is a more complex relation of the elements. Knowledge, we assume will be subject to the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason and Reasons for Actions will play a decisive role in determining the ontological nature of action whether it be, for example an instrumental act of survival (feeding, fighting) or a categorical act aimed at living a flourishing life.

O'Shaughnessy argues in this context, that the will takes as its first target the part of the body that will be used to bring about the action and change in the environment the agent desires. If the action is the instrumental action of building a house, the idea of the completed house will, of course, determine the large number of acts necessary to bring the house into existence. Beavers and bees engage in this kind of instrumental action. Human dwellings, however, are not constructed instinctively, but by consciously using technical knowledge (*techné*): a product of a complex belief system and a complex set of intentions situated in a matrix of rationality steered by a form of consciousness that can begin with an idea and end with a house. Apart from the talk of "events" in the mind (and fixations upon material and efficient causes) both Aristotle and Kant would not see much to quarrel with in O'Shaughnessy's schema, except perhaps the possible absence of "forms" and principles. Otherwise the schema could also be seen as a defence of behaviourism and its insistence that experimentation upon animals is sufficient to provide adequate evidence for the functioning of human mental activity.

The primary task of O'Shaughnessy's schema, however, is to represent the role of the Will in our transactions with the World. Given this qualification, Freud would probably have viewed this schema positively in spite of its emphasis on the dualistic division of the mind into sensory and motor compartments. Instrumental action is the primary focus of the schema. The role of discourse and rationality are not immediately clear but their presence is presumably implied in the elements of Knowledge and Desire. We are, as Aristotle rightly claimed, social/political animals and this implies knowing and desiring in a communal context: the context of a polis. The schema also leaves a possible space for contemplation and the examination of ones beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions. In this space the validity of ones reasons can be subjected to a principled examination.

O'Shaughnessy claims that it is the function of Consciousness to generate intentional bodily action, and the more primitive the form of Consciousness, the less likely it is that one can adopt the above form of reflection required for civilisation-building and culture constituting activities. O'Shaughnessy asks

what the function of such a complex psuche could be and provides himself with an Aristotelian answer:

"What is the function of the mind in a developed animal like man?...for what does awareness do for life in the rational? Or have we by now managed to transcend the primitive good of our ancestors? Are our final concerns now something else? Such as death? Heaven? The Good Life? Nothing at all?.....Rather as the Freudian libido retains its primal objects even as the resources of symbolism enable it to be deflected in ever widening circles of sublimation outwards into the world, so it seems to me, that the developmentally original function of consciousness must be retained as it ramifies into wider horizons."³

The interesting reference to sublimation raises questions of the psychological activities required for widening the circle of activity dedicated to the furtherance of life: activities that appear to require building civilisations and creating cultures. Sublimation was defined by Freud as a non-sexual form of substitute satisfaction. This defence-mechanism obviously refers to the Pleasure-Pain principle, but it also takes us beyond its scope into the realm of Reality and the Reality Principle: a realm that includes the Aristotelian practical principle of *areté* and its importance in the construction of a flourishing life. Given the complexities of living in a civilisation/culture it is difficult to conceive of Knowledge and Rationality not playing significant roles in the achievement of the human summum bonum. O'Shaughnessy points in the context of this discussion to the importance of the roles of intentional action and Consciousness in the generation and integration of the powers necessary to do what we ought to do in the spirit of *areté*. He also insists on the importance of physical action that could, in principle, be observed as an event in the creation of cultural works such as Shakespeare's *King Lear*: without a quill moving physically across a parchment, he argues, we would never have had access to the play. This, of course, was a necessary material/efficient condition of the existence of the work but we also require reference to the weight of Shakespeare's knowledge and life-experience to appreciate the full cultural significance of the work. What we encounter in this context of explanation/justification is the presence of different kinds of explanation/causality in the search for the totality of conditions demanded by the principle of sufficient reason.

O'Shaughnessy's concentration upon physical bodily action in the context of the presence of other conscious minds does, however, reveal the fact that my actions have a natural function of expression in a natural organic manner in those cases when my body becomes the organ of expression of my desires and intention. It is this expressive function that otherwise ought to close the sceptical abyss which is opened up by atomising this expressive action into an inner and outer event.

The way in which the Other Consciousness is introduced into the Psychological Theory of Freud is via the agency of the Superego: a critical social agency

internalised as a judging function. Maxims, intentions, desires, and actions are submitted to critical standards embodying principles that have helped to build our civilisations and create our cultures. O'Shaughnessy argues that it is the concept of another person that is responsible for forming the vicissitude of Consciousness we refer to as Self-Consciousness. He claims this concept is innate but the empirical existence of others is required if this form of Consciousness is to be actualised. Language is obviously an important power that also requires this innate concept and its empirical conditions that are to be found in the community of language users. Language for Freud was Janus-faced with one aspect turned toward the sensory world which it names and describes, and the other toward the world of thought which it expresses. There is the I that speaks, and the I that thinks, and the soundest approach to describing and explaining this state of affairs is to refuse to atomise the self into compartments, but rather regard the expressive self as logically identical with the thinking self that expresses thoughts in a public realm of discourse--thus realising the social and political intentions of a rational animal capable of discourse. O'Shaughnessy's view is that Self Consciousness is a secondary phenomenon, the primary phenomenon being a vital expressive animal interacting with a demanding environment.

Heidegger's contribution to this debate was to question the above prioritising and to regard Being-with-others and one's own Dasein as equi-primordial phenomena:

"Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of others belongs to it; this means that because Dasein's being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of others. That understanding, like any understanding is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them but a primordially existential kind of Being which, more than anything else makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially"⁴

This Being-with is characterised by a fundamental ontological attitude of solicitude, and this attitude is part of the structure of Dasein for whom Being as such, and in particular its own Being, is an issue. This raises the question of our Being-in-the-world as a whole, and the question of Being in general. Solicitude is an attitude related to Dasein's basic state of mind, and to some extent Anxiety: an anxiety that can take the form of fleeing from oneself. The public "They", the empirical others, encourage this way of Being and also encourage a fleeing in the face of one's own death. The origin of Anxiety lies in the fact of our having being thrown into the world, but amid the chaos, there exists the possibility of authentic ways of Being, disclosing itself for Dasein, e.g. the holistic existential characteristic of Care for the world in all its forms, including the instrumental ready-to-hand, the world demands and the solicitude the other person demands of us. "Being-in-the-world", Heidegger argues "is essentially Care"⁵. No attempt

shall be made, he continues, to reduce Being-in-the-world to special acts or drives, and this might be a rejection of both Freudian Psychology and the Psychology of Behaviourism. Willing, Heidegger argues, is essentially teleological, implying a disclosedness of "that for the sake of which", and a disclosure of something to concern oneself with. Underlying this state of affairs, however, is the ontologically prior necessity of Care. This Care is ultimately a Care for all Being or Reality. It is, however, difficult to care for Reality independently of the judgments that one makes of its nature. If, as Freud argues, our relation to Reality is ultimately one of acceptance against a background of discontentment, the question arises as to whether this can be construed in terms of caring for Reality. Indeed it is possible that the combination of the state of mind of Anxiety and the Ontological way of Being-in-the-world we characterise as Care, may in fact be best characterised by the Freudian attitude of resignation. The wisdom of the prophesy of the Greek Oracle that "Everything created by man is destined for ruin and destruction" is also raised as a counterpoint to the philosophical point that categorises man as a rational animal capable of discourse. In the light of the History that was flowering around both Freud and Heidegger, one may well ask what the best response to this prophesy was--the Heideggerian Romantic idea of Care, or Freud's attitude of resignation in the face of Ananke. Both this idea and this attitude seem important and not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Ancient Greeks Cared about their Cities and protected them from ruin and destruction by passing laws in the spirit of *areté*, *arché*, and *diké*. If metaphysics is the study of first principles of Being, then this search for first principles was certainly present in the search for, and the passing of laws worthy of praise by the oracles. The virtue of the past, instantiated by war-heroes like Achilles, had been courage, and this virtue was being replaced by a broader virtue of wisdom, thus facilitating a transformation of the bestowal of dignity upon the wise men of the city rather than its warriors.

Heidegger, in Opening remarks in his work "Being and Time" claimed that we moderns have become forgetful of the question that Being raises for us, and we no longer are struck by awe and wonder at questions such as "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Heidegger refers us back to Aristotle:

"Aristotle himself knew the unity of this transcendental universal as a unity of analogy in contrast to the multiplicity of the higher generic concepts applicable to things."⁶

This universalising of the concept emptied the idea of Being of all content and resulted in a turning away from first principles. For Aristotle aporetic questions about the unity of Being and its many meanings evoked awe and wonder in a realm of contemplation that evades us moderns. We find in Aristotle no reference to anxiety, and the concept makes but a brief appearance in Kant's account of the Sublime when, in the face of an overwhelming physical force of Nature (a powerful waterfall), we experience a momentary powerlessness, only

for an awareness of the power of our freedom and worth to immediately emerge and produce a state of mind of awe and wonder. Neither Aristotle nor Kant saw Anxiety to be of primary significance in our philosophical investigations. Heidegger also sees the absence of anxiety and the presence of awe and wonder emerge in considering the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" In this adventure of reflection, Man's Being (Dasein) is raised and defined as having a necessary relation to Being as such. Heidegger concludes:

"Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being"⁷

He continues by claiming that man understands his existence:

"in terms of a possibility of itself; to be itself or not itself."⁸

In other words Man's Being is an issue, perhaps because our modern understanding of Being is vague. This issue includes our comportment toward entities that exist in different ways to the mode of existence of Dasein. Deficient modes of comportment towards Being can, Heidegger argues, be detected in the opinions and behaviour of the masses, for example, over the issue of our death or ceasing to exist. Death is an issue that is avoided, distorted, or denied by "They". Obviously there is a sense in which we cannot "care" about death because it is something that happens to us and is largely beyond our control. In Kant's Anthropological ontology this would place any concern for death outside the scope of the will. Perhaps it was this feature that contaminated the contentment man tended to feel in the use of his knowledge and reasoning. Both of these elements of man's nature must have led to the realisation that all life forms cease ultimately to exist. Freudian resignation appears, then, to have no serious alternative unless it is the Kantian alternative that is offered to us in his account of the Sublime in which our response to being overwhelmed by the power of nature is to respond not with the passive attitude of resignation but rather with a positive thought activity invoking a positive evaluation of man's moral worth.

Temporality or Time is an issue of fundamental importance for Dasein or the human form of Being-in-the-world. The method Heidegger uses to investigate these matters is the phenomenological method, which he characterises as a method which reveals "things themselves". We should remind ourselves in this context that the Greek word for "phenomenon" designates a verb--"to show itself", that in turn relates to another important Greek term, namely "aletheia", which is a name for our access to Being in the mode of comportment Heidegger calls "unconcealment"—an adjective that describes a noun or substantive, which according to Aristotle is a part of speech that contains no indication of time. There is however an indication of time in the above adjectival form. Time, for Aristotle was by its nature a relational intuition that is a consequence of the

measurement of motion in terms of before and after. This "measurement" does not necessarily have to be connected to number, but can be spatially presented in perception as it is in Kant's example of a boat steaming down a river. In this perception the motion of the boat is tied together by the unity of before and after. This is "shown" to us in the "phenomenon". The influence of Temporality in thought, however, may be more important than its influence in the synthesis of perceptions. In thought we can use reasoning to organise a Heraclitean matrix of change in accordance with a Parmenidean strategic vision of truth in relation to "The One". In volume one of this work we characterised the role of the truth and man's forgetfulness of Being in the following terms:

"Our understanding of man quite rightly may, in the end, be more Parmenidean than Heraclitean because Parmenides is the first philosopher to write about "The One" in terms of the goddess Aletheia. Aletheia, according to the continental Philosopher Heidegger is the Greek term for truth that he translates as "unconcealment" and he contrasts it to the Greek term for "The False" which is "Pseudo". Pseudo is in turn translated by the Latin "falsum" which carries the meaning of "bringing to a fall". Heidegger, in his essay on Parmenides points to the fact that this "bringing to a fall" is in the realm of the essence of "domination", of overseeing. "Verum" in Latin has no connotation of bringing out of unconcealment and simply dogmatically means "to be not false" and thereby leading us once again into the domain of domination, the domain of the imperial dogmatic command."⁹

This is amongst other things a historical look at the process of our modern forgetfulness of Being and alludes to the notion of historicity which Heidegger regards as an essential aspect of Dasein. This vision is not an attempt to characterise Tradition as we conceive it in terms of modern consciousness because historicity is part of what is concealed for us in our forgetfulness of Being. "Pseudos" in Greek is dissembling, which lets something appear differently to its real nature (conceived of in terms of "The One"). The ethical/anthropomorphic connotation of the term is unmistakeable and stands in sharp contrast to the Latin inversion of the original meaning of aletheia in favour of the more politicised connotation of "bringing to a fall". Heidegger maintains that the Greek term for "phenomenon" contains the connotation of "semblance" and this has little to do with our modern interpretation of the term as "appearance". "Appearing", Heidegger argues in this context, is precisely that which does not show itself but dissembles. So, for Heidegger phenomena are never "appearances"¹⁰. Rather Phenomenology, for Heidegger, is connected to both historicity and Logos whose primordial function is: "to let something be seen by pointing it out".¹¹ Logos also, on this account, has an important role in leading to the "things themselves", via one's discourse and its primordial relation to aletheia. Phenomenology, for Heidegger thus becomes the royal road to the ontological understanding of the Being of beings and Being itself. Heidegger's Phenomenology emphasises the Aristotelian power of discourse in the process of clarifying the vague understanding we moderns have of the Being of Dasein:

"The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting.....this hermeneutics also becomes a "hermeneutic" in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends....Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicity ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can be called "hermeneutic" only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those human sciences which are historiological in character."¹²

The Kantian telos of transcendental knowledge is one of the aims of phenomenological aletheia, which he then paradoxically characterises in Latin as "veritas transcendentalis". Philosophy is for Heidegger:

"universal phenomenological ontology"¹³

O'Shaughnessy's account of the Will has its transcendental dimensions and can be construed as in some respects Aristotelian, but it is not in agreement with Heidegger's concerns, especially insofar as the equi-primordially of Being-with-Others is concerned. One would hesitate to characterise O'Shaughnessy's reflections as phenomenological or hermeneutical but there does seem to be similarities to Kantian transcendental reflections upon the nature of Time and its relation to intentional action:

"First it is because any intentional project whatsoever is a cognitively synthesising force: it unites as one acts the multiple changing cognitions acquired during action. The commitment across time, both past and future which is internal to intentional action, guarantees the retention in memory of the fruits of the cognitive synthesising capacities put to use during the course of action: it guarantees to the agent a knowledge of his experienced active past. After all a self-conscious being cannot be engaged in intentional action if he harbours absolutely no knowledge of his immediate active past."¹⁴

The Kantian ontological distinction between the active, what one does, and the passive, what happens to one, is very relevant to understanding the perceptual intuition of time, and the active measuring of what is happening. Time can be said to "measure" in the sense of synthesising intuitions into a perceptual unity in the case of the ship steaming down the river. Yet the transcendental commitments of Kant are very different to the commitments of twentieth century Phenomenologists. Merleau-Ponty falls into this latter category. He, unlike Kant, regards Science as a second-order expression of the life-world. His phenomenological "reduction" reduces Science to a form of body-world experience. Kant, on the other hand, defines science in terms of matter in motion conceived of in a matrix of event, substance and material and efficient causation. James Ellington's essay "The Unity of Kant's Philosophy", contained in "Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Nature, trans Ellington J, (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1985) provides us with insight into Kant's approach to phenomenology:

"In phenomenology matter is regarded as movable insofar as it can be an object of experience. Here the concern is with the relations matter has to the mind that knows it. Now the fundamental determination of a something that is to be an object of the external senses must be motion, for thereby only can these senses be affected.....Accordingly, the discussions in phenomenology centre primarily on motion itself. We have seen that representations can be regarded as merely the contents of a consciousness or as referring beyond themselves to the objects which they purport to represent. The representation of motion is given to us merely as an appearance, i.e. as an undetermined object of an external empirical intuition"¹⁵

Kant's account refers to appearance that might or might not become determined by the concepts of the understanding. If, in the process of thinking the "I" thinks something (conceptually) about something (the appearance) there is what Heidegger called a veritative (truth-making) synthesis and, to take the above example, the predicate of motion is asserted of this change of relation in space. Both matter and space are involved in this account. The intuition of time is obviously also involved, as it is in the experience of the Kantian ship steaming downstream, but in this case whether sensibility links up to the understanding and whether the truth is aimed at, depends upon whether the "I" that thinks, thinks something about something in terms of the Categories of the Understanding.

The above is clearly a very different account of phenomenology than that which we encounter in the 20th century. These reflections do not aim at the "things themselves" in the noumenal realm because, by Kant's definition, this realm lies beyond determination by the Categories of the Understanding. Yet it also ought to be pointed out that Kant's account is well synchronised with both Aristotle's hylomorphic theory of change and the Greek terms for phenomena. Kant's account is also partly synchronised with Newton's Natural Philosophy (Kant, however, has hylomorphic criticisms of the Newtonian account.)

Heidegger locates the positive view of Science we find in Kant, in Aristotle's claim that the care for seeing is essential to man's being. The care for thinking and its fate may be more embedded in the temporality of Historical thought and this is to be distinguished from the care for seeing located in the realm of space and matter. This "seeing" however for Kant is logically connected to that noumenal something that "appears" for the senses. Heidegger calls this "care for seeing" pure "beholding"¹⁶. Logos and its operation in discourse "points out" what is seen in this "pure beholding" in an act that must have more ontological significance than the act of ostensive definition we find in the writings of analytic philosophers and logical positivists.

Merleau-Ponty is one of the spokesmen for the phenomenologists that deny the above Kantian metaphysical account of phenomenology. The Phenomenal Field for Merleau-Ponty (MP) is a field of meaning (a field O'Shaughnessy

also appeals to): a field in which the thing experienced is not to be reduced to a bundle of dead properties or variables. The Phenomenal field, for MP, is rather constituted by an active act of perception which changes the significance of what is seen, e.g. the child burned by the flame of the candle that attracted his hand, is now repulsed by the same flame. The world, for MP, is not a spectacle to be passively observed by a pure observer with his notebook, and one's own body living in the life-world is not a bundle of causal "mechanisms" surrounded by a bundle of variables signifying a network of general properties. Rather, the living body, for MP, is the location for a centre of expression:

"But this reciprocal relationship of expression which presents the human body as the outward manifestation of a certain manner of Being-in-the-world, had, for mechanistic physiology, to be resolved into a series of causal relations."¹⁷

Mechanistic physiology reduced perception to sensation observed by a pure observer and the mechanism of connection for these sensations was "association". This violated the integrity of the phenomenal field as far as MP was concerned. This atomisation resulted in

"...the living body becoming an exterior without an interior and subjectivity becoming an interior without an exterior, an impartial spectator. The naturalism of science and the spiritualism of the universal constituting subject, to which reflection in science led, had this in common, that they levelled out experience: in face of the constituting I, the empirical selves are objects."¹⁸

Empirical perceivers and thinkers became objects to be incorporated into the scientific matter-oriented matrix. The phenomenological response to this was to criticise Science without distinguishing between the metaphysically grounded science of Kant (and Aristotle) and the modern mathematically inspired methodological pursuit that relied on hypothetical theories or "models". For MP, Kant was a dogmatic rationalist and is regarded as "worldly" because he refuses to banish science from the human life-world in favour of a phenomenological reduction that attempts to situate meaning at the level of lived experience. Heidegger, in spite of his criticisms of Kant is more Kantian, acknowledging the role of transcendental a priori logic which concerns itself with, as Kant defines the matter, the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as that mode is a priori.

On the other hand, Heidegger regrets the fact that Kant did not explore the question of the meaning of Being in general and its a priori conditions. This criticism is against the background of Heidegger's rejection of the metaphysical distinction between noumena and phenomena. Given that Heidegger thinks that the central issue involved in the issue of the meaning of being is that of Time (which is intimately connected to Care) he must believe that the Kantian account of time is inadequate. Somehow Kant's account belongs to a project Heidegger calls "Destroying the History of Ontology", because he shrank from

investigating the transcendental imagination which Kant had himself dubbed "an art hidden in the depths of the human soul". Kant is accused by Heidegger of aligning himself with Descartes, and thereby assisting in the shrouding of the relation between time and the "I think" (Being and Time, P.45). Interpretation and criticism of Kant by empiricists, rationalists and phenomenologists alike have failed to appreciate the extent to which Kant's Critical Philosophy is an attempt to restore Aristotelian hylomorphic thinking in the arena of philosophical reflection. This together with the "domination" ("bringing to a fall") of modern Science over all areas of thought and investigation relating to the humanities and the human sciences, has led to the submergence of Kant's Critical Philosophy beneath the advancing waters of Modernism. The perpetuation of interest in Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy was left in Post-Kantian times to a university system formed on the principle of specialisation that determined the Guild system of The Enlightenment.

The question to pose in the light of this phenomenological diversion is whether O'Shaughnessy's essentially Analytical account of the Will and Consciousness contains Hylomorphic and Critical elements. The surprising reference to Freud certainly suggests that some principles from Aristotle and Kant are being used in contexts of explanation/justification.

O'Shaughnessy points out, for example:

"that Freud believed that consciousness developed out of, and was as such an agency for the expression of that part of the mind that is entirely inhabited by psychic forces that are closely akin to "will" in its broadest sense".¹⁹

The Subject for O'Shaughnessy is no passive observer or spectator, but rather a subject in charge of the contents of his own mind, and this in a similar way to the way in which a playwright assembles the words of the play he is engaged in writing. One of the aims of Freudian therapy was to put the patient back in charge of his experiences. Insofar as consciousness is related to this wakeful active state of mind, it is, O'Shaughnessy argues, connected to the non-psychological cause of the lived-body and this is clearly a hylomorphic position. On this position, man is an instinctive animal that is unconsciously attracted to a world that he Cares for. O'Shaughnessy's unique elaboration upon hylomorphic /critical accounts of human activity involves focussing on the Will and intentional bodily action. The focus on action brings the sense of touch to the forefront of the phenomenal field (cf Berkeley's theory of vision). The desire and care for the world obviously also echoes Jonathan Lear's view of the work of Aristotle as containing the essential feature of a "desire to understand". We are rational animals capable of discourse, and in the process of the actualisation

of our potentialities to become social/political beings, the connection between knowledge and intentional action becomes less easy to discern. We need, however, to remind ourselves that it is man, **the person**, that is the bearer of the will and not his mind--man, that combination of form and matter (lived body)

O'Shaughnessy signals his Kantian view of Action by maintaining that it is not, as many rationalists and empiricists would maintain, a mode of causation, although action does instantiate causation in the physical external world. Action proceeds from the depths of a soul that "moves" a lived body. This movement is "spiritual" and instantaneously responsive to the Agents intentions, judgement, understanding, and reason. This is an expressive movement that is happening in one actively, but is not happening to one passively via a play of causes that give rise to "events". Intentional action is poised on the threshold of a part of the mind that contains the principles of action and a lived body that can be immediately activated by a will operating in accordance with these principles. In simple animals, intentional action operates in relation to a will moved by instinct and impulses and a system of powers that constitute the form of the animal concerned. In such simple animals there is no ability or "psychic space" to delay the action in order to "think about alternatives"--only more complex animals capable of discourse and rationality have this power. That is, there may not be an "I" that thinks but rather a simpler form of consciousness that is bound to stimuli in its environment. Consequently animals are less capable of the phenomenon of "Work": a phenomenon that expresses complex desires connected to more complex forms of life manifesting the temporal property of historicity.

Sometimes we may have difficulty in separating the Aristotelian and Kantian aspects of O'Shaughnessy's work from his more materialistic and dualistic concerns. The ideas of the will and freedom are not of course naturally connected in dualistic positions and this is probably due to the "royal" category of "substance" determining events via mechanisms of causation. On such accounts deciding to move ones foot and the actual movement appear as two "events", and the relation between these events of course becomes problematic. We see this problem surfacing in O'Shaughnessy's work when, in discussing this relation he refers to a "magical force" (The Will, P. XLV). Kantian Critical Philosophy would refuse to embed the phenomenon of action in a matrix of categories containing substance, causation, and event and insist that the correct context for the phenomenon of action is a network of concepts containing power, agency and freedom.

That there are a priori limits to the will could well have been a Kantian position but we find this claim in O'Shaughnessy. It is, he claims, a fact that there are actions which it is logically impossible to will, e.g. the relation between the

chemical interactions that is occurring in an arm. I cannot be conscious of these chemical interactions but this does not entail that such processes are not to be counted among the material and efficient conditions of any action such as raising my arm. There are other further Kantian elements in O'Shaughnessy's reflective process. Firstly, in Kant's "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view", Kant draws attention to an ontological distinction that O'Shaughnessy appears to accept in some key elements of his account, namely, that between what a man does and what happens to a man. Secondly, whilst there are reservations, O'Shaughnessy appears to accept the metaphysical distinction between causality and the freedom of the self-initiation of the will. An involuntary raising of the arm due to cramp, connected to certain chemical processes in my shoulder and arm, is an event that happens to a man. The voluntary raising of an arm/hand in a lecture is an intentional voluntary action that is self-initiated and freely chosen by the agent. Sensations receive the status of "passive" in O'Shaughnessy's account and are also among the phenomena that cannot logically be willed. The sensation of pain, for example, is given an "inactive" will-value yet it is a psychological phenomenon of significance. The arguments for this position refer back to origins. Pain has its origins in the physical lived body--a psychological but non-mental realm of our lives. Intentional bodily actions, on the other hand, have origins in the realm of the mental which is a vicissitude of the realm of the psychological. This reflection is perhaps an elaboration on the Wittgensteinian grammatical observation that I cannot be said to know that I am in pain. I must, however, know that I am raising my arm/hand to ask a question. The above distinction helps in constituting an ontological identity for Action.

So, on the ontological schema O'Shaughnessy provides us with, some psychological events can be actions and some are not, and it may prove useful to raise a Kantian caveat here. According to Kant one can conceptualise actions both as events that happen, and as willed mental activity. In the former case we are dealing with an observer/spectator-relation to the phenomenon and a cognitive attitude that is interrogative. In the latter we "live" or inhabit the phenomenon and "know" what we are doing non-observationally. I do not, for example, "notice" that I am raising my arm/hand in the lecture. This caveat clearly questions the wisdom of speaking as O'Shaughnessy does of "events of the mind".

Aristotelian hylomorphic Philosophy also would question this description given Aristotle's later characterisation of "form" as "principle". The principle may well originate in the mind for Aristotle, but it would be misleading to characterise this as an "event". The mind is not an inner theatre with events occurring on a mental stage, but rather something which springs into existence (self-initiated) when we think. Reasons are then provided for this activity, and these reasons

will contain reference to principles. For example, if someone hallucinates that they are an angel of God delivering a speech to the inhabitants of earth, (whilst addressing a group of cows), it is difficult to conceive of this in terms of a will-active phenomenon, and the conception of this phenomenon happening in, and to, the agent appears a more rational ontological characterisation. The reasons provided for doing what one is doing are in Kantian terms "maxims", and maxims embody principles which in themselves have different ontological values. The pleasure-pain principle behind the experience of pains and hallucinations, for example, are explanatory principles relating to what Aristotle referred to as material and efficient causes and what analytical philosophers refer to as "events". Confining explanation to the psychological realm regulated and constituted by the pleasure pain principle risks limiting the scope of the reality principle, and its use in constituting and regulating instrumental and categorical ethical action. The scope of the rational idea of freedom also risks being limited in its use. The Kantian approach to this discussion is to distinguish "behaviour" which, as an event, appears as physical motion, from "action" which is constituted by maxims that are formed rationally and in accordance with the knowledge of the agent. O'Shaughnessy sees in the mind a division of import that can be construed hylomorphically or dualistically:

"It corresponds to a major divide running through the phenomena in the mind, comparable in significance to the great divide that marks off these phenomena that owe their existence to the faculty of reason (beliefs, desires, actions, etc) from those that cannot (dreams, emotions, sense impressions, etc)"²⁰

The above quote also aligns well with the Kantian architectonic of sensibility, understanding and reason, and the implied metaphysical distinction between phenomena and noumena. There is a significant difference between regarding the above phenomena as events or as acts of mind. The schema O'Shaughnessy presents, divides belief and desire, and both are unwilling yet both have an interesting relation to Reason, which, incidentally, has no obvious place on his diagram. Irrational beliefs and desires are also an integral part of the psychology of the human individual. Belief in the epistemological mode, when it is self consciously believed by self conscious believers, occurs under the aspect of Truth, but it is nevertheless on O'Shaughnessy's account of the will-value of mental phenomena, essentially inactive. One of the aporetic questions one encounters in hylomorphic and critical Philosophy, is the question of the relation between The Good and the True. The truth, it is said colloquially, will set you free and both "forms", "ideas", or "principles" are what Kant would call "ends-in-themselves", but the exact nature of their relation remains to be investigated. The logical validity of practical arguments has of course been investigated and for Kant, the primacy of practical reasoning has been clearly established, whilst for Aristotle there is at least a relation of equi-primordiality between the two forms of reasoning. Plato, in his "Republic" also testified to the primacy of the

form of the "The Good" and in his architectonic of ideas, truth plays an important but subordinate role to "the sun" of his system. O'Shaughnessy's (OS), position thus resembles the Platonic position in that it is claimed that willing is a primary phenomenon and consciousness a secondary phenomenon.

An important logical limit of will is placed upon its terminus in the lived body. We know some parts of the body, e.g. limbs and their tendon and muscle systems are movable by the will, but once the work of moving bodily targets is done, OS argues, the wills work is done. Control of movements that fail to achieve their purpose, e.g. trying to turn the television on with a remote control whose batteries are dead, are not under the control of the will. Nevertheless orders such as "turn the television on!" make sense, because actions can in principle make statements relating to the television being turned on, true. The action, that is, can make statements true. There is no doubt that there is an intimate relation between Truth and The Good. The power of language also makes itself felt in the context of discussions relating to the will and OS's account is not afraid to use the Kantian tools of a priori ideas of the mind regulating our Being-in-the-world:

"Like a vine on a trellis our very minds are moulded by a conceptual edifice that is structured out of Time, Action, Consciousness, and Reality...what is innate is the particular endowment, what is experienced is language and the items of the world, and what takes place when these concepts are acquired is the product of the interaction of these factors."²¹

Freud's acceptance of the description of psychoanalysis as a "talking cure" may well be related to the power of language to contribute to the process of setting his patients free of their maladies. We know that Wittgenstein, at one point in his career regarded himself as a disciple of Freud, and this may be related to the important role that language plays in forming thoughts in the mind. Curing patients, and preventing philosophers from talking nonsense, obviously have something in common with each other.

So, even if it is true that the will terminates in certain target areas of the body, action itself shall not be restricted to bodily movements, and whilst the language of action may not be philosophically transparent, it is clear that it is intentional and extends out into the World, allowing one human to order another to turn the television on. The relation between external and internal factors constitute the inner and outer face of the phenomenon of action and this must also partially determine the active use of associated linguistic terms. Both these dual aspects are present in the linguistic demarcation of intentional actions. Actions, OS argues, can be both mental and physical. A number of factors coalesce in this linguistic demarcation process, e.g. inner factors such as desire, intention, non-observational knowing, and the selective process involved in determining the choice of the region of the body to use in the intended action.

OS discusses so-called volitionist theories of the will which refuse to extend the scope of action beyond the movements of the lived body. He claims this theory to be a false metaphysical theory, because it fails to demarcate the proper scope of the a priori concept of action. Such volitionist theories, OS argues, end up by falsely construing physical actions as mental events which stand in some kind of magical relation to their objects. The mind, on such theories, instead of being occupied by maxims and principles, is transformed into a private theatre housing concrete events that come and go. This is the picture that has become embedded in the minds of the "new men" of our modern age: amongst these new men, we find scientifically inspired philosophers who have, since the Enlightenment, deliberately jettisoned the metaphysical reflections of Aristotle and Kant.

Now whilst the role of knowledge in action is obviously connected to knowing, for example, that I am raising my arm/hand to ask a question, it is not so obvious to find a role for sensation in this phenomenon. Do I, for example, know that I am raising my arm/hand because I sense a sensation in the limb? That would place my relation to my action in a category resembling the category of events that have happened to me, and if the Kantian account of action is correct, jeopardise the agency involved in this activity. OS locates sensation in this activity by claiming that, were it to be the case that the limb were anaesthetised, I would not be able to raise it even if all the knowledge conditions were present. So, on OS's account, the sensation in my limb is some sort of condition for the power of agency involved in arm-raising. This sensation-based awareness of my limb is, then part of the mechanism involved in the raising of the arm. One of the material conditions for the operation of this mechanism relates to the material constitution of the limb, e.g. the fact that my arm is composed of bone, tissue, nerves, tendons and muscles connected to a nervous system. Now if we were dealing with a mere bodily movement of the arm caused by a reflex, that in turn was caused by the cramping of muscles in the limb, it is quite clear that, because we are dealing with a non psychological causal event, it would not make sense to request a reason embodying desires, beliefs and intentions. It would, in such circumstances, not be grammatically correct to say "I raised my arm". The "I" mentioned here is not the cognitive "I think" but rather the "I" of the personality--the person or the agent. One of the conditions of my saying I raised my arm is the non-observationally based knowledge referred to earlier. The aforementioned "mechanism", of course, has to be "on-call" and subject to initiation by the "I" of personality. OS points out that were my arm to cramp and raise reflexively there would be an element of surprise attached to this event (The Will, Vol.1. P.115): no such surprise ought to occur when the movement is self-initiated and flows from knowledge I possess. The purpose of the action of raising my arm is obviously the reason for the action, and this reason is to be distinguished from material and efficient conditions and causes, and this reason will also be connected to the formal and

final forms of explanation referred to by Aristotle. The sensations experienced in this process are then connected to the mobilising of the limb by the "I" of the personality.

Action for OS has a dual aspect, an interior aspect connected to the psychological conditions that we find related to the "I", and connected to first-person reports of actions, and an exterior aspect connected to third person observation based reports. Either aspect may serve as a corrective to the other, but it does appear to be more difficult to be mistaken about the first person report, e.g. "I thought I raised my arm but was mistaken", would be a very puzzling thing to say and require abnormal circumstances involving perhaps the loss of a limb and the fantastic postulation of "phantom" "actions". Contrariwise, someone who upon being truthfully told that I had raised my arm /hand was met with a sceptical retort "But could it not have been a muscle spasm?", would respond with incredulity to such a retort. This is testimony in favour of the priority of the psychological conditions which are admittedly not completely inviolable. This, however, should not encourage volitionist accounts in which the whole activity is divided into two kinds of event, one interior event and one exterior event. Both of these aspects are synthesised in an action, and although it is not certain OS would agree to describing this in Aristotelian terms, namely, of form organising matter, this nevertheless appears to be the best way of avoiding the atomisation of the action into two events. Plato's metaphysical dualism was a far better theory than the epistemological dualism of Descartes, but both would be the target of neo-hylomorphic theory: a theory in which, in the case of action, it is a principle and not a ghostly event that is organising the movement. In hylomorphism the mechanism is mobilised not by a ghostly pilot governing a floating machine but rather by a principle "governing" (in the political sense) a living body.

Spinoza claimed in his Ethics, that the first idea of the mind is an idea of the body and this is also registered in Freud's claim that the first task of the agency of the Ego is to protect the body. OS refers in similar vein to an epistemological relation to the body: a state of affairs that enables the will to utilise the power of the body for its purposes. Involved in this relation is a non-observational form of awareness of the parts of the body that are potentially utilisable. On this view these parts are "present" from a first person point of view. Undoubtedly it is also the case that from a third person point of view the matrix of substance, event, causation can become a relevant perspective, but the question remains as to whether this is the perspective one ought to use in describing and explaining /justifying the maxims that lie behind willing an action. According to Kant it is these maxims that provide us with the essential aspect of the action. Willing is perhaps better conceived in terms of an actualisation of the potentiality of the principle embedded in the maxim. The action from this perspective, is a self-

initiated phenomenon located within the confines of the lived body-image. We relate to the world via this image and the action that flows from its activated parts. OS claims that the Freudian Ego provides an interesting framework of theories of body-image. The Freudian account begins with an oral centre which then spreads in accordance with the ERP and PPP to the entire body via other regions. For Freud it is the Ego that is the nucleus of the will, an ego whose sensory-motor idea of the body can be instinctive, connected to memory and associated knowledge centres. The Principles that constitute this ego are the ERP, the PPP, and the RP. The Id is one of the more primitive agencies of the Freudian account, being the locus of both the life instincts and the death instincts that play their part in the unleashing of aggression. Death is the end of life, but it is never present to the dead person. Dying by its very nature is painful, and this is the best evidence for the truth of the Aristotelian claim that all human activity aims at the good. When activity is no longer possible the anticipated end of all activity can only be painful.

OS warns us in his later work, "Consciousness and the World"²², of the danger of unnecessarily splitting the mind up into psychological forces that never reach the realm of representation (the forces of the id). The risk one takes with embracing wholly and completely Freudian and Schopenhauerean theory is that man can be characterised as a non rational being. In Freud's case this is less likely given his claim that his Psychology is essentially Kantian. The Freudian Reality Principle must at the very least operate in accordance with the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason, but it is also a fundamentally practical principle regulating mans action normatively with the aid of laws and looking forward in time to the flourishing life and the flourishing city. One may be worried about the ultimate unity of the mind as characterised by Freudian theory, but given the fact that the "parts" of the mind are defined (in accordance with Aristotelian recommendations) holistically, and not atomistically, the unity of the Freudian mind is guaranteed by the hierarchy and interrelation of the three principles (ERP, PPP, RP) and the interaction of the agencies of the id, ego and the superego in their relations to the external world. These principles are tied irrevocably to the phases of actualisation of the human psyche: phases in which first consciousness, and then higher mental processes, arise as a consequence of the actualisation of powers rooted in the system of organs that constitute the human lived body. In these phases we encounter psychological processes such as identification and sublimation, and these appear to be invaluable additions to Aristotelian and Kantian theory. The organ-limb system of the human form of life begins with zones of activity and the production of pleasure in relation to certain kinds of object. As these zones of pleasure expand and are integrated with each other, powers emerge that allow a wide range of substitute satisfactions related to a wide range of objects. These powers and objects form constellations in various psycho-sexual stages. The instincts involved in these

stages can even change their aims. The "defence-mechanism" of sublimation uses the power of the life instinct to change the aim of the instinct and construct objects necessary for a flourishing life. This change of aim is fundamental--from aiming to survive /reproduce, to a quality of life that sustains more abstract forms of satisfaction and contentment, and also abstract attitudes such as resignation because one is discontent with ones civilisation. This more abstract aim and attitude contributes to the attempt to construct a cultural environment worthy of a rational animal capable of discourse. A strong Ego sublimates its more primitive impulses, redirecting the energy connected with them instead of denying or repressing it. One of the purposes of the Freudian RP is to regulate sensory impulses so that the motor system is not used detrimentally. In practical reason, thought sublimates these impulses with the idea of the Good. For Freud, the motor system (in practical contexts) is the telos of thought processes. The telos of the sensory system, on the other hand, is feeling which, according to Spinoza informs the experiencer of whether the body is faring well (pleasure) or ill (pain). When the body expresses to the mind that it is not faring well we experience anxiety which is a disintegrating force for the mind whose aim is unity and harmony. It is this force that motivates a possible battery of defence mechanisms which reduces the activity of thought and inhibits the wise use of the motor system.

OS distinguishes between a short term body images and a long term body image: between an "i" interacting with the environment and changing with the changing circumstances and a more permanently constituted "I" . This latter I is not an "I think" but rather an "I intuit" or "I represent". The latter, intuitive I, however is a material and efficient condition of the "I think".

The body-image is, for OS, the "iron in the soul" that enables the will to remain rooted in earthly limits. Here there is no desire to soar out into the external world magically. This body image is the target for the will: it is pre-attentional, pre-conceptual, and intuitively constituted: it is "felt". The logical space of thought, on the other hand, has its origins in a thinking process in which one weighs up whether or not to act in accordance with impulsive urges. This, when developed at the conceptual level, provides us with a type of discourse reminiscent of Hamlet's soliloquy: a conversation that occurs at the doors of the motor system which is itself keyed into the body-image. The question to raise here is whether the categorisation of the above state of affairs ought to be in terms of event and causation--or whether, rather, this is indeed a logical space constituted of a pure potential of activity activated by activity from other realms of the mind. OS, however, might conceivably consider this an unnecessary ontological elevation to a metaphysical realm: a realm too far to be defended by his dual aspect theory. It is undeniably the case that we consider our acts as part of the realm of action, but the question remains as to how we ought always to

categorise these acts: whether it is nobler to classify them in terms of actuality: in terms of facts and the truth, or whether actions conceived of in this logical space of thought are best characterised in terms of ought premises and the categories of potentiality and possibility and the telos of the good.

OS claims that the act is formed in thought, but he also claims that when we act, the phenomenon of action is like that of a substance leaking from one world into another! His account of a man making a chair in the presence of a physicalist noting the movement of material from one location to another, might be able to invoke physical laws to explain the motion of the material, but such a form of explanation will never be able to provide us with the ontological principles that determine the chair to be the kind of artefact that it is. Such principles will be instrumental in character and these are also expressed in terms of ought-premises in an argument culminating in a concrete particularistic ought - conclusion relating to the commitment to do the action in question. The forming of the intention to make the chair will eventually involve choosing to do the first action in a chain of actions that will lead to the construction of the chair. Involved in this choice will be reference to that part of the body image that will be mobilised in this first action, e.g. chopping, sawing, or buying the wood. A series of directing imperatives will result from a series of ought judgements designed to transform the potential idea of the chair to its actuality. Amongst this series one might find: "buy the wood" "Cut the wood" "Make the chair stable", "Make the chair comfortable". Different kinds of principles will be involved in the performing of these different kinds of actions. Whether the description given by OS relating to the leaking of one substance from one world into another is appropriate for this situation is a matter for conjecture. The body is the vehicle for change in the above instrumental act. It is also the vehicle for the actualising of the knowledge of the chair-maker.

OS also uses the image of the intervention of one realm into another in relation to an action which carries the possible interpretation of being designed or created. For Aristotle, the idea of dividing the whole of the creation of chaos into events of different types to be connected by a linear mechanical idea of causation, would, to say the least be a questionable strategy. For an observer that has absolutely no knowledge of what is happening in an environment, perhaps atomising the chaos into events until it becomes clear what is happening is a possible strategy, but if in this process, one atomises actions into events, one might never get clear about what one is doing, .e.g., if one is making a chair out of the chaos of a wood-pile. Such is not the world of the chair-maker who is engaged in the world via a series of maxims directing acts which form a different kind of entity to events. These acts can, for the observer be condensed into "events" via hypothetical judgements but they can also be a chair-series which is linked to knowledge driven activities aiming at making a good chair in

the spirit of *areté*. In this latter case the observer "participates" in the situation in a different way involving the sharing of knowledge. Perception is, of course, involved in this process of chair-making but it is not of the observational interrogative kind (Lo! What have we here!) but is rather of the circumspective kind referred to by Heidegger, and to be found in the realm of the ready-to-hand (to be related by "In-order-to" judgements). Observation for Heidegger is a different kind of concern. It is not situated in our life-world in the same way, but is a more theoretical kind of activity. The world of work (chair-making), on the other hand, for Heidegger, is a practical world in which the context of equipment and material form a practical whole. The chair is produced "in order to" provide equipment for different kinds of activity. Observation is not "work" in this sense even if it is done in the name of theoretical science in the spirit of exploration/discovery. For Heidegger the chair belongs in a context which he defines "ontologico--categorically" (P.101 *Being and Time*). For Heidegger "work" is not a series of events but a series of phenomena: the chair only presents a theoretical problem for its user if it can no longer be used, perhaps because it has been broken. In such circumstances the chair presents itself for interrogation of a theoretical kind (Can it be fixed?). We are not "absorbed" in this activity in the same way in which we are when we are involved in the world of equipment. The state of affairs in which we atomistically confront the broken chair is a world containing the event "The chair is broken" and this is not the life-world that interests the phenomenologist. Now whilst the Heideggerian reflection above suffices to distinguish a change in the world as an event, from a change in the world that involves a process of work, or a product of such a process, this is not sufficient to distinguish a technological instrumental work of labour (making a chair) from the more disinterested process of producing and appreciating a work of fine art. This latter form of "work" rather is not "rule-governed" in the same way, but rather is a free work of genius involving faculties and powers of mind striving for a mental harmony. The beauty of art, in other words, pleases neither via sensation or concept, Kant claims:

"Now art has always got a definite intention of producing something. Were this "something", however, to be mere sensation (something merely subjective), intended to be accompanied by pleasure, then such a product would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the senses. On the other hand were the intention one directed to the production of a definite object, then, supposing, this were attained by art, the object would only please by means of the concept. But in both cases the art would please not in the mere estimate of it, i.e not as fine art, but rather as mechanical art."²³

Kant goes on to suggest that in order to avoid these possible responses, the talent of the artist ought to include the ability to disguise the intentionality of the work, and present it as something natural. The requirement of originality or uniqueness is thus important in the production of fine art. Kant then makes a fascinating observation relating to Science, and the ability of scientists to imitate the Genius

of Newton. This is not the case, however, with fine artists of genius who most of the time are unable to say exactly how they produced their finest art. Their genius is free, and cannot be imitated in a process of labour. We lesser mortals require Taste to form an estimate of the value of the work of the genius. We do not, for example, necessarily need to understand the final end of the work but satisfy ourselves with its formal cause. This, from the point of view of the genius is a soulless form of appreciation. The presence of soul in the process of appreciation is evidenced by understanding all the causes of the work (material, efficient, formal and final, causes) in a holistic act of appreciation. Soul, Kant argues:

"..in an aesthetical sense signifies the animating principle in the mind"²⁴

In such contexts we are dealing with aesthetic ideas freely presented and not deterministic rule-governed concepts. Aesthetic ideas, Kant goes on to argue, are the counterpart of rational ideas--and are related to our freedom. The imagination obviously plays a key role in this process of estimation in which we arrive at the experience of the Beautiful via a free play of representations of the imagination.

The equation of the "genius" of Newton with the technological ability of a craftsman, suggests the predominance of an instrumental form of rationality and its hypothetical form of necessity. Kant also points to the importance of freedom in a cultural life-world context, aligning this aspect of Culture more closely with ethical goods than with the "scientific truth": a position that Plato articulates in the Republic.

OS does not consider intentional, aesthetic action in his account of willing. Clearly the play of the imagination in the selection of representations is better characterised as an act of selection rather than as an observer-constituted "happening" or "event". Events are more difficult to characterise as expressions of an agent, and are more likely to demand evaluation in terms of the categories of substance and causation (material and efficient causation). Acts, on the other hand, are the natural form of expression of an agent. Such acts fall more naturally under the notion of self-initiation. This concept of self-initiation, if inserted in to a substance-causation matrix, is more likely to result in the kind of speculation that gives rise to strange supernatural phenomena such as spontaneous generation. A car that bursts into fire is of course not an event that has been spontaneously generated. Looking at the car as an agent in the context of such an event rather than at some prior underlying cause is a pointless investigation. Similarly, characterising the act of willing as an event rather than an activity of an agent seems also to invite confusion.

In volume one of his work on *Willing*, OS has been resting his analysis upon a notion of sensory-motor integration that he has not explained or justified. In volume two, however, we are provided with a brilliant hylomorphic analysis of the foundational state of his reasoning. He begins by claiming that our ascription of visual powers to one another requires a behavioural foundation and vice versa:

"The concepts of physical action and perception naturally require one another."²⁵

This move of referring to the mutual implication of items inhering in a circle of fundamentally necessary items, is a phenomenological tactic used with great effect in Merleau-Ponty's work *"Phenomenology of Perception"*. In another earlier work, Merleau-Ponty provided us with a fascinating account of a moving light in a dark room attracting our attention. He claims that what we have here is a holistic phenomenon gifted with both intention and meaning that is incorrectly analysed by science into two kinds of event--an inner and an outer event--the light is both in us and also a vibrating outer phenomenon--the latter causing the former which is degraded into a "subjective" effect. For the scientist the real effects of this vibratory movement occurs on the surface of the retina and then subsequently in the nerves leading away from the eye and toward the brain. What the scientist presents us with here is, instead of the phenomenon of the movement of light as experienced, a classical reflex classified in terms of the hybrid category of action-reaction.

In this matrix the experiencing organism is passive, and the account we are given is of something happening to the organism. In this form of description, the light ceases to be an entity invested with intention, human value, and meaning. The "figure" of the moving light against the background of the darkness of the room, is the form of phenomenon that engages with the living organism by attracting its attention and dragging this attention along with it. There is no "event" of attention merely "happening" but rather the activation of a perceptual element of the stream of consciousness of an agent: a form of life that expresses its interest in the light by actively following its path across the wall of the dark room. This power of seeing or sight is a fundamental power of an agent that is a free self initiating entity causing itself to act in an act of expression whose form is not decomposable into events that are mere responses happening in a particular segment of the spatio-temporal matrix.

OS's analysis also displays hylomorphic characteristics. He analyses the actualisation of the potentiality of "seeing something" in the new born infant.. An infant, it is argued, can see and his visual field is:

"more or less continuously inhabited by visual sensations (without necessarily implying that they engage his attention)"²⁶

But, we might wonder, would the infant necessarily follow the moving light in the darkness. OS doubts that this is possible because all we know about infants is that they can see but not necessarily see something (e.g. as being closer to, or further off than something else). On this account the visual sensations the infant experiences have not got formal objects, i.e. these sensations do not mean anything to the infant until he develops the capacity to see "something". Indeed until the infant begins to show in his actions that he sees something, e.g. by reaching for it--it is doubtful that his visual field is even three dimensional. For OS we can only say that the infant sees the world three dimensionally when he can act in relation to the object that he sees. Depth perception is only possible for those who have sufficiently structured visual fields: something that is possible only when a certain level of integration of sensory-motor powers has been achieved. Both of these powers, in turn, are connected to an awareness of space as something that is not merely external, but is organised in a form that can be explored by other senses such as touch. Space itself is not constructed, bit by bit, in such an exploration, but is taken to be an apriori given for all life forms. This space cannot be said to be a purely visual phenomenon because an animal that was totally paralysed and unable to act in the world, or actively touch the world, would not be able to know very much about this world. OS also argues that a being without any sensation of touch but could move, would be inconceivable. The possession of the powers of sensation and the ability to move without any capacity to organise ones perceptions and actions in time would also, OS argues, be inconceivable for any life form. Here the Aristotelian principles that connect the before and after of the action-sequence are the following: that from which a thing is changing, that toward which something is changing, and that which endures as the same throughout the change. These are three central principles of hylomorphism and suffice to explain and justify the role of before and after in the constitution of objects in an environment of development and change.

Freud's use of these principles, is in relation to the bodily ego that emerges with the help of the integration of the sensory-motor activities of the human life-form. OS claims, for instance, that the infants "kickings" are meaningless until they can be integrated into his bodily ego--a structure that is of central importance for intentional action and willing. Consciousness also has its role in the actualisation of the sensory-motor powers. Consciousness, is, namely, a state in which sense experiences and instrumental intentions give rise to instrumental actions that emerge from some region of the body-image. All of these phenomena are interdependent and ultimately constitute the defining conditions for the activities of a rational animal capable of discourse:

"a tightly meshed grid of psychological concepts of type "see", "want", "pursue"²⁷

Perception and action, on this account, are a priori conditions in animal life, but this in itself does not justify using the third person form of perception (observation) to define type conditions of action. For OS is very clear on his position that the type of awareness involved in action, is non-observational. Furthermore the idea of agency and powers (e.g. action, perception, language etc) assume epistemological attitudes that are non explorative and non interrogative and not part of any context of discovery which seeks to arrive at knowledge of what is happening. Rather we are dealing here with contexts of explanation/justification, in which knowledge of the principles and ends of action are assumed. In this kind of activity and possessing the appropriate epistemological attitude, we use principles to change nature and do not wait for events in nature to happen and help us form principles.

OS then provides a proof of how the process of involuting ones attention onto ones action destroys the inner structure of the action (the intention and meaning). The normal role of action, OS argues, is circumspect. Circumspection engages with a dynamic ready-to-hand world in a different way to that which occurs when we are observing the world. In the latter case the world is a static world of present-at-hand events. OS uses the example of watching ones hand while throwing a ball at a target. The moving hand is thus transformed from a dynamic instrument, dynamically connected to a target, to a passive entity to be explored with an interrogative attitude. In the ethical mode of the imperative mood, the dynamical world containing the dynamically moving hand is both intentional and laden with meaning. This dynamical world is a world of action governed by imperatives, e.g. "The road up the hill is the road leading to the Professors house" and the same road (according to logos) leading down the hill is the road leading to the policeman's house. OS uses the example of the imperative "Pick me!" guiding the hand toward the orange.

The world of the observer, on the other hand, is a world that is being questioned, rather than being forced to respond to a knowing intervention. The world of the observer is a world in which we are wondering where this road up leads, and where this road down leads. If, OS argues, in the midst of the action of reaching for the orange, I begin to observe my hand in motion, the unity of the world collapses into two present at hand objects--the hand and the orange (no longer tied together by an intention). The knowledge that I was going to pick the orange dissipates and the meaning of the movement becomes unclear, until the attitude of exploration dissipates in confusion and the intention is renewed, thus renewing the unity of the hand and the orange.

As an observer watching someone else act, I wonder if his hand is moving toward the orange hanging on the tree. The hand and the orange remain unconnected categorically but there may well be a postulated hypothetical

connection awaiting confirmation, at the terminus of the movement. This is not the dynamical categorical world in which the agent is imposing a form upon the world motivated by the knowledge of what he wants to do. In the case of observing someone else, I do not even know whether they want the orange. In this case I impose a number of hypotheticals on the world and await their verification/falsification. OS asks whether in the case of involuting my attention upon my own hand in an interrogative manner, I have lost the will to act, or whether I have merely lost my orientation toward the object. Obviously I still want the orange so neither of these are true. It is rather, OS insists, that I am in this case trying to do two things at once and the difficulty is that I am one person and not two, and the different attitudes demand the agent to engage totally in accordance with them. I cannot both circumspectively act, and observe hypothetically at the same time, OS argues. The hypothetical and categorical attitudes are logically distinct in that they both require the active presence of the personality--both attitudes give rise to different intentions. If one does try to do both of these things at the same time the result OS argues is a dispersal of the self. On Aristotelian principles, observing one's actions then becomes impossible, because there is no one enduring self throughout the change from active agency to the more passive activity of observation.

The major problem with a reliance upon first person reports of intentions, beliefs, desires etc is the Freudian problem. Under certain circumstances, perhaps because of a certain causal history, the mind may not be conscious of these intentions, desires or beliefs. If this is the case we are forced to rely on third person hypothetical reports which are embedded in a matrix of substance, causation and event and the method of observation in contexts of exploration/discovery. In so doing we marginalise the third person attitudes connected to "reading" or "interpreting" (marginalise substances interacting causing and being caused by events but prioritise changes involving agents, actions, beliefs and desires embedded in a life-world). Here, the reading and interpreting will involve an explorative hypothetical attitude, and a "logic of probability". An enduring agent is the Aristotelian necessary condition of understanding the change that is occurring in this human life-world. Kant in his account of ethical action guided by the categorical imperative adds another a priori element that demands practical action toward each other in the spirit of treating each other as ends-in-themselves---in the spirit of respect.

A problem occurs, however, in the interpretation of particular action-situations in which it is difficult to conceptualise the action I am witnessing. In such a context of exploration we need to use powers of observation and the testing of hypotheses to establish the intentions, desires and beliefs of the agent. Yet even in such cases I am a priori aware that the agent is attempting to make something true, and establish some form of the good in the world, even if it is

egocentrically connected to his own life-world. Sometimes, in circumstances where the agent does not have full control of his intentions, desires, and beliefs, the "motives" of the agent may only become apparent via the use of special Freudian techniques, e.g. free association, analysis of transference relations, Freudian slips, or the interpretation of dreams, symptoms etc. OS claims that in such circumstances the Cartesian thesis of consciousness being transparent to itself does not hold.

One of OS's theoretical goals is to integrate the Cartesian and Freudian theories into one account. Freud, OS argues, has definitely proved that in certain circumstances there is no privileged access to one's own mental world that is "infallibly guaranteed" (Vol 2, P.75). OS categorises 4 types of mental phenomena (forgettings, motives, pains, and mental images) and on the basis of this categorisation claims that a limited form of Cartesianism must be true. Forgettings dwell in the Freudian unconscious and motives too can be forgotten (as can beliefs, desires and intentions). Pains can both elude consciousness and be brought into consciousness. Bodily sensations obviously cause conscious knowledge of themselves under certain conditions, e.g. sanity, and wakefulness. The marginalisation of pain from conscious awareness also obviously requires special conditions. All of these facts enable us to construe sensations as a type of phenomenon that definitely falls into the Cartesian category of translucence. This reasoning also applies to some tryings but here too there are qualifying conditions, e.g. wakefulness. Now trying to open a door is not an interior event in the mind given that it is occurring (in space) in the vicinity of my arms and hands, and thus (when successful) has universal and sufficient and necessary psychological truth-conditions. It is, OS argues, however, unlikely that we will ever be able to provide a full list of these truth conditions given the differences that exist between individuals, species, and forms of life in general. These conditions can however be condensed into the following formula:

"the immediate active event effect of a desire to act. It is the will moving in a certain direction."²⁸

This applies over a whole range of types of action including basic act striving, instrumental strivings and sub intentional basic act strivings (e.g. seemingly idle tongue movement).

OS continues to insist, however, that we can without confusion identify an act with an event (P.127). The argument OS provides for this position appears to be "grammatical". He claims that acts are often singled out by event terms, e.g. swimming, lifting, murder, rape, etc (P.128) but it is still not clear that we can "perform" an event of swimming or that an event can be linked to the power of agency. Events appear to be more akin to states of affairs than the active bringing about of change in the world. Can an event support a moral property

such as "wicked"? Surely moral principles apply only to actings, e.g. "So act...")?

OS claims that:

"All action necessarily have mental causes. (P.133)

But is a reason for doing X, a cause? The Greek word for cause is "aitia", which is often translated as "explanation". Explanation, however, can take 4 different forms for Aristotle, the primary form of which is "the principle" constituting the phenomenon. The issue being discussed here, of course, is that of the ontological status of events and actions, and perhaps also that of the ontological status of events and mental activity. The discussion becomes more convoluted when OS claims that physical action is "the most primitive manifestation of consciousness" (P.134) along with three other items, namely perception, desire, and belief. Now these three latter items are clearly psychological, which in OS's mind raises the question as to whether, in dealing with physical action, we are dealing with something that belongs to the **category** of the psychological. OS maintains that we can see the above quartet of terms at play in the phenomenon of a crab moving along the sand on a beach. We see, he argues, the crab striving and giving expression to desire. OS has no hesitation in attributing consciousness to this form of life. Could we then argue that the crab possesses a primitive ego? OS does not say. Perhaps Aristotle may have agreed to the use of the term consciousness for such a form of life (Psuche)? Certainly Descartes's denial of the pain and suffering of animals on the ground of them being mere "mechanisms" is questionable. The crab when kicked does not of course squeal like the dog kicked in the presence of Pythagoras, so it does not give "voice" to its suffering, but perhaps its struggles suffice to convince us that it does not want the pain we are inflicting upon it--it wills to carry on expressing its desires.

The counterargument to the claim that actions are psychological, involves reducing action to the same category of biological events as digestion and this for OS is inconceivable. For Aristotle there is a hierarchy of life-forms which are embedded in one another. The functions constitutive of these life-forms are nutrition, reproduction, sensation (including the feeling of pleasure and pain), movement, memory, imagination, and reason. When all of these functions are present in one life-form, the result is also expressed in terms of a particular constellation of limbs and organs. The human form of life is obviously the most complex life-form because it integrates all of the above functions into one unity. There is therefore a hierarchy of functions such that "soul" is the actualised potentiality, or first actuality of the living body. The exercise of "soul" is a further actualisation of a potentiality or a second-level actuality. So a man who is asleep possesses a soul but is not actualising a potentiality. In the state of sleep, the human psuche most resembles the lowest plant-like form of psuche.

The distinguishing potentialities and actualities that differentiate man from all other life-forms are the power of discourse and the power of rationality. These are connected to the power of thought which contains intellectual principles. Thought, according to Plato and Aristotle, is entirely independent of any physical substrate such as a physical body, and it only comes into existence in actual thinking activity. It is in thought that we grasp the essence of what we are thinking about. Mind, on such an account, is independent of any material substance. The soul, however, according to Aristotle, is intimately connected to both particular memories and particular images from the imagination. This is, for example, evidenced by geometrical images which are used in our reasoning about shapes in space. Geometrical reasoning seeks to establish relationships between images. For Aristotle too, then, reason, when conceptualising, is blind without the presence of intuition.

For Freud, the interpenetration of practical powers was connected to three principles which are recognisably Aristotelian: ERP, PPP, RP. The Reality Principle (RP) covers both the first principles of nature and the first principles of morality. There is, however, in spite of the integration and interpenetration of these powers, a recognisable hierarchy that ends in the rational ideals of Truth and The Good. Reducing the rational ideal of The Good (an a priori of action, according to Aristotle) to a biological event like digestion is, as OS claims, inconceivable, but it does nevertheless seem easier to conceptualise digestion as an event. It is less easy to conceptualise thinking in this way, as an event that self-initiates, because thinking is nothing until there is an act of thinking. Does the crab scuttling across the sand, think? Does it have a will? It is not capable of discourse or reason, and might this difference suffice to differentiate the crab from the human life-form? Is the behaviour we observe sufficient for an attribution of consciousness? The crab is certainly alive and functioning in accordance with the ERP and PPP but does it possess the psychical power to act for the ideal of the Good? Can it make something true by acting? More exploration of these questions is required. When the crab remains still for a long period, is it awake or asleep?

Aristotle had this discussion in relation to fish, and decided that when it was dark and the fish remained still for a long period of time, the fish were probably asleep. Many of Aristotle's critics jested at this judgement and asked what grounds there were for saying such a thing. Subsequent evidence from fishermen proved him correct. So perhaps if a crab sleeps during the night and comes back to consciousness when it is light, we can attribute consciousness to the crab? Other questions also arise in the light of this discussion, e.g. if there are forms of life, are there forms of consciousness? Certainly possessing the power of thought could suffice to make perception, desire, intention, and action more complex powers but is the difference we discover one of degree or a

difference in kind? If the crab lacks thought, how far down the hierarchy of powers must we descend before we arrive at the highest power of it's being? Does a crab remember its hunts and when it gets old, does it forget them? Aristotle clearly conceived of a chain of being that included a complex continuum of life forms. If a crab can "remember" things does this occur as a content of its stream of consciousness? If so, is this content best conceived of as an event, or as an act? Sensations, we know would seem to be the most likely occupants of such a stream. For us humans, on the other hand, we can be at one end of the continuum when we sleep, and at the other end when we philosophise about the human psyche. The question that remains hanging in the air, however, is "How ought we to characterise action?": as involving mental activity, (perception, intention, belief and desire) and physical movement linked into the unity of an action? Or as something primarily mental and psychological?

OS wishes to demarcate the psychological in terms of a lower realm of mentality containing sensations and sub intentional activity, and a higher realm that he designates as "mental": a realm that contains thoughts, listenings etc. (P.148). I can notice sensations occurring in the lower of realm of mentality but not in the higher realm, i.e. I cannot notice my thoughts and mental images.

Perhaps the key issue to raise in any attempt to establish the ontological status of action, is related to the idea of the body which we have in our minds. Mental activity such as tryings to remember, and forgettings, are obviously in the realm of the mental (a higher realm than the psychological non-mental realm). Bodily action may then be placed in the psychological non-mental realm. If, as OS claims, all physical tryings are actions, and if we have the same kind of epistemological relation (of knowing) to them, then perhaps there is no doubt that physical actions are psychological non mental activities. This realm of the psychological is not physically confined to the substrate of the brain but can be extended to the limbs of the body and its outer skin and tissue covering. The organs of the body, however, do not fall into the realm of the psychological but must rather be construed as material and efficient causes of "the psychological". They will therefore play a role in sub-intentional and intentional limb and tongue movements. Reflexive arm-raise due to muscle spasms fall within the scope of the ERP but outside the scope of the will. As a consequence of such spasms the connection of pain with the spasm must however be some kind of necessary connection. OS argues that the mental realm is independent of causal laws relating events. On this account phenomena such as belief are holistically related to the contents of the mind (P.217). This, however, creates difficulties in accounting for Freudian phenomena such as hysteria in which a patient can in fact lose sensation in his limbs or alternatively feel pains where there are none. OS makes the following Freudian claim:

"The hysterical symptom is a disturbance of that part of the ego-function that relates to the sub mental (psychological non mental) part of the mind. This is so even though the trouble lies, not in the "frontier post" (of the body) itself but in the sector of the mental that links the "frontier post" with the Mental receptor centre that is geared specifically to the frontier.....for hysterical symptoms are the fruits of attacks on the thinking ego-function."²⁹

Examination of the paralysed limbs or painful area reveals no physical ailment. OS's theory, then, is that hysteria is a mental non psychological dysfunction. This would justify the Feudian technique of the talking cure over any purely physical treatment. This is also a good illustration of OS's thesis that the "mind has a body" (P.222), and this fact in turn illustrates how the past evolutionary history of homo sapiens has left its traces in the system of the human mind.

In a section entitled, "The Evolutionary History of the Self-Conscious Mind", OS charts the developmental of that part of the mind he calls the "Mental". First, he claims, there was a physical universe out of which life emerged. OS is a physicalist, and life for him, is a matter of brute fact: an organisation of the materials of this physical universe (e.g. carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur phosphate and a few trace metals). The next momentous ontological differentiation occurred in later forms of life when the brain differentiated itself from the rest of the lived body and perhaps changed its function. This in turn led to the self conscious form of life:

"and with it the coming into being of rational general modal concept dependent truth sensitive thought, i.e. of anything really worthy of the title thought"³⁰

We are not informed of the roles of discourse and language in this actualisation-process. For this we may need to turn to Psychologists like Julian Jaynes.

Language, Jaynes argues began as an expressive phenomenon partly connected to events of importance in the external world (e.g. hunting and gathering). By a charted series of functions, this developmental sequence eventually reaches the level of representative thought in which we find the names for animals developing into a more complex stage in which names are given to individual people. At this stage it would be fair to say that we are definitely thinking something. As group life evolved we then find language evolving into more complex forms via the use of sentences with subject-predicate structures which illustrate the fully mental power of thinking something about something, which Heidegger called the veritative (truth-making) synthesis. This, however, is not the final level of the Mental which is achieved only when the principles of Logic and Truth tables begin to constitute and regulate the field of sound argumentation--the field of rationality. These higher mental operations are undoubtedly inhabitants of the realm of the mental being essentially connected to the telos of self-conscious thought.

When such a form of thought begins to operate in practical reasoning about the maxim of actions and an ought-system of concepts and principles begin to be formed, we are then dealing with another form of higher mental process. The Greek/Socratic idea of defining thinking in terms of "talking to oneself" belongs in this arena of higher mental activities. In the case of the Kantian ideal of the universalisable maxim, we are obviously dealing with **"arguing with oneself"** in the initial actualising processes of embracing the moral law, e.g. "Promises ought to be kept, I promised Jill I would pay back the money I owed her, Therefore I ought to pay Jill..."

In the above example "Promises ought to be kept" is a universalised maxim that holds necessarily of all promises made. It is of course a generally known fact that not everyone who makes a promise with good intentions, fulfils the promise made. This is not, however, a universal fact. Just because it is a fact does not prevent anyone from adopting a critical position in relation to this fact, and arriving at the universalisable maxim **"Promises ought to be kept."** OS, however, continues to insist upon using the terminology of "event" and "cause" to determine the essence of the realm of "the psychological" but it is not clear whether appeal to material and efficient causation is enough to satisfy the logical demands the principle of sufficient reason makes upon the argumentation we encounter in such investigations. Whether we, in fact, on every particular occasion, reason in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is, of course, irrelevant. Anyone that fails to do so is still subject to the criticism that one ought to organise ones life and arguments rationally (lead the examined life).

The question of Mental Causality is in fact taken up at the end of volume two of OS's work on the Will. OS provides us with a description of what he calls the causal sequence involved in action:

"A particular act-desire springs up in a man. Whereupon he begins to wonder whether to perform the act. He engages in a procedure of trying to decide whether to do so, which necessitates reaching a decision on some matter of fact. Then the instant in which resolution of his factual uncertainty occurs, is the instance in which a certain intention takes up residence in his mind. Now the instance in which he judges the time ripe for the expression of that intention, is the instant in which both the intention and the act-desire begin expressing themselves: and their expression consists in a striving. Finally, the process of striving is one that in the body tends naturally to lead to the occurrence of the willed event. Then most of these phenomena stand in a causal, and for the most part mental causal, relation to one another."³¹

The argument above is curiously circular. He claims that all that is required of the connection between phenomena in the mind, is that they not be mediated causally by non-mental events or states. This, he claims, is in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. Yet this is clearly not a sufficient reason for

the application of the category of actuality to an area of reality defined by the category of potentiality. OS goes on to claim that the relation between phenomena in the mind possess "certain peculiarities" (P.291). Now it is true that we experience mental phenomena as they occur in time in terms of before and after, but do we also experience a causal relation?

Hume's argument certainly appears more appropriate here than it does in the case of one billiard ball causing another to move into the pocket of the table. Aristotelian argument explains this mental phenomena relation in terms of formal and final causes in the context of the category of potentiality. The reason we give for our actions in both instrumental and ethical cases, is given in the form of ought-premises in an argument structure, but the whole experience may well need all 4 types of Aristotelian explanation, if the principle of sufficient reason is applied. In such a case the sole appeal to the material and efficient explanations or conditions will not provide us with a complete explanation for the relation between the agent and his reasons for acting. In such an explanation we might find ourselves talking about an actuality that is an actualising of a potentiality.

The future state of affairs contained in the formulation of the intention also supports this account. Beliefs are also held for reasons, and these can also be characterised in terms of a syllogism that presents the concluding belief as a justified true belief. I can, that is, have a good reason for believing that every event has "a cause", but the reason for believing that not every action, desire, and intention are events, may lie, not in the realm of theoretical reason, but rather practical reason as defined by Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy. This issue, namely, concerns the principle of sufficient reason related to both the ideals of "The Truth" and "The Good".

OS defines action in terms of striving for an act fulfilment and this, on Hylomorphic and Critical accounts, places any such definition in the arena of the actualisation of a potentiality. He then claims that striving is an expression of act-desire and this, he further claims, is a psychic force. Now, no one will deny that desire is a power we possess, a potential that under certain circumstances can be actualised, but perhaps the only reason for using the term "force" may be connected with the categorical requirements of the matrix of actuality, substance, causation, and event. If we focus upon the moment of making up ones mind as to whether to do X or not, the question arises of whether it may be preferable to use the matrix of potentiality, agency, power, action/activity.

OS claims that Will takes a back seat in the process of the forming of cognitive attitudes (ratiocinative activity) such as the forming of a belief. It can be argued that this is an act for which one is required to take responsibility, and thus is

further strengthened by the claim of practical reasoning that universalised ought premises are not statements of universal fact but rather statements of law: normative, prescriptive statements. OS refers to the process of actualising the potential practical rationality of the agent as "cognitive crystallisation", again using a physical inorganic process to model psychic processes. This in turn invites mechanistic descriptions/explanations. We are, of course, not denying that where the issue is a physical one, and the intention is to view a series of phenomena under the aspect of "The True", reference to material and efficient explanations is necessary. The same phenomena, however, can be thought of under the aspect of "The Good", i.e. is crystallisation a "good" thing. What we must not do, however, is to confuse the one aspect with the other.

OS discusses the case of a juror deciding whether to cast the vote of guilty on the base of evidence produced in the course of a trial. He claims that the making up of the jurors mind on the basis of the facts, and the deciding to vote guilty are identical enterprises. (P.300) Are they? We raise a doubt here because it seems as if even if it is difficult to separate these two aspects of this enterprise, the mere fact that the separation makes sense, indicates that there is a difference to be considered here. Aristotle would claim in relation to this case, that two different powers or functions of the mind are involved: firstly, calculating whether evidence falls under the law in an act of conceptualisation of the evidence, and secondly, whether the juror is doing the right thing in voting guilty.

This latter feature of the activity may involve knowledge of oneself and, for example, ones prejudices against the defendant. OS softens his position somewhat by referring to the two different aspects as "milestones" along the same road, because the completion of the calculation as to whether the defendant is guilty is the onset of an intention-state (P.301). The whole discussion becomes murkier when OS then claims that we ought to characterise deciding to do X as an activity. Deciding is a process. Processes have beginnings and endings where the end comes after the beginning in time. If there is one thing remaining the same at the beginning and at the end throughout the changing process, it is the presence, namely, of the agent that is engaging in the process of deciding what the argument is.

In the concrete case of the juror presented by OS, it is difficult not to understand that what is at stake in this decision-process is the dignity and worth of both the juror and the defendant (even if he is guilty--he is still potentially rational). The moment of the forming of the intention after the completion of the process of deciding what to do, e.g. vote "Guilty", is a mental "phenomenon", that is preparing to make an entrance into the physical world in the form of an action. This action will of course actualise the intention practically, and also make it

true that one juror voted "guilty". OS asks the aporetic question "What is an intention?" (P.305) and considers three alternatives: an un-analysable psychological entity, an analysable psychological entity, or a mere combination of psychological entities.

OS asks in relation to these alternatives whether intention, for example, ought to be analysed into the components of belief and desire or whether these two entities are merely combinations in the complex of intention---the belief sorting under one heading and the desire sorting under another. Again, it is not clear whether this kind of substantive analysis is situated in the appropriate conceptual system. Is the forming of an intention by an agent a substantial event?--- a qualitative transformation of a thought process, or is it rather the result of an actualisation of a potential connected to a number of powers of a rational animal capable of discourse? P.M.S. Hacker in his work "Human Nature: A Categorical Framework" would not necessarily agree to the above form of analysis because Agency and Powers for him are situated in a framework of potentiality best explained in terms of hylomorphic powers:

"To say that a human being moved his limb is to subsume behaviour under the category of action. It earmarks behaviour as being of a kind that is in general under voluntary control, as something of a kind which a sentient agent can choose to do or not to do and hence indicates the propriety of asking whether there is an intentionalist explanation of the deed. The attribution of the movement to the agent is not causal."³²

Action, for Hacker, require teleological explanations situated in a web of ought judgements. He appeals to two-way powers in the account he provides. There is no doubt that the statement "his arm rose" is a statement about an event because the implication present is that he did not intentionally or voluntarily raise his arm. An action is not being referred to in this statement--rather it is something which happened that was not under his control--not within his power. The powers referred to in this example are not substantial, causal, functional forces, but rather related to purposes requiring teleological forms of explanation. Hacker clearly relates purposes and teleology:

"Only living beings and things related in various ways to living beings have a purpose. Teleology is accordingly at home in the sciences of life, a study of living beings and their forms of life, and in the study of man and his works."³³

Both discourse and rationality as it occurs in discourse and the arena of judgement are, of course, primary purposes for the rational animal capable of discourse, in spite of the fact that the instinctive/reflexive behaviour of the animal part of our nature can also be actualised on occasions when rationality and the power of discourse fail to regulate or sublimate these tendencies. The goods involved with these primary purposes differ, of course, from the more biological "goods" of nutrition and reproduction. The telos of human nature

involves so much more and reaches into the realms of both the psychological and the mental as conceived by OS. Rationality in the works of man requires cultivation in the soil of a Culture, where knowledge of ones world and ones self are important and dignified achievements. The summum bonum of a life, according to both Aristotle and Kant, is connected to knowledge and the ideal of Reason that makes one worthy of the happiness one hopes will follow from leading a flourishing life. Asking of events, what they are good for, is likely to confuse many issues, simply because whilst Kant might agree that conceptualising actions as events is theoretically possible, the consequences of such an activity would never satisfy the completeness demanded by the principle of sufficient reason:

"As regards the absolute totality of the ground if explanation of a series of these causes, such totality need suggest no difficulty in respect of natural existents; since these existences are nothing but appearances, we need never look to them for any kind of completeness in the synthesis of the series of conditions."³⁴

Kant goes on to argue that practical reason insofar as the idea of the freedom of the will is concerned, does not seek for the laws of nature determining that which happens (events) but rather it:

"provides laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to happen--although perhaps it never does happen--therein differing from laws of nature which relate only to that which happens."³⁵

For Kant, then, there is a clear logical distinction to be drawn between the uses of reason that respectively answer the questions, "What can I know?" and "What ought I to do?". Kant furthermore states that in relation to this latter question and the follow-up question "What can I hope for?", knowledge is attributable to those that hope. All hoping is directed at happiness, Kant argues, and is connected in turn to a law of morality that determines the dignity and worth of the agent concerned. This position refers back to the ancient Socratic account: an account which demanded of justice that we ought to get what we deserve in our lives. Kant aligns himself with this position unequivocally. The formulation of maxims during ones life, whilst aiming at happiness, can only hope for thus consequence on the grounds of having done ones duty when it was required.

Paul Ricoeur using a hermenutical/phenomenological approach, defines human existence in terms of a desire to be and an effort to exist, and here too, we encounter a refusal to reduce mental phenomena to mental events. In a work entitled "Memory, History, Forgetting" (trans Blamey, K., and Pellauer, D., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004), Ricoeur analyses mental phenomena into the act (the noesis) and the intentional correlate (the noema) (P.3). Ricoeur points out that the Greeks had two words for memory correlated with firstly, passively remembering something (mneme) and secondly actively

recalling, recollecting (anamnesis). In this latter case a necessary question relating to an agent (Who?) must be answered. This follows the Kantian line in relation to the conceptualisation of action in the light of practical reasoning. The key question for Kant related to whether the agent involved is a worthy man, an end-in-himself.

For Aristotle *aitia*, or "cause" was a formal kind of explanation that responded to the question as to why something is as it is. Sometimes the cause of the change being explained is a physical mover or a substance--but even in such situations the context is one of explanation/justification and not a more concrete context of exploration/discovery. When, on the other hand, the question "Why?" is directed at human activity, what is being asked for, is instead "that for the sake of which" the activity in question occurred. It is also clear insofar as Aristotle is concerned that one and the same phenomenon will have several different complementary explanations. If a mental event is categorically a state of mind then, Hacker would claim, that neither belief nor desire are states, and he would also maintain that neither of these items could be identified with brain states.

OS persists on his physicalist course when he insists that the intending of something "causes" the belief in that something. Certainly there is a sense in which the intending of X entails the belief in this X. The defence of his causal claim appeals to the Cartesian cogito, and OS states that were it not for the state of mind I am in here and now, I would not here and now, know that I exist. The appeal is to facts, such as that the state of consciousness I find myself in here and now, could in fact be removed by the blow of a hammer to the head.

When Freud spoke of Consciousness as a Vicissitude of Instinct he was, of course, not implying that consciousness is a particular concrete event, but was rather attempting to provide us with part of an essence-specifying definition. The question also arises in this context as to whether Descartes was attempting to give an account of consciousness as experienced here and now at a particular moment, or whether he was attempting to characterise it in more universal terms. It would appear that Descartes must be committed to the proposition "everything that thinks knows that it exists". Kant too, in his account of the "I think" is not referring to a particular "I" but rather the universal act of apperception, which is a power all rational animals capable of discourse possess: a power, moreover, that will play an important role in actualising the potentiality of rationality in such a being.

Now nothing that has been said contains an objection to the relation of mutual entailment that OS insists holds between action, intention, desire, and belief. What has been claimed is that this logical relation requires a practical architectonic of concepts and principles which orbit about the basic term "Action". The premises of arguments generated in this architectonic are, of

course, ought-premises (in the major premise and the conclusion). Later in Volume two of his work on the Will, OS specifically denies that intention is an event, and claims that it is a state which endures, and is directed towards performing a particular act--although he also later maintains that this "enduring intention can be replaced by another intention" (P.310). What is missing from the above architectonic account is the necessary attribution of the intention to an agent: for surely if one intention can evolve into another that is not logically or conceptually connected, the only enduring thing in this process of change must be the agent. The language of causation is still present on P.318 when OS maintains that it is the agents reasons that cause him to intend to do X. It is also clear from the above reasoning that OS reifies the intention into a substantialised supervising agency, and in this context he once again declares the intention to be a higher order mental state that is caused by its reasons. For OS it is this agency, rather than the "person" (Hacker) that is endowed with the power of reason to cause action (P.320). Hacker would claim this reasoning to be an example of what he called the mereological fallacy--the fallacy of attributing to a part a property that is only true of the whole.

OS, in some respects, shares the concerns of Ricoeur's account of existence, defined in terms of the desire to be and the effort to exist:

"Therefore both the "active" genus of which intentional action is a species and the very forces (of desire) which bring them into being, in the final analysis owe their being to the item they encompass and engender, viz, intentional action...it is only because such a life-enhancing phenomenon as intentional action came to be that desire and will came to be, i.e. "selection" reveals their roles in nature."³⁶

OS goes on to argue that the having of needs and the organisms response to these needs is a primary phenomenon, and will and desire are the psychic representations of these life-fulfilling needs. He also argues that the use of knowledge is what lifted will and desire out of the matrix of primitive need, and elaborated need as a higher order phenomenon. Consciousness also played a role, standing as it does at the threshold of higher order psychological phenomena. In his "causal" discussion of these phenomena OS resorts to the idea of statistical significance. This discussion is only possible on the condition of events becoming once again the focus of the discussion: intention, it is argued is a statistically given power", whatever that is.

At the end of Volume two OS presents himself less as a physicalist and more as a dualist in his discussion of the mind-body problem and its relation to two levels of being. This context permits the mind-body relation to become a causal relation(P.332). Two domains are tied together via a nomic bond that somehow forms an entailment relation.

OS discusses the phenomenon of "paralysis of the will" and claims that we have no reason for believing in the phenomenon, but we do know that anxiety can have curious effects on the Will. He speaks of anxiety affecting both the will and the spirit of a man. Anxiety causes us to abandon projects (P.338) but it does not directly effect the will. It affects the will via affecting desire (a chain reaction). Self-determination is also discussed in relation to agency and OS insists that desire cannot alone play a role in this state of affairs, since desires happen to one--one suffers from ones appetites and primitive passions. This is the reason why desire is characterised as both an event and a force. Desires can however be what Freud called ego-enhancing (P.345) but it is on OS's account part of a causal event chain running from one end of a continuum to another across several domains.

Notes to Chapter 9

¹*The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory*, O Shaughnessy, B., (Cambridge, CUP, 1980)

² Ibid. P. XXXV

³ Ibid. P.XXXVI

⁴ *Being and Time*, Heidegger, M., Trans Macquarrie J., and Robinson E., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, P.160-1)

⁵Ibid. P.193

⁶ Ibid.P.22

⁷ Ibid.P.32

⁸ Ibid. P.33

⁹*A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, Emotion, Consciousness, and Action*, M., R., D., James (Mauritius, Lambert Academic Press, 2019), P. 115-116

¹⁰*Being and Time*, P.53.

¹¹ Ibid. P.56

¹² Ibid. P.62

¹³ Ibid. P.62

¹⁴ *Consciousness and the World* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000) P.204-5.

¹⁵ *Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Nature*, Trans Elington J, (Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing, 1985), P.211

¹⁶ *Being and Time*, P.215

¹⁷ *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty, M., Trans Smith, C., (London, Routledge, 1962) P.64-5

¹⁸ Ibid. P.64-5

¹⁹ *The Will*, P. XLV

²⁰ Ibid. P.19

²¹ Ibid. P.78

²² *Consciousness and the World*, P.170-171

²³ *Kant's Critique of Judgement*, P.167

²⁴ *Critique of Judgement*, P.175

²⁵ *The Will: a Dual Aspect theory*, Vol 2, P.4

²⁶ Ibid. P.6

²⁷ Ibid. P.15

²⁸ Ibid. P.115

²⁹ Ibid. P.219

³⁰ Ibid. P. 231

³¹ Ibid. P.289

³² *Human Nature: A Categorical Framework*, P.158

³³ Ibid. P.169

³⁴*Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans Kemp Smith N, (London, Macmillan, 1963, A 773, B801)

³⁵ Ibid. A802, B830

³⁶*The Will*, P.323.

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Chapter 10: (O'Shaughnessy) The Metaphysics of Consciousness

When Psychology separated itself off from Philosophy in 1870, the major articles of divorce concerned methodology and the scope and limits of Psychological Theory. In Germany the focus was on structuralism and the search for basic structures, but in the USA, William James embraced the opposing position of Functionalism based on a concept of "pure experience" and what he called "The pragmatic method". Wundt, the Structuralist, settled for the definition of Psychology as "The Science of Consciousness" whilst James was moving away from the experimental method of Science and the structuralist substantive idea of Consciousness. Pragmatism and "Radical Empiricism" were the tools James was using in his attempt to establish "experience" as the foundation stone of all psychological theorising. His definition of Psychology was: "The Science of Mental Life, its phenomena and conditions".

This definition, given a broad conception of Science, might have been one which both hylo-morphic (Aristotelian) and critical (Kantian) Philosophers alike may have accepted as a starting point for their anthropological reflections. James was also very aware of the research that was occurring on the Continent of Europe and he was eager to connect the threads of many theories together under the heading of "Principles of Psychology". His empiricism was radical because it refused to rest upon a theory of Humean and Lockean ideas and impressions being connected together by the "mechanism" of association, preferring instead to search for the conditions of a functional phenomenon such as memory.

Radical Empiricism also dismisses spiritual reifications of the soul that regard the soul as a substance manifesting the presence of various faculties such as Memory. One of the conditions of the function of memory results in the claim that, firstly, the senses must be affected in some way and in turn, secondly, affect the functioning of the brain. This reminds us of the Freudian Scientific Project in which one system of neurones (phi-system) does not change in the process of innervation, and another system of neurones (psi-system) in which neurones **are** chemically changed in the process of innervation (e.g. in memory). The latter system is connected with the preconscious memory system that records the effects of learning in the neurone system.

The Psychologist, James argues, in the spirit of the early Freud, must be a nerve **physiologist**. James also notes in this context that when mental states are conditioned by bodily processes, the investigation of this must lead back to the body and its activity, perhaps to the phenomenon of voluntary deliberate action. The mechanical explanation of the movement of inorganic objects such as iron filings toward a strong magnet differs from explanations for living movement which are, James suggests, more complex. Romeo, James argues, is an example

of a living organism that possesses a mental life. When in the course of this short life he chooses to overcome all obstacles in the way of his love for Juliet, he is exercising a freedom and intelligence that cannot be found in the determinate relation between the iron filings and magnet. James then proposes a criterion for the identification of organisms possessing a mental life:

"The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment."¹

Mechanical motions of course have no purpose in the sense of possessing the ability to choose between alternative ends or alternative means. A magnet cannot choose **not to** attract the iron filings. Whether this is due to the absence of agency or the absence of the right kind of principle or both is, of course a matter for conjecture. It is doubtful whether the magnet would ever feature in a Shakespearean tragedy as Romeo does. Romeo's powers quite simply obey principles that we expect of an intelligent rational living being. His experiences are composed of doings and undergoings, and they are organised in an architectonic of plot and character determined by Actions and their Reasons, rather than substances (magnets and iron filings) and their transformations and changes.

James claims that Consciousness is necessary for the learning of intelligent performances which can then subsequently become pre-conscious and wait for activation by Conscious choice. He uses the example of an experiment on a hemisphere-less frog to illustrate the difference between spontaneous selection of ends and means, and mechanical movement. He then links the hemispheres of the brain to the "representations" of muscles at different levels in a hierarchically organised nervous system. In this system the spinal cord is involved in reflexive defensive activity and the hemispheres are the arena for bundles of sensory-motor representations. There is no direct reference to principles organising either the reflexive or the spontaneous activity, but the description of the various functions of the nervous system certainly imply the operation of both constitutive and regulative principles.

Agency is not an idea or category that one can easily attribute to the brain, but it certainly is significant in the attribution of understanding, reasoning, and rationality to the doings and undergoings of a human being. Attempting to locate these "spontaneous" powers in a physical location such as a brain, risks committing to what P.M.S. Hacker called "the mereological fallacy": claiming that what is true of the whole is also true of the part of the whole.

James does, however, specifically claim that the hemispheres of the brain are the physical location for consciousness--a different kind of claim that ought to be seriously considered. In his discussion of the issue "Does Consciousness exist?"² James questions the wisdom of characterising consciousness as a substantial

entity, and recommends instead that we characterise it as a "function". Instead, we should regard what he calls "pure experience" as the substance of knowing and thinking. This "substance" when taken in the context of one set of associates will provide us with the thing known, and when taken in another set of associates, provides us with the consciousness of the knower. To illustrate his thesis, James uses the analogy of paint separated from a painting--lying ready for purchase in a paint shop. This paint when purchased and applied to the canvas in relation to other paint is used to represent objects two dimensionally: when thus used, the spiritual function of the painting is created(P.9) This is reminiscent of hylomorphic accounts of art, and whilst James continues to appeal to "pure experience" as the substance involved in this activity there is, paradoxically, no appeal to "Principles" in this account. A surprising omission given the fact that James was the author the of the work "Principles of Psychology". An incipient dualism emerges, however, in the following:

"If the reader will take his own experiences he will see what I mean. Let him begin with perceptual experience, the "presentation" so called of a physical object, his actual field of vision, the room he sits in with the book he is reading as its centre: and let him for the present treat this complex object in the common sense way as being "really" what it seems to be, a collection of physical things cut out from an environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the same time it is just these self same things which his mind, as we say, perceives: and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus's time downwards has just been one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a persons mind. The puzzle of how one identical room can be on two lines. It can, if it be situated at their intersection."³

The two lines referred to above, represent the personal biography of the reader of the book in the room, and the physical history of the house, of which the room is a part. James points out the obvious fact that the conscious experience of the book cannot, as such, catch fire, but the actual book can, if the house catches fire and burns down. The personal biography of the reader will include memory of the meanings of the words once learned, and other books that have been read. The house, the room and the physical book, do not possess the power of memory, or the powers of understanding and reason, and these physical objects are not conscious of anything. There certainly seems to be no reason to object to the "common sense" view of the physical world as composed of parts that can be divided up in various ways—ways, which in turn, do not deny the possibility of the conception of a universe as a continuum of mass and energy. All that is needed to sustain such a conception is the scientific assumption that the physical world is a spatio-temporal continuum. Such a conception allows us to characterise doings or actions arranged temporally into the unity of an action. This unity refers to principles behind the formulation of the maxims of such actions. In the above case, the difference between reading the book in the present and the conceptualisation of an action stretching into the future of the

temporal continuum, manifests the difference between the world "seen and felt", and the world thought about in the absence of the thing being thought about. The "knowing" involved in these two alternative scenarios takes a different form. In the former case what we are dealing with is primarily a description of an event in terms of "is-concepts and judgements", and in the latter case the maxims contain principles that are normative and belong in the "ought-system" of concepts. The world seen and felt and the world thought of both constitute, under different aspects, the spatio-temporal continuum of a world whose primary components are percepts, concepts and principles. Indeed James specifically claims in his essay "Does Consciousness exist?" that there is no difference in the degree of certainty involved in an object presently perceived, or an object conceived of in the remembered past or the anticipated future. There is, he mysteriously adds, no transformation of "an object known into a mental state." (P.19)

James criticises the Kantian notion of an "I think" that accompanies all my representations on what appear to be Cartesian grounds, claiming that Kant is attempting to substantialise thought. He does not, however, discuss the role of the Categories or Principles of reason (noncontradiction, sufficient reason) in the organisation of acts of apperception. The Kantian architectonic regards thinking as an Act--something that is done--not an event occurring in the privacy of an individual's mind. Consciousness is involved in the act of apperception that takes the form of discriminating and selecting what should and what should not be subsumed under the concept being formed with the assistance of the Categories of the Understanding and the Principles of Reason. The Aristotelian perspective also disappears in James' radical empiricist approach, especially when appeal is made to the structures and functions of the brain, which he regards as the fundamental condition for the functions of life, consciousness, and mentality (the ontological levels proposed by O'Shaughnessy).

Sensations, James maintains, are related to the functions of the lower centres of the brain whilst perception, memory, and thought appear to be connected to the higher centres and the hemispheres. The motor system located in the frontal lobe hemispheres is represented at all levels of the nervous system. Appetites, and the activity associated with them when connected with desires, memory and our belief system, are all situated in the higher centres of the nervous system. Abstract ends and complex means-end solutions are also situated in the memory-belief systems of rational animals capable of discourse. Even within the scope of this genus, James articulates a hierarchy of human life forms stretching from the tramp living from hour to hour, the bohemian living from day to day, the bachelor building his lonely individual life, the father building for the next generation, and the patriot who builds for whole communities and coming generations. (Principles, P.23). The role, however, of concepts, categories and

principles in this hierarchy of forms is unclear. There is much talk of "currents", "loop-lines", "discharge", "stimulus" and "response", "groupings of sensory-motor elements" in relation to ideas, and memory, and belief systems. The proposed "model" for action initiated by the hemispheres is a reflex model illustrated by the example of a child whose fingers are burned by an attractive candle flame and who subsequently learns to retract his fingers the next time they reach for the flame. The grasping reflex is then inhibited by a sensory memory of the pain and a motor memory of retracting the fingers: both memories are located in the hemispheres.

James also provides us with an empirical account of language with Aristotelian elements:

"Take, for example, the "faculty" of language. It involves in reality a host of distinct powers. We must first have images of concrete things and ideas of abstract qualities and relations: we must first have the memory of words and then the capacity so to associate each idea or image with a particular word, that, when the word is heard, the idea shall henceforth enter our mind. We must conversely, as soon as the idea arises in the mind, associate it with a mental image of the word, and by means of this image we must innervate our articulatory apparatus so as to reproduce the word as physical sound. To read or write a language other elements still must be introduced. But it is plain that the faculty of spoken language alone is so complicated as to call into play almost all the elementary powers which the mind possesses, memory, imagination, association, judgement, and volition."⁴

Many of these elements, e.g. association, memory, imagination are the typical array of powers promoted by empirical theorists, and the powers of understanding and reason are conspicuous by their absence from this account. The principles constituting and regulating this linguistic activity are also absent from the account. On this empirical view, ideas are copies of impressions related via the "mechanism" of association. The "Process" of discrimination, so important for the act of conceptualisation, is also not mentioned. The mimetic aspect of language is referred to, but not its expressive aspect as encountered in contexts of interrogation ("Lo!") or prescription ("So act...!"). It is clear that the mechanism of association arises in connection with an obsession over the naming process and the possible "association" of the parts of brain involved in this process. The claim that a correlate of this process and mechanism both occur at the higher levels of consciousness and mentality, is surely, however, a fallacy of some kind (the fallacy of projecting lower functions onto higher functions?)

Empiricism dogmatically views language in the light of the above obsession with the naming process: logical atomism then becomes the strategy for justifying the dogma. The Wittgensteinian "turn" from a logical approach to meaning towards a more pragmatic approach in which the use of a word becomes crucial in determining its meaning, then becomes a crucial landmark in

the history of modern Philosophy. Wittgenstein, we know read both Freud and William James with considerable interest. The use of a word is more easily connected to agency, action, and the good reasons provided for activity in this domain. The reasons we give for holding a belief are more related to truth and knowledge. A rule in the later Philosophy of Wittgenstein can appear to be a regulative "mechanism" for discourse, and can appear to be a mere "fact", but the fact of the matter is that when we emphasise the normative aspect of rules we then see rules as signposts that we "ought" to follow. We then place rule-following in the grammatical category of imperatives rather than descriptives. There is also a distinction between types of rule ranging from the "mere" mechanical level of exercising a simple skill (The King can only move one square at a time) to the more abstract and complex strategic level (do not leave your Queen exposed). James largely ignores the expressive function of language and its normative role in our communal language-related activities.

In drawing the distinction between the higher and the lower centres James wonders whether the lower centres can possess a primitive form of consciousness. He discusses hypnosis and its implications:

"If there be any consciousness pertaining to the lower centres, it is a consciousness of which the self knows nothing."⁵

This implies a higher thinking capacity located in the hemispheres: one in which knowing is occurring, whether it be the knowing that the King can only move one square at a time, or knowing that is it dangerous to allow ones Queen to become exposed to attack. Both of these knowledge items are learned in a state of consciousness that occurs at a higher level compared to the kind of learning that is occurring when the child learns to inhibit a grasping reflex. Yet we should, in this context, not forget that James' criterion for mentality is pragmatic and related to the pursuance of ends and means and "intelligent action" (P.79).

Consciousness, for James, as it is for O'Shaughnessy (OS), is a power intimately related to Attention, a power that is exercised in the act of apperception. Attention is a voluntary self-initiated activity and James outlines a scenario in which a sequence of acts or what he calls "nervous events" (P.114) are consciously chosen! What actually happens is a consciously chosen beginning of the sequence which then continues subconsciously until the end is reached and consciousness emerges again. The start and the end of the process are, according to James, conducted at a high ideational level. Should anything go wrong in the subconscious section of the sequence, consciousness will emerge and the ideational level will once again regulate what is to be done next, either abandoning the project as a whole or making smaller regulatory adjustments. This suggests that habits (on Freudian theory) occur principally at

the preconscious level (Pcs) and there is a transactional relation with the system of Consciousness (Cs).

In a section entitled "The ethical implications of the law of habit", James points out that habit:

"dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or early choice."⁶

A prophecy of doom, if there ever was one, and a suitable fate for a creature that did not possess ideas of what he was doing and the will or freedom to choose to do something different. The message of the importance of rationally based Freedom was of course an Enlightenment message, but by the time we reach the 20th century this message has been submerged by the instrumentally and technologically minded "new men" for whom literally, "everything was possible". The categorical ethical end of the prescriptive normative idea of "The Good" had been all but lost, and pragmatism and utilitarianism were embraced by many scientists in the spirit of "modernism". The Aristotelian rational end of virtue and the importance of character for the normative task of areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time) had also been marginalised by the time of the Enlightenment, and Kant's attempt to restore categorical ethics in the arena of Philosophy only lasted up to the time when Hegelian and Marxist Philosophy presented itself. Fortunately for us, the above Prophecy of doom is not a categorical prophecy, but merely a hypothetical judgement which presupposes that we continually fail to exercise our powers of understanding and rationality. What is important to note here is that philosophical discussion since Aristotle's hylomorphic shift from epistemological substance to metaphysical principle, has preferred to focus on the former position which obscures the fact that ideas are not merely related to true beliefs but also to normatively structured good beliefs about good actions. Different principles regulate beliefs directed at the Truth, and beliefs directed at The Good. Consciousness plays an equally important role in the learning process involved in the acquisition of concepts and truth-related beliefs, as it does in the learning process connected with actions. In the latter case we are not dealing with habits alone but also with a realm of explanations and justifications that are related to the imperative that has been handed down to us from the Greek oracles, namely "Know thyself!". Both Aristotle and Kant believed that this form of knowledge transcended the scope of any one science and stretches over the domains of theoretical, practical and productive science. The task of Philosophy is then, to coordinate the judgements emanating from these different sciences and arrive at the essence of the self-principle.

James attempted to suggest that Habit plays the part of a principle in ethical life and the following maxim could well have been used as a formula for becoming one of the "new men" of the age, Arendt complained about:

"Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain."⁷

The evaluative, reflective and critical tribunal of *areté* has disappeared and the question as to whether the habits are good, is not even raised. This question, of course, in turn requires an answer to the ethical question that can be raised in relation to the concern about the ethical value of the action: whether, that is, the action is Right. Keeping the flame of will and effort alive appeared to be more important to James than the Kantian absolute of the "good will" or the Aristotelian absolute of "the virtuous man".

Consciousness is, at all levels, for James, an agent of selection driven by its interests and instincts. Ends and means are selected. For James it appears that thinking about an end must always involve conscious ideation unless we are dealing with the subconscious thinking that occurs in a habit. The man who has formed the habit of punching people who disagree with him is of course consciously surprised when he is arrested and tried for his crime. Hopefully the tribunal will install an equivalent tribunal in the judgement system of the defendant: one which will question the wisdom of responding violently in contexts of disagreement. The defendant obviously has a long road to travel on the journey of knowing himself. What has to happen on this journey is that the responses initiated from the lower parts of the nervous system need to be regulated by the higher centres (the hemisphere, according to James). Ideational centres need to prevent impulses from colonising the motor system for violent purposes. The impulse needs to be inhibited and the question needs to be raised as to whether the violent response ought to occur. Here one imagines the language centres and the power of language needs to be engaged in this process. If, however, the impulsive response has become an ingrained habit, the question arises as to whether this impulsive complex has been split off from the self of the hemispheres. The will needs to be regulated by the belief/knowledge system and maxims need to be formulated that are rationally justified.

The brain is composed of lobes and the cortex of the occipital lobes is the site of things seen, whilst the temporal lobes is the site of things heard but Consciousness itself, James argues:

"is itself an integral thing not made of parts, "corresponds" to the entire activity of the brain, whatever that might be at the moment."⁸

So, whilst the object thought of, e.g. the room in the house I am reading in, obviously is a complex made of parts and this is also the case for the brain related activity, it is not the case for the thought. The distinctions between consciousness and its objects and thought and its objects are both important for

James, because he argues that "The Psychological Fallacy" is a form of reasoning that confuses what is true of the object, with what is true of consciousness or thought. We should add that many Philosophers and Scientists are also guilty of this form of fallacious reasoning. James elaborates upon this point:

"If to have feelings and thoughts in their immediacy were enough, babies in the cradle would be psychologists and infallible ones. But the psychologist must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, he must report them, and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace their relation to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property: it is only post mortem that they become his prey....No subjective state whilst present, is its own object: its object is always something else."⁹

So the Psychologist must distinguish between the mental state and the act of talking about that state. This is obvious in our understanding the difference between an act of anger (punching someone) and the act of saying "I am angry with you"! In the process of naming the mental state, James reflects, a common mistake is to assume that the thought must have the same ontological and epistemological structure as the objects that are thought of. He admits that the relation of thought to its object is ultimately a mysterious matter and though we can know of the existence of this relation we can say very little about it. The only "universal conscious fact" (P.226) we can know about thoughts and feelings, argues James, is related to the necessary presence of a personal self, i.e. an "I". It is the same I that thinks, feels, remembers, forgets, acts, judges understands, reasons etc. It is what endures in the change from feeling to thought. It is the stream of consciousness that carries all these activities to their telos or end, and although a stream theoretically could be measured in terms of a large number of coffee spoons of water, the stream re-composed in this form of measuring would have little to do with the entity of the stream flowing toward the river which in turn is flowing toward the sea. A more natural division of this stream would be in terms of its origin, extension and end.

According to James, Reasoning is also a selective agency and denotes the power of the mind to analyse and synthesise the totality of conditions of phenomena reasoned about and reason ones way to logical consequences. (P.287). Practical reasoning is a selection centre for whether one ought or ought not to perform a particular means-related action, whether or not one ought to pursue a particular end. James also refers to the way in which the human race as a whole selects means and ends and thereby regulates agreements and disagreements in relation to these. No specific mention is made of principles in this process but one presumes they will be playing an important role.

There is, however, no doubt about the fact that James does not embrace the Kantian Copernican Revolution insofar as knowledge and the synthesising

activity of the "I" is concerned. James would claim that the reality of pure experience and the pragmatic method will suffice to ground our knowledge, and further that there is no need to refer to a Reality underlying appearance that no-one can know anything about. On Kantian assumptions we can think about the realm of the noumenal, and to that extent we can have faith in its existence as the ground for the phenomena we experience. Kant, however, rejects any claim that reason can know anything about this underlying condition, and he would reject any attempt to project what can be known about the objects of experience onto this noumenal realm. James and Kant would appear to be in agreement with this kind of attack on metaphysics. Otherwise James espouses an empirical approach to investigating the role of the self in our lives. Four forms of self are postulated: a material self, a social self, a spiritual self and what he calls a pure ego. This latter entity (the pure ego) resembles accounts of the transcendent self we find in Kant and others. It also resembles the metaphysical enduring self of Aristotle. If we ignore the radical empiricism and its methodology there is much in James that is suggestive of hylomorphic theory but the absence of a resting point or terminus of reasoning in "First Principles" is conspicuous by its absence.

The idea of "selection" James uses, might however be a psychological consequence of hylomorphic and critical thought. Selection is also operative at the level of the lower psychological processes:

"Attention, implying a degree of reactive spontaneity would seem to break through the circle of pure receptivity which constitutes experience"¹⁰

Interest and desire are present in the above in the form of choosing what I attend to. James does also agree with the Kantian distinction between objects of Sensibility and objects which are more abstract and intellectual. In the latter category of objects, interests and ends are more remote and distant, more abstract and ideal.

Attention, according to James has its effects in perception, conception, discrimination and memory. The act of conception for James has an ideal categorical character that tears us away from concrete reality. A white piece of paper burned black by a fire has changed, but the concept of "white" and "black" have not changed, and remain the same (P.462). Indeed these concepts provide us with a kind of standard to be used to navigate through processes of change involving coloured phenomena: a standard that is not merely a matter of "convention" (as conceived of by empiricists) and because we are dealing with standards as such (the source of our necessities), cannot easily be abandoned. On this account we can extrapolate that the role of these concepts is to assist the voluntary operation of attention in the organising of the sensory manifold. James, however, also claims that concepts form an essentially discontinuous

system that is "petrified" and "rigid" (P.468). Nevertheless it is clear on the Jamesian account that the purpose of the concept in this process of conceptualisation is to transform the perceived world into the world conceived. There are, however, on James' account no categories or principles binding the elements of the conceptual world into a whole (cf Kant): a whole that normally manifest the ideals of "The Truth" and "The Good".

The relation of James' work to the work of O'Shaughnessy is interesting in several respects. Firstly, both are in a certain sense physicalists although James is a radical empiricist and OS is clearly more inclined to embrace the ideal of the a priori that we find in many rationalist positions. Secondly, both thinkers wrote voluminously about The Will and Consciousness from their similar, though differing, perspectives. Thirdly, both thinkers agree that Consciousness is not to be analysed in terms of the category of "Substance". Fourthly, both thinkers appear hesitant to adopt any position that resemble hylomorphic or critical metaphysical positions. OS appears to be more willing to speak of consciousness in relation to a priori concepts and he also is more willing to explore the truth orientation of this aspect of our psyche. OS also shares with James the belief that consciousness is intimately and necessarily connected to the having of experiences. Experience in the architectonic of OS's ontological system is at the level of the psychological, above that of "life, and below that of the "mental". OS also points out that beliefs, intentions and memories are not "experienced". Experience for OS has objective reality, and whilst we know that we are experiencing something, when we do so, it is unanalysable. It can however be situated in a classification matrix which defines it as belonging to the genus of what is necessary and psychological. James associated experience with the stream of consciousness which itself is in a constant state of change and flux. OS claims that experience is occurrently, and continually, renewed. (Consciousness and the World, P.43)

OS also notes the important bond between experience and temporality. Experience picks out the present as a "now" and a passage of time as a continuity of nows (P51). This is in accordance with the Aristotelian definition of time which is "the measurement of motion in terms of before and after". This definition refers to an activity, the doing of something, as distinct from the bare paying of attention to motion occurring, which of course is also a "possible experience".

OS discusses animality in this context and a distinction is drawn between animal intention and action and its human form. The former is undoubtedly directed toward the future and suggests an animal can have expectations, although perhaps not expectations it can think about. OS claims that the animal possesses no power or capacity to think **about** the future but it is capable of a mental

posture or attitude toward an experienceable future. OS notes the important fact that in the context of explanation, human beings use future phenomena to explain present phenomena. For us, one phase of time logically relates to another. This fact is important for the account of intentional action which occurs, according to OS at the level of mentality where thinking connects a "now" to a matrix of past-present, and future: for this form of human mentality the past and the future meet in the present (P.55). Time is both psychologically and mentally structured in intentional action and this structure is manifested in the ethical schema of "Reason-Action-Consequence": a schema that also stretches across the past-present-future continuum. This schema might be implied by the Heraclitean reference to a "Logos" of change.

The Kantian ship steaming downstream is Kant's image of the relation of consciousness and Time and the seamless continuity of before, now, and after appears to be captured in this one image. This continuity, however is also manifested at a practical level by the above schema of Reason-Action-Consequence, in which perhaps, the presence of consciousness is more obvious than it is in the ship steaming downstream. In the case of the R-A-C schema it is obvious that agents engaged in action, experience the passage of time. In the act of speaking, for example, there is a consciousness of what has been said, what is being said now and what will be said. The agent involved in such action "inhabits" time. OS points out that time is not a principle or form of consciousness because two sensations of pain located in different bodies are, of course, psychological phenomena but they are not temporally related in one consciousness. Experience and Consciousness in the writings of Freud are regulated by the ERP (Energy regulation principle) which regulates life sustaining functions and the PPP (Pleasure-Pain Principle) which regulates what OS refers to as the psychological level of psyche. The higher the form of life, the more complex are the pleasures and pains experienced. The "man of experience" is of course acquainted with Ananke, and as a consequence approaches the world and his life with more than a hint of resignation as old-age approaches. This testifies to the important role of the Reality Principle (RP) in the organisation of his experience. It was in the spirit of the RP that Socrates defined his own death as a necessary good, whether it would take the form of a dreamless sleep or an after-life form of existence. Socrates was the rational man of experience par excellence--a fact well illustrated by his philosophical activities in the agora.

OS claims that in terms of experience, Time is a more important dimension of existence than lived-in space:

"time is closer to our essential nature than is space." (P.66)

The life of an organism obviously proceeds essentially in time, and the notion of process assumes an importance at the same level as state. Processes are the very

stuff of experience and consciousness, but states of consciousness are also important milestones. There does not, however, appear to be any important use for the term "states of experience". An animal that is asleep is obviously not conscious but if it is capable of dreaming it is surely experiencing its dreaming.

In his analysis of whether the term "state of consciousness" possesses a real or an a priori determinable essence OS claims that Consciousness is a basic fundamental state and all other states are privative or derivative (P.73) The arguments for this position are four-fold:

1. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions for states of consciousness.
2. States explain the properties of these states.
3. There are techniques for causing a loss of consciousness and to assist someone in an unconscious state to regain consciousness.
4. Properties form syndromes or constellations.

OS also maintains that sleep and comatose state-conditions are states of consciousness, and the question then arises as to whether these too can be classified as "psychological" states. Sleep appears to meet the conditions necessary, but a question mark hangs over the latter condition. Beings in a comatose state are certainly alive, and if they are human they still possess potentialities that can be actualised in a waking state.

The term "state of consciousness" helps us to remember that, though Consciousness may perform the important function of opening a window onto the world, it is not as such directed at objects in the way perception is. This fact may force us to look for its origins not in any psychological state, but rather in the brain (P.80). This is a non-psychological cause and the principle involved in the regulation of cerebral states can only be the ERP. We also need to rely on explanation of mechanical kinds to describe such activity. This may help us to distinguish consciousness from experience, although it will still remain true to say that the stream of consciousness is something experienced. Consciousness, regarded from a hylomorphic perspective, is constituted both by its material substrate operating in accordance with material/mechanical principles and by a set of psychological powers that also have their origin in a body composed of a constellation of organs and limbs that in turn form the physical substrate of the human form of life.

There is also the Critical view of Consciousness, which consists in assembling the necessary and sufficient conditions of its phenomena, in accordance with

the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. It does appear as if OS is using some form of the critical approach in his attempts to sketch the outlines of Consciousness. Kant, however, also emphasises the use of practical reason and its contexts of justification. The Kantian architectonic would, of course, require charting the role of consciousness in relation to both types of reasoning.

The Consciousness we have of the fact that the lightning has struck the tree is a more complex matter than the bare intuition of the phenomenon of the lightning striking the tree, but the former could not occur without the latter, thus affirming the Kantian axiom that concepts without intuitions are empty. Conceptualisation in both Kantian and Aristotelian theory is an important element of all higher forms of consciousness in which Sensibility and Understanding are preparing true beliefs of the kind "The lightning struck the tree". True beliefs also are integrated into a larger scale thinking process that possess the aims of explanation and justification. With this larger scale venture we are definitively placed in the ontological realm of the mental.

Practical reason orbits around the actions of man rather than his beliefs, and in this respect is closer to the reality it is constituting and regulating. Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* argued that every activity aims at the good, and this ought to suffice to place all discourse and all forms of reasoning about action high on the list of the defining features of human life. Willing, as OS points out, can be both bodily (intimately related to the body-image) and mental. The goods of animal strivings involve only the bodily will and their body-image and consequently a psychological lower form of consciousness. Animal consciousness is not self-determined in the way human consciousness is, and the mere fact that we have consciousness in common as life forms, does not in any way guarantee that the forms of consciousness are the same. The behaviourists have perhaps discovered this fact but continue to either claim that consciousness does not exist, or alternatively, that it has no role in the explanation of the highest life forms.

OS claims that there is a mutually supporting circle of powers helping to constitute consciousness and actualise it in accordance with the life-form that has generated it. These powers are situated in an architectonic ontological matrix of life-consciousness-mentality. Perception and Action lie at the input-output thresholds of this matrix, at the thresholds leading in from, and out to, Reality. On Freud's hylomorphic/critical account of Consciousness there is an important link to external reality, but there are also links to the Preconscious and Unconscious systems that form the context of id, ego, and superego activity. These systems and agencies have a developmental history and telos best described in hylomorphic terms. The Reality Principle largely determines

the actualisation of the powers of understanding and rationality and also crucially determines a state of self-consciousness that is based on the knowledge of the activity and the power of one's mind.

Aristotle widens the scope of concern we moderns have with reality by relating knowledge to desire and making the universal claim that we all necessarily desire to know. He embedded this desire in an attitude of awe and wonder in the face of the world: an attitude that can only be dispelled by asking and attempting seriously to answer questions posed in contexts of explanation /justification (Why-questions). Accompanying this awe and wonder at the external world is an awareness of a power of self-consciousness.

OS paradoxically approves of both the Freudian and Cartesian accounts of self-consciousness. He wishes to combine knowing the nature of my existence through "thinking", and an understanding of the self, that ranges from an understanding of the body regulated by the ERP and the PPP, to an understanding of the human psyche via the activities of the agencies of the Ego and Superego. For Freud, we know these things because we are aware of truths about our selves under various aspects. OS shares the Freudian conviction that the mental health of the subject is crucial for actualising the potentiality for the above kind of self-awareness. The Reality Principle plays an important role in the constitution and regulation of the kind of self-understanding required for "knowing oneself".

OS illustrates the truths that an animal knows, e.g. a dog knows it is about to be fed, but the dog is not aware of the higher order fact that it is True that it is about to be fed. The reason for this state of affairs, OS argues, is that the animal is unable to compare the "thought" "I am about to be fed", with the reality that makes it true. It is a familiar psychological observation that animals are tied to their environment in a way that we humans are not. Our thought is capable of psychically distancing itself from reality, and this is evident in its activity of linking concepts in veritative (truth-making) syntheses, e.g., Categorical judgements distinguishing what is possible from what is actual. The psychical space created by categorical judgements is formed in a voluntary self-constituted logically structured (with principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason) space. From this perspective knowing hypotheticals such as not-P might be false, but is in fact true, is a part of our belief systems. OS in fact appeals in the context of this discussion to Kantian Categories of Judgement.

Self-consciousness or self-awareness is conditional (i.e. related to necessary and sufficient conditions). They are therefore potentialities that can fail to be actualised. The predominance of this kind of awareness, OS argues, reveals a Cartesian bias in the account of the so-called "state of consciousness"-- a bias

that claims we need to be conscious of the present specific contents of inner consciousness but no such condition applies to the contents of outer reality.

OS does in fact specifically discuss psychotic states of mind and points to the way in which the products of the imagination tend to invade the experience of reality, creating a dream-like state in which, according to Freud, the ERP and the PPP distort both the spatial and temporal aspects of Consciousness. The problem with states of mind in which this invasion occurs, is that the psychotic does not know that his experience is being partly determined by his imagination. This condition is similar to that of the dreamer who believes he is perceiving something rather than knowing that he is imagining what he is experiencing. The psychotic giving a speech to cows in a field does not, OS claims, "know what he is doing". He elaborates upon this by claiming that of course the psychotic knows that he is speaking, but what he does not know is that he is addressing imaginary beings (the seraphim). It is this kind of "occurent delusion" that, if presented as a defence in a court of law, can excuse the man prosecuted for a crime. Insanity alone is not a sufficient defence. What the schizophrenic experiencing an occurrent delusion lacks, which other insane people do not, is the possibility of distancing themselves in thought from their actions and reasoning about whether they are right or wrong. There is, in such cases, a significant failure of insight or self-knowledge linked to a failure to choose freely for oneself what ought to be done. Even if there do exist veridical beliefs in the belief system of the psychotic suffering from an occurrent delusion, e.g. "I am speaking here and now", these are tied to fantastically delusional beliefs of being divine ("I am the alpha and omega"). The total experiential product suffices to destroy the texture of reality otherwise sustained by belief systems whose task it is to cognitively represent the world as it is, and as it can be. The belief system of the normal person evolves and transforms itself in accordance with the powers of perception and reasoning, but this natural evolution and transformation is not available to the psychotic partly because his anxiety-saturated memory-system may be compelled to repeat the same trauma over and over again without significant variation. Even experiencing himself speaking, is so structured that it does not form a normal memory in the psychotics memory system. A normal memory over the course of time can dissipate large amounts of anxiety and allow the traumatic core of the memory to embed itself in contexts of many different kinds of associates. It is learning that is largely responsible for the transformation of the normal persons belief system and pleasure supervenes as a consequence: in sharp contrast to the painful state of mind of the psychotic. It is the former state of consciousness that is best equipped to produce knowledge. In such states, the concern is not merely for the truth (what is happening, or what has happened), but also with explanation/justification (**why** it happened or ought not to have happened). It is

this structure that enables actions and beliefs to be justified/explained in terms of their reasons.

OS appeals to Cartesianism in this work but he might equally have appealed to the role of thought in Kantian Critical Philosophy and its architectonic of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. Needless to say the Kantian account of thought is far more complex than that which we encounter in Cartesian accounts. The scope of the Kantian architectonic certainly can sustain a discussion of dreams without an appeal to God and it can also provide many of the concepts required to correctly characterise a difference between normal and psychotic states of consciousness. It can also provide us with a justification of scientific explanation across the domain of the three kinds of science Freud relies on in his account of mental health. Cartesianism contributed to the epistemologisation of Philosophical thinking in a way that Kantian Critical Philosophy did not. Descartes' obsession with mathematical forms of reasoning also contributed toward the acceptance of mechanical forms of explanation for the phenomena of life-forms, preferring to dismiss important categorical distinctions that we inherited from the more biologically oriented Aristotelian accounts of *psuche*.

For Descartes, as we have indicated before, the cries of unaesthetised animals were merely sounds or vibrations of the air (manifestations of energy). For OS on the other hand, the consciousness of these suffering animals and the suffering of human beings were indistinguishable and any attempt to harm animals would certainly have met with a Pythagorean response by OS (the yelp of a dog kicked for Pythagoras was the cry of a kindred spirit). For Descartes it was clearly the case that the exactitude of the measurements of physics and the axiomatic certainty of physical laws made more of an impression on Descartes' thinking than did Aristotle's *De Anima*.

Experience, for OS, is inextricably linked to the concepts of "process" and "event" and this once again raises our earlier question as to whether the concept of "event" (that which happens) suffices to characterise agency and action in a context of explanation/justification. This in turn raises the further question as to whether the concept of "event" could contribute anything positive to ethical discourse in the wider sense envisaged by Aristotle who rested his practical system on *areté* (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time). Surely, many would argue an event just happens and is what it is: it cannot make sense to claim that it ought not to have occurred. An event just does not seem to possess the right form of universality (of the ought) to be of any use in ethical or religious discussions, or indeed any form of discourse involving values. House-building is one activity but does it make sense to say that it is one event?

Housebuilding causes the existence of its product: the house, but if we introduce the concept of event, it seems that the category of cause and effect is implied, especially if we are called upon to describe or explain the phenomenon as it appears to us. What was clearly one logical activity suddenly becomes two, namely, the process of the building and the finished product.

John Dewey in his work "Art as Experience" characterised experience in terms of undergoing and doing, without addressing the essential ontological distinction between the two as noticed by Kant: the distinction between what happens to one and what one does. It certainly, at the very least, appears to strain the requirements of grammar to claim that events are something that is done. The safer option here would appear to be to align experience with doing and situate it in a matrix of power, agency, possibility, potentiality and purpose. It is, of course undeniable that physical processes/events underlie experience and this materialist connection might account for the appearance of compatibility between the normal language of experience and the language of events. The language of processes/events serve thus to focus on the material and efficient explanations of the phenomena concerned rather than on the more relevant final and formal explanations that are of central importance in hylomorphic theory. It is these latter forms of "cause" that are more relevant to determine the essence of the actions we engage in.

OS partly rests his argument in favour of the reduction of experience to events upon the position which claims that mental processes must transform themselves into mental states--the processes of forgetting, for example, result in a state of forgetfulness. OS admits that this transformation takes place "out of sight" (P.178), but he also adds that he agrees that forgetfulness cannot be an experience, because experience as per his definition, cannot be a state composed of states. Similarly the states of belief and intention are non experiential. His argument for this is the following: I can go to sleep with the intention of buying a house and wake up believing that it is not a good idea to buy a house(P.178). A non-experiential process has occurred in the interim he claims--a process outside of the realm of consciousness. The question to raise here is whether the description "I have changed my mind", is a relevant thing to say about this phenomenon. If the answer is that it is, then a further question arises as to whether, in changing my mind, this is something that has happened to me, or rather something that I have done. If experience is best defined as Dewey claimed, a matter of both undergoing and doing, then perhaps we can say of the case under discussion that we are dealing with an activity that was outside the scope of consciousness. This approach, however raises other problems which may require an architectonic as complex as that of Freud's theories to resolve. The agency of the Ego, we know has conscious, preconscious and unconscious dimensions. The conscious ego is, for Freud, the primary vehicle of our contact

with reality but the preconscious system uses our knowledge and the meaning of words as part of its contribution to our transactions with reality. This account does not sit comfortably with the Cartesian account of experience as something that is somehow "infallibly known" (P.181). For both Descartes and OS there can be no category of phenomena that can be termed "unconscious experiences" because, by stipulation, all experience occurs within the confines of the "stream of consciousness". OS notes in passing that Freud never postulated the existence of unconscious emotions, but what are we to say about those learning processes that occur in the run-up to the formation of a belief, e.g. after the learning process involved in building a house -- I now believe that I can build a house? On one account all that is required is the conscious idea of the house and the will to engage in the building process. This in its turn requires that I have insight into my own intentions. Is this insight a more stable phenomenon than my belief that it is raining? This latter may in the end require meteorological knowledge if I am called upon to justify the truth of my belief-- I felt a drop, but did it fall or was it hanging in the air? Might it be the case that, once self-actualisation processes have mobilised, the necessary and sufficient conditions for insight, that this inner self-knowledge is more stable? Knowing that it is raining does not make one a meteorologist, but knowing how to build a house does make one a builder, knowing how to do mathematics does make one a mathematician and knowing oneself might similarly make one a wise person or a philosopher. Is the difference then between a builder and a wise man a matter of the difference between inner (insight) and outer knowledge? Are these different aspects of experience or does insight transcend experience?

In a section entitled "Principles of Insight" (P.189) OS launches an investigation into Insight in terms of aims and principles. What emerges from this discussion is the importance of self-knowledge for the form of consciousness we encounter in the human life form (the rational animal capable of discourse). OS also highlights the importance of thinking for the constitution of the condition of consciousness (P.200). The quote that follows touches upon our earlier discussion of the logical difficulties involved in identifying active experience with the analytically motivated reductionist concept of "event":

"One interesting fact about the conscious is that their experiential life is active in character. I do not just mean that it is eventful, I mean that it is actively or intentionally or willingly eventful"¹¹

In the context of this discussion OS claims that the stream of consciousness contains essentially active phenomena. The representation of a substance-like phenomenon such as a stream and focusing upon its contents, however, does make it easier to look at the contents of the stream as something that happens to it. Kant in his First Critique did speak of the possibility of characterising human activity in terms of cause-effect and events, as well as in terms of self-initiated

activity: different forms of reasoning, e.g. theoretical and practical are however involved and the question then is raised as to whether theoretical reasoning necessarily falls upon the ontological psychological category of "that which happens to man" rather than "what man makes of himself".

Desire of course, becomes more complex as the experience of the animal form of life concerned becomes more complex. Powers build upon powers, and the integrated result forms a self-conscious form of consciousness that is capable of even accepting the extinction of its own life. Complex attitudes such as this emerge from an actualisation process in which the first actuality of the human form of psyche is the actualisation of the power of discourse in terms of its systematic exercise. The next level of the actualisation process results in the systematic exercise of the power of reason in both its theoretical and practical forms. OS points to the importance of the ontological condition of being active in the achievement of the condition of Consciousness, and he argues insightfully that there is an interdependence between the executive and cognitive functions of life forms. He further maintains that the linguistic power of the self conscious form of consciousness is dependent upon this interdependence rather than vice versa.

OS emphasises that activity per se is not sufficient to generate what he calls the "charmed circle" of mutually supporting powers that actualise in a human form of psyche. Activity can take two forms it is argued, firstly, the explorative activity of attention and perception in the construction of objects in relation to a spatio-temporal continuum. Secondly, the internal activity of synthesising past-present, and future in the context of action. These different forms of activity have different aims, namely The Truth and The Good and different metaphysical conditions underlie these different forms. Different kinds of knowledge are involved in the performance of what can be regarded as a determinate theoretical task as compared with the practical tasks that manifest choice and freedom. Observation is obviously involved in theoretical explorative, object-constructing activity and non-observational forms of awareness are involved in idea-guided bodily movement: the body-image will also be involved in this latter kind of activity aiming teleologically at its purpose with the assistance of both maxims and principles.

OS refers to the mental will and its connection with the power of reasoning activated by an agent. The action produced as a consequence, originates internally, but is consummated externally when a desired/intended state of affairs is brought about. Wittgenstein, in his later thought, claimed that an inner process always stands in need of outer criteria, and the bond between these is obviously, in one sense, causal, and in another primarily logical and conceptual. On both the Aristotelian and Kantian accounts less emphasis is placed on the

exchange between inner and outer events/processes, and more attention is paid to principles capable of operating as major premises in practical argumentation: principles which form a foundation for the reasoning which concludes that a particular action ought to be done. As far as OS is concerned, the bond between the will and reason, is mysterious, and this is perhaps tied to an assumption that inner mental events need to be related to outer behavioural events. There is, however, we are suggesting, an alternative interpretation of Wittgensteins thought, and that involves seeing the behaviour as manifesting or revealing something logically connected with it. There is, in such circumstances no call for invoking a possible material/efficient causal explanation. The roll of thought events in this context are called into question. Thought in the form of a principle that is self-constituted may be a more reasonable characterisation of such a state of affairs. If Kant was correct in his claim that "every event must have a cause" is an a priori truth, then, applying this in practical contexts where action is involved, appears to be a dubious invitation to divide a logical whole into material entities and relations. Accepting such an invitation then neutralises the operation of the principle of sufficient reason.

Refusing to accept such an invitation, however, allows us to regard thoughts as agent-constituted entities that aim at the True; these entities can then be seen as parts of a belief system that as a whole aims at "The Truth". Obviously false beliefs can be a part of this system but there is a question as to whether deluded beliefs such as

"I am Napoleon"

can be a part of the system. Such a belief ruptures our ideas about life, death, History and individuality and also seriously threatens our relation to Reality.

OS in a section entitled "Perception and Truth" discusses the role of Perception in Consciousness from what is clearly, an analytical point of view. He discusses the distinction between the waking state and the state of being asleep and the role of consciousness in both. He admits that there is a persistence of the stream of consciousness in sleep that manifests itself in dreaming activity. This latter state however has a questionable relation to reality, in that the dreamer believes falsely that he is engaging in actions. This is a misapprehension, what is "experienced" is a product of the imagination (e.g. wishes engaging with the memory system). In the waking state the stream of consciousness assists in generating our waking experiences via the use of the will and the "mechanism" of attention.

OS raises the classical analytical question of whether we are aware of facts, or of things. He claims that noticing that the tree was struck by lightning does not only engage the attention, but is a more complex cognitive "event" that has the

"aim" of forming a belief. The attention appears to be operating at the psychological level of the human psyche, but beliefs that aim at truth appear definitely to be operating at the higher level of "the mental". The true belief that the lightning struck the tree is, of course, logically related to the psychological activity of noticing. The memory in its cognitive mode also needs to be engaged for the activity to become a "mental" activity. The pure noticing of the lightning strike is of course also a possible "experience" but engaging with the conceptual system certainly appears to take the activity out of the realm of Sensibility and move it into the realm of the Understanding. Claiming that in the simpler case of noticing, that we "notice" facts is confusing one kind of apprehension with another. In the course of this discussion OS once again claims that perception is an "event". Whether this way of describing the matter is compatible with the involvement of the will is a question we raised earlier. Critical Philosophy refers to the role of the transcendental imagination operating intermediately between intuition and understanding to form what Kant calls schema-images of concepts as part of the preparation for thinking conceptually about a phenomenon. The imagination uses non conceptual rules for the formation of these schema-images.

OS deals with the imagination in a section entitled "The Imagination" and he invokes a diverse number of contexts in order to illustrate the wide scope of the exercise and products of imaginative activity. There are three different modes of exercising the imagination:

1. Imagination **that** as is engaged in by the construction of a fictional narrative by an author
2. Imaginative perception employed when we engage with representations such as photographs or film
3. Perceptual imaginings, e.g. hallucinations or mental imagery.

Propositional imagining is probably the most interesting sub-species of the genus being investigated, containing as it does the widest literary and philosophical implications for our cultural lives. Imagining is also a sub species of thinking, OS maintains (p.344). There is, on OS's account, however, no opposition of the kind we encounter in the writings of the positivists and atomists, namely, that between objective thinking and subjective imagining. Indeed, OS even allows for the possibility that dream beliefs can be accidentally true and claims further that dreams have a "robust relation to reality"(P.345), given the fact that the memory system assists in providing the content. If, for example, I dream that I am in Paris, the dream scene is provided by the memory system and knowledge that it is I and not someone else that believes they are in Paris. Of course one can have this dream and wake up in Bogna Regis and it then becomes clear that I was not in Paris but merely imagined that I was, but it

is still, however, true that it was I and not someone else that dreamed I was in Paris: and I know this in some sense.

Fiction has a structure that is partly constituted by the imagination and the product we are confronted with may be a product of both our knowledge about the world and our knowledge about ourselves (about the self and its transcendental features). The "experiences" reported in fictional narrative are of course in some sense "unreal" and "imagined" but they are tied together by an aesthetic idea that unifies and guides the content in a way analogous to the way in which principles and laws govern content in the Theoretical and Practical Sciences. The Productive Sciences in general communicate ideas that relate conceptually and logically to their products, but poetry and theatre aim not at knowledge about external reality or action, but at the worthiness of the Agent behind the actions via a plot construction that meets the criteria of *areté* (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time). Productive science in the form of theatre, is thereby more intimately linked to ethics and Practical science than it is to the Theoretical sciences. The plot of tragedy clearly has ethical intentions via the medium of aesthetic ideas. Imagining someone murdering his King and then as a consequence losing his mind by degrees over a period of time may well be an aesthetic way of thinking about Justice (*diké*) and Ananke. It is a way of consciously imagining that justice is an end in itself both good in itself and good in its consequences.

Imaginative seeing for OS is imagining a landscape via the photograph of it. Here the imagining is occurring without the use of concepts. It is to be distinguished from visual imaging which manifests itself in the form of hallucinations, dream perception and mental imagery. After conducting his survey of the forms of imagination and their products, OS arrives at the insight that the best that can be achieved is not a constitutive essence-specifying definition of the phenomenon, but rather only its defining marks which indicate that imagining of all forms are "imitations" of reality that can have different causes and different purposes. The "normal" relation to reality in this mode of "thinking" is short-circuited and a form of thinking that is only analogous to The True emerges, constituted by practical and productive ideas of the Good. If, as in the case of dreams, the mental powers required for narration are inoperative, we then find ourselves confronting a phenomenon where even space and time can be ruptured in dream scenes that appear to defy logic. Any plot requires at least an intact time structure of a beginning, a middle, and an end and is thereby a more complex imaginative creation than the dream.

Perception is, on some theories, regarded under the ontological aspect of "What happens to us", rather than under the aspect of "What we do". If, as Kant claims, the ontological distinction between what happens to us and what we do is an

absolute distinction then it becomes problematic to claim that we can will our perceptions and perceive our willings. But surely we must be aware of our willings. Even in the extreme case of having lost a limb, and trying to move that limb, I must be aware of having tried to move that limb. But could it not also be the case that in looking at a landscape I am non observationally aware of moving my eyes (as part of the awareness of my body-image). Is this what we mean by self-knowledge at the level of perception? According to OS, self-knowledge is part of our rational condition (P.409). This a condition in which the relationship between the potentiality for rationality and its actuality is a complex matter. The degree of self-consciousness associated with the actualisation of the rational powers will probably correspond to the extent to which the rational condition has been actualised in the individual concerned, which in turn is conditional upon the extent to which powers have been integrated with other powers in the developmental process, e.g. the power of perception and the power of action. Attempting to characterise the relation of experience to both of these powers, without recognising the ontological divide within the stream of consciousness, merely seems to confuse matters. John Dewey in his work "Art as Experience" is aware that the ontological divide can only be unified against the biological background of the interaction of a living creature with its environing conditions. Dewey chooses to use the term "Art" solely in relation to the doing of something or making of an art object. He uses the term "aesthetic" to describe the experience of appreciation. Art, for Dewey is emotional, to do with a self:

"concerned in the movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked."¹²

Dewey refuses to connect experience with object-events and instead insists that we are dealing with a more complex phenomenon of "events with meaning", For Dewey it is the power of the imagination in an emotive mode that creates "meaning". Part of this meaning is related to the way in which knowledge is both used and transformed in the work of art. For Dewey, a bare awareness of events, would be an insufficient characterisation of the kind of knowledge that is meaningfully employed. Emotion, for Dewey, in a work of art, functions in very much the same way as the aesthetic idea does in Kant's aesthetic theory. In Kant we are not dealing with nature divided into events and causes, but rather with a nature that in contrast to its causal relations has its finalities (nature as a final end).

For both Kant and Dewey, the aesthetic idea of feeling, is not an empirical sensation-like entity but more like a complex feeling of life. The perception of the landscape for Dewey might, that is, be construed as an event with meaning generated by a similar event with meaning, namely the willed movement of the eyes. In modern Psychology the role of the eyes is a life function that is even involved in the generation of dream images (REM). Both the landscape and the

dream become then, events with meaning in the "feeling of life". Both events, however, are different because they incorporate forms of awareness that are different--in the case of the landscape we are dealing with an observational form of awareness but in the case of the dream the awareness obviously has to be of a different kind. Dewey claimed that the Kantian "feeling of life" involved in aesthetic situations ought to be characterised as the "sense of moving tendencies" that is generated by the imagination operating in an emotional context--a sense rooted in the biological relation one has to ones environment, culminating in an object that is constituted not causally but in terms of being a final end of nature in itself created not by another separably identifiable event but created by an agent with an intention to create a sense of contentment. This is the structure, then, that gives rise to the aesthetic judgement made in the spirit of universality and necessity.

OS in his discussion of visual perception notes the importance of the fact of depth perception. In perception of a landscape, the eyes can focus on an object lying further away, and the landscape can form around this new figure. Depth perception is a universal characteristic of perception and is partly responsible for the objectivity of perception. If we were to attempt to translate this transformation of the first perception of the landscape into the second perception of a landscape further away (using the language of event and object), it is not certain that the above mentioned objectivity and universality can be maintained. In the end, even Dewey's concept of an object as an event with meaning, fails to provide us with the means to correctly characterise visual experience and the peculiar kinds of knowledge involved (e.g. spatial intuition).

The Being of seeing, according to OS, cannot be related to causal conditions but must rather be related to constitutive non-causal conditions. Seeing is, as Kant envisaged, not full blown knowledge in itself, because in its raw form it is a mere power with a particular essence. In its raw form it is exercised in acts of attention, e.g. in focussing upon parts of a landscape. What happens after this initial moment in time is dependent upon whether other powers, e.g. the understanding or language become involved or not. Causal conditions such as the invisible light beams which play a crucial role in making the visibility of objects possible, obviously belong to the material and efficient conditions for the formation of visual phenomena. Were the sun to explode, and light eventually to disappear from our solar system, this might well, as a matter of fact, cause the extinction of many life forms. Those life forms that survive (not perhaps for very long), would possess sensory motor fields in which sound waves would replace light beams. Memories of light would persist and be an important part of the cultural heritage and perhaps if we were ingenious enough to replace the biological life-enhancing effects of light, life would persist under the conditions of artificial light. OS points out that we do not need to engage in

explorations to find the source of light as we do with sounds that present themselves more ambiguously. OS argues in his analysis of sound that there can be no "sound representative" account of the perception of sound (P.447). Sound obviously travels more slowly and may in special cases have ceased at its origin when it reaches its destination, but this does not hinder us from perceiving the direction of the sound emanated. This is also true of light over great distances (e.g. light years): the arrival of light from a star that has gone out of existence is intelligible on a Kantian account, and on the accounts given by science. Light is obviously a more complex medium than sound, bringing with it the shape of the object and immediately causing colour under the right conditions. Sound may also, in particular circumstances bring with it some indication of the texture of the surface it emanated from to the discriminating listener. The fact that the appearance in my telescope of the orange light originating in a position in space many light years away is exactly the same, whether the source of the light exists or not, indicates that our contact with objects is primarily epistemological. This fact also testifies to the importance of sense perception in the generation of knowledge about what really exists. The articulation of the phenomenon of light would also suggest that we can objectify the light beam as an orange cylindrical form, and transform it into an object whose meaning is of course partially dependent upon the nature of light, but also dependent upon the form of its source. If all of this is true, Moore's proof of the existence of the external world: "Here is one hand", "Here is another hand", does not fully meet the requirements of an unambiguous proof: is Moore referring to the hand that is part of the body-image and whose movement has its source in the motor system of the brain, or its sense-data or both?

There is no doubting the importance of the scientific investigation of phenomena under the condition that it refrains from reductionism, respects more modest metaphysical presuppositions, and understands the categorical framework and the operation of principles involved in the investigation of all forms of phenomena: i.e. physical phenomena and organic phenomena such as the movement of a hand might well require different methods of investigation, different categorical assumptions and determination by different laws even if the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason apply across the whole range of phenomena. The differences between the material and efficient conditions of auditory and visual phenomena, for example, ought to be left to the scientist to investigate. There is of course an obvious phenomenological difference between seeing and hearing that ought also to be investigated. Sounds, phenomenologically, are more diffuse than sights and do not press on the attention in the same way: they do not spontaneously build "fields" in the form of landscapes although a concert may be an artificially constructed exception to this rule.

What the above scientific excursion into the sensory world may reveal is that there is in fact a case for sense-data in the analysis of sensory phenomena. This claim cannot obviously rest on a commitment to atomistic theories of the so-called psychological primitive of sensation that we have argued against throughout these volumes. Attention, for example, is as vital to the psychological equation constituting sensory-motor forms of life, as is voluntary movement. Sense-data obviously fall on the retina and the orange form I saw through the telescope after having been processed by the rods and cones of the eye generate an image on the retina. OS provides us with the following account:

"...assume that the retinal area under consideration is sufficiently central to permit full perceptual colour differentiation. Then given these background considerations, (a quatum) light of colour C1 at point P1 on the retina is in such a conscious being a causally sufficient condition of colour C1 being present at a corresponding point P1' in the visual field. Now let us make one more innocuous assumption. Let us assume that the C1 light at point P1, effects the appearance of C1 in the visual field through locally generating some chemical (x). Why not? It must do it in some way. Accordingly (x) at P1 must in the assumed standing conditions be a causally sufficient condition of colour C1 at point P1' in the visual field...It is in my view already weighty argument in favour of the view that when in normal vision C1 light impinges at P1 on the retina, it causes a visual sensation of colour C1 at P1' in the visual field."¹³

It is important to note that in the above account of what occurs prior to the visual sensation, reference is made to physical conditions (light, chemical (x)) and this reference is on OS's account non-psychological. The visual sensation of orange, on the other hand, is psychological in accordance with OS's ontological architectonic. This separation of ontological domains correlates very well with the Aristotelian separation between material/efficient conditions and formal/final conditions. The consciousness of orange that ensues after the physical chemical transaction is of course available as an individual phenomenon to no one else but the possessor of the body that is affected and generates the chemical, but the sensation as such only becomes conscious under psychological conditions. With this kind of reflection we leave the realm of physical events and causation behind, and enter into the domain of the psychological. The sensation, OS argues is the only psychological item that can become the material object of attention (P.534).

The role of language as a mediator in the production of knowledge is also dealt with in OS's account. He proposes an evolutionary account of knowledge in which there is an initial stage where language (in a hypothetical mood) singles out for linguistic attention items in the physical world, without necessarily knowing very much about their essences. He cites as evidence the first namings of metals and diseases. This, it could be argued, given the above abstruse account of visual perception, might be true of the phenomenon of perception, although if one, for example, examines the ancient greek words for auditory

phenomena much of the essence of the phenomena appears to be captured by Greek vocabulary.

The scientific account however is even more complex and provides us with the following chain of phenomena: the transitivity of attention travels down a chain extending from the psychological (non-mental) part of the mind to the lighting of the landscape, to the snow on the surface of the mountainside situated in space. This analysis also suggests a characterisation of the phenomenon of perception into the perceptual "given" (a visual field composed of two dimensional points) ordered in accordance with colour values. Such a visual field (under a certain description) will contain no shapes or structures of any kind (P.546). So, it is not sensations but these two dimensional colour points that are the atoms of the system OS describes. Analysis as a philosophical method is required because, contrary to the claims of some realists we never perceive material object particulars directly but only via mediator items, i.e. we only perceive some particular X in virtue of seeing something else, a Y, which is not identical with the X. For example:

"I see Mt Blanc through seeing its south side, its south side through seeing its south surface, its south surface through seeing a patch of snow thereon."¹⁴

Yet the seeing of X and the seeing of Y is, in some sense, conceptually related. There are multiple descriptions of the particular of Mt Blanc and each description will relate to a different Y mediator. The two dimensional colour-valued point-system never as such becomes a phenomenon of experience that can be singled out by the attention. It is in fact the mediators that live epistemologically closer to the perceiver. The first item in the chain of mediators will provide a description that is not a matter of interpretation, e.g. the two dimensional pointillist visual field.

But what then is a material object, e.g. a mountain? Is it the matter of the mountain that is its essence? We know that the matter must be formed (organised) before any essence can be attributed to it. Matter in itself, and without form is mysterious, and its inner constitution is not given to us in any way. For OS the material object necessarily has an inside, sides, surfaces, a shape, and parts. We may not be able to perceive the inside of an object depending upon the disposition of the surfaces. The inner density of an object is such that it can have many aspects and perception alone cannot reveal these aspects. It might well be that it is through Perception that Consciousness opens a window out onto the garden of the real but it is a surface based phenomenon and cannot plumb the depths of the matter of an object.

Perception, especially visual perception as a power, takes us on a journey outside of our bodies. The power of attention is a part of this journey and seeks a

two-dimensional colour value resting place for the eyes and mobilises other powers to impose a structure on this field, constructing, for example, shapes in space initially independently of any activity of conceptualisation that emanates from the understanding. The question to pose here, however, is whether the understanding may be involved in the non-observational awareness the agent has of his own bodily position in space and across time. Bodily awareness uses the media of proprioception and touch. Touch as we know has been appealed to historically as the sense that finally verifies the presence of a seen or heard phenomenon, but it too is a surface based phenomenon. We know that Macbeth reaches for the dagger and the absence of contact with the object suffices to remove his hallucination--so much for Moores proof --but it may be improved if the hands could simultaneously touch each other. Kant would of course claim that any such "proof" is impossible and in Socratic spirit would claim that we ought to know what we cannot in principle know, and reserve the request for proof to the domain of what can be known.

Proprioception must be related in some way to body-image, but as we have seen, there are problems with conceptualising this idea of a body-image. OS argues that it is possession of a body-image that enables us to experience two qualitatively identical pains simultaneously in two different hands. He concludes:

"the possession of a body-image must on a number of counts be rated as part of the very foundation of absolutely every form of perception and thus ultimately of consciousness itself."¹⁵

A conclusion that would not look out of place in the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception*), which of course is a tribute to the depth of OS's account. The lived conscious body is certainly the hylomorphic foundation of everything animal and human and the condition of eudaimonia (living a flourishing life). Piaget once proposed a stage theory in which sensory-motor schemata are formed as a preliminary to the operation of thought at both concrete and abstract levels, but this account contained no specific reference to the body-image or proprioception. For Aristotle, the organ and limb system of the animal would be the basis of all perceptual powers but proprioception and body-image are nowhere directly invoked in the way OS envisages. We know OS appears to prefer the Freudian stage model in the creation of his idea of body-image. To the extent that Freud's reflections rest on hylomorphic grounds, this may allow appeals to Aristotelian metaphysics in the justification of OS's account.

Some theorists have claimed that we have an immediate perceptive knowledge of limb presence and posture (an awareness that does not extend generally to the organs of the body but does extend to the movement of the eyes). It is

interesting to note that this awareness of limb posture does not in any way interfere with our visual attendings. Attending to the path of a ball in the context of intending to catch the ball and moving the hand into the correct position is a coordinated integrated undertaking. The attention function of these two different systems do not compete with each other. OS poses the interesting question as to whether, as a result of the above considerations, we have to rule out the possibility that we are conscious, via an act of perception, of the position and posture of our bodies. OS argues that this is not the case and that there is no contradiction involved in the idea of the non-observational form of awareness we have of our body position and posture. He wonders whether proprioception is a sixth sense given his argument that proprioception cannot be reduced to touch. From an earlier work on the Will, we recall that proprioception does not involve any introspective involution of visual attention upon the limb engaged in an action: this form of attention, we saw served to destroy the structure of the action. These different types of attention cannot be coordinated and integrated. OS argues in his later work that the coordination of attention is best illustrated in the example of playing a stroke in tennis. Here he argues most of our attention is focussed upon the speed and direction of the ball but there is also some left over for the proprioceptive awareness of the moving arm: an awareness that would be registered in the short-term memory system of the tennis player. What we encounter here is a unity of the elements of looking, proprioceptive awareness, and the striking of the ball.

OS distinguishes between an experience related short-term body-image associated with a kind of primitive self he terms "i" and a long term body image that is associated with an "I" or a more complex self that has innate characteristics (presumably of a hylomorphic kind). It is not clear, however, whether this I is "psychological non mental" or "psychological mental" insofar as his architectonic is concerned. OS appears to rest his case (as William James did), on focusing upon the cerebral cause rather than at the level of what he termed the "psychological". The isolation of the brain from the other organs such as the eyes and disregard of the fact that the brain does not in fact belong to the body-image leaves this question hanging in the air. Psuche is the root of our word psychological. The moorings to the Kantian "I think" also seemed to have been loosened on OS's account. Kant's account of the unity of apperception and the will, placed our human form of consciousness at a different level to the consciousness of animals (who also have brains). The dawning of a psychical distance between oneself and the environment was attributed by Kant to the "I think" actualising in a developmental process. The implication of this reflection is that affective impulses on their way to the motor system are hindered by a will in the spirit of "I ought not to..", and thus appears to allow the space for an "I" that possesses a long term body image. We are not provided with any reflections

relating to ethical actions and judgements in OS's essentially analytic presentation.

The brain, argues the brain researcher Edelman, is the most complex object in the universe. Surely, it can be argued that this could be the site of the "I" considering its relation to the limbs, thought and language. Language centres have been mapped in the brain and we can see the trace of ancient reptile and mammal brains in our brain suggesting once again the hierarchy of levels of activity Hughlings Jackson proposed. These "lower structures" might have brought some innate knowledge with them. Chomsky suggested that the language centres of the brain also were related to innate knowledge, e.g. universal grammar. He was fascinated by the phenomenon that we appear to be able to produce completely unique sentences that we have never heard before. He raised the question of whether one could have learned to structure sentences into subject-predicate without some kind of predisposition toward extracting rules and algorithms from the stream of discourse we are exposed to early on in life. The form of the sentence in which I think something about something, e.g. "Athens behaved unjustly toward Socrates" has a categorical structure that we do not find in the naming of something: this structure expresses a thought about something when we are thinking conceptually. The name Athens is either used correctly or not and whilst it may summarise a manifold of representations it does not express any truth about Athens. We know that theoretical rationality as expressed in arguments rests upon the truth of the components of those arguments, namely propositions. We also know that practical rationality as expressed by Aristotle in the act of the implementation of laws, also rests upon certain truths, e.g. "All activity aims at the Good" (Opening of Nichomachean Ethics). For Kant, the categorical structure of judgements follow the principles of logic (noncontradiction, sufficient reason), and these are a priori (independent of experience). How these categories relate to Language is, however, not clear. Wittgenstein claimed he was engaging in grammatical investigations and he used logical principles in these investigations as well as categories such as potentiality and actuality. The Wittgensteinian "turn" however involved emphasis upon practical forms of life in which language is embedded, and in this respect it became obvious that Aristotelian Categories such as "Having", "Acting" and "Being Affected" became more relevant when determining the meaning of practical judgements. The relevance of the "I" in relation to such categories emerges as an important element. Truth is perhaps converted to truthfulness in the context of first person avowals and the issue of self-knowledge is raised. Human beings as agents that "have" or possess powers and that can have the status of being potential or actualised becomes one important focus of Wittgensteinian Philosophy. Kant, we know found Aristotle's categories to be essentially rhapsodic and spent much time revising them with his "tables of judgement". There is in fact a partial acknowledgement of the importance of

Kantian Philosophy in Wittgenstein's claim that his method had much in common with the method employed in Critical Philosophy. Theoretically, the role of language in relation to thought and the "I", perhaps in the light of our current knowledge, is not clear, and perhaps the best articulation of our present knowledge was given above by James when he claimed that language is related to elementary powers of the mind such as memory, imagination, association, judgement, and volition.

Its essential relations to rationality also ought to be mentioned. Language was certainly the medium of thought for those ancient Greeks who claimed that thinking was essentially speaking to oneself.

In his work "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view" Kant reiterates his view that animals do not possess an "I" that thinks. We know that on OS's account animals have a body-image but the question then arises as to whether they only possess a short term body image which is connected to a more primitive "i". This would mean that the animal "i" is more instinctive. From Freud we learned that the instincts express the body to the mind, and one of the first tasks of the Ego, we know was to protect the body. Animal instincts have sources, objects, and aims, but a question arises as to whether the aims of their instincts can be changed (as is the case with humans), or whether they are immutable. There is also the question of the death instinct which could aim at the extinction of the life that sustains all activity and builds civilisations: is this a contradiction that complex beings such as humans "suffer" from, or do they "will" to destroy what is Good. Is this a characteristic of the "I" that thinks?

Notes to Chapter 10

¹*Principles of Psychology, Volume one*, James, W., (New York, Dover Publications, 1890, P.8)

²*Essays in Radical Empiricism*, (Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1966).

³ Ibid. P.11-12

⁴*Principles of Psychology*, P.28-9

⁵Ibid.P.67

⁶ Ibid. P.121

⁷ Ibid. P.124

⁸ Ibid. P.177

⁹ Ibid. P.189-90

¹⁰ Ibid. P.402

¹¹ *Consciousness and the World*, P.200

¹² *Art as Experience*, (New York, Capricorn Books, 1958, P.42)

¹³ *Consciousness and the World*, P 467-8

¹⁴ Ibid. P.549

¹⁵ Ibid. P.626

¹⁶ Ibid.

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Chapter 11: Aristotle's Metaphysical Legacy

Aristotle's work "Metaphysics" relates his earlier reflections on ousia (primary unchanging substance) to investigations in the realm of special ontology (the realm of the world of change) and relates both of these aspects to the investigation of "First Philosophy" into "to on he (i)"(general ontology). This latter investigation begins with the strategic aporetic advice, "Ask of everything what it is in its nature".

The importance of essence-specifying definitions in Aristotle's reflections are self-evident, and these can be seen to serve as a bridge between special and general ontology. It is important, however, to recall that we are only defining "substance" in terms of hylomorphic criteria (forms organising material) and not attempting a definition of material *per se*.

This becomes more apparent if the "substance" at issue is *psuche* (living beings, life), rather than the matter of the body (its tissues, bones, limbs and organs). There is no doubt that, on hylomorphic theory, the matter of the body underlies the organising form of the soul, and this matter can be a partial cause of, for example, sensations of pain and other feelings. Moving to higher mental processes such as thinking and thought, however, requires a more complex approach, and requires reverting to Kantian language, for example, reference to an "I" that is a self-causing agent (self-sufficient in the sense of being able to cause itself to think or do things). In terms of the Aristotelian idea of *psuche* we are also dealing with living beings that are self-causing beings. For Aristotle, asking of the soul what it is in its nature, requires the use of the hylomorphic matrix of 3 media of change (space, time, matter)⁴ kinds of change, three principles, four causes, as well as the mastering of three different realms of science. The soul, Aristotle argues, is the essence of the body, and its primary activity is thought: this thought activity aims at knowledge as a positive state which is able to pose questions relating to the nature of things and beings. In relation to this point, Aristotle in *De Anima* has the following to say:

"If thinking is akin to perceiving, it would consist in being somehow affected by the object of thought or in something else of this sort. It is necessary, therefore, that it be unaffected, yet capable of receiving a form: that it be this sort of object in potentiality but not that: and that it be such that just as the perceptual faculty is to the objects of perception, so reason will be to the objects of thought."¹

Hylomorphism was partly developed as a theory to deal with the aporetic problem of characterising and explaining the life of living beings in terms of their essence. The essence-specifying definition of the human form of *psuche*, namely, the rational animal capable of discourse, is the result of reasoning in a hylomorphic categorical framework (special ontology) embedded in the general

ontological framework of "to on he (i)". There are 4 categories of change in the realm of thought and this realm is, in turn, connected to three types of "form-communication" in the world, the most important of which is, education of a student by a teacher (the other two types of form-communication being sexual reproduction and the transmission of skills to materials or apprentices). This accords well with the Aristotelian claim earlier in *De Anima*, that whilst change in what O Shaughnessy called the "psychological" realm of sensation, perception and feeling (which has to do with one state of mind being removed and being replaced with another (privation)), change in the "mental" realm, where thought occurs, takes place in accordance with a context of explanation/understanding which moves toward understanding the essence of things.

In Plato's *Republic* we are given one of the first accounts of the pleasure-pain principle operating in the "psychological" realm. Plato claims that pleasure in its more primitive form results from the relief that occurs with the fading away of pain or suffering but, he maintains, the pleasure of learning is not so constituted, and is essentially related to the understanding of thought and the forms. In such a journey up the psychological hierarchy of emotions, we encounter the form of truth on the way to the terminus of the knowledge of The Good. In the case of the more primitive form of pleasure, we appear to be involved with a dialectic of opposites succeeding one another, and in the latter more complex form, we encounter a categorical end to a categorical process. This primitive form of pleasure-pain is obviously connected to the dialectic of wish fulfillments and anxieties Freud's patients were experiencing. It was in this context that Freud introduced Thanatos, the death instinct, as an explanation of why the Reality Principle was not functioning in the lives of these patients. He encountered among other things an interruption of understanding by a repetition emanating from a past trauma: a repetition that appeared to be immune from the normal processes of forgetfulness.

The *Metaphysics* of Aristotle begins with pointing out that all rational animals capable of discourse desire to know². This desire operates at both the psychological and the mental levels (using O Shaughnessy's special ontology). At the higher level of the mental, it is involved in the contemplation of knowledge. Contemplation is not purely theoretical for Aristotle, being unequivocally related to the practical idea of *eudaimonia* which we suggest is best translated in such contexts, not as happiness, but rather as the good spirited flourishing life. For Aristotle contemplation is concerned with the essence of being (*onta*).

Christopher Shields in his work on Aristotle³ refers to Anaxagoras who is mentioned several times in the *Metaphysics*. Anaxagoras and his claim that "All

is mind" was responsible for the "Socratic turn" away from investigations of the physical world. Shields formulates the Aristotelian argument for the position that the mind is essentially a potentiality and actualises itself in thought. He extracts 4 premises from the argument presented in *De Anima*:

1. Mind thinks all things (DA429a18)
2. Hence, mind is unmixed (DA429a18)
3. Hence, the nature of mind is nothing other than to be something potential (DA429a 21-22)
4. Hence, mind is none of the things existing in actuality before it thinks (429a22-24)⁴

Metaphysics concerns itself with the many meanings of Being: with potentiality being an important aspect to consider in contexts of explanation/understanding.

Politis, in his work "Aristotle and the Metaphysics"⁵, claims that 15 aporetic questions delineate this realm of Being qua Being, and many "First principles" emerge in this exercise of "First Philosophy". With the consideration of these first principles in this contemplative activity we have reached ground zero in the context of explanation/understanding. In most of the sciences the adventure begins with knowledge of a few categories of being and continues via sense perception (in a context of exploration/discovery). The next phase of the process generates basic general terms and moves to the next level of generalisation which may, or may not be, principles. In the science of metaphysics, on the other hand, we begin with puzzles generated by the contemplation of principles and use the first principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason to untie the knots in our thinking about Being. Aporetic questions are posed and answered in the wake of mental activity occurring in the spirit of puzzlement and concern, and best expressed in the question "WHY?". When we are contemplating at the level of first principles it is, of course, the case that there may be more than one possible answer to our question and the subsequent discussion may appear dialectical (thesis-antithesis). The answers given to our question at this level of reflection ought not to be the *doxa* (opinions) of the many, unless these opinions have been subjected to the contemplation of the issues involved via the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. This becomes obvious when we peruse the 15 *aporia* from Metaphysics Book 3.

In previous volumes of this work we have characterised the Aristotelian architectonic in terms of the three "categories" of the sciences: Theoretical science (Theology, Maths, Physics, Biology), Practical Science (Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, Economics, and Grammar), Productive science (Mimetic

arts, crafts, medicine, psychoanalysis). Logic, in the form of the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason, are presupposed in all of these sciences and from the above list it is also apparent that sciences from different "categories" can be linked together: Psychoanalysis, for example, integrates the concerns of both Medicine and Psychology. A number of the aporia in Book 3 aim at answering the question whether it is the task of Metaphysics (First Philosophy) to investigate all of the different kinds of explanations of things. The answer we have given to this question in the course of this work is that the task of First Philosophy is to investigate the changeless realm of forms in the three media of change (space, time, matter), the 4 kinds of change, three principles of change, and 4 causes of change. These investigations occur in the architectonic of sciences referred to above. First principles and logic will serve as the *arché* of the architectonic. The question we posed in the beginning of this chapter, namely, "Ask of everything what it is in its nature?" appears therefore to be the overarching question originating from the investigation into First Principles and will permeate the activity of all the sciences. The Theoretical sciences are concerned with substance in its various forms, e.g. in physics and biology, and perhaps theoretically oriented psychology (situated in a context of events and causes). Practical sciences differentiate themselves from the Theoretical sciences via the concern with human actions in both categorical and instrumental circumstances: actions conducted in the spirit of *areté* and *epistémé*. Productive sciences are concerned with things produced in the spirit of *techné* for individual, family, and communal purposes. All these sciences are human activities and are covered by the opening words of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which claim that all activities aim at the good. This aligns Aristotle with Platonistic Metaphysics which also subsumed the form of the True under the form of the Good.

The beginning of *Metaphysics* Book 3 states that whilst it is important to refer to the history of the discussion of an aporetic question, the problem one is addressing is not necessarily in the thinking (conceived as being logically disconnected from its object) but rather, as Aristotle, puts it, the problem is that of untying the "knots in the object". Seen from the perspective of our modern conception of thought, where there is no necessary connection of thought to its object, this appears to be a puzzling claim. We are here reminded of the discussion by Heidegger of the aporetic question "Why are there essents rather than nothing?"⁶ Heidegger is attempting in his reflections to untie the knots in the discussions of those that might affirm that we cannot know that there are essents. His aim is to demonstrate that modern man suffers from the malady of "forgetfulness of Being". Heidegger claims that his question is the widest and deepest of all questions, attempting as it does, to embrace even our relation to nothingness. We are inquiring into something extraordinary: into a foundation constructed by first principles. Heidegger also addresses the concerns of the

theoretical science of physics. He claims that physics is about the physical changes in the realm of things: including things that emerge in the course of change and linger on. Heidegger uses the term "power" (P 15) in the context of this actualisation process of emergence and enduring, and Aristotle is singled out. Unfortunately one of the results of this discussion is that Heidegger draws the conclusion that Metaphysics and Philosophy are not sciences at all, and it is also claimed that logic is somehow a secondary discipline of thinking. Thought, for Heidegger, has the primary characteristic of *aletheia*--revealing (undisclosing) essences which are present. It is not at all clear how the sciences can be held together by mere *aletheia*, and Heidegger adds the complaint that all that unites the scientific disciplines is the technical organisation (*techné*) of the universities which have assisted in transforming man's "spirited existence" into (mere) "intelligence". Even Language according to Heidegger has lost its moorings to what is essential in Life---language is no longer a safe harbour for the understanding of Being. It can no longer show the fullness of the permanence of being and its fundamental relation to, and difference from, processes of Becoming.

Works of Language such as *Oedipus Rex* were works of unconcealment (*aletheia*) revealing the form of *Dasein* (Being-there) we find manifested in many works of tragic drama. The journey of *Oedipus* terminates in the downfall of a great King. Both Greek Philosophy and Greek Poetry, Heidegger argues, are therefore ontologically significant, and reveal Being qua Being in their different ways. Our forgetfulness of the aporetic questions connected with asking of Being, (what it is in its nature), is partly due, Heidegger argues, to the Latinisation of the Greek language, and the Romanisation of Greek Culture in which thought, for example, is construed in terms of "intelligere", allowing a form of intellectualism to emerge that is more in the spirit of *techné* than *epistémé*. In the same spirit, *Logos* becomes logic (mathematical logic—set theory), and in that translation process, lost its relation to the world. The task of untying the knots in the objects of thought became an impossible endeavour. The foundations were being laid for the theoretical distinction between subject and object, with Being situated on the side of the object, and thought situated on the side of the Subject. Heidegger argues against this state of affairs and refers to a fragment of *Parmenides* in which it is claimed:

"Thinking and Being are the same"⁷

This, for Heidegger, carries the true meaning of *Logos*. Unfortunately, in the context of this discussion, Heidegger claims (without textual evidence) that the process of concealing the true meaning of *Logos* began with Aristotle and his linkage of *logos* to the notion of truth as correctness. This interpretation of Aristotle, we have argued previously in this work, probably emerged when Aristotles works were translated into Latin by translators with a clerical interest

in the use of his works. Aletheia was suddenly related to the struggle against what is false (or "pseudos"). Determining something as something in this process became the intellectual adventure of avoiding claiming something that might conceivably be false or misleading: aletheia became a technical issue. In this process values such as arché, diké, areté, and epistémé became factual matters to be determined by a subject grasping a dualistic correspondence of a thought to reality. Much was lost in this parsing of Greek Culture and this loss was exacerbated by the fact that the activity of Philosophy never found an institutional home until Kant appeared on the University and Philosophical stage during the Enlightenment era (Philosophy schools were closed in 6th century AD). The guild system that dominated social institutions in the 18th century unfortunately contributed to what Heidegger characterised as the loose technical organisation of the universities. Latin had become the "academic language" and the guild principle of specialisation dominated these institutions. The principle of specialisation operating in Universities assisted in the marginalisation of the Aristotelian-Kantian tradition.

Aristotle's Ontological architectonic of disciplines, on the other hand, provided us with criteria by which to distinguish groups of disciplines but it ought also to be pointed out that the proliferation of disciplines in universities is still today more in accordance with the principle of specialisation than philosophical principles. Aristotle, for example clearly distinguishes the science of nature (Physics) from the practical and productive sciences, at Metaphysics 1064:

"There is a science of nature, and evidently it must be different both from the practical and from productive science. For in the case of productive science the principle of production is in the producer and not in the product, and is either an art or some other capacity. And similarly in practical science the movement is not in the thing done, but rather in the doers. But the science of the natural philosopher deals with the things that have in themselves a principle of movement. It is clear from these facts, then, that natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but theoretical...And since each of the sciences must somehow know the "what" and use this as a principle, we must not fail to observe how the natural philosopher should define things and how he must state the formula of the substance--"⁸

The theoretical formula of the substance we designate as human psuche, then, for Aristotle is "rational animal capable of discourse". This is the formula that Aristotle believes will help untie the knots in objects related to psuche (forms of life) which modern science has, in the case of the human form of life, demoted to the realm of "the subjective". Many commentators have failed to appreciate the scope and depth of this formula or essence-specifying definition, claiming, for example, that it lacks reference to the law of causality. The definition, however, is clearly teleological, instantiating or actualising the potentiality or form of the substance we designate as human psuche. The definition also designates the archeological origins of man by pointing to his animal nature, claiming that the powers of the human being are developments and

modifications of animal instincts. Principles become paramount in the explanation and understanding of the substance of human psuche and its powers of language and rationality. Here rationality is manifested in all three domains of the theoretical, practical and productive. Both discourse and rationality are civilisation building capacities and powers. Every science, Aristotle argues, seeks principles and causes in the realm of infinite media (space,time, matter) and the 4 kinds of change.

Accidental happenings or phenomena have no cause or principle attached to them. Whilst there is no doubt that such phenomena exist, there is no attempt on the part of any science to explain them. This applies also to superstitious correlations of happenings such as the act of the witch doctor piercing the head of a doll, and the headache of the man in the next village. Accidental correlations can never occur necessarily.

Empirical Movement (behaviour) is the focus of behaviourist theory and this, together with other naturalistic theories of human activity, is categorical, and can be studied by the sciences, but Aristotle points out that substances as such cannot move: movement is confined to the categories of quality, quantity, and place. Subjects such as agents and patients are hylomorphic entities, and phenomena connected to them, are to be subsumed under the categories of activity and passivity. What "changes" in agents and patients, is not their nature (rational animals capable of discourse) but rather their qualities, the place they are in, or their size, (e.g. they become musical by learning to play an instrument or sing, they move from Stagira to Athens, they become taller as they reach adolescence). The logical consequence of this argument is that, if human nature could be changed by the forms of activity related to quality, quantity, and place, we would no longer be dealing with human psuche. For Aristotle something must endure in a change occurring in accordance with his three principles: that from which a thing changes, that toward which a thing changes, and that which endures throughout the change.

The death of a human being is an interesting topic to discuss in this context because of the Socratic witticism in his death cell. He is asked what should be done with him after his death and he replies to his friends, saying that they can do what they wish with his body, because they will not find him after the event of his death. What is meant by this is elaborated upon by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*:

"But we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases this may be so: e.g. the soul may be of this sort--not all soul but the reason: for doubtless it is impossible that all soul should survive."⁹

Aristotle goes on to claim that the ideas of the soul would disappear with the parts of the soul that do not survive, but rationality as a power, principle, or form, would not. We know that Socrates clearly believed that the essence of his soul was connected to his rationality--this was his substance, and this in turn was the reason for his commitment to leading the examined life. This form of life, according to Aristotle is the prime mover of humanity. Desire will obviously die with the event of death and this may be why Eros, in Greek mythology, is portrayed not as a God but as a bare footed figure padding around the city, searching for what alludes him.

Psyche, then, is embedded in the larger Aristotelian matrix of matter, form, privation, moving causes, and the eternal unmovable substance. In this matrix neither movement nor time can come into being--both are also eternal and unchanging--when regarded as principles--but they also can be conceived as the matter of experience waiting to be formed. They are not however to be identified with physical substances, but rather with the processes of change in which these substances are embedded. They are categorical in the sense that they are what endure throughout change--not particular movements measured mathematically, nor particular times measured by our clocks and calendars, but rather movement as such and time as such (the absolute time of Newton?)

The soul we know moves itself, as do the heavens. For the soul the "starting point" is thought and this is partly why it is important to untie the knots in the object by leading the examined/contemplative life that is connected to the kind of pleasure that is not the consequence of privation (relief from pain). The principles are "that for the sake of which", (Aristotle argues at *Metaphysics* 1072b1 2021), and the fact is that thought thinks itself because it is the same as the object, and when it is active it possesses this object. Aristotle sometimes identifies this kind of thought with the divine and God--a being that is eternal, and good.

We humans tend to think of movement not as substance but in terms of change of place and quantitatively, which are minor categories of Being (which we ought to recall has many meanings). God is identified with primary being and primary movement. He is the unmoved mover, and this is the closest Aristotle comes to a formula for the divine. The divine embraces the self movement of the soul as well as that of the heavens. God is such that his/her perfection demands that he/she is both thinking of the movement of the heavens or rational human psyche activity in divine time (one day= a billion human years?) and simultaneously thinking of him/her self. This contemplative activity ensures that eternal primary change is never a change for the worse but always a change for the better participating in the One, complete Good.

Non-accidental movement and time as conceived by rational animals capable of discourse are ordered in terms of principles. The Kantian image which best illustrates this, is that of the ship steaming downstream. The Good order we witness here is that in which the before and after organise both the nows and the movement. Everything related to the primary first principle of God will be so ordered including life forms, since God is, according to Aristotle, alive. All things connected by principles manifest themselves as rational and divine and have some relation to divine time. The wisdom of this divine matrix is manifested in the forms which are primary and there is nothing, Aristotle argues (1076b120-21), which is contrary to the forms that constitute Primary Being. Primary Being orders the forms into One. There is only one ruler (designer) of the universe.

In Book 13 Aristotle raises the question of the nature of Mathematics. Plato in his Republic had already demoted Mathematics to an intermediate level of Being between the forms and sensible things. Aristotle continues in this vein and asks how it could be possible that anything such as the heavens, which are moved, could exist apart from our sensible experience of them, and he also wonders how a line or a plane could be animate. Such mathematical objects appear to be wholly constituted by a formula, e.g. a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, but they nevertheless, Aristotle argues, do not exist separately from the sensible realm as "substances". This is part of the argument that "existence" has many senses:

"It is true to say without qualification that the objects of mathematics exist and with the character ascribed to them by the mathematician...if its subjects happen to be sensible, though it does not treat them qua sensible, the mathematical sciences will not for that reason be sciences of sensibles, nor, on the other hand, of other things separate from the sensibles."¹⁰

Given the obvious fact that mathematics manifests order to a high degree, we can, therefore, without difficulty attribute both the good and the beautiful to mathematical thinking. The order of the sensible world, on the other hand, according to Heraclitus, is in a state of flux, and the things in that world are many. In such circumstances non-sensible ideas claim a degree of universality which gets expressed in definitions of these sensible things--such definitions aim at the unity of One Substance, and the definition provides us with knowledge of this substance. This knowledge also manifests its relation to the good, because it is self-sufficient and a good-in-itself. Both of these qualities are important characteristics of the examined contemplative life. All forms which share in this unity are therefore, on Plato's theory, subsumed under the idea or form of the Good. Mathematics is clearly an activity of calculation and can be applied to the real concrete world of sensible particulars on the condition we make certain quantitative and relational assumptions, and are prepared to deal with quantitative and relational abstractions of things (images). The formulae for

these images function like principles. Mathematics therefore manifest both categorical and hypothetical aspects (e.g. Let $x = 10$).

Principles (non sensible things) "exist", according to Aristotle, in a certain sense of "exist". When principles are referred to in essence-specifying definitions, they "really" occur in contexts of explanation/understanding, which in turn refer to particular things we have discovered in our inductive explorations in contexts of discovery. Both of these contexts are important for science in general, but insofar as the scientific account of particulars like Socrates are concerned, the starting point is the definition, namely, rational animal capable of discourse. Inductive investigations will reveal, however, that he was born in Athens, annoyed some people in the agora, and died in Athens. This is the study of Socrates as "aestheta", and many other knowledge claims embodying principles emanating from different sciences, and even different kinds of science (theoretical, practical, productive) can also be made. In this context, a starting point for Aristotle, is not something that belongs in the context of discovery /explanation, but rather something that belongs in a context of explanation /understanding. It is used to organise activity in the context of exploration /discovery. His starting point is more motivated by a *quaestio juris* than a *quaestio facti*. Inductive investigations hope that generalisations will emerge that go beyond the data. A merely inductive generalisation resulting from the observation of the death of Socrates: one which did not go beyond the data, however, might conclude with the generalisation "The state ought to put Philosophers to death". Such a generalisation would be the result of an empirical assumption about the world that it is merely a totality of facts. Principles relating to the *quaestio juris*--how we ought to conceive of cases-- are excluded in such contexts of explanation. In these contexts it is the principle that is the starting point and the outcomes are the judgements-- guilty-not guilty --and this is the *telos* of such justice-related activities. From the point of view of the *quaestio juris* one does not need an investigation into whether people murder other people--one already knows that fact. The law is normative, and there is no interest in the verification of such facts. One of the primary functions of the fact is to describe and not to prescribe. The different sciences use both *quaestio facti* and *quaestio juris* (prescriptive principles, in Wittgenstein's language:"norms of representation") to provide us with the answer to questions relating to what things are, where they have come from, and how these things are knowable. Prescribing takes the form of "Ask of everything what it is in its nature" in the context of explanation/understanding, and it is certainly a more difficult endeavour in the case of Mathematics which appears to be primarily concerned with shapes and numbers. Different sciences: e.g. Biology (which concerns itself with living beings), e.g. Philosophical Psychology (which concerns itself with rational animals capable of discourse), and e.g. Metaphysics (which concerns itself with the whole realm of Being) will use the above prescription in various

ways. Metaphysics will also ask the ontological questions relating to what something is, and why it is so, as well as the epistemological question of how a rational animal capable of discourse is capable of knowledge. We should recall here that the Metaphysics opens with the epistemological claim that all human beings desire to know.

Aristotle's idea of form differs from that of Plato, partly because of his rejection of the substantive dualism involved but also because Aristotle's logical principles apply, according to Politis, to both things, and our statements or thought about things. In the context of this discussion, Politis in his work "Aristotle and the Metaphysics", points to an important pseudo-distinction insisted upon by the "new men" of our modern age (e.g. Russell) between statements/thoughts about things and the things themselves. More accurately it is claimed in the name of Logic (the discipline of which was the creation of Aristotle) and its principles that the principle of noncontradiction (PNC) is a principle about the thought or statements about things rather than about those things themselves. Russell's philosophical program went in many different directions during his writing career, but his idea of the separation of logic and metaphysics remained relatively constant over a long period of time. It can be argued that, apart from sharing the widespread phobia for idealism common to the academics of the period, Russell also focussed upon a narrow sense of "exist" that we encounter in both his theory of descriptions and in his wider program of logical atomism. Metaphysics was anathema to Russell who appreciated neither Hylomorphic nor Kantian Critical Metaphysics. Politis formulates Aristotle's metaphysical commitment to PNC in the following way:

"Evidently Aristotle thinks that PNC is true both with regard to statements and with regard to things. But he appears to be especially interested in the question of whether PNC is true with regard to things."¹¹

This is a wider and deeper conception of "existence" than anything we can find in Russell or the work of the early Wittgenstein. It could also be argued that one of the major differences in the different conceptions is that both Russell and Wittgenstein situate "existence" in a context of exploration/discovery, whereas Aristotle situates "existence" in a context of explanation/understanding in which PNC and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) are determining explanatory factors. Rationality is, of course present in both types of context, but in different forms. The role of logic, for example, in the context of exploration/discovery is limited, and confined with the logic of the relation of concepts rather than the logic of the relation of statements. All deductive argument is regulated by PNC and PSR. PNC, Aristotle argues, although necessary for scientific demonstration cannot itself be demonstrated by outside principles. His argument is basically a humanistic one appealing to the education of those that know what can and what cannot be demonstrated.

Politis's discussion is important because it draws attention to a possible important difference between the views of Aristotle and Kant on this issue.

He argues that Kant believes PNC to be a transcendental Principle but he does not provide textual argument or any other argument for the claim outlined below:

"Why cannot PNC be both a transcendental and a metaphysical principle? In a sense it can. That is to say, in so far as PNC, in its metaphysical formulation, is true simply about things, it is a metaphysical principle: and insofar as PNC is a necessary condition for the possibility of thought and language about things, it can in a loose sense be called a transcendental principle. The question, however, is whether PNC is true of things because it is a necessary condition for the possibility of thought and language about things."¹²

One of the issues involved is the question of the type of idealism we may attribute to Kant. In the Prolegomenon it is clear that we are not dealing with the empirical idealism of Descartes or the mystical idealism of Berkeley:

"My idealism concerns not the existence of things since it never came into my head to doubt this: but it concerns the sensuous representations of things, to which space and time especially belong. Regarding space and time and consequently, regarding all appearances in general, I have only shown that they are neither things (but are mere modes of representation) nor are they determinations belonging to things in themselves.. But the word "transcendental", which for me never means a reference of our cognition to things, but only to our faculty of cognition, was meant to obviate this misconception... Yet, I now retract it and desire this idealism to be called "critical".¹³

The "loose" sense of "transcendental" referred to by Politis is not that employed by Kant in his work "Philosophy of Material Nature" (trans Ellington J. Indianapolis, Hacker Publishing) 1985. Ellington in his introduction to the above work claims:

"Metaphysical and transcendental principles require a priori philosophical justifications showing how it is that principles which in their origin owe nothing to experience are nevertheless applicable to experience. For example, according to the transcendental principle of efficient causation, all things change in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect."¹⁴

Another use of the term "transcendental" occurs later on in Ellington's Introduction:

"The transcendental concept of substance is one of an unchanging subject to which changing predicates belong: this is the most general vision that we can have of a phenomenal object"¹⁵

The Metaphysics of material nature requires the principle of the application of transcendental concepts to matter. We can see that neither of these uses of the

notion of "transcendental" by Kant as reported by Ellington resembles Politis's "loose" sense of "transcendental". There is, in other words, nothing to prevent us from situating both Aristotle and Kant in the same philosophical

territory insofar as their views of the relations between the metaphysical and the transcendental are concerned.

It is certainly true to claim, as Politis does, that if PNC is not valid, then one necessary consequence of this is that we would not be able to talk or think about things, but we should also add that the reason for this is that, for Aristotle, there is a logical relation between thought and object in contexts of explanation /understanding.

Rationality in the context of movement and action by animals capable of discourse is the subject of study by the practical sciences. Here too the logical relation of thought and object appears present according to Politis's interpretation:

"Such animals, we are asked to recall, are directly moved by their own rational thought and desire, when they deliberate and come to recognise that something is good and worth pursuing. As Aristotle points out here: "reason (nous) is moved by the object that is rationally thought of (to noëson)"(1072a30).

But while the thought and desire of an animal changes when the animal moves as a result of its thought and desire, the **object** of desire, (i.e., what is recognised as good and worth pursuing) need not change. For example, if I can reason that a certain kind of exercise is necessary in order to secure health, which I recognise to be a good thing and worth pursuing, then (supposing that I am sufficiently rational) my desires will change and they will cause me to change. But the object that I recognise to be good and worth pursuing, health, does not change, and it does not need to change in order to cause me to pursue it."¹⁶

The "objects" of health, courage, justice, and wisdom are goods, both in themselves and in their consequences, and the above is Aristotle's answer to Glaucon's challenge to Socrates in the Republic. Socrates was urged to prove that Justice was both good in itself and good in its consequences. Both in Plato's view and on Aristotle's view the objects of knowledge are also Good. Perusing the pages of *De Anima* one might also want to insist that *psuche* is a good object in itself. Being alive is, of course, connected to being healthy and the *telos* of *eudaimonia* (a good spirited flourishing life). *Psuche*, then, is both cause and principle of the forms of life we know about. Christopher Shields argues cogently for the souls being the *telos* or final cause of the body (P.276) and also for the essential unity and self sufficiency of the soul in the following argument (P.281):

1. A body is a unified entity, composed of several parts.
2. If it is unified, then it has a principle of unity.
3. If that principle of unity cannot be the body itself, then it must be the soul.
4. Hence the principle of unity for the body is the soul.
5. The soul itself either has parts or is simple.
6. If the soul has parts, then since it is a unity, it too has a principle of unity.
7. The soul either contains its own principle of unity (by being essentially a unity) or is unified in virtue of some external principle of unity.
8. There is no plausible external principle of unity for the soul.
9. Hence the soul contains its own principle of unity (by being essentially a unity)
10. If the soul is essentially a unity, the soul is a metaphysical simple.
11. Hence the soul is a metaphysical principle.¹⁷

The soul is a metaphysical simple, presumably because it is self sufficient (e.g self-moving) and thereby essentially connected to "The Good". Aristotle's argument is directed both at the substantial dualism of Plato and the materialistic theories of his times, which even then, were seeking to eliminate metaphysical principles of the soul. The form and matter (soul and body) of a rational animal capable of discourse are one and the same in the same way in which a piece of wax and its shape cannot be separated. It is now easier to understand the hylomorphic characterisation of thought as something which is moving toward fulfilment in knowledge and action. Thinking and thought are both potentialities and become actualised when activated. Their form of existence, when not activated, is potentiality: actuality is their telos in the mode of contemplation that is situated fairly and squarely in a context of explanation/understanding. Shields does well to remind us, however, of the Delphic oracles complex challenge passed down to humanity, namely to know ourselves. This may be the aporetic problem par excellence and require a lifetime of contemplation of all the theoretical sciences including their metaphysical and logical aspects, all the practical sciences and perhaps some of the productive sciences.

Notes on Chapter 11

¹*The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation*, Edited by Barnes, J., (Princeton, Princeton University Press, Two Volumes, 1984, De Anima 429a13-18)

² *Ibid*, *Metaphysics*, 980a1

³ *Aristotle*, Shields, C., (Routledge, London, 2007)

⁴ *Ibid*. P.307

⁵ *Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, Politis, V., (London, Routledge, 2004)

⁶*Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger, M., Trans. by Mannheim, R., (London, Yale University Press, 1959)

⁷Ibid. fragment 5, P.136.

⁸*The Complete works of Aristotle*

⁹Ibid. Meta--1070a 24-28

¹⁰ Ibid. 1078a2 2-4

¹¹*Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, P.123

¹² Ibid. P.136

¹³ *Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics*, Kant, I., Trans by Ellington, J., W., (Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing Company, 1977, 293)

¹⁴ *Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Material Nature*, Trans by Ellington J., W., (Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing Company, 1985, PXV)

¹⁵ Ibid. PXV

¹⁶*Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, P.277

Chapter 12: The Legacy of Aristotle in Practical Philosophy

The Enlightenment is an era in which the hylomorphic Philosophy of Aristotle transforms itself into a broader metaphysical view in which it is claimed that the practical reasoning governing our conduct is regulated by both principles and a moral law. One aspect of this transformation was a more formal reorganisation of the Aristotelian ideas of *arché* and *psuche*, in relation to the arts and sciences involved in leading the good spirited flourishing life (*eudaimonia*). In this reorganisation, perhaps the biological determinants of *psuche* fell away in favour of the more psychologically oriented determinants. We maintain, however, that the essence-specifying definition of Aristotle, namely rational animal capable of discourse, is embraced by Kant, and this can be seen in the later elaboration upon Kantian Philosophy by Freud's Philosophical Psychology. This latter aspect is best manifested in Kant's work "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view".

Kant's reorganisation also emphasised the primacy of practical reasoning and a system of concepts orbiting around the theme of agency and the categorical activity of Action. Action for Kant, retains the quality of bringing about good in an environment of a world "worlding", and subjecting oneself to events that happen: events calling upon the agent for action. In this arena of reasoning the account we are given, or the "logos" of the phenomena we encounter, refers to world-building instrumental actions that transmit the "forms" of children, artefacts (houses etc) and important ideas in the community. For Kant, as for Aristotle, Action and all forms of activity aim at goods-in-themselves such as health, courage, justice, and wisdom, (in the spirit of *areté*, *arché*, *diké*, *phronesis*, *eros*, and *eudaimonia*). Kant's Political Philosophy can also be seen to be a sophisticated elaboration upon the hylomorphic naturalism of Aristotelianism: one which, coming as it does millennia after the fall of city states to the empire-builders, proposes a view of a cosmopolitan fully global "kingdom" of ends lying one hundred thousand years in the future (a kingdom that will be based on universal human rights which could not exist without acceptance of the categorical imperative of a moral law).

In this account Kant embraces the necessity of man's social/political nature, a necessity that requires "good" laws and public education to realise human potential to the full. Kant also shares with Aristotle an appreciation of the value of religion. There is perhaps a shift away from the centrality of the theoretical idea of God, toward the practical idea of the freedom, but there is nevertheless a firm commitment to an idea of the divine and the sacred that sees man's rationality as limited in form compared to the thought of eternal unchanging Being whose primary form surpasses our limited understanding. The good will, for Kant, is the will guided by the forms or principles of

noncontradiction and sufficient reason, and he often refers to this absolute in terms of the "holy will". Man may be composed of the material of "crooked timber" (his animality) but he has sublime potential which can be realised in actualisation processes that occur with the assistance of principles: processes that aim at the ultimate good of a kingdom of ends.

The focus upon the practical idea of Freedom was undoubtedly a Kantian contribution which, to some extent, revised hylomorphic ethical and political philosophy. The idea that "Everything created by man was destined for ruin and destruction" was a reference by the oracle, not just to the crooked timber of humanity, but also to the way in which the potential to become a good being, with a good will, living in a good community, was being stifled by the ways in which we were choosing to organise these communities. The Aristotelian focus upon justice needed to be complemented by an idea of freedom that respected universal human rights and this in turn required the political creation of an international institution whose responsibility it was to protect these human rights internationally (The United Nations).

Centuries of discussion of the idea of "I think, therefore I am" enabled the construction of a very abstract and theoretical idea of consciousness, and this discussion was certainly on Kant's mind when he was formulating his critical Philosophy. Criticism of the Philosophies of the "new men", e.g. Descartes and Hobbes, with arguments resembling those used by Aristotle to criticise the dualism and materialism of his time, was a priority of the Kantian agenda. The Kantian "architectonic" of the canon of sciences, resting upon a metaphysical and logical foundation, was also reminiscent of the Aristotelian project. Kant, however, does not seek to authenticate the proliferation of university subjects of his time and probably was suspicious of both the principle of specialisation that reflected the guild structure of the towns and cities of the time, and the instrumental/pragmatic spirit in which many subjects were taught. The new men had certainly succeeded in launching a search for what was new and different at the expense of "first principles". The Enlightenment spirit of "sapere aude" was, with the advent of Hegelian Philosophy, being diluted by a spirit in which some felt that everything was possible, and many felt that nothing was possible anymore. The real realm of possibility was obscured by the self-obsessed fantasy constructions of a manic-depressive "spirit".

The Spirit of the Enlightenment, up to the point of Hegel's appearance, rivalled the Spirit of the Golden Age of Greece. Hegel, it can be argued constructed a form of idealism in which the retinal image of Culture was turned upside down and the world was seen through a pair of Stratton spectacles darkly---North became South in the name of dialectical logic. It

would not be, however, until the World was ravaged by two World Wars in the twentieth century, that an attempt was made to remove the spectacles and see real possibilities again. In the interim, Freudian Psychology would chart the contours of insanity in the spirit of Kantian Psychology, and in a way that acknowledged mans instinctive endowment in hylomorphic terms. After the second world war, an old Kantian "possibility" was realised with the creation of the United Nations, and the war against totalitarianism was fought on the terrain of human rights. The metaphysics of Morality had condensed from a cloud of potentiality into the actuality of a global organisation. The metaphysics of Politics also began to return to the Aristotelian idea of the "Politics of the golden mean" and public education began the task of educating the "classical" (Aristotelian) middle class of men. Both freedom and justice were important ideas in the restoration of what had been lost.

Restoration was also on the agenda of the later Wittgenstein when he retreated from his earlier position of reductive logical atomism, and began using Aristotelian phrases such as "forms of life" in the context of a Philosophy of Action that was neither behaviourist nor pragmatic, but shared some of the commitments of hylomorphic and critical rationalism. The unique focus of Wittgenstein was, however, on the medium of communication, namely language, but it nevertheless succeeded in providing the philosophical community with arguments against logical atomism, logical positivism, non hylomorphic forms of naturalism, instrumentalism, pragmatism, phenomenism, existentialism etc. This "change of mind" reshaped the philosophical landscape sufficiently for both hylomorphism and critical Philosophy to reemerge as significant historical landmarks. Wittgenstein insisted that Language had a rational structure, and thereby avoided the relativism associated with a blunt "language creates the world" formula. For Wittgenstein grammatical investigations were essence-specifying activities, and therefore presupposed the rational principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason shared by both Aristotle and Kant.

Language--for Wittgenstein--was an activity embedded in a form of life and had the teleological function of aiming at the good. Whether the concept of "language-games" embedded in these forms of life was a useful one or not, remains to be fully evaluated. A game is minimally constituted of moves (e.g. Kn to QB4), rules, and principles (Protect your queen), but somehow the seriousness of the world appears to be missing in such an idea. Both life and the issue of the quality of life are serious matters, and reducing them to conventional regulation by rules would not be taken seriously by either Aristotle or Kant. Neither Philosopher would, for example, consider viewing the laws regulating life and the quality of ones life in a society as arbitrarily conventional. The idea of the rule governed game does, however, have the

advantage of closing down the number of real possibilities that can occur in the course of the development of sequences of events.

The number of possible "moves" of possible "agents" is circumscribed, and because it is so, is therefore amenable to mathematical calculation using Bayes' theorem (the probability of an event occurring is determined by the information we have relating to that event). If the field of variables to be calculated is indeterminate or "open", no value can be calculated. The idea of a game (being a closed field of variables) therefore, is one way of introducing mathematics into the arena of the social sciences, but it is important to note that the introduction of this concept is at best hypothetical (if human activity is regulated by rules, then we can determine its value). Both Plato and Aristotle would regard the introduction of mathematics into the field of human action as problematic on the grounds that mathematics manipulates abstract images of things rather than those things themselves. Games and images, for serious philosophers concerned with Being qua being and first principles, do not engage with the seriousness of life and its catastrophes and calamities each of which is capable of bringing the ruin and destruction of all our hopes and desires. It is this latter aspect of life that is the concern of Ethics and the categorical forms of language that govern this region of our existence. Kant went in search of an absolute in the arena of ethics and found it in the form of the idea of the good will. To use a Wittgensteinian metaphor to describe this hylomorphic "move", one could claim that a cloud of practical Philosophy was condensed into a drop of Philosophical Psychology. One needs, however, to detach the idea of a game from this reflection and insert the idea of a good will into a hylomorphic framework of first principles, thought, self-knowledge, and self-sufficiency for it to become completely intelligible. The essence-specifying definition of man as a rational animal capable of discourse also needs to be part of the apparatus of explanation/justification. Practical reasoning and first principles govern the "moves" that can be made in the ought-system of concepts we encounter in the arena of the explanation/justification of actions that aim at both the good in itself, and the good in its consequences. Universality and necessity are important features of reasoning in this system of concepts.

Needless to say, the introduction of a Cartesian inspired idea of consciousness into such a context of explanation/justification is merely going to destabilise the system. Kant in his willingness to divide the whole of the mind into the parts of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason, does however invite a non Cartesian idea of Consciousness into the arena---an invitation that would later be accepted by Freud, when he constructed a topography of forms of Consciousness differentiated into the agencies of the ego, id and superego. The three principles of Energy-Regulation, Pleasure-Pain and Reality could

well have come from Freud's reading of Aristotle earlier in his career. These are not first principles, but rather domain-regulating principles that presume a self-actualising process over a long childhood of living among the discontents of civilisation. Hughlings Jackson was also an influence on the Freudian neurological account of higher centres interacting with lower centres. The language centres of the brain and Language as an activity of the mind obviously stretches over the domains of sensibility and understanding, and perhaps over the domain of reason too. It plays an important role in the Freudian system by being the medium through which preconscious and unconscious items are brought into the "light" of consciousness, which itself, according to Freud, has an instinctive base and is in fact a vicissitude of instinct. Language, for Freud, engages with both sensibility and thought in its various forms, and becomes not just the medium of disclosure of difficult to access thoughts and feelings, but is also connected in a complex way to the memory system which is used in the process of "the talking cure". The compulsion to repeat traumatic events over and over again, for example, is partly caused by the inability to "remember" these events in the normal way (which enables the thought of the event to fade in intensity over time).

For Kant, the idea of a form of life stretches from the instinctive animal to the rational animal capable of discourse, and to the divine will, (that is not limited by the lifetime of physical organ systems that can fail with trauma or age). This continuum testifies to the inherent tragedy of the human condition that can lose the gift that makes it what it is. The form of life of the divine is unchanging and eternal for both Aristotle and Kant.

The Gods of course were the subject of Homeric concern and Homer was on Plato's mind when he considered excluding artists from his ideal Republic. Homer we know portrayed divine beings as quarrelling, deceptive beings, using humanity as a means to their selfish ends. This called into question one of the essence-specifying features of divine beings, namely, that they ought to be necessarily good. Aristotle, too, would have objected to the contamination of the idea of the divine with human qualities. Kant speaks of the divine life in terms of the holy will, but does not attribute physical action to this form of life and thereby shares with the Greeks the idea that even conceiving of the divine as acting to create the universe is inconceivable and requires an intermediate form of life, e.g. the demiurge.

Aesthetic creations of artists are activities, therefore, that ought to aim at the good in the spirit of *areté*, and this is one way in which "forms" are communicated in the polis. The other two types of forms that assist in the building of civilised communities are, the reproduction of children for these communities, and the transmission of "good" ideas in the name of education.

These latter ideas are the most important aspect of sustaining our culture, and in this respect, insofar as artists take upon themselves this role, they ought to respect the integrity of these ideas. In aesthetic contexts, for Kant, we communicate ideas of reason using categories of judgement. The best forms of art will strive to produce objects that help to explain the mysteries of human life and existence, thus promoting a self understanding that is part of the Delphic project for rational animals capable of discourse, namely to "know themselves". These objects are presented as goods-in-themselves in a context that requires a certain amount of psychic distancing from the everyday instrumental concerns of life. They also require a culture in which understanding of the media of artistic communication is an important part of the process of building a civilisation. Art, in the Aristotelian architectonic of his scientific curriculum, is a productive science which nevertheless has necessary connections with Truth and the theoretical sciences as well as "the Good" that is aimed at by the practical sciences. It was the work of Aristotle that suggested the definition of Philosophy as the systematic understanding of the world as a systematic whole. Kant continued this tradition by claiming that reason seeks for the totality of conditions for anything that happens or requires explanation or justification.

There are differences between the projects of Hylomorphic and Critical Philosophy, but we have argued in this work that the differences lie on a continuum at least insofar as basic principles and worldview are concerned. In the 20th century a contrary view positing the opposition of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics, emerged in relation to the above two projects. Let us examine this further by referring to a relatively recent work by Gerard J Hughes entitled "Aristotle on Ethics" (London, Routledge, 2001). Hughes confirms the connection we are proposing in his outline of the topic, structure and aim of Aristotle's ethics:

"What do we aim at in life? What is it that would make living worthwhile? A worthwhile life must surely involve developing our specifically human characteristics to the full. How could we find out what those are? Upon reflection we can see that what is most characteristically human about ourselves is the way in which thought colours all our lives--not just intellectual pursuits, but also our feelings and emotions, our choices and relationships. So we start by considering the ways which thought influences those traits of character which contribute to living a worthwhile fulfilled life... We need to think about choice and responsibility in more detail."¹

The conditions for understanding the meaning of these reflections are embedded in the Greek language: in the meaning of the words, areté, diké, arché, epistemé, eros, ananke, and eudaimonia. Responsibility and choice presuppose freedom as well as the right view of akrasia (weakness of the will) which, according to Aristotle, is a failure of rationality. The Nichomachean Ethics is crystal clear in its position that all activities aim at the good and the

specific relation to epistemé insofar as ethical activities are concerned is that if we know the good we will do it. Akrasia, then, as a phenomenon, is characterised as a kind of confusion caused by the cognitive system being overwhelmed by intense desires, emotions etc, in a similar way in which the functions of the body are overwhelmed by the overconsumption of alcohol. This confusion can neutralise the activation of the knowledge we have of the premises constituting the reasons for the action concerned---so the knowledge lays dormant in the system because other systems relating to the sensible part of the mind are using all available energy for their purposes.

Ethics and Politics are both Practical sciences and aim at the good, not theoretically, but with the aim of becoming Good, i.e. to possess in Kantian terms a good will. Kant, like Aristotle, views this matter in terms of the principles of logic regulating premises, e.g.

Promises ought to be kept

Jack promised Jill he would pay the money back he borrowed from her

Therefore

Jack ought to pay Jill the money he owes her

The above argument mirrors the typical form of an ought argument that refers to the virtues of Promising and honesty. We see in this argument the integration of truthfulness and areté (doing the right thing at the right time in the right way). The ought major premise is a necessary warrant for the formulation of the intention to do a particular action. Promises, we know are not merely ethically important, they are of central importance to the process of ruling in civilisation-building political activity. Promising is the arché of Politics, and is intimately related to the demand placed upon the shoulders of politicians to take responsibility. The Greeks were the first to begin the understanding of these virtues in the context of Political Power. "**Dunamis**" is one Greek term for power, and this concept is closely related to the hylomorphic ideas involved with the actualising of potential. It is also itself an idea that responds to Glaucon's challenge in the Republic to prove that Justice (diké) is both good in itself, and good in its consequences. Power in the Greek philosophical mind was related to the sacred and the divine, and thereby possessed both a civic aspect as well as a divine aspect. Dunamis was therefore a characteristic of the divine being, and something sublime and mysterious. Using the power of the law to bring Socrates to justice, for many intellectuals of the time, was a sacrilegious act, because the power that brought people together was a divine power, and it was clear at least to some

that Socrates was aiming at the good via his philosophical activities in the agora.

The Latin term "religio" contains an interesting reference to binding things together that might otherwise fall apart or fragment. The idea of *diké*, (Justice), on the other hand, contains the meaning of **separating** things that do not belong together--perhaps we can conceive of this as the drawing of a line between those possessing a good will (Socrates) and those that are weak willed (his accusers). Justice also carries with it a consequentialist idea relating to its recipients deserving what they get out of life, and here we can see the importance of the role of the system relying on agents of justice acting with a good will. That was not the case with the accusers of Socrates and a miscarriage was the inevitable result. Socrates was accused of bringing new Gods into the polis and corrupting the minds of the youth. The accusers of Socrates were, then, not just guilty of abusing a legal system but they were also defiling what was sacred.

The next great era of Cultural restoration after the Golden Age of Ancient Greece began with the Renaissance and culminated in the Enlightenment. In these centuries there was an intensification of all forms of human activity, but particularly in the arenas of Aesthetics, Ethics, Politics, and Theology. Politics was becoming more and more important than Theology, and Aesthetics was also threatening to displace Ethics at the level of individual action. The science of physics was also growing in importance. Generally in cognitive terms there was a move away from justification in terms of the principles of reason and understanding, and toward explanation in terms of the principles of judgement.

The Kantian response to this state of affairs was to shift the focus of Philosophy from Theoretical rationality to Practical rationality, to crush pseudo-metaphysical projects, and to initiate reflection into several central issues in the arena of Philosophical Psychology. In doing so Kant retained the relation of the Sublime to both Ethics and Theology. The practical idea of Freedom replaced the theoretical idea of God as the central metaphysical concern, and became a central focus of both cultural and political activity. Hegel, of course, was to destroy this web of relations with an idea of Spirit embedded in a form of dialectical reasoning best suited to contexts of exploration/discovery rather than contexts of explanation/justification.

For Hegel, the development of mans Sensibilities became more important than the development of his intellectual powers of understanding and reason. Hegel's criticism of Kant led eventually to a Romantic idea of man as sufficient unto himself, as long as he follows his instincts, emotions and passions. It was this "spirit" that was instrumental in forming the idea of

heroic "new" men for whom "everything was possible", even if the vast mass of men were beginning to feel "nothing was possible anymore". Kant's Critical Philosophy, along with its underlying hylomorphic commitments, was submerged in this new form of populism that appeared to be able to create mass movements which would later play a catastrophic role in the political events of the 20th century, where both fascism and communism found soil in which to flourish.

The Aristotelian idea that Politics ought to concern itself with noble and just actions was washed away by waves of selfish pity and fear. The Aesthetic object and its descriptions of the sensible activity of man (his feelings, emotions, passions) occupied the public stage and distracted attention from more complex explanations and justifications of world-events. The world lost its depth, and inner exploration and discovery supplanted external objective concerns. The relation between *areté* (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time) and *eudaimonia* (leading the good spirited flourishing life) was ruptured.

One curious consequence of this state of affairs and the intellectual reaction to it, was the elevation of a mathematical form of *arché* (axioms) above forms of explanations/justifications such as the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. This, some observers have noted, may have been an inheritance of the Cartesian conception of the external world in terms of a system of coordinates (by a system of thought that confirmed the existence of man in the bare terms of the Cogito argument). God "saved" the whole Cartesian system from collapsing by guaranteeing that life was not a dream from which we might at any moment awaken. At the beginning of the 20th century this commitment to mathematical forms of reasoning focussed upon German idealism as the source of fundamental confusions about the nature of reality.

For some obscure reason both Kant's Critical Philosophy and Hegel's historical actualisation of world spirit were placed inside the same pair of brackets. The Kantian arguments against materialism and dualism of the Cartesian kind were disregarded and these oppositions unsurprisingly emerged in new forms in the wake of this rejection. The idea of Consciousness also emerged as an organising principle of experience, and the imagination was appealed to as an important power of thought. Heidegger's reflections on this era of our history pointed to what he called a "forgetfulness of Being", but it nevertheless criticised Kantian appeals to Ancient rational principles and claimed that Kant had missed an opportunity to rest his whole critical philosophy upon the foundation of transcendental imagination. This forgetfulness included the forgetfulness of the objective rational quality of

the good, but Heidegger failed to acknowledge this aspect of modernism: a forgetfulness that rejected the Aristotelian argument for the good-in-itself:

"If there is some point to everything we do, something we want for its own sake and which explains why we do everything else, then obviously this has to be the good, the best of all. And there has to be some such point otherwise everything would be chosen for the sake of something else and we would have an infinite regress, with the result that it would be futile and pointless to want anything at all."²

On this account, the good spirited flourishing life would also include the qualification that nothing was lacking in such a life and this contributed to making this the most worthwhile of all forms of life: a life that is deserved only by those who have led virtuous lives. Only organisms possessing the powers of discourse and rationality could lead such lives, and whilst the power of the imagination might be important for the purposes of correctly conceiving of what is possible and what is not, it is nevertheless the case that the principles of rationality are of greater importance for determining the correctness of ones conceptions.

Aristotle's requirement that men ought to lead lives of contemplation is partly shared by Kant, but it is not clear whether Kant shares the Aristotelian characterisation of the importance of "theoria" and its connection to thought and the activity of God. It is clear however that our theoretical understanding of this Primary Being that is the manifestation of Pure Form or Pure Principle is limited, and we have more access to this pure form via our practical activities that aim at the good in the realm of the noumenal.

Arété is connected to ethical action or "deeds" in accordance with the following Aristotelian formula:

"So a virtue is a habitual disposition connected with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, a mean which is determined by reason, by which the person of practical wisdom would determine it."³

The above disposition is not connected to the disposition to feel sensations occurring in the sensible part of the mind, because, as Aristotle maintains, no one is praised or blamed for having feelings. Agents are praised or blamed for their choices and their choices build upon the reasons the agents have for doing whatever they have chosen to do. One can praise or blame the agent's reasons and we can also blame him/her for his/her character. The reference to the golden mean in the above quote is meant to highlight the processes involved in the acquisition of our habits--processes that occur primarily in the context of exploration/discovery. The reasons an agent provides us with in contexts of explanation/justification differ significantly from the reasons given in a context of exploration/discovery that occurs largely in the mode of the hypothetical.

Sufficient explanation or justification is praised and insufficient explanation/justification is blamed. Self-sufficient justification is of course a key to leading a worthwhile flourishing life. Habits can also have a technical character (*techné*) in which case we are praised or blamed for a skill we possess as measured by the quality of the objects created by those skills. This contrasts with the ethical case in which it is the reasoning leading to the intention or action that is praised or blamed and there is also an epistemic element related to our knowledge or lack of knowledge of what is good-in-itself. If we build good houses we are called a builder and this instrumental power is praised. The form of praise a man receives for his good will and good character, however, is a different form of praise and is more desirable because in our scale of values *epistémé* is more valuable than *techné* in that the former is good in itself and good in its consequences, whereas the latter has merely an instrumental value---good in its consequences.

Emotions such as carelessness or cowardice in the course of a battle are what they are, but the praise-blame system will introduce a willingness to transform ones responses into a more rational response. *Areté* is the key idea to apply here, and a part of its application to the behaviour of soldiers in battle is not just doing the right thing at the right time in the right way, but also perhaps having the right feelings at the right time and both of these can be shaped by discourse and rationality. The man whose character has been shaped by practical reasoning over a long period of time, is called a *phronimos*, a great-souled man, a virtuous man. He has become the master of the golden mean. The relation of emotions to knowledge is a complex matter involving objects we are concerned with, and ways of of being aware of the world that are regulated by the lower order principles of energy regulation, and pleasure-pain. We know that in emotional states, the world can take on the "colouring" of the emotion. In my anger, I am as likely to lash out at substitute objects as I am at the real cause/object of my anger. In such a state my perception is of a world that is hostile to my agency and intentions. Sartre calls this a magical transformation of the world, but a supplementary account comes from the work of the Later Wittgenstein which showed us how perception in the form of seeing something as something (a triangle as "half a square" or as having "fallen over") appears to be half sensibility and half thought. In such an experience, Wittgenstein implies that I can become conscious of myself as organising my experience, especially in those cases where I first see one aspect of the thing and then another. Seeing the triangle as half a square is of course less of a magical transformation than seeing it as having "fallen over". The emotions, then, might also fall on a continuum of perception and thought and be subject to regulation by different principles. Courage, for example would be a more complex entity than anger, and this might explain why we praise agents manifesting the former, and blame agents for manifesting the latter. More thought obviously appears to be involved in the

former "virtue" (areté). As we ascend the hierarchy of virtues to the wisdom of a phronimos, or ruler of a Republic, the principles involved become more abstract and require more complex explanations that may rely on the kind of knowledge we find in the architectonic of theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. These explanations/justifications will also rest upon "First Philosophy" and the higher order principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

Wittgenstein once claimed in one of his earlier "Notebooks"⁴ that the world of the happy man is a different world to that of the unhappy man. Happiness is of course a precipitate of the good-spirited flourishing life, and both Socrates and Aristotle bear witness to the way in which leading examined and contemplative lives are different forms of life to lives that lack these properties. The question "Why?" plays an important role in such lives, as does the accompanying forms of consciousness of awe and wonder at a world and a soul that appears to be susceptible to endless exploration. It is of course not difficult to think of the happy man leading a good-spirited flourishing life as someone who systematically deliberates about the Good-in-itself, Good consequences, and Good means to Good ends. This kind of deliberation occurs naturally in the context of explanation/justification, and begins with the arché of first principles, e.g. Promises ought to be kept, and ends in a particular verdict/telos of a particular action that ought to be performed. The "attitude" involved in such a deliberation is that of a Kantian judge putting questions in a tribunal whose purpose it is to reason its way to a grounded judgement. The phronimos deliberates in this fashion, in the spirit of areté, proceeding from the arché to the telos.

Perusal of the Greek language used in Athenian courts reveals the use of the terms "hekon" and "hekousion" which Hughes translates as "willingly". This is the fundamental condition required for holding someone responsible for their actions. Modern philosophical discussions of willed actions involves reference to "intention" which is technically defined (in Anscombe's work on "Intention") in terms of the agent seeing his action as falling under a particular description, e.g. "shooting a deer moving in the wood". If, as a matter of fact, it turns out that I shot my father, it is the task of the tribunal to determine whether the shooting of my father occurred intentionally or not. The presumption is that an investigation will be able to reveal the relevant facts necessary to make such a determination. What I did immediately after, during, and before, the act may contain decisive evidence, as may what knowledge I had, e.g. did I know my father was in this region of the wood. If I could not have known he was, there the tribunal must find the accused not guilty of murder, but may well find me guilty of some other criminal act relating to negligence, perhaps because sufficient precautions were not taken before the act of shooting occurred.

For Aristotle, "Eros" and "Philia" are the "bonding" conditions that shape families, villages and cities. Kant prefers the term "respect" for the attitude involved in treating people as ends in themselves, whether they be familiar figures or strangers that visit the agora. This respect even for strangers carries with it the expectation that these strangers will both understand and respect the laws of the city. The absolute of the good will that we encounter in the Kantian ethical system we can also encounter in Aristotelian philia toward strangers. Aristotle himself was a stranger in Athens as a young man. Philia is also Aristotle's term for friendship and there are three forms of friendship: relations of utility, relations of pleasure, and relations involving the good-in-itself. In relations of utility the parties involved seek mutual utilitarian benefits. In relations of pleasurable transient interaction, the utilitarian relation to the external world is to some extent suspended, e.g. in the case of the meeting with strangers and people one knows in a symposium where the collected company enjoys discourse and feasting together. In the case of the deepest forms of friendship where two people care for each other as ends in themselves, there is in this latter case, as there may not be in the former, a preparedness to sacrifice one's own goods for the person who is one's friend. Here we are clearly dealing with the goods for the soul that are necessary to lead a good spirited flourishing life (eudaimonia).

The difference between Politics and Ethics insofar as Aristotle is concerned is partly due to the fact that political theory is a more abstract reflective elaboration upon ethical principles in the public context of justification we encounter in the arenas of justice. Aristotle's "justifications" did not extend to arguing for the justification of the existence of the city-state, perhaps because for him it is the mark of an educated man to know when to require a justification and when one is not required because of the self-evident certainty of the issue. For Aristotle it is self-evident that the idea of a state is both good-in-itself and good in its consequences as long as the laws governing that state are rationally constituted and respected, i.e. they are just laws. Part of the essence of being human involves living in organised communities in which the laws can facilitate actualising processes that will provide one with a reasonable quality of life. We have a need not merely to live (survive) but to live well, and this manifests itself in a commitment to public education (communication of knowledge of "the sciences").

To argue, as Hobbes does, that the law is mere words unless these words are defended by swords, is to reject Aristotle's political (hylomorphic) naturalism. The basis for such a rejection is usually based on the claim that the laws of a city are mere artificial conventions, tools to prevent internecine strife in a community. Aristotle's political views rest on a view of human nature and cultural development that is historically constituted of structures building upon

structures, in organic fashion. The family might well survive in a benign environment, if the family was large enough, but, as Hobbes claimed, life in a state of nature would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Families that unite into a village will experience advantages that are both utilitarian and pleasurable, but still lacking some of the goods of the external world and most of the goods for the soul that can be provided by a well-functioning polis. The family and the village are social structures that are assimilated by the polis. These structures are transformed into a unit of self-sufficiency that provides a quality of life that only knowledge of the Good can bring with it. Our modern obsession with the private individual alone and discontented in his chamber of consciousness would have seemed a regressive concern for Aristotle.

Aristotle was very familiar with the political problems of his time partly via the works of Plato, and partly via the research of his own school into a large number of constitutions of city-states (158). He develops as a consequence a schema of good and deviant states based on an idea of The Good that rejects "noble lies" and other questionable Platonic practices outlined in "The Republic". Here "The Good" is characterised as "Aristos"("the best")⁵ and this conception combines the best elements of oligarchy and democracy into a so-called "aristocracy" in which an emerging educated middle class will unite the polis into a self-sufficient unit where peace reigns. It is this form of constitution, Aristotle argues, that will most likely provide the conditions necessary for its citizens to lead a good spirited flourishing life, a virtuous life.

Such a constitution would include respect for techné and allow a free cultural space for rhetoric and poetry. In these activities, which aim at the good, there will be a reliance upon areté, arché and epistemé. The telos of rhetoric, Aristotle argues, is political persuasion via enthymemes and related rational instruments. Rhetoric was of course used (abused?) by the accusers of Socrates to end the philosophers life, but Aristotle would not have regarded this use of pseudo-arguments as legitimate rhetoric. For him the measure of rhetoric was Truth, and this measure was discarded by the accusers of Socrates who were using rhetorical devices for their own utilitarian (technical) ends. This testifies to the weakness of all technical activities--namely, that they can always be detached from the knowledge of the good-in-itself, and used for evil purposes (consequences). So far as rhetoric is guided by the truth and the good, however, it is rationally constituted and will contain principles that may even be "first principles".

Poetry for Aristotle, is connected to learning, even if there is an element of "imitation" involved. The production of poetry is for the purposes of learning via the imitation of reality. Actors dress up in clothes, imitating real kings and strut about a stage amidst scenery imitative of castles or cities. The words they

utter are also imitative of characters they are attempting to portray. This, for Aristotle, is a natural form of learning something about something, e.g. that flatterers are not to be trusted, that kings are not gods etc. Learning such things brings us a non-utilitarian form of pleasure connected to epistémé and the knowledge of the good. We are, in the above examples, clearly learning about the essences of things in practical contexts, especially if the creator of the production is a genius, a great souled writer like Shakespeare. The spirit of tragedy contains necessary references to Thanatos, suffering, and Ananke, all of which are capable of evoking powerful emotions in man, e.g. pity at undeserved suffering and fear of ruin and destruction at the hands of processes we do not fully understand. The question "Why?" looms in tragedies as it does in most other processes of change initiated by humans, and if the semblance of an answer suggests itself in the work of the great souled artist this purifies the minds of the audience leaving them in a musing contemplative state. Presumably in such lessons we also learn something about the self that is thrown into the midst of events of considerable magnitude. Even if the tragic work is historical, it is not facts as such that are important, but rather universal "possibilities" that are suggested by the prophecy of the Greek oracle: "Everything created by man is destined for ruin and destruction". Learning that flatterers are not to be trusted or kings are not gods, then, is a matter of learning about the universal possibilities of tragedy.

Christopher Shields in his work on Aristotle points out, in a chapter dedicated to the legacy of Aristotle, that his works were not distributed for several hundred years after his death, and when they became available again, the Neo-Platonists dominated the means of production with their commentaries. When all philosophical schools were closed by order of the Emperor in the 6th century AD, Aristotle's works were again "lost", until Aquinas discovered a translation. Aquinas' interest was largely religiously inspired and his interest at best could be described as perspectival. Shields insightfully comments upon Aristotle's legacy in the following:

"Often enough the views rejected as Aristotelian in the early Modern period are not recognisable as such to anyone with a primary familiarity with Aristotle's texts."⁶

This is certainly true of the writings of the "new men" e.g. Descartes and Hobbes, and their rationalist and empiricist followers, who failed to understand the Aristotelian arguments against dualism and materialism. Shields notes that hylomorphism today is viewed as an interesting alternative to the extremes of reductive materialism and Cartesian dualism that continue to flourish in our universities (P.402). There is, however, no acknowledgement of many of the details of either Hylomorphic or Critical theory, in spite of the fact that these positions have been the most effective critics of the above extremes. There is also no acknowledgement of the relation of Aristotelian to Kantian metaphysics.

Instead Shields focuses upon postulated differences between the ethical theories of these two philosophies. Elisabeth Anscombe and her followers are cited as lying behind this state of affairs. We believe, however, that the story of the relationship between these two philosophies is more complex, and that the reason for this postulated opposition between the two ethical theories, the so called deontological and teleological opposition, rests upon misinterpretations of Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics.

Notes on Chapter 12

¹*Aristotle on Ethics*, Hughes, G., J., (London, Routledge, 2001, P.11).

²*The Complete works of Aristotle*, (1, 2, 1094a 18-22)

³*Ibid.*(11, 6, 1106b 36-1107a2)

⁴*Notebooks*, Wittgenstein, L., Edited by Von Wright, G., H., and Anscombe, G.,E.,M.,Trans by Anscombe, G.,E.,M., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969)

⁵*Aristotle*, Shields, C., (London, Routledge, 2007, P 365)

⁶*Ibid.* P.401

Chapter 13: Kantian Overview and Legacy.

The legacy of Kant is manifold because both dogmatism and skepticism have been, and are, present as general attitudes in many areas of discourse. Aristotle in his attempt to synthesise the dogmatic and skeptical influences of his time, proposed a contemplative attitude of mind which experienced change, attempted to understand it, and then reasoned about it, with a view to knowing oneself and the world that surrounds one. Kant's Critical Philosophy is designed to embrace and elaborate upon hylomorphism in ways that would partly aim at the restoration of an Aristotelian spirit in the arena of Philosophical debate. This Aristotelian renaissance was also intended to capture the spirit of intellectual and moral "progress" in accordance with a "hidden plan", that Kant claimed was present in thousands of years of development leading up to the Enlightenment.

The Modern Age is traditionally defined by the demarcations of Hobbes and Descartes: demarcations that involved both a general sceptical attitude toward Aristotelian Philosophy and a dogmatic belief in the substance-oriented science of the day. Kant would attempt to synthesise the ideas of substance and form into a principle-based Critical Philosophy that contained a virtue-based moral Philosophy resembling Aristotelian virtue ethics. The Greek terms *areté*, *arché*, *diké*, and *phronesis* were embodied in the Kantian approach, which also incorporated Newtonian Physics and Christian Ethics (all men are brothers and thereby equal).

The Enlightenment approach to Freedom, paradoxically surpassed the negative view of man being "evil" (in comparison with the goodness of God), with a positive view, that we can view the species through its potential to be rational, and thereby call man (as a species) "good". This was also a positive enhancement of the ancient Greek prophecy that "Everything created by man is destined for ruin and destruction". If, in accordance with Enlightenment attitudes man "Dared to be Wise!"/"*Sapere Aude!*", the eventual outcome (weighed in terms of one hundred thousand years) could be expected to be Good (resulting in a Kingdom upon earth, a perfectly just cosmopolitan society).

Even the eagle eyes of Freud may have missed this aspect of Kant's Critical Philosophy, if we judge him on the basis of his work "Civilisation and its Discontents". Perhaps it is just too much to ask of man to fix his eyes/mind upon a point one hundred thousand years in the future. At issue in the difference between the Freudian and the Kantian views may be the difference Kant claimed to exist between a Civilisation and a Culture. Activities guided by the instrumental goods of instrumental imperatives where the concentration of the mind is upon the means to an end rather than the inherent value of the end, constitute the realm of civilising activities. In this realm the bringing about of an end is viewed as a consequence, for which one is responsible, and the ruling

category is the causality between events which in turn can be analytically separated. Activities that are categorically constituted, on the other hand, are unconditionally done in the spirit of being "good-in-themselves" and are responsible for the cultural advancement of man. Civilising activities are examples of rule-following behaviour that is important for the maintenance of order in society, and the provision of everything that meets what Maslow calls the Maintenance needs that are necessary for survival and safety of human forms of life. Maslow's growth needs are obviously connected to higher values that no longer are merely instrumental (i.e. the physical activity of the building of cities). These needs are related to the ideas and rational methodologies constituting the ideals of "Culture". For Kant these two types of activity, the instrumental and the categorical, can dwell together in harmony side by side, as long as there is no "colonisation" of the one domain by the other: no dogmatic idealism denying the role of experience, or sceptical realism denying the role of rationality. For Aristotle, all activity is guided by the idea of its good, and this, can either be the instrumental activity of building a house serving the goods of the body and its relation to the external world, or the activity that is done unconditionally because of its intrinsic value in the spirit of areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time)--in service of the goods for the soul. It is of course also an ultimate good for the soul that both civilisation building/maintaining activities, and cultural-constitutional unconditional activities, are in harmony with one another and the citizens living in the community. One of the differences between the Platonic and Aristotelian Political positions is that the latter believed in the rule of the Golden mean in the realm of all activity in the polis. Political activity came into existence for the preservation of life, but its continued existence was tied to the provision of the conditions necessary for leading the good life, and ultimately the flourishing life (eudaimonia). The mechanisms for the actualisation of the complex ideal of the city-state that Aristotle presents, is connected to the developmental phases of social activity from firstly, the family unit, to secondly, the unit of the village, and finally to the terminus of the city-state (Callipolis). The growth through these different phases of social activity is "organic". The process, that is, resembles the phases of the growth and development of living organisms but also perhaps resembles the evolution of one animal form of life into another. Teleological forms of explanation, therefore, are important in contexts of explanation/justification. Aristotle believes that the 4 "causes" or "kinds of explanation" build some kind of unified totality of conditions that alone can satisfy the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. The materialistic concentration upon explanations that seek conceptually independent causes which are the "movers" of change, transform necessity into random contingency. In such a context, attempts at unification into a totality of conditions consequently appear arbitrary and contingent. The so called "formal cause" when combined solely with the material and efficient causes, takes the form of a

mechanical deterministic principle that forces life forms into confining strait jackets and limits both description and explanation of the telos of organs and organisms. (Telos ought rather to focus upon what the organs and organisms are good-for).

The structures of civilisations and cultures require the totality of conditions referred to in a 4-fold schema of explanation, building as they do primarily upon action and production. This implies that it is primarily the practical and productive sciences that provide us with the knowledge we require to build civilisations and actualise Cultures.

The successful interaction and integration of hypothetical and categorical imperatives is, of course, essential for the organic development of society toward the Kantian end of a Kingdom of Ends built upon morality and human rights. The "replacement" of categorical cultural attitudes by the more technical (techné) hypothetical civilisation-building attitudes is problematic, and raises once again the spectre of the Ancient Greek Prophecy claiming, "Everything created by man is destined for ruin and destruction". The condition for the actualisation of such a prophecy is, however, that the social activity of man is "colonised" by instrumental forms of activity which focus continually upon means without seriously evaluating ends.

Kant is very clear over the importance of categorical attitudes in the "Progress" of society towards its telos. He is also very clear over the importance of the categorical structure of theoretical science for civilisation-building. What he would have thought about the technological "achievements" of putting a man on the moon, and the invention of atomic bombs is, however, unclear, but the suspicion is he would have reasoned in a similar manner about these events as Arendt did--seeing in them something ultimately regressive given the importance attributed to them.

Kuehn's biography of Kant underscores the importance of Kantian teleological explanation in his search for the totality of conditions for phenomena. The Cartesian "revolution" aimed at regarding animal life-forms, for example, as subject to mechanical description and explanation, and also viewed the human psuche dualistically, (as a kind of substance that could interact with material substance via mechanical processes in the brain). On this view, matter was "inert" and Kant characterised this Cartesian "picture" in terms of a "dead force". Kant, in his early work, entitled "True Estimation of Living forces", sides with Leibniz who, Kuehn argues, appeals to Aristotelian concepts of "form" or "entelechy". There is, on this view, a force locked up in a physical body that constitutes its inertia to change: a force that is expressed in the impenetrability of the object, a phenomenon related to the force of attraction. Kant's argumentation for this characterisation centred around the mathematical

calculations relating to experiments doubling the speed but having to more than double the force to achieve this result. This asymmetry pointed to a limitation of mechanical calculation of momentum (speed times weight of the the object). Kant concludes that the force of attraction belongs essentially to all matter. This force, Kant argues also has to be complemented by a counter-force of repulsion (the possible original form of an energy regulation principle?). It is this latter that explains why matter does not contract into one point of unfathomable density. What is important to note in Kant's early account is the fact that these forces are not "dead" or inert, but rather are "active", and the original creators of free motion. This, argues Kant, is a rejection of the Cartesian idea of dead matter being tossed about by mechanical forces. There is, an established harmony regulating these two forces (ERP). This regulation principle probably sufficed for Kant to "locate" the soul in the body and to conceive of the combination of soul and body to move other things. The "soul" for Kant is clearly a hylomorphic unity and "mechanical" explanation emanating from a Cartesian matrix of space-time-brain causation which connects disparate contingent "events" will, on Kant's view, fail to pass the tests of the principle of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. The ontological assumption is that in the realm of action--a realm in which movement is freely self initiated--the categories of agency and the "forces" of "Powers" are more relevant than the categories of substance and causation. Kant's early work suggested that matter or substance has power which he described as "living force", but later work throws these remarks into a different context which is closer to Aristotle than it is to Leibniz and Newton. The title of the early work referred to above, "True Estimation....", indicates the hypothetical nature of his reflections upon the events of the physical external world. The same uncertainty that plagued the reflections of the early Socrates, hovered over the mind of the youthful Kant, and this lack of certainty may have been the cause of his so-called "Copernican Revolution", in which he sought for categorical certainty no longer in the arena of ever changing experience, but rather in a categorical form of reflection involving structures and powers of the mind. The choice of Kant to write his first major work in German rather than the traditional Latin of the Academics testifies to his independence as a thinker. The fact that he wrote in German might also be due to the fact, as M Kuehn points out, that Kant's genius, at this point in time, was not appreciated in the academic world of Königsberg.

In his earlier work, Kant also investigated the relationship between matter and space. The first basic term of this early system was that of Prime Matter which was regarded as the consequence of the Being of God. This Prime Matter extended throughout the universe possessing the potentiality of both attraction and repulsion, causing the actuality of moving matter and the consequences of collision and rotation. These were the elements of the planetary systems. God stands to some extent outside this chain of events given the fact that Kant did

not believe that God gave Prime Matter a shove--the potentiality for movement was in the system from the beginning. Kant also shared the Aristotelian assumption that the universe was an infinite complex of material, space, and time, which could be the source of awe and wonder, but whose origins were not as easily investigated as were the origins (the natural history) of life-forms. Kant clearly did not share the Socratic concern that physical investigations into origins might blind the soul, but he did share the Socratic conviction that such investigations into origins were more speculative than, for example, investigations into the origins of the Idea of the Good. Whilst conducting both types of investigation did not lead Kant to turn his back upon speculative metaphysics, they did contribute to the important phenomenal-noumenal distinction that permeates Kantian Critical Philosophy.

In his *Metaphysics* lectures of 1765 we encounter the following remarks about Space which:

"must be the first actus of the divine all-presence of God, through which the things come into connection (nexus). The status post mortem is very probable, the entire world would equal nothing without rational beings."¹

We see here an early Aristotelian move, but this kind of metaphysical thinking, according to Kuehn, drove Kant's friend Herder toward reading poetry or Rousseau. Kant himself in his later work, also followed Rousseau at least insofar as *Education of the Young* were concerned (*Emile*). In his early work, Kant distinguished between rational logic, and the real reasons we look to in the course of causal investigations. In these latter reasons we find even the early Kant locating these reasons in the activity of our minds. The issue of God's existence was also an early concern, but theological investigations gave way to ethical investigations into "The Good" and its rational conditions. Agency became the central focus, and character was conceptualised as a good form of agency to be tested by the Greek idea of *areté* (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time). Character was principally concerned with what was good in itself and what was good for the soul. The dignity of man and his freedom to choose his destiny was placed at the centre of Kant's reflections, but not in abstraction from the polis and the Ancient Greek prophecy relating to the potentiality for life in society to descend into war, chaos, ruin and destruction. Kant, like Aristotle, was pessimistic about the young under 40 understanding the responsibility that accompanies freedom and the potentiality for rationality. He embedded the Christian concept of rebirth or conversion in his account of an actualisation process that is moving toward the *telos* of rationality. The lynchpin in this process of man becoming, amongst other things the "political animal", is the duty to tell the truth expressed in Kant's later work: "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View":

"That someone has a character can only be proved by his having adopted as his highest maxim the principle to be truthful in his inner confession to himself as well as in his dealings with anyone else"²

Kant believed the age of 40 to be the beginning of this process of the dawning of a new form of consciousness which may also be connected to the psychological fact that, this is the point at which our memory, the building block of cognitive processes, begins to wane, allowing us to expand our knowledge but not, according to Kant, allowing us to learn anything new.

The key element of character are our maxims or general policies, that we have learned from significant others or influential books. A maxim is a principle of practical reason that guides both civilisation-building and culture-constituting activities, but it can also, for Kant, be related to happiness which is the principle of self-love in disguise. Such a principle is reflective, and examines ones desires in a reflective spirit. The will is involved in such reflective processes which principally are directed toward civilisation-building and culture-constituting activities. Such activities require a strong will and character, that, in their turn, require self-knowledge--the most difficult of all knowledge to acquire but nevertheless something demanded by the oracles in the name of eudaimonia. For Kant it is the intention and the maxim that are critical for determining whether the will is worthy of praise, for it is these elements that constitute the essence of ethical activity. Kantian reflection in this area, as in all other areas, was partially formed by English empiricism and its limitations in the field of ethics. Hutcheson, for example, spoke of the moral sentiment and Kuehn quotes Mendelssohn in this context--moral sentiments are

"phenomena which are related to rational principles in the same way in which colours are related to the angles and refraction of light. Apparently they are of completely different nature, yet they are basically one and the same."³

We should recall the great respect that Kant had for Mendelssohn and the fact that both thinkers entered an essay competition announced by the Berlin Academy of Science:

"Whether metaphysical truths in general and in particular the first principles of *Theologiae naturalis* are capable of the same clear proof as geometrical truths, and if they are not capable of same said proof, then what is the real nature of their certainty, to what sort of degree can one bring their certainty and whether this degree is sufficient for complete conviction."

Mendelssohn's essay won the competition narrowly, probably because the judges were predisposed toward the metaphysical approach taken which was presumably more mathematically inclined than Kant's contribution. Mendelssohn's work might also have been less inclined toward the hylomorphic view of human nature Kant favoured. One of the philosophical issues of the time

was that which involved a search for a unified theory of sensation and reason. For Kant the starting point of any answer to this question was Hutcheson's theory of moral sense, and initially Kant placed both elements on a continuum, but even in 1763, Kant did not believe that moral judgements were based on feelings. Kuehn reports that Kant's thinking underwent a change insofar as the continuity thesis was concerned in 1770, when he claimed that the faculties concerned with reason and sensation (sensibility) were separate entities.

In an essay entitled "Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Directions in Space", it is clear that for Kant, Space is a fundamental concept which is not a consequence of external sensation, but rather a concept which makes the experience of space possible. It is not an idea of reason or even what he would later refer to as a category of the understanding. The bipolar account of this time did not include the faculty of the understanding and its categories, but referred instead to sensibility and intelligence. The former was defined accurately in the above essay as:

"The receptivity of the subject through which it is possible that its representative state be affected in a certain manner by the presence of an object"

Intelligence was more controversially defined as:

"The faculty of the subject through which it is able to represent things which cannot by their own nature come before the senses of the subject."

The account appears somewhat dualistic, presupposing a *mundus sensibilis* and a *mundus intelligibilis*, both of which exhibit forms of object peculiar to themselves. Kant points here, in defence of the above separation, to the ancients, who apparently distinguished between phenomena and noumena in relation to these two different kinds of object. Space and time begin to be identified with subject-centred yet a priori conditions of experience.

Wolff embraced the continuity thesis which in Kant's view prevented him from producing an intellectually based moral Philosophy based on Pure practical reason. Kant thus situated himself in the camp of the "ancients" and Wolff in the camp of the "moderns". Kant's Project was clearly to establish ethics in an intelligible world in which actions have a rational form and essence. Principles ruled in this world (the forerunners of the categories of judgement /understanding?) e.g. possibility, necessity, actuality, agency community, causality. Moral perfection was constructed from these a priori elements and the concept of a good will moved to the centre of a metaphysical system aiming at explanation and justification of noumena. This account is a clear rejection of Hutcheson, and perhaps all empirical accounts relying on the theoretical notion of abstraction from a continuum of experience. Practical reasoning takes

precedence, and will in fact move to becoming the central pivot of Critical Philosophy. This coincides with the move toward acknowledging synthetic a priori judgments as the founding elements of the sciences. Wolffian Metaphysics is replaced with transcendental forms of inquiry that resemble the investigations of the ancients and those modern concerns that lean more towards mathematical reasoning and the methodology of science, are dismissed. Kantian investigations are explorations of the powers of the rational animal capable of discourse--powers of sensibility, understanding and rationality.

Kant drew the boundaries of the limits of the understanding and reason with the help of the Categories which were a priori notions that organise our experience. He argued, for instance, that viewing God in terms of the category of causality became problematic, given the necessary relation of categories to space and time. Principles such as the axioms of intuition, the anticipations of perception, the analogies of experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought have no room for the rational/theoretical idea of a God. We know something holds the world together as a systematic whole, but our powers are limited to believing just that: they can reach no further into the realm of things in themselves at least insofar as theoretical reflection is concerned. We can have a negative conception of this realm and believe that it cannot have spatial/temporal characteristics or perceptual/experiential characteristics, but it is at this point that our theoretical understanding of the matter ends. Theoretically, according to Kant, we cannot know ourselves, as we are in ourselves, because we are an animal form of life confined to the power of discourse in our philosophical investigations into the nature of space, time, causation, and reality. When we discourse about ourselves, the subject of our discourse is the self as it appears phenomenally and conditionally in the matrix of sensibility and in accordance with the categories of the understanding. The self that is doing the discoursing or the thinking, the "I think", appears to be a second self that is independent of experience and this is the self the Oracles and Philosophers of Ancient Greece were urging us to explore. Theoretical investigations, however, are problematic, because thought does not appear to have the power to think about itself and this non-empirical self therefore cannot "find" itself. This, however, is not a recital that is doomed to end in negation. Another form of causality, that of freedom, allows us access to both God and our noumenal selves.

Kant lined up the theoretical arguments claiming to prove the existence of God and demolished them all, but then in his discussion of the human journey to moral perfection, allowed space for faith and hope in relation to both God and our moral futures.

Kuehn points out that the first reviews of the "Critique of Pure Reason" viewed it as belonging to the British tradition of idealism and scepticism: a product of

the Philosophy of Berkeley and Hume. Hamann's criticism was particularly interesting, because it was to foreshadow the work of the later Wittgenstein, which was also attempting to respond to the threat of continental idealism and English scepticism. Hamann claimed that we are misled by the language we use, and that we should inquire more systematically into the functions of language rather than inquire into the use of pure reason. Kant, in a later work entitled "Prolegomena", protested at the false characterisations of his work, and criticised both Berkeley and Hume, but his phenomena/noumena distinction was still regarded with suspicion. This distinction in its turn required the use of transcendental logic applying a priori principles and laws to nature, and this too was sceptically received. This illustrated not just the limitations of pure theoretical reason, but also the scope and depth of pure practical reason where communities of rational animals capable of discourse were free to form and combine concepts in ways that would serve a diverse set of purposes. Moreover it was in the practical sphere that the strategy of stepping outside these categorical and conceptual systems would be subject to philosophical criticism via the Socratic methodology of elenchus, or the Aristotelian methodology of logic determined by the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. This form of criticism would not, however, destroy the object of faith, namely God, and would reject all attempts at anthropomorphising the idea. Hume's scepticism, in Kant's view, risked rejecting too much, and thereby failing to realise the fundamental limitations of experience. Philosophical aporetic questions often transcended the boundary of experience and revealed an ideal realm of thought constituted by principles of reason. Morality and Religion occupied a realm that the events, substances, and causality of science did not regulate or constitute. The function of transcendental logic in this realm was not just the negative function of transcending experience, but also the positive function of providing us with the conditions necessary to both conceptualise experience and organise it into bodies of knowledge. Science was, for Kant, hylomorphic: every science had both a material aspect and a formal aspect in which principles organise the subject-matter. The forms of Synthetic a priori judgements constitute the foundations of the different sciences.

The categorical imperative, for example, constituted the fundamental form of justification of both the maxims of actions and those actions themselves: making the actions both good in themselves and good in their consequences, because they were deeds flowing from a good will. Such Synthetic a priori judgements reach into the realm of noumena and all that can be claimed insofar as our understanding of such judgements are concerned, is that they are used as justifications but cannot themselves be fully comprehended in their intention. This means that the ultimate conditions of the possibility of morality cannot be fully understood. What we do understand is the brute fact of our freedom where it is clear to us that we are free to give ourselves laws because we are a law unto

ourselves so long as these laws are valid for every rational being in an ideal intellectual realm constituted of noumena.

Kuehn, in discussing Kant's first moral work "Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals", claims that this work and the following works on Practical Reason are "one of the greatest achievements of the history of Philosophy"⁴. We can concur with this judgement with a clear conscience because it respects the intellectual integrity of the other sciences of *mundus intelligibilis*. History too is respected as a universal discipline with Cosmopolitan intentions and its use of teleological explanation is praised as a necessary justification for the Progress of humanity through historical ages. Transcendental logic is the tool Kant uses to situate freedom and the categorical imperative at the centre of these processes of the actualisation of the *telos* of the "kingdom of ends". Historiography is not the same as History because it merely charts the sequence of events throughout the ages. It is Transcendental History, however, that transforms this mechanical recording process of historiography into a narrative of significance that confirms Aristotle's hylomorphic claim that all activities aim at the good. Kant claims:

"If it examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale it will be able to discover the regular progression among freely willed actions"(Kant's Political Writings, "Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan point of view")⁵

Kant is clearly in search for a principle that guides us toward the cosmopolitan kingdom of ends. The account we are given obviously assumes that it is nature itself which ensures that all that is good ends well for humanity--even if the journey is a long and tortuous one. The journey, requires good and just government--an Aristotelian requirement. Such a journey obviously requires the courage to think freely for oneself--to dare to be wise! ("Sapere Aude!")

Kant also theorises about Conjectural History and the beginning of the human race. A state of nature in which human nature was guided by instinct and could be described as "happy". In such a state the imagination begins to construct a myriad of objects of luxury, and the famous "fevered city" from Plato's Republic becomes a reality. In Christian History, this stage of transformation of our life was identified with "a fall" from the Grace of God. From a moral point of view, however, the "choice" to feed ones appetites in accordance with the demands of the imagination is the beginning of the good works of man which will require the acquisition of large bodies of knowledge if his journey, as a species, to a good end, is to be not just a possibility but a real actuality. Freud promoted an oracular vision of the discontents of Civilisation and pointed to the state of affairs in which man must of necessity be discontent with the active and free powers that are governing the course of the world as a whole. Kant thinks that this form of discontentment is absolutely necessary for man if, as a species, he wishes to transcend this state of discontentment. He believes that such a

problematic state of affairs has been brought about by a misuse of mans rational powers which must be corrected. One of the sources of discontent may well have been an irrational belief in the existence of an anthropomorphised God as the craftsman of our world. Situating Freedom at the centre of his theory and deriving a faith in a Good being from such a source is, for Kant, the kind of correction needed in our use of reason. God is undoubtedly a supersensible Being, and therefore lies beyond the reach of human knowledge, but not beyond the reach of human faith and hope. If this thesis can be maintained, virtually all of religion remains justified on the condition that God is not anthropomorphised. The nature of the presence of evil in the world is still an issue which needs accounting for. Kant's solution is to postulate that man is conscious of the moral law, but chooses to make himself an exception to it. The evil man thus, freely chooses a deviation from the Good. Kant clearly does not view the universe as the battleground for two dualistic Manichean powers. Evil is a subordinate principle in Kant's system. Man is by nature Good and his activities aim at the good, unless something causes man to deviate and choose to follow this deviant path. The decision to follow the correct path for Kant, was a duty, and such a duty was far easier to understand than any obscure principle of happiness. Kant, and Kantians, throughout history have argued for the simplicity of doing something to increase ones worth rather than to make one happy, because it is in fact very difficult to decide what will make one happy. We all know that what makes one man happy will not necessarily make another man happy unless it is because these two men know that they are worthy of being happy. In the context of this discussion the Greek principle of areté (doing the right thing at the right time in the right way) is the principle one ought to follow in doing ones duty.

The Kantian system is almost unique (among modern works) in that its teleological justification of action is both a religious and a political state rolled into one: the kingdom of ends is both a just and a holy state of affairs. The civil law and the holy law meet under the umbrella of the categorical imperative and in the arena of practical reason in which major premises of practical arguments are in the mode of "ought-statements", e.g. "Promises ought to be kept", "One ought to tell the truth". Governments are bound by teleological justifications and they ought to keep promises and tell the truth to the people they govern. Failing to do so however does not, according to Kant ever justify revolution. Kuehn points out that Kant only approved of the French "Revolution" because it was not technically a revolution:

"Legally Louis 16th had in effect abdicated when he called the Estates-General. So, legally, the French Revolution was not a Revolution"⁶

Otherwise governmental activity is to be regarded in the light of the perspective of the good. The breaking of key promises and lying might well compromise this fundamental attitude of the governed toward their governors, but otherwise

in most circumstances, we assume a good will and good intentions. Kant was in favour of anyone freely criticising their government, but on general grounds he felt that violence was an irrational form of response in human affairs and the response becomes even more irrational and irresponsible when turned upon those who are trying to serve the people. Kant himself wished that those that governed were better educated, but he was probably more Aristotelian in his politics than Plato, and would not have recommended that Philosophers rule the Republic. Government is only ultimately justified by the consent of the ruled and the idea of an inalienable human right is systematically addressed in terms of the idea of freedom which Kant characterises in terms of the universal moral law limiting the freedom of each member of a society.

Human Rights would be fundamental in the Kingdom of Ends which would regulate interaction between states by a League of Nations or United Nations. It is important to note however, how the statement of rights above is an elaboration (in the form of an essence-specifying definition of a political concept of duty) upon the categorical imperative, an elaboration that uses the foundational idea of freedom in a way that explains or justifies the categorical imperative, thus taking us to the very outer boundary of what can be thought. The reference to power is an interesting one, and raises the question as to whether such an exercise of coercion would be necessary in a kingdom of ends which, to avoid the tyranny of the instrumental imperative, ought to rest upon the categorical unconditioned duties connected to virtue. Obeying the law just because it is the law, and not knowing why, i.e. not knowing why the state needs regulative laws which ought to be constitutive of ethical action in the minds of citizens, is heterogeneous, and compromises the autonomy of the free choice to do what is right and good. The definition does, however, articulate the close relationship between the duties of virtue and the political duties connected to rights. The Kingdom of Ends for Kant is more like a moral entity in which virtue reigns and one cannot help but wonder whether the State will wither away when the potential rationality of the human species becomes an actuality.

Kant's relation to Religion is both positive and critical. Miracles and supernatural events are not to be believed or used to trick people into believing and hoping for a moral Kingdom on earth some time in the future. The Bible for Kant, as it was for Spinoza, must be interpreted in terms of practical reason. The dialectical progress of metaphysics from dogmatism to scepticism to the criticism of pure reason must be reflected in this "modern" interpretation of the Bible, which aims not just at the worthiness of one's character, but also at a cosmopolitan world in which cosmopolitan law will replace nationalistic laws: cosmopolitan law that constitutes and regulates the human rights of citizens of the world. Obviously in such a world inner moral legislation will be more important and prevalent than external juridical legislation and the good will,

moreover must have a "holy" religious dimension. For Kant, the laws we find in the Bible, are those that logically specify our duties and build character via a conception of the worthiness of being human. The "transgressions" of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, for example, will, in the science of Anthropology, be a narrative that highlights the move away from animal instinct into the world of the human, where the search for the knowledge we need to lead our lives begins with an act of freedom. The rational animal capable of discourse that is the subject of investigation, in Kant's Anthropological investigations, is a knowledge bearing creature for whom the Socratic ideal of wisdom (knowing what one does not know and what one could never know) is acknowledged as the model of Oracles.

There will be moments that are difficult to interpret such as God's presence in the Garden and those too, ought eventually to be interpreted anthropologically, without anthropomorphising a mode of Being that does not occupy the space-time matrix. This hermeneutical exercise will, Kant insists, need to be in accordance with a metaphysics that has engaged in a critique of pure reason and all putative so called "proofs" of the existence of God.

The details of our political development on the way to a Kingdom of ends is given in Kant's work "Perpetual peace" from 1795. Direct democracy is regarded as a despotic system. Kant's preference is for a Republic in which representatives (presumably with political knowledge and political skills) ensure and uphold a constitutional system in which the executive and legislative branches of government are separate from each other and possess genuine independence. Such government would protect property as part of human rights. It is rightful that one ought to be able to enjoy the fruits of ones work and that what is yours is yours, and what is mine is mine. Ones possessions, rightfully and deservedly gained, are protected under the infringement of freedom principle articulated above. Obviously under such a principle a person, being an end-in-themselves--cannot be owned or used without their consent. We do not "own" our children Kant argues, they are bearers of rights toward which parents have duties which are not reciprocal. Even in marriage the ideal of the person as an end in themselves means that one does not own the partner but rather consents to giving the partner rights over oneself. For Kant it is the Promise that is the central issue of this commitment. Talk of contracts both here and with respect to the relation the citizen has to the government, must be placed in this ethical context: a context in which the notion of quid pro quo is a subordinate notion to that of rights and promises. Any allegiance to any government must be predicated upon the reciprocation of duties that build upon a moral foundation of treating people as ends in themselves, and a legal foundation of rights and freedom. The Enlightenment "revolution" was a repeat of the Socratic attempt to introduce a new set of values that replaced the stronger with the wiser. The

Enlightenment twist that Kant added was that of the political wisdom of a phronimos who envisaged a peaceful cosmopolitan world ruled by moral values and human rights: a community of peaceful nations on earth. Forcefully occupying the lands that were being newly discovered was problematic for Kant and an enterprise filled with bad faith.

Education was of central concern to all the Enlightenment thinkers of importance. Kant believed in a method he described as catechism, by which the teacher does not dogmatically preach his subject or engage in a dialectical dialogue where the discoursing parties are contesting to win an argument. Rather the teacher engages the pupils in a form of discourse involving the kind of questioning Socrates engaged in with Meno, the boy-slave who then "reclected" a principle of geometry. This form of education is particularly important in moral education and this must precede any form of religious education. Religious education shall, when it occurs later in the educational process, not attempt to neutralise a fundamentally autonomous attitude with something more heterogeneous such as an attitude that emphasises duties to God. The question of what sort of moral relation we have to God may, Kant argues, be beyond the scope of our understanding and reason. The duties we have to man on the other hand are clear and comprehensible and easily understood by everyone.

Notes to Chapter 13

¹ *Kant: A Biography*, Kuehn, M., (Cambridge, CUP, 2001, P.132)

² *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Kant, I., Edited and Translated by Louden, R.,B.,(Cambridge, CUP,2006, 7, 294f)

³ *Kant:A Biography*, P. 184

⁴ *Ibid.* P.287

⁵ *Kant's Political Writings*, Kant, I.,Trans by Nisbet, H., B.,(Cambridge, CUP, 1970, P.41)

⁶ *Kant: A Biography*, P.375

Chapter 14: Legacy of the Third Critique

Kant's First Critique is a work that explores and explains the boundaries of the mind as a whole by delineating the structures and functions of parts of the whole. Kant names the faculties of Sensibility, Understanding and Reason. There is no doubt that Kant largely subscribes to the hylomorphic definition of being human as being a rational animal capable of discourse. Kant, however, obviously advances the thought of Aristotelian metaphysics by claiming that there are two realms of metaphysics: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. Copernican revolutions aside, the major contribution of Kant's Critical Philosophy to the enlightenment, was his emphasis upon practical rationality, and the idea of freedom at the expense of theoretical explanation and its seemingly endless generation of hypotheses in search of the truth. There was, however, more to come from Kant on the topic of the nature of our minds in his third Critique on the power of Judgement.

This work from 1794 built upon the threefold divisions of the mind with a threefold division of our cognitive powers: understanding, judgement and reason. Kant thus provided a much needed convulsion in the landscape of our theoretical characterisation of human capacities and powers. It is these powers that tear us away from a merely sensible contact with our environment: a process that in the case of conceptualisation begins with the act of the unity of apperception, or act of thinking something about something. Heidegger called the act of thinking or saying something about something, the veritative (truth-making) synthesis. The conditions for such synthetic truths are thus provided for us: conditions which enable us to use concepts or "principles" or "forms" as a consequence of the "act" of thinking. The act of conceptualisation occurs in the context of the a priori categories of the understanding which produce categorical judgements, (e.g. S is P) rather than hypothetical judgements (e.g. Is S, P? or Assume that S is P). The latter may of course occur in the context of exploration in which concepts or principles are "formed". The truth-making synthesis results in judgements such as "Men are mortal". There is no experiential verification of this judgement which, of course, would involve surveying one's environment to find an immortal man (an impossible feat, because the Methuselah we discover may die tomorrow). The function of the understanding is purely categorical (knowing what life is) and conceptual (knowing what a man is). This judgement is also a candidate for what Aristotle called an essence-specifying definition. The "form" or principle of *psyche* (life) determines how we conceive of the human form of life, providing at the same time a matrix for a number of other related judgements--matrix that also forms the context for another essence-specifying definition of man, namely rational animal capable of discourse. *Psyche* would, of course, be the element that unites all the elements in this latter definition together.

In the aesthetic judgement, however, we still encounter the "S is P" form of judgement, but in this case the something that is thought about is not related to the world, nor is it conceptual. It is rather, a claim about the universal judging self, and the harmonious play of two cognitive faculties: the imagination and the understanding. The aesthetic object that is the occasion of this judgement, e.g. a particular rose, is initially intuited by the faculty of sensibility, but the manifold of representations is not categorised and conceptualised: it rather retains its particularity and uniqueness. Instead, the understanding engages with the life form of the rose, and an awareness of the interactions of the imagination and the understanding forms in the mind of the appreciator of the rose, along with a feeling of pleasure. There is, however, a categorical element to the judgement "This rose is beautiful" because we spontaneously claim that the rose is beautiful with a so-called "universal voice". The pleasure involved is not one related to the physical experience of a sensation, but rather the kind of pleasure related to the learning of something. This pleasure is also disinterested. Practical desires and interests are excluded, and this to some extent accounts for the reflective form the judgement takes. In reflecting upon this power or capacity for Judgement, Kant is in search of an a priori principle that can account for the structure and function of both aesthetic and teleological judgements. In this respect Kant's investigation is a transcendental one. In the case of the aesthetic judgement the principle of the finality of nature suggests itself:

"Now this transcendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the Object, i.e. to nature but only represents the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon objects of nature with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience and so is a subjective principle, i.e. a maxim of judgement"¹

Involved in this process is an interaction of the cognitive faculties of the imagination and understanding which, in turn, is related to the supervening of a disinterested pleasure. The Aesthetic object that occasions this activity, e.g. the beautiful rose, of course has to have the appropriate "form" to cause the subsequent stream of events that eventually lead to the judgement "This rose is beautiful".

The Critique of Teleological Judgement, on the other hand, argues Kant, is not capable of generating a constitutive principle and is, in contrast to aesthetic judgement, not a reflective judgement but a determinant judgement that attempts to use the cognitive faculties of understanding and reason to estimate the **real** finality of the object of attention in Nature. Here the aporetic question of the relation of reality to the categories of the understanding is encountered once again, and standard realist and idealist (Berkeley) positions are rejected on the grounds of violating the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. We are here witnessing the use of transcendental logic, but no principle emerges

from the discussion. Rather this adventure of criticism focuses upon what Aristotle would have called the final cause or telos of Nature. Kant insists that this telos or end of Nature is neither in us (as is the case with the aesthetic judgement) nor is it really in the Object (because all we can know about the object is related to the categories). In the spirit of Aristotle, Kant asks whether we are dealing with a special kind of causality or order of nature². Though it is not clear whether we can "project" **real** ends onto nature, Kant argues, we can:

"...picture to ourselves the possibility of the object on the analogy of a causality of this kind--a causality such as we experience within ourselves--and so regard nature as possessed of a capacity of its own for acting **technically**: whereas if we did not ascribe such a mode of operation to nature its causality would have to be regarded as blind mechanism. But this is a different thing from crediting nature with causes acting designedly."³

It is important to note that Kant insists upon a difference between an estimate of reality in accordance with a principle of judgement and a determination by an idea of reason that derives effects from their causes. No principle emerges from this transcendental investigation into the relation of teleological judgement to nature--merely an analogous causality to that which we experience within ourselves, a causality which, of course, neither acts technically nor blindly. Is this a form of "projection" or not?

In the Third Moment of the Critique of the power of Aesthetic Judgement, Kant elaborates upon the notion of purposiveness which he claims can be characterised in the following manner:

"the causality of a concept with regard to its object."⁴

He uses the term "imagine" in the above reflection. The reference to the work of the imagination allows us, then, to claim, not finality in the object (i.e. that they have "real" ends), but rather merely to estimate a finality of form in the object. We, who are familiar with 20th century aesthetics, are accustomed to discussions in which "form" or "significant form" is defining for analysing the formative arts such as painting, sculpture, architecture etc. This 20th century discussion was distinctly hylomorphic and referred to the organisation of the material medium the artist is working with. In some cases one also was claiming that, involved in the creative process, a causality was operating that was analogous to that at work in the harmonious play of the faculties (sensitivity, understanding). What we see at work in the work of creation of an art object is the organisation of the material of the medium in an attempt to imitate reality. This aspect is a central feature of the design or composition of the work of art. This technical work however is not represented as such, and it is rather the intentions of the artist relating to the point of the work that are perceived in the object (given of course that one has the requisite knowledge of the medium and its possibilities).

The beauty of the work of art, however, Kant argues, is different from the free beauty of the rose. He terms the beauty of a work of art a "dependent beauty" and he includes in this characterisation the beauty of animals and the human body. Both of these life forms, he argues are concept-dependent beauties and thereby carry an interest with them in any activity of aesthetic appreciation associated with them. The idea or form of The Good is the motivating force for the artists intentions insofar as their "works" are concerned. If a human being is represented in a painting or a sculpture, then, there must be some kind of reference to mans moral virtue. In the Giorgione Painting "Tempesta", for example, the man standing in the foreground against the background of a brewing storm appears at peace with his ambiguous surroundings and with himself.

The causality involved in Teleological Judgement is illustrated in the idea or ideal of works of art which ought to be viewed, not in terms of any technical or "mechanical" causation, but rather in terms of a causation which is ideal or final. The contrast between technical/mechanical and final/ideal causes is characterised in the following manner by Kant:

"Thus a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the building of the house."⁵

A house is an object nested in a network of instrumentalities but may also be viewed purely aesthetically in terms, for example of the mass-effect of its stone or the "blossoming" of carved features on its walls. In this latter case we view all the parts of houses appreciated aesthetically as constituting a unity of the whole: a unity that is:

"being reciprocally cause and effect of their form"⁶

In these cases the formal and final causes of the whole are the primary organisers of the more technical and mechanical material and efficient causes. This kind of transcendental reflection is also important, Kant argues, in Political Philosophy in which the parts (the citizens, their character, and territory) are the material cause of the "form" of the organised state which they partially "constitute". "Constitution" is an important political form for Aristotle which he conceived of in terms of "organic" form, thus linking the matrix of concepts linked with psuche to the estimation of political activity.

Kant's discussion of teleological judgement, and the necessity of teleological explanation to fully characterise the essence of a blade of grass rejects material and efficient "mechanical" explanation in his transcendental investigation. Involved in this rejection is appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and the matrix of concepts associated with psuche. The principle involved is, Kant

insists, a reflective and not a constitutive principle, and this is a crucial difference between the forms of aesthetic and teleological judgement.

Nevertheless, Kant argues, we are in need of this reflective principle in natural science but rational limitations ought also to be observed when using teleological explanations in the natural sciences. For example, introducing the idea of God from Theology will only destroy the integrity of both the natural sciences and Theology. Material and efficient causes, can, never be invoked in relation to the idea of God which is best characterised in terms of formal causation/explanation. This kind of confusion or transference of ideas from one domain of epistémé to another may have been responsible for the confusion that led to characterising God as the physical creator of the universe when the more neutral principle-related ideas of "architect" or "designer" would have been more appropriate. We have earlier in this work pointed to the fact that the Ancient Greeks did not succumb to this confusion and left the actual physical process of creation to the Demiurge. Nevertheless, the extent to which natural science ignores the importance of teleological explanation is the extent to which:

"...the nexus does not touch the constitution of things, but turns wholly on the combination of our conceptions."⁷

Modern science has several times manifested the tendency to regard reasoning in terms of final or teleological causation, as a contradiction of the results achieved in "mechanical" explanation. The Scientist relies on a form of perception he calls observation, to ground his reasoning, and this appears to conflict with the more philosophical account of perception presented by Wittgenstein in his later work, where it was claimed that an ambiguous figure can be seen both as a duck and a rabbit depending upon the organising activity of the eye. If Wittgenstein's account is correct then, observation may not be the royal road to understanding the essence of things, because it requires some kind of organising principle itself: an organising principle that must be "formal". Kant also takes up this discussion in relation to our manipulation of objects and events, and insists that there is no contradiction between the following claims:

"All production of material things and their forms must be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws.

"Some products of material nature cannot be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws (that is, for estimating them quite a different law of causality is required, namely, that of final causes)"⁸

Kant's explanation for this is:

"For if I say I must **estimate** the possibility of all events in material nature....This assertion is only intended to indicate that I **ought** at all times to **reflect** upon these things **according to**

the principle of the simple mechanism of nature, and consequently push my investigation with it as far as I can, because, unless I make it the basis of research there can be no knowledge of nature in the true sense of the term at all. Now this does not stand in the way of the second maxim when a proper occasion for its employment presents itself--that is to say, in the case of some natural forms.....we may, in our reflections upon them, follow the trail of a principle which is radically different from explanation by the mechanism of nature, namely the principle of final causes"⁹

This, roughly speaking, is the position Aristotle adopts. Kant's account is more elaborate and more complex, and rests on a conviction that explanations relating to the noumenal world of things in themselves, refer i.e. to a supersensible realm beyond what we can know. We can, however, **think** of this realm without knowing anything about its constitution. In the context of this debate it is worth recalling Christopher Shields' essence-specifying definition of a star, namely:

"A star is a gravitationally bound ball of hydrogen and helium made self luminous by internal nuclear fusion."¹⁰

A number of materialistic scientific concepts are combined in this definition and we can be forgiven for believing that once we have studied the theories these concepts are embedded in, we must be coming close to knowing what a star is in itself. No one can deny that many misunderstandings may be avoided if one understands the above definition, but the suspicion remains, however, that if stars are the remnants of a cosmic explosion, they may yet be a part of a whole we only partially understand. Was the universe a form of matter and energy at the inception of this explosion? What was the state of this universe before this explosion? These are questions that can be reflected upon in the spirit of Aristotelian and Kantian principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason.

Returning to the earlier discussion relating to whether we can be said to "project" ideal causality onto the world, we find Kant claiming the following:

"For strictly speaking, we do not **observe** the ends in nature as designed. We only **read** this conception into the facts as a guide to judgement in its reflection upon the products of nature. Hence these ends are not given us by the object."¹¹

So we cannot say categorically, Kant continues, that "There is a God"--we can only represent the world we experience as the product of a divine architect, i.e. of a God. There is, therefore, no alternative but to think about objects exceeding the capacity of our understanding in terms of the:

"subjective conditions necessarily attaching to our human nature in the exercise of its faculties."¹²

Such reflections cannot just assume the idea of an unconditioned original foundation of nature. Instead we read into nature a form of finality: a matter of

judgement, not of understanding. The problem with the linking together of mechanical and teleological explanation, is partly the problem of finding a common source for both. Kant claims that this source is the supersensible substrate of reality. Being part of the noumenal realm of Being, we cannot form a conception of this source, though perhaps we can in some sense indicate or **show** what we are reflecting upon.

Kant asks the question "What branch of knowledge does Teleology belong to?", and rejects the alternatives of natural science and theology in favour of claiming that teleology is better characterised as the "method of critique" used by the faculty of judgement. This method, Kant argues further, proceeds according to a priori principles. This continues to be a philosophy of limitation which is well expressed in the following:

"For the mode of representation based on final causes is only a subjective condition of the exercise of our reason in cases where it is not seeking to know the proper estimate of the form of objects arranged merely as phenomena, but is bent rather on referring these phenomena, principles, to their sensible substrate, for the purpose of recognising the possibility of certain laws of their unity, which are incapable of being figured by the mind otherwise than by means of ends (of which reason also possesses examples of the supersensuous type)"¹³

Kant refuses to regard man as the peak of creation in the light of his frailty in the face of the mega-forces of nature, and also because we harbour destructive tendencies that are more than capable of bringing the species to ruin and destruction. The only characterisation of man's telos that Kant is prepared to endorse is his freedom in his choice of ends, especially those cases in which the free action conceived of is aiming at "The Good". Kant also distinguishes between civilisation and its instrumental works (means to ends) and Culture and its categorical works (focussing upon ends-in-themselves). What is highlighted in this discussion is the critical distinction between good works of skill (*techné*) and good works of knowledge (*epistémé*). The latter rely on an absolute of "the good will" which:

"consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, in our attachment to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own."¹⁴

There are in these reflections an echo of a distinct concern of Socrates who never directly endorsed the "fevered" city of Plato's Republic. He never produced arguments to abandon the picture of the healthy city he painted in the early books of The Republic: a city obeying one principle--the principle of specialisation (a city without warriors or philosophers). In the "fevered city" of his times, we encounter desires out of control, and privileged individuals oppressing others less fortunate than themselves, chaining them to a form of existence that is undignified. Kant's solution to this problem is not to conceive of a city ruled by philosophers telling "noble lies", but rather to conceive of a

culture whose constitution contains laws which prevent the infringement of the freedoms of any individual. This, Kant continues to argue, can only occur if we develop a system of states that is cosmopolitan-- a system which prevents one state infringing upon the freedom of another state. Without such a system "war is an inevitable outcome" (P.96).

Kant further argues that the role of the arts and sciences in such a culture is to prepare man for the adventure of freedom. The utilitarian pseudo-argument that mans telos or final end is happiness is dismissed many times throughout all three Critiques. The Critique of the Power of Judgement uses the following argument:

"The value of life, for us measured simply by what we enjoy (by the natural end of the sum of all our inclinations, that is by happiness) is easy to decide. It is less than nothing. For who would enter life afresh under the same conditions? Who would even do so according to a new self-developed plan (which should, however, follow the course of nature) if it also were merely directed to enjoyment? We have shown above what value life receives from what it involves when lived according to the end with which nature is occupied in us, and which consists in **what we do**, not merely what we enjoy, we being, however, in that case always but a means to an undetermined end. There remains, then, nothing but the worth which we ourselves assign to our life by what we not alone do, but do with a view to an end so independent of nature that the very existence of nature itself can only be an end subject to the condition so imposed."¹⁵

The implication of this argument is that everything in nature is conditioned by the supersensible substrate, including our internal thinking nature. Man, that is, has a supersensible noumenal aspect that is manifested in his freedom and moral action, and this is well illustrated in Kant's "parable of the waterfall" (a discussion of mans relation to "the Sublime"). Confronted by "dunamis" or the power of a mighty waterfall, mans first response is awe and wonder in the face of this force of nature, but this, however, is quickly displaced by a positive estimation of his own power of freedom to act as a moral agent. This for Kant is the sublime unconditioned noumenon that lies at the heart of all conditioned phenomena. Happiness, Kant points out, is variable, and cannot therefore be the true end of human existence: it appears to vary within the same individual at different times of his life. If someone is ill, health appears to make them happy, but if they are healthy but poor, wealth appears to make them happy, until fear of losing their fortune forces them to pursue power to preserve their fortune. This fear, however, is then replaced with the fear of losing power. Happiness also appears to vary between different individuals: what makes Bentham happy does not appear to make Kant happy. Nevertheless, Kant maintains, happiness is part of the summum bonum of life, but only if it is a supervening consequence of a good will and moral activity. It is in relation to these kinds of reflections that man forms an idea of an architect or author of the world: an idea which ensures that the good-in-itself is necessarily related to good consequences (eudaimonia-- a good spirited flourishing life). These ideas, embedded in these reflections, are

regarded by Kant as subjectively practical, but emanating from our reason as they do, they are nevertheless important and necessary and resemble principles that can regulate our existence. These ideas are also practically real, and transcendently possible, and related to the principle of sufficient reason. This matrix of ideas and principles then forms the conviction that becomes part of our faith in a transcendental Being. Transcendent objects of thought are apriori and also a question of faith.

This true reflective form of faith differs from the kind of faith that is built upon historical narratives and personalities. It is also in this region that the philosophical distinction between facts and values lie. Faith is:

"the moral attitude of reason, in its assurance of the truth of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge."¹⁶

This is probably what Plato had in mind when he placed the idea or form of the Good above that of The Truth in the metaphysical reasoning he presented in The Republic. Kant elaborates upon this thought in terms of freedom, and claims that faith has its foundations in the practical reality and transcendental possibility of freedom. Christianity appears to lean very heavily on historical narrative and personalities but Kant has a great respect for this religion which also places emphasis upon mans moral life:

"But this is not the only case in which this wonderful religion has in the great simplicity of its statement enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer conceptions of morality than morality itself could have previously supplied. But once these conceptions are found, they are freely approved by reason, which adopts them as conceptions which it could quite well have arrived at itself and which it might and ought to have introduced."¹⁷

Faith also relates to the idea of the soul, but there are great difficulties in the representation of this supersensible, noumenal aspect of ourselves which historically became characterised as "immortal" because it clearly is a representation that must be disconnected from the time-conditions of experience. This, however, does not entail that the soul is substantially timeless, unless by "substantially", one means, "in principle". One can claim that the soul is, in principle, timeless, because its time conditions appear to be the same as the time conditions of ideas which must necessarily exist as long as there are humans thinking these ideas. Ideas, however, do not appear to possess the practical reality that actions do, and it is for this reason that Kant proposes that freedom proves its own objective reality:

"of the three ideas of pure reason, God freedom and immortality, that of freedom is the one and only one conception of the supersensible which (owing to the causality implied in it) proves its objective reality in nature by its possible affect there. By this means it makes

possible the connection of the two other ideas with nature and the connection of all three to form a religion."¹⁸

The surprising inclusion of freedom as an important component of religion has startling consequences when it comes to interpreting the historical narratives of the Bible. We discussed the parable of "The Garden of Eden" earlier in this work, and questioned the ecclesiastical interpretation which claimed that this was a story about "The Fall" of man from the Grace of God--a narrative about the disobedience of man partaking of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. On a Kantian interpretation, this story is obviously an anxious moment in mans history, because it is a moment in which instinct was left behind as an organiser of mans life, and a choice had to be made as to whether one ought to place ones faith in knowledge. This was clearly a moment of freedom, of emancipation, and characterising it as a fall from the Grace of God merely testifies to the primitive idea of God man must have had at this time. God is undoubtedly an important part of the supersensible noumenal substrate, and as such is going to present difficulties in the attempt to represent this form of Being. To recognise our duties as divine commands is testimony to the fact that, whilst we are potentially rational beings, we are not as yet (as a species) actually so. Hence the command structure of the categorical imperative and ought-matrix of concepts that lie at the foundation of our moral intentions and actions. Nevertheless it is still reasonable to pose the question "What is it that we have an obligation towards?". There appear to be three possible answers to such a question:

1. Being
2. Ourselves
3. to the potentiality of the species

All three answers may be correct if elaborated upon in a Kantian spirit. Conceiving of God as a Prime mover as Aristotle does is criticised by Kant on the grounds of it requiring a definite conception of a form of Being in relation to the Category of Causality. This, for Kant, is a confusion of different aspects of the thinking process. Aristotle also, we know, used the term "Primary Form" in the sense of "Primary Principle" to represent God and this formulation of the power of the divine appears to be more in line with Kantian thinking.

Kant proposes using the term "intelligence" to characterise the being of God and his "activity" and there is a clear risk of anthropomorphising the principle that is being referred to: confusing an idea of reason with something that appears to be connected (at least in the modern mind) with the categories of understanding. Hughes in his work on the Critique of the power of judgement equates intelligence with:

"the teleological cause of the object"¹⁹

If, however, purposiveness is also implied in this telos, then there is a risk of it being reduced to concrete purposes and this will confound any thinking which sees intelligence to be a manifestation of a principle (e.g. areté). Any principle equated with the "intelligence" of God would, of course be far beyond the reach of human understanding and reason. Our understanding is limited to representing this Being in terms of formal and final causes and presumably, as a consequence, material and efficient causes or any form of "mechanical" characterisation would be otiose (using the principle of sufficient reason as the logical standard)

The presence of "analogous thinking" in any characterisation of the telos of living beings is elaborated upon by Kant in his claim that living organisms are both cause and effect of themselves: they cause, i.e. both their own activity and the reproduction of their kinds. The difference between the telos of living organisms and the teleological explanation of the divine principle is that, in the former case, the principle is likened unto a plan or goal of action, whereas in the latter case, there can be no conceivable separation between a plan and its outcome i.e. no separation between God's contemplation of a change and that change coming about: everything is actual and the potential dissipates, and this is the explanation of our earlier point that God, the principle, is not subject to experiential time-conditions. Both Aristotle and Kant believe that the telos or natural purpose of the living organism is internal to that organism. Such organisms are actualising their potentials under sequential time conditions. Taking the example of a rose, the principle of the telos of roses is internalised, but the question is whether this is related to the aesthetic idea of the form of finality of the rose that we find beautiful. These two aspects are clearly different since in the aesthetic appreciation of the rose we are not exploring the properties of the rose with a view to classifying it as such. We may, however, be appreciating the psuche of the rose. Now whilst life itself cannot be said to have a telos, different forms of life clearly do. The activity of the harmony of the faculties occurs only in relation to objects manifesting themselves aesthetically and this is clearly happening when we appreciate the life form of the rose.

Does nature as a whole have a purpose? Well, life forms would have natural purposes, on Kant's account, and together would constitute a "system of purposes". The question that arises is how to characterise Gods role in this system of purposes. Is the principle internalised in the system or does it stand at the boundary of the system as the physical eye does to the visual field? Kant's challenge is a reflective one and not directed at understanding what, by definition, lies outside. There can then, be no definition of God, and we are then challenged to follow Plato's example when he could no longer give an account in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. Plato's response to this state of affairs is to present us with analogies or allegories, and this is what we must do

in our attempts to represent the God-principle. We ought, that is, to look at both nature as a system of purposes and the role of God in this system in terms of metaphor or analogy. The Being of God, for example, can be represented **as if** it were an architect or supersensible intelligence. This amounts to claiming that the God-principle is a regulative idea in our minds. This complex form of existence of the God-idea or God-principle clearly is a contributory factor involved in the difficulty of maintaining a large community in which this principle or idea is revered.

Modernist conceptions of the world are bipolar---whatever exists must be subject to observation or manipulation, and if ideas can neither be observed nor manipulated in such a relatively primitive sensory-motor system, such ideas have no form of existence. We can, on this account, only have knowledge of what exists. Thoughts are parsed in this sensory-motor system as particular items that could vary depending upon which private chamber of consciousness they reside in. They might have a particular psychological relation to the chamber they inhabit, but they have the quality of sensations which can only privately "felt".

For many, the acid test of teleology, is in the experiencing of life-forms and the above account seemingly makes it impossible to see the manifestation of these life-forms in their activity. This may to some extent be so in the case of being a human form of life and also in our attempts to "read" the behaviour of other animal life forms: analogous thinking may be required to understand some aspects of what we are experiencing. We humans, from hylomorphic and critical perspectives, stand in the middle of a continuum of life-forms. We certainly need to apply analogous thinking to activity connected to the God-principle or God-idea, especially when it concerns trying to understand the role of such a principle or idea in nature's system of purposes. It could be argued that, in some respect, we "participate" in the "form" of the divine via the actualisation of our potentiality for rationality, in a similar way to the way in which we "participate" in the "form" of animality in the context of attempting to understand the behaviour of non-human animal forms of life. Our attempts to understand pure matter and pure form as presented in the Aristotelian system are also problematic because in the former case our sensory-motor and thought systems may well "disguise" the true nature of what we are experiencing, and in the latter case we are encountering a form that is not physically embodied. The brain (the most complex object in the universe), for example, according to Gerald Edelstam in his work "Bright Air brilliant fire" is "merely" organised carbon, hydrogen oxygen nitrogen sulphur phosphate and a few trace metals. It is, Edelstam argues, the organisation of this material that makes a brain a brain.

That we are dealing with analogous thinking is manifested in Kant's first Critique when it is claimed that insofar as our search for, and reliance upon knowledge, is concerned, we are organising our experience rationally for the purpose of acquiring empirical knowledge via observation and conceptualisation. "Construction" is involved in this activity of processing by two different cognitive faculties, and, as we pointed out above, this might "disguise the true nature of "things-in-themselves"--the supersensible substrate. How can we, then, even think such a possibility? We do, Kant argues, have some limited kind of contact with this noumenal realm in our moral activity--contact with people as ends-in-themselves and contact via thought with a future kingdom of ends which better manifests these ends-in-themselves. Given the structure of our sensory-motor activity and limitations of conceptualisation activity, we have no choice, Kant argues, but to use analogous thinking in reflections about nature in itself and the God principle in itself. Conceiving of this principle as a primary form or an intelligent architect ought, then, to be conceived of analogously or metaphorically, because we are dealing with a non-material non-observational a priori "principle". Being a principle entails that God's "thinking activity" is "deductive" "moving" from wholes to parts instantaneously. Whether one wishes to call this strategy related to analogy "projection" or not depends to a large extent on what one understands by this term. The form of existence of this divine form of intelligence is both beyond our knowledge and to some extent beyond our capacity to think anything in particular about this form. This is why many thinkers, in an attempt to explain exactly what it is they have faith in, end up throwing up their hands in despair and proclaiming "God must exist!" Kant's explanation also arrives at this conclusion via an account that stretches over a number of works, including one specifically aiming at the presentation of theological difficulties with the problem of the existence of God (Religion within the bounds of reason alone).

The "new men", Descartes and Hobbes, regarded life-forms as "mechanical" and Descartes' barbaric experiments on unaesthetised animals indicate a form of disrespect for life forms we have not encountered by Philosophers before. Such examples also testify to the extent to which mechanical explanations with the aid of mathematics fail to meet the requirements of the principle of sufficient reason. We should recall in the context of this discussion Kant's claim that mechanical explanations fail even to meet this requirement insofar as explaining the existence of a blade of grass is concerned.

Aesthetic reflection places us at a psychic distance from scientific investigation in general and mechanical explanation in particular, partly because it is disinterested and partly because of its refusal to think in terms of possibilities and necessities (categories of the understanding). In many

respects aesthetic judgement manifests an interesting combination of two of the major cognitive faculties in its representing activity. The particular is perceived and the imagination is engaged in a search for a universal that is not categorical. In this process we intuit (sense) the form of finality of nature, e.g. we do not perceive the rose as a botanist might but rather **see it as** a life form striving to preserve itself in its form of existence. Involved in this process of reflection is also the seeing of the rose as being the manifestation of the "work" of a divine intelligence. This form of speculative reflection leads us back (via a different route) to God, seen under the aspect of the beautiful (as compared with the aspects of the Truth and The Good). Reflective judgement thus bears some relation to moral judgement which provoked Kant to claim that beauty is the symbol of morality, and furthermore prepares the mind for ethical understanding. The life-form of the human being is the most interesting aspect of one kind of aesthetic judgement, perhaps because of this intimate connection with our moral natures. In this respect humans are not simple beauties such as flowers but nevertheless "partake" of the form of the beautiful. In judging that a human being is beautiful, we are estimating this part of nature **as if it** were a work of art. We cannot, however look at all nature in this way because we are well aware of the devastating impact of forces of nature on human civilisations: tsunamis, earthquakes, and massive volcanic activity regularly cause widespread ruin and destruction in relation to humans and everything created by humans. We spontaneously and naturally judge such events to be in some sense "evil" exactly because of the fact that we "project" "the good" onto works of nature, and in an act of further reflection, attribute these good works to the divine artist. We do not normally attribute natural catastrophes and disasters to anything divine, however.

One of Freud's thoughts in the context of this discussion orbits around the idea of religion being a "delusion": he claims namely that religion is the unhealthy projection of psychotic minds. In earlier discussions of this claim we suggested that it was not absolutely clear what the target of the Freudian attack was. The fact that Freud claimed his Psychology was Kantian, would suggest that Freud would not place the Kantian interpretation of nature as art or the work of the divine artist, in the same category. Freud may, that is, have been talking about "patients" and their religious tendencies to "Project" their anxieties and wish fulfillments into a being that in the end is a substitute for the father they wish they had. These patients appear to dwell permanently in the realm of an imagination, plagued by anxieties and desires they cannot control. It almost seems impossible for them to move reflectively toward the realms of understanding and reason and do the work of interpretation needed for genuine religious understanding.

Kant's characterisation of the divine principle or law-giver is in terms of omniscience, being all-good, all-powerful, all knowing, absolutely just, absolutely wise, eternal, and One. This might be how Aristotle conceived of Primary Form. There may, however, be other aspects of the divine form that escapes us. Spinoza, we know, conceived of God in terms of a substance possessing an infinite number of dimensions. We humans, Spinoza claims, only know of God under two finite aspects: namely thought and extension.

On Kant's gravestone there is a quote relating to the two things that evoke awe and wonder in the human mind: the starry sky above and the moral law within. Scientists, when conducting their experiments are not reflecting aesthetically upon the parts of the world they are concerned with, and furthermore they would not know what to do with the result of an experiment with humans which resulted, if the subjects responded with awe and wonder at the experiment. Kant, however much respect he had for science and the manipulation and measurement of dependent and independent variables was Philosophically less interested in the confirmation or verification of imagined hypotheses, and more interested in investigating aspects of being that generate awe and wonder. In his transcendental investigations into human and divine existence, judgement obviously played an important role whether it be aesthetic or teleological.

Notes on Chapter 14

¹ *Kant's Critique of Judgement*, Trans, Meredith J., C., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, P.23)

² Ibid. P.4

³ Ibid. P.5

⁴ Ibid. P.61

⁶ Ibid. Part II P.21

⁷ Ibid. Part II, P.34

⁸ Ibid. Part II, P.37

⁹ Ibid. Part II P.38

¹⁰ Ibid. Part II, P, 98

¹¹ Ibid. Part II P.53

¹² Ibid. Part II P.58

¹³ Ibid. Part II P.91-2

¹⁴ Ibid. Part II P.95

¹⁵ Ibid. Part II ftnt P-97-8

¹⁶ Ibid. Part II, P.145

¹⁷ Ibid. Part II, P.146

¹⁸ Ibid. Part II, P.149

¹⁹ Ibid. Part II, P.149

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Chapter 15: The legacy of Pure Reason

Objects exist and we can sense them, think about them, and the relation between them, and reason about them. The relation, however, between an objects existence and the activities of sensing them, thinking about them, and reasoning about them, is a complex one that Kant believes neither common sense nor the rationalism and empiricism of his day can fathom. The ancient Greeks did not speak about reality in these terms. It has been noted, too, that the Latinisation of Greek Culture and Greek Philosophy transformed the term "hypokeimonon" into subjektum. This together with the translation of "ousia (primary being) into substantia, set the stage for an epistemological interpretation of the being that underlies all appearance and all knowledge of it.

Kant's Copernican Revolution is an attempt to restore our relation to Being and give an account of that which remains the same throughout change: the enduring subject. This account takes the form of a metaphysical/transcendental inquiry in which the existence of reality is neither assumed by the subject nor constituted by the subject characterised by Kant in terms of the faculties of sensibility, understanding and reason. This is clearly neither a realist nor an idealist position and perhaps is best construed as an elaboration upon Aristotelian hylomorphism.

The First Critique is a paradoxical work in that it provides us with a very technical abstract account of experience (concepts and intuitions), but it nevertheless is very concerned to limit metaphysical speculation by principles of experience. Kant criticises all principles that transcend any possible experience, especially principles purporting to be rational. Experience is, of course, broadly defined, and includes not just what happens to us, but also what we do, e.g. thinking. Insofar as we are dealing with the latter notion of experience, Kant focuses upon my understanding of reality in terms of the "I think". In the course of the examination of the first person case of thinking, the focus is upon, not my sensory encounters with reality, but rather my understanding of what is encountered--an understanding that is concerned with objects that:

"render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts"¹

In this form of examination there is also a rejection of reference to examples which appeal to the faculty of Sensibility, and a verdict in favour of conceptual clarity and distinctness. Concepts are a form of general principle, and determine, therefore, the way in which an object is thought about. Logic is an important tool in Kant's investigation and is applicable in both theoretical and practical forms of reasoning. The telos of these forms of reasoning is either epistémé (knowledge) or making something (the object of the thought) actual. Galileo, Torricelli and Stahl are cited as examples of scientists who refused to be led by natures leading strings, and instead forced nature to answer questions formulated

in a tribunal of reason. The tools of judges in such a tribunal are both logical reasoning and the experiment. The procedure of the tribunal ought to provide a guideline for metaphysical reflection (The Queen of the Sciences):

"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts have, on this assumption ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."²

This is the famous "Copernican Revolution" initiated by Kant, and the difference between his Critical Philosophy and Aristotle's hylomorphic Philosophy may be seen in Kant's focus upon the idea of an object. This focus was a reflection of the epistemological discussions of his era-- a discussion which, prior to Kant, disregarded the earlier integration of epistemological and metaphysical issues we encounter in Aristotle. Kant's "destruction" of the metaphysical projects of his times aimed at a better integration of these two perspectives. Kant's "revolution" also required a division of the mind into the faculties of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason, and this in turn also encouraged a focus upon objects and what we can know of them via observation and experiment as well as what we can know of them via a priori knowledge. Objects, concepts, and principles are a reflection, then, of the activity of the above faculties, but the focus upon the object is also a consequence of Kant's emphasis upon the importance of the principles of experience in his Philosophy. A priori knowledge was another important emphasis, and also necessary to give an exhaustive account of scientific activity and theory in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. Kant criticises the metaphysical tendency to abandon all contact with experience and insists upon the role of the understanding and transcendental structures of the mind in determining what is possible, actual and necessary in experience. Critical thinking, then uses the principles of noncontradiction in the following manner:

"For what necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and of all appearances is the unconditioned which reason by necessity and by right demands in things as required to complete the series of conditions. If, then, on the supposition that our empirical knowledge conforms to objects as things in themselves, we find that the unconditioned **cannot be thought without contradiction** and that when, on the other hand, we suppose that our representations of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects as appearances, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction vanishes...."³

This mode of representation can be intuitive or conceptual dependent upon the faculty of mind involved and dependent upon the nature of the experience. The above makes it clear why sensibility or intuition as such is not co-extensive with what is real (in-itself). Kant will later claim that sensibility plays an important

role in what we regard as "empirically real". Kant further insists that things-in-themselves, as a consequence, cannot be known but that we can, however, think about them and reflect upon them.

The discussion of Practical Reasoning also confirms the above conclusion of theoretical thinking but its focus is upon action and the will that motivates it:

"there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far **not free**, while yet as belonging to a thing-in-itself, it is not subject to that law, and is therefore **free**."⁴

So, we cannot know that we are free, but are able to think this idea of practical reason, and it is critical for Kant's ethical theory that this be so, because otherwise there would be no metaphysics of morals: merely a theory representing the determining causes of action. We must, Kant insists, ask not for the law-like causes of action, but rather for the reasons for action. Kant's theory has distinct advantages over analytical theories which flatly reject the Aristotelian postulate that all human activities aim at the good, and probably also the Aristotelian claim that we praise people for the good that they do, and blame them for the harm they cause by not doing what they ought to do. Unless, as Kant claims, freedom of choice trumped being caused to do these same things, praise and blame would be meaningless. There would be no general attitude in which people expected other people to do what they ought to do. On analytical views, where the world is defined as the totality of facts, everything that is done is merely a fact, and there would be little point in praising anyone for anything--we do not praise reality for being what it is and not something else. Perhaps our regret or joy would then focus on the cause or causal chain that brought the event of the action about (and the associated "sensations"). For many analytical philosophers, the cause and the effect are neither logically nor conceptually connected, and this leaves us in contexts of explanation with the refuge of many empiricists, the so-called "law of association". Many attempts to construct psychological theories from such unlikely elements have been attempted, including the theory of the pragmatist, (and enemy of metaphysics), William James. Paradoxically, however, James' definition of Psychology might have been found acceptable by the targets of his attacks (e.g. Aristotle and Kant):

"The Science of Mental Life, both its phenomena and conditions."⁵

James' pragmatism is, however, grounded in materialism as is evident in his interpretation of the conditions of mental life:

"The experiences of the body thus are one of the conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is. And a very small amount of reflection on the facts shows that one part of the body, namely, the brain, is the part whose experiences are directly concerned."⁶

One of the major laws of brain functions is of course the "law of association". James' admits that the boundary-line of the mental is obscure, and claims that:

"a certain amount of brain physiology may be presupposed as included in Psychology"⁷

We can but wonder whether the stage is not being prepared for another act in the drama or dance of the materialists and the dualists. James, however, mysteriously defines association in the following way:

"Association, so far as the word stands for an **effect** between **things thought of**--it is **things**, not ideas, which are associated in the mind....And so far as association stands for a **cause**, it is between **processes in the brain**--it is these which by being associated in certain ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought."⁸

The only "things" in the brain, however, are neurones, and these are either connected with each other ("associated"), or not, in various networks. We should recall that Psychological theory concerns itself with learning and one physiological definition of learning is:

"The facilitation of neuronal pathways such that, as a result, a type of experience is present that was not present before."

James takes the example of a child reaching for the attractive stimulus of the light of a candle and, as a consequence, burning his fingers. The motor activity and the consequent sensation of pain (response) are associated in a network that now prevents the completion of the reflexive reaction to the light. A question that might arise here, given James' earlier reflection, is: "Is pain a thing?" It surely is an experience, but it is an experience that is undergone, and the question then becomes whether the reflex operation of reaching for the candle is an experience? John Dewey in his work "Art as Experience" (Dewey, J., New York, Capricorn Books, 1958) defined experience both in terms of what is undergone, and in terms of what is done⁹. The OED in its turn, defines experience as "practical contact with facts and events", and this suggests that both sensory and motor events can be elements of experience. Yet in terms of the above quote by James, we still remain sceptical about the claim that a pain can be a thing. It certainly can be a fact, but it is not a fact that I observe in the normal case of my experience of pain. I can observe "things" and order them in causal networks. The act of reaching, and the feeling of pain, however, are not "things", but the one event certainly causes the other, and the child would not have been transformed by the experience unless the events occurred in the context of a principle that prevented the effect of pain upon the next encounter with the exciting stimulus. Surely, one can insist, it is this kind of principle that we ought to be reflecting upon in a work entitled "Principles of Psychology".

For Kant, pain is certainly something that we undergo and it is part of the activity of the faculty of sensibility which ought to be accounted for under the heading of "Physical Anthropology". It is, however, "Pragmatic Anthropology", Kant insists, that concerns itself with what we do, and the principles behind what we do. In Kant's view the ontological distinction between what we do and what we undergo is a key distinction that ought to be observed, and these ought also to be the concern of different disciplines. In Modern Philosophical Psychology, as we have seen, in our previous reflections on the History of Psychology, the sensation emerged as a postulated, fundamental, element of psychic life and consciousness. We argued that this was probably the result of materialist tendencies wishing to "atomise" and wishing to reduce the psychic whole to more comprehensible elements.

Merleau-Ponty, (MP) in a work entitled "Phenomenology of Perception." (Trans Smith, C., London, Routledge, 1962) comments on the tendency to focus upon sensation:

"if we try to seize sensation within the perspective of the bodily phenomena which pave the way to it, we find not a psychic individual, a function of certain known variables, but a formation already bound up with a larger whole, already endowed with a meaning distinguishable only in degree from the more complex perceptions."¹⁰

The brain, MP argues, is not a collection of contents ("things") or facts, Rather its structures are ordered in terms of psychological functions or principles. The system of sensations of colour, for example, belong to a more comprehensive life-structure such that:

"The destruction of sight, whatever the injuries be sustained, follows the same law: all colours are affected in the first place, and lose their saturation. Then the spectrum is simplified being reduced to four and soon to two colours: finally a monochrome grey stage is reached, although the pathological colour is never identifiable with any normal one. Thus in central as in peripheral lesions the loss of nervous substance results not merely in a deficiency of certain qualities but in the change to a less differentiated and more primitive structure. Conversely, normal functioning must be understood as a process of integration in which the text of the external world is not so much copied as composed"¹¹

MP goes on to claim that physiological events obey biological and psychological laws. He does not however name these laws in the way Freud does. Freud regards the state of homeostasis the brain strives for, a result of the operation of the Energy Regulation Principle (ERP). This is the most primitive brain function for Freud. The next level up in the hierarchy concerns the psychological functioning of the entire organism and this occurs under the auspices of the Pleasure-pain Principle (PPP). It is at this level that the faculty of sensibility becomes the focus of attention for the Psychologist. Finally, we arrive at the Reality Principle (RP), which governs the most complex aspects of

mental functioning for human forms of life. This is the Kantian realm of the understanding/reason which for Freud is the field of operation for the agencies of the ego and superego. James does not directly appeal to any of these principles or laws but rather to the law of association between things, and the causal relations between them, thus succumbing to the reductionist strategies of the materialistically minded empiricists that MP, Freud, Kant and Wittgenstein rejected so convincingly. James does, however mitigate his empiricism with an interesting definition of the Mental:

"The pursuance of future ends and the choice of the means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon."¹²

Here James is concerning himself not with the conditions, but with the phenomena to be studied, and it is in this arena that he is at his best. In the above quote there is allusion to the Greek idea of telos, and by implication, an appeal to areté, since he goes on to evoke the idea of "intelligence" to explain what is meant by the above definition. This, however, if anything, is a narrowing (from a Kantian point of view) of what initially looked like a practical concern, to a theoretical concern, and it might be related to the earlier discussion of the laws of association in which "ideas" were replaced by "objects". Of course there is no conceivable representation of an "association-relation" between ideas unless one "mechanises" what is essentially a logical or thought-relation. Perhaps such a concentration upon the condition of the possibility of experiencing an object is useful in the scientific process of exploration/discovery, but given the hypothetical nature of such activity, it would be problematic to characterise what is going on here as determined by a law or a principle. Such activity might assist us in the discovery of a law or principle but cannot itself be characterised as such. Moreover the unity of the "I think" we find in Kantian Critical Philosophy is missing from the account James provides us with. James, for example, claims that there is no unity of the self because we are constituted of a number of different selves and different kinds of self. This is empiricism at its most extreme. Once the unity of something that remains the same throughout myriad changes is compromised, the chances of producing a unified theory of Psychological Principles is diminished significantly. The pluralistic pragmatism James espouses is anti-metaphysical, and this is one explanation behind the move to give concrete and materialistic accounts of the conditions of phenomena. James' discussion of the phenomenon of the "spiritual" self becomes puzzling and appears dualistic. We should recall that when the dualist Descartes was forced to answer mind-body relation questions he retreated to the materialist explanation of "brain activity".

The Kantian metaphysical/transcendental investigation into the conditions of experience rests upon a priori knowledge in the form of intuitive representations (space and time) and the form of the categorical framework of conceptualisation.

James was familiar with this account and rejected it, but his grounds for doing so were unclear. In his work on Pragmatism we encounter an objection to metaphysics that, on inspection, turns out to be not a criticism of the Kantian account, but rather a criticism relating to a conceptual dispute over whether to say someone is circumambulating a squirrel when the squirrel is adjusting its position out of sight as we are circumambulating the tree in order to catch sight of it¹³. This does not resemble the metaphysical disputes we usually encounter in criticisms of the major metaphysical systems of Aristotle and Kant. In his work on Pragmatism, there is a reference to G K Chesterton, and James praises him for his claim that the most important thing about a man is his view of the universe. It is a pity that James did not pay attention to Chesterton's fence-principle, which urges those who wish to tear down a fence, to first ask themselves why the fence was built where it stands. James, however, is not alone in systematically ignoring metaphysical and transcendental logic in his Psychological and Philosophical investigations. Indeed it is almost a defining feature of our modern era that thinkers embrace some form of this anti-metaphysical attitude. Phenomenological thinkers, e.g. Husserl, believed, that one should abstract from the categories of the understanding and the principles of reason in order to "represent things as they are in themselves." Many modern thinkers, would also object to the claim in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, that:

"We are in possession of certain modes of a priori knowledge, and even the common understanding is never without them."¹⁴

The notion of cause, is an example of a priori knowledge that we impose upon representations as a category when we conceptualise experience. This category also contains, Kant argues, a relation to the modality of the necessary: a relationship Hume (the believer in the law of association) denied. Hume claimed, that we become acquainted with the idea of cause through the repeated association of causes and effects. Kant rejects this on the grounds that the mechanism of association could never produce the modality of necessity that is attached to causal judgements. Such judgements, Kant argues, cannot be negated without violation of the principle of noncontradiction and these judgements are further characterised by Kant as synthetic a priori judgements which he claims forms the nucleus of metaphysical investigations:

"Metaphysics, even if we look upon it as having hitherto failed in all its endeavours, is yet, owing to the nature of human reason, a quite indispensable science, and ought to contain a priori synthetic knowledge. For its business is not merely to analyse concepts which we make for ourselves a priori of things and thereby to clarify them analytically, but to extend our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose we must employ principles which add to the given concept something that was not contained in it... This metaphysics consists at least **in intention**, entirely of a priori synthetic propositions."¹⁵

Kant then takes up a discussion relating to how such synthetic a priori judgements are possible. He points out that Hume did not realise that the propositions of Mathematics are synthetic a priori (e.g. the shortest distance between two points is a straight line). Had he realised this fact, Kant continues, he might have realised the importance of metaphysics for philosophical investigations. He would, that is, have realised the importance of the faculty of reasoning and its use of the principles of a priori knowledge. Kant also defines the transcendental in terms of reason:

"I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori."¹⁶

The principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason are, then, the substantial core of transcendental knowledge. The role of experience in this context has two aspects and depends upon whether the part of the mind involved in the experience is the faculty of sensibility or the faculty of understanding. If it is the former:

"In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way."¹⁷

Kant also claims, in hylomorphic spirit, that sensation is the matter, and that which is responsible for ordering all representations into a unity, is a "form"(principle). Sensibility, for Kant, has both an inner and an outer aspect. Outer sense enables us to represent objects outside of us in space (a form of outer intuition). Inner sense, on the other hand, is ordered in Time and this is an a priori form (principle) which underlies all kinds of representation. The key Aristotelian notion of change, for Kant, is only possible via the a priori inner intuition of Time.

MP argues that Time is:

"the most general characteristic of psychic facts."¹⁸

and even though we are aware of the fact that events occur in time, they nevertheless, according to both Kant and MP presuppose Time as a necessary condition of experience. Moreover:

"The events are shapes cut out by a finite observer for the spatio-temporal totality of the objective world."¹⁹

This also applies to the activity of observation. The Kantian ship, for example, steaming down the river, cannot be divided up into events in proximity to each

other. Neither can this experience be reduced to a series of "Nows" juxtaposed and tied together by some form of causality. The subject that "constitutes" time in the Kantian sense does so, MP argues, not by projection of memories into the future but via a network of intentions operating continuously throughout a "lived" process centred in the present. MP characterises the role of Time in experience in terms of the "Logos of the Aesthetic world" (P.498).

Aristotle, on the other hand, defines Time as "the measure of motion in terms of before and after". The advantage of such a definition is that it places man in an active role as a measurer existing continuously, not in a series of juxtaposed "nows", but as something that endures through change and moreover measures this change in terms of before and after--making the "now" a nothing--a mere point or boundary between these aspects of change. In terms of Aristotle's categories, Time is a Quantity that is related to any enduring entity capable of initiating any change witnessed. This entity is also something that itself is capable of changing. As something capable of changing, e.g. acquiring a sun tan, material and efficient causes/explanations will be appropriately appealed to. If we are dealing only with the "logos of the Aesthetic world" as MP maintains and Kant suggests in his claim that no judgements of the understanding are involved in intuitive representations, then Mathematics in its use of number may be a science dedicated to the measurement of the aesthetic world and "counting" may be an activity that primarily involves the faculty of sensibility.

Thought about objects, for Kant, is a function of the faculty of understanding which uses concepts that provide us with a power to know objects. In the context of knowledge both sensibility and understanding are equally important, and the role of reason is that of an organiser of the categories of the understanding/judgement in knowledge systems, e.g. the sciences. Logic is the science that we use to explain/justify our claims at many different levels of thought:

"Logic again, can be treated in a twofold manner either as the logic of the general or as the logic of the special employment of the understanding. The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatever of the understanding. It therefore treats of understanding without any regard to the difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed. The logic of the special employment of the understanding contains the rules of correct thinking as regards certain kinds of objects."²⁰

The general employment of logic uses the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason (pure a priori principles). Mathematics and the Natural Sciences are examples of knowledge systems that focus on different objects. Number, for example, focuses upon Time, and its relation to change-in-general, and Natural Science investigates the efficient and material causes of the physical changes we see in the natural world: a world that contains inorganic stars (df=

gravitationally bound balls of hydrogen and helium made self fluorescent by internal nuclear fusion) and organic life forms (psuche). Similarly different kinds of objects will be focussed upon in the practical and productive sciences as defined by Aristotle. Psychology is specifically mentioned by Kant in this discussion:

"General logic is called applied when it is directed to the rules of the employment of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions dealt with by Psychology."²¹

Psychology as a discipline also makes an appearance in contexts of practical reasoning where we are dealing with both pure and applied ethics. Pure ethics relates to the constitution of the moral law by the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. Applied ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with the limitations placed upon moral action by feelings, inclinations and passions. The activities of praising and blaming moral agents for their possession or lack of possession of the virtues, is the empirical aspect of moral understanding. Insofar as rational demonstration or justification of an action is concerned, this can only occur in deliberations in which principles relate to the moral law: it cannot occur in relation to the pluralistic sphere of the many and various virtues. In this context Kantian ethical theory is an elaboration upon and improvement of Aristotles pluralistic virtue theory.

The role of transcendental logic in Kant's Critical Philosophy is partly as a regulator of the categories, and relates to the non empirical a priori origin of knowledge, its scope and validity. Insofar as experiential judgements are concerned, the role of transcendental logic relates to both the categories of the understanding and the principles of reason. In a discussion on the Nature of Truth, Kant adopts a position similar to that of Aristotle when he claims that a general definition of Truth cannot be given, because truth claims carry specific reference to specific objects. Kant agrees, however, that we can "nominally" say that Truth is the agreement of knowledge with its object, but given the different realms of knowledge no universal formula is possible, and insofar as we attempt to apply the principle of sufficient reason, this is also limited to specific realms and their differing objects. Logic, insofar as it relates to the categories of the understanding, however, provides us with both universal and necessary rules, and here we use logic in its "special use": a use which includes an understanding of the a priori elements of Space and Time. Kant calls the abuse of logic its dialectical use and he refers to this as "the logic of illusion" (P.99). The role of the concept in this system is clearly defined:

"concepts rest on functions. By "function" I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation."²²

Concepts are then used in judgements which have the structure of thinking something about something (a representation of a representation). Concepts are not in immediate relation to objects in the way intuitions are. They are, rather, that which we use to think **about** intuitive representations, and they can also form conceptual and logical relations with each other in accordance with categories and principles. Pure concepts abstract from the content of judgement, and form 12 logical kinds in accordance with 4 groups of categories. The most important question to ask in this context is "With what right is the concept used?" In other words, what is the justification for the use of the concept in the judgement. Kant calls this a *quaestio juris*, and distinguishes this type of question from one in which the answer expected is factual.

Consciousness as a phenomenon does make an appearance in Kant's first Critique in the context of the deduction of the concepts of understanding:

"Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they may participate either directly or indirectly. In this way alone is any knowledge possible. We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations."²³

This is Kant's version of the more general Aristotelian principle of change whereby something endures throughout the change: if this change is to be understood and explained. Kant goes on to say that it is appearance of reality combined with this consciousness that produces Perception. (P.143). He further claims in a footnote:

"Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself."

It is the imagination that synthesises representations into the form of an image, which is the schema of the concept. In this context Kant speaks of the role of association not as a law, but as a power of the faculty of Sensibility. This power rests upon the power of the mind to both synthesise and connect representations in an "abiding and unchanging I" (P.146). Once this power is exercised, a further power of the understanding in the form of the use of the categories is, then, also needed to provide the unity in experience required for knowledge. It is this combination of powers that allows us to view nature as law-governed. The activity of connecting or combining concepts, however, is not a matter for the sensible power of the imagination, but is rather an "affair of the understanding" (P.154). There is a difficulty which Kant acknowledges concerning the nature of the relation between the I that is conscious of itself (intuits itself) and the I that thinks (combines and connects concepts in thought). Kant points out that there is no difficulty in representing oneself as an object of intuition and inner perception. The "I" that thinks, on the other hand, is not a representation of an

appearance but rather a representation of my existence. This is the region in which the difficult realm of knowledge of myself dwells. Kant is, in the context of this discussion, pointing to a distinction between the "phenomenal" self that "appears" in intuitions and an existential self which is not the same as the "noumenal" self and is the focus of activity in ethical action and reflection. All three notions of the self (phenomenal self, existential self, noumenal self) are aspects of the self-in-general that the Delphic Oracle had in mind when she challenged humanity with the imperative "Know Thyself!". Kant insists that we cannot know ourselves except through the categories, judgements and intuitions of myself and my powers. The role of Judgement in the triumvirate of the higher faculties of knowledge (understanding, judgement and reason), is to decide whether something does or does not accord with a category and will therefore use special rather than general logic in an investigation that is in accord with the principle of sufficient reason. This opens up a space for the use of transcendental logic which will focus both on the category involved and an example that correctly exemplifies the category. The role of reason in this triumvirate is to be "the faculty of principles" (P.301)

The Principles of Logic, for example enable us to generate knowledge from a special principle, e.g. "All men are mortal". The reasoning process in this case is familiar:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal.

Both the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason are at work in the operation of the above deduction. But the ultimate task of reason is to provide us with the totality of conditions for phenomena and also to focus on what is unconditioned. Kant provides us with a very illuminating example of the use of reason by Plato to illustrate both the scope and limits of reason:

"Plato made use of the expression "idea" in such a way as quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is coincident with it. For Plato, ideas are archetypes of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the categories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view they have issued from the highest reason."²⁴

Kant continues:

"Plato found the chief instance of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of

reason. Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as many have actually done) what at best can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge, would make of virtue something which changes according to time and circumstance... On the contrary as we are all aware, if anyone is held up as a pattern of virtue, the true original with which we compare the alleged pattern and by which alone we judge of its value is to be found only in our minds."²⁵

Sensibility, and Human Nature in general, which Kant elsewhere characterises as prone to antagonism because of a desire to rule himself as he wishes and obey the rule of others only when he wishes, is an obstacle in the way of the achievement of the archetypal idea of virtue (*areté*). At the level of judgement, virtue or *areté* is characterised in action-terms as "doing the right thing in the right way at the right time" but at the level of reason, virtue is characterised in terms of the three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Kant, as is the case with Aristotle, extends his account of practical reasoning from the realm of ethics to that of Politics:

"A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others--I do not speak of the greatest happiness for this will follow of itself--at any rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws"²⁶

This projected perfect state of affairs, of course, does not, strictly speaking, exist, and will not do so, Kant argues, for another 100,000 years. One of the obstacles in the way of the actualisation of this perfect state of affairs is man's nature: man is a being, Kant argues, in need of a Master in his current pre-rational state, but there is ambivalence in his attitude toward living in a society because he also desires to live as an individual free of all bonds, deciding for himself in accordance with his own selfish idea of "The Good" (The Good-for-himself). In this "primitive" state there still exists a moral disposition urging him toward good deeds, but this disposition will not be transformed into an absolutely good will, until the moral law becomes a dominating force in this species, defined by Aristotle as "rational animal capable of discourse". Until man becomes more rational, wars will continue to plunge us back into primitive states of nature. Eventually, however, a combination of catastrophic experiences and rationality will allow a moral disposition to mature into the good will required by the Categorical Imperative. This in turn will have consequences for the societies man dwells in and a so-called "kingdom of ends" will supervene in which the laws will be fully rational: man will treat man as an end-in-itself, and maxims of action be willed to be universal laws. Societies, that is, will transcend earlier stages of civilisation and culture. This is "the hidden plan"²⁷ (Kant's *Political Writings*, Ed., Reiss, H., (Cambridge, CUP, 1970 "Idea for a Universal History", P.50)) of nature that is operative in human history. The Enlightenment in general, and Kant's work in particular raised the idea of freedom to a central place in the march of History in accordance with this "hidden plan" and this has

been a central theme of the 4 volumes of this work. The Globalisation process and its end-state, Cosmopolitanism, where all races and notions are integrated, perhaps not geographically, but morally, may well have been submerged by the tsunami of totalitarianism in the 20th century. One century, however, in a span of 100,000 years is merely a temporary setback for "the hidden plan". Three generations of the 20th century experienced two world wars and a cold war before a light appeared at the end of the 20th century tunnel, and the journey toward Cosmopolitanism continued (very tentatively). The idea of the end of Cosmopolitanism is largely the result of the work of three thinkers, e.g. Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, but many other thinkers have contributed toward the idea of the archetype of the ideal society. All three thinkers, for example, consistently criticise the empirical tendency to deduce what ought to be done in the name of morality from the experience of what is done. One cannot jump in logic from an is-judgement to an ought-judgement without presuming a major ought-premise which manifests a principle relating to an archetypal idea or action in ethics or politics. All three thinkers also see Education as a necessary condition of moral and political action, and all three thinkers see the Law as something freely constituted by the rational activity of man. Laws must meet the criteria of justice demanded by Glaucon in the opening books of the Republic, namely that justice be both what is good in itself and what is good in its consequences. Other virtues such as wisdom, honesty, self control, magnanimity etc also need to meet Glaucons criteria.

In practical reasoning we see reason relating not to the objects of sensibility but to concepts and the categories of the understanding and judgement. Kant argues in this context that the metaphysics of critical philosophy ought to deal not only with freedom but also with immortality of the soul and God, as well as the complex of relations that exist between these ideas.

Psychology again emerges as a theme of the first Critique in relation to the concept/judgement "I think" which Kant connects to the understanding and conscious thought. Kant categorises this kind of reflection as "Rational Psychology". Thinking something about something whether that be as banal as "Socrates is a man" or thinking the "I" as (an immaterial) substance is attributed to what Kant terms "personality" (rather than "intelligence"). Personality is the bearer of both lower psychological and higher mental powers (cf O'Shaughnessy's ontology). The cogito argument is the starting point for rational psychology which, for Kant, but not for Descartes, extends into a categorical framework for all thought. The first consequence of this Kantian account is the proposition claiming that the I is an absolute subject, substance, or principle of thought. This substance or principle is, furthermore, that which endures throughout processes of change. There can be no trace of sensibility or intuition in the characterisation of this thinking I, and as a consequence:

"We do not have and cannot have any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the "I", we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this "I" as it does all thought."²⁸

Beyond reference to the categories there is nothing more to say about the "I" and the form of consciousness Kant is speaking about here is:

"Self consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity and is unconditional."²⁹

Rational Psychology, therefore, will contain no empirical predicates asserted of the soul, and will in no sense be doctrinal, but merely serve as a discipline assisting us in avoiding the rocks of materialism and the sandbanks of dualism. Personality theory is here being theoretically presented as a theory of the soul, and no reference is intended to the body, or the nature of the relation between the body and the soul. In this sense it conforms to the requirements of transcendental reflection, and is only substantial in the sense of being a principle. A principle can only have an abstract timeless relation to what it constitutes or regulates. If, then, the soul is a principle and is timeless, this is the respect in which it is immortal. In this case "immortal" merely means "not mortal" in the categorical sense of not belonging to the category of mortal things. Rational psychology, then obviously deals with the intelligible world to the exclusion of the ever-changing fluxions of the sensible world in which boats steam downstream and before are transformed into afters by the time-constituting intelligible subject or personality. Even as a sensible being occupying the sensible world, this sensible "I" legislates by ordering world-phenomena into a spatio-temporal framework. Kant's Copernican revolution thus reaches down into the depths of the "logos of the aesthetic world". Even at the level of the act of apperception that unites representations into a timeless concept there is an I functioning as a principle. The "I think" that legislates for the intelligible world of thought, however, is closer to the noumenal supersensible that lies at the source of our moral personality. We see this I at work in the world via the medium of action embedded in a framework of "Reason-Action-Consequence"(RAC). In such contexts the I-principle formulates maxims which are constituted by the categorical imperative: the action and consequences that follow upon this rational law are logically and conceptually linked.

Modern Psychological Theory systematically ignored the moral aspect of personality presented in Kant's "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view". The term "pragmatic" connoted for Kant two ontological aspects: a concern for what man makes of himself via his actions and deeds, and a

concern for what nature makes of man. In the former case we are dealing with a telos of uniting the citizens of the world into a cosmopolitan unity.

Eysenck's personality theory is a good example of a theoretical account of the human being based on biological descriptions and explanations of what nature makes of man. References to genetics, the sympathetic nervous system and testosterone occur in a spirit of materialism and atomism. The personality traits that Eysenck delineates in his matrix are all innately determined and peripherally influenced by environmental factors. The human and moral dimension of a man making something of himself, e.g. doing his duty, telling the truth, and becoming a citizen of the world, are not directly the concern of Eysenck's theory. What we are presented with is, rather, a trait theory that is built upon the obscure foundations of materialistic and atomistic energy regulation principles and pleasure-pain principles. The moral personality is atomised into a number of traits whose relation to the "I" is obscure and whose relation to each other is largely determined by a position in a matrix.

Freudian trait theory may be rooted in Biology (oral, anal, phallic, genital) but these characteristics were embedded in a developmental hylomorphic actualisation process in accordance with Principles (ERP,PPP,RP) which are operating in humanistic contexts, such as a children identifying with parents and authority figures. There is, therefore, no inherent difficulty for Freudian theory to engage in criticism of civilisation. In such contexts, Freud does not refer to the sympathetic nervous system or testosterone, but rather to aggression and wars and the moral depravity associated with such phenomena. Freud's theory has both Hylomorphic and Critical aspects, whereas trait theory of the kind one encounters in the writings of Eysenck and Jung would be consigned by Kant to be theories explaining what nature makes of man, i.e. theories that belong to what he termed "Physiological Anthropology". For Kant all attempts to root moral character in a matrix of temperaments rooted in biological functions would be misdirected.

We know today what Kant merely suspected, namely that the formation of hypotheses in the context of exploration/discovery and the truth value of these hypotheses are dependent upon probability theory which in turn builds upon Bayes' theorem (The probability of an event is determined by the information we have about that event). The problem with investigations rooted in contexts of exploration/discovery is that we do not know whether we have arrived at the terminus of complete information. Determining whether an event is probable at a high level of significance is not possible in such circumstances. We may, that is, think we have complete information about the functioning of the sympathetic nervous system or testosterone in character formation, but this must remain an open question as long as we isolate such biological "parts"

from the biological/psychological whole. The relation, that is, between the parts of a person may not be relevant to the formal and final relations constituting a holistic phenomenon such as the character of a person. The probability of the event of the withdrawing of a white ball from a bag of 10 black and 10 white balls is easily determined, because the information about the variables of this system is complete: this is a so-called closed system. The material composition of the ball and the relation between any possible "parts", e.g. its atoms, is irrelevant to this calculation. Returning to the Psychological theory of Eysenck, defining the axes of the matrix in terms of neuroticism and stability, and characterising these ultimately in terms of the arousal of the sympathetic nervous system may be useful in terms of clarifying a possible material necessary condition but this is only a part of the whole story of a persons character (and probably not the most important part--many including Socrates would have thought it to be irrelevant). In this realm of reflection we are seeking reasons (formal and final causes) and not causes. As far as Kant was concerned reflections upon the physiological characteristics connected with temperament are a concern for physiological anthropology.

Jung's theory is similarly biological and is related to a matrix of two types of orientations toward the world (extraversion, introversion) and 4 psychological functions (thinking feeling intuition, sensation). Jung once claimed in a film documentary that the reason his theory was so different to Freudian theory lay in the fact that he was very much influenced by Kantian theory which he claims Freudian theory was not. The above matrix and its psychological functions are reminiscent of some of the concerns we find in Kantian Anthropology, and they have also proved useful in the construction of personality assessment tools, such as the Myers-Briggs Personality Index. Many aspects of Jung's theory, however, appeal to genetic mechanisms for their final justification and are therefore problematic. Jung's theory of the archetypes of the unconscious mind, for example, are supposed to be innate and transmitted by genetic mechanism-- a position that genetic scientists themselves disavow. This is, of course, merely another form of materialistic atomism, a position that fails to acknowledge the Kantian view of Human nature. The moral implications of Jung's theory are obscure and it appears that this was a deliberate strategy on the part of Jung.

The Freudian superego, we know, is a result of an environmental actualisation-process of identification with authority figures, and Freud would have rejected any suggestion that genetic mechanisms had any relevant direct explanatory connection to the character of a person, We know Freud claimed that his Psychology was Kantian, and there is much that speaks for this characterisation, especially if one agrees with the thesis that Kantian Critical Philosophy is intimately aligned with Aristotelian Hylomorphic theory. If this

is the case, then the view that Freud was a strict determinist is problematic. Indeed it is difficult to believe that Freud would not have subscribed to the following Kantian reflection on human freedom:

"But any beginning of action presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause; and a dynamical beginning of the action, if it is also a first beginning, presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of the cause, that is to say, it nowise follows from it. Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality... It is not to be met with in any experience."³⁰

Kant cites the example of a man rising from his chair and claims that, when this is a spontaneous action, it is due to a self-originating source that generates the action spontaneously. Pragmatic Psychology rests upon the foundation of freedom and the forms of psychological explanation/justification that are provided in the name of this kind of Psychology are formal and final. The desire to arise from my chair, that is, has no prior material or efficient cause (e.g. the arousal of the sympathetic nervous system or the increase in testosterone). Rather, it arises from an "I" that thinks and exists. It also ought to be pointed out that Kant does believe that there is a role for research into the role of biological factors, insofar as the body is concerned. Such research, however, would be a matter for physiological anthropology and not of interest for pragmatic anthropology.

In the act of arising from the chair, viewed intelligibly, there would be a reason and an action and the reason would incorporate Aristotelian efficient, formal and final causes. This same series of movements constituting the action, however, according to Kant, has an empirical character, and could be categorised by the understanding in terms of a chain of causes appearing in the sensible world. My non-observational knowledge of what I am doing, however, has less to do with the observational knowledge of the above gained by acts of perception and more to do with an apperception of the "I" that thinks and exists. A clue that we are in the intelligible realm of reasons and actions is indicated by the way in which we use the concept of ought in our reasoning about our actions. In arising from my chair I might have done so "in order to" or because I ought to take the dog on a walk. This would in turn determine the consequence of fetching the leash for the dog. Looking upon this action with observational intentions it would not, of course, make sense for any observer to negate this "reason" by claiming that I ought **not** to take the dog on a walk. Such observations of mans behaviour and explanation in terms of causation in the sensible world of appearances are, for Kant, at the level of the understanding rather than reason. Things are as they are in such a context of exploration/discovery and there is no logical space for the unconditioned condition of all voluntary acts, namely freedom. How these two forms of explanation/justification interface can be seen clearly in the following passage:

"Let us take a voluntary action, for example, a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been caused in society. First of all, we endeavour to discover the motives to which it has been due, and then, secondly, in the light of these, we proceed to determine how far the action and its consequences can be imputed to the offender. As regards the first question, we trace the empirical character of the action to its sources, finding these in defective education, bad company, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition insensitive to shame, in levity and thoughtlessness, not neglecting to take into account also the occasional causes that may have intervened. We proceed in this inquiry just as we should in ascertaining for a given natural effect the series of its determining causes. But although we believe that the action is thus determined we none the less blame the agent, not indeed on account of his unhappy disposition, not on account of the circumstances that have influenced him, nor even on account of his previous life.....Our blame is based on the law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all the above mentioned empirical conditions could have determined and ought to have determined the agent to act otherwise."³¹

In other words, the agent was free to act otherwise. For Kant all the virtues are ideas of reason with practical power that ultimately resides in our freedom to choose what ought to be done. **Ideals**, for Kant have less practical power, but function as archetypes, e.g. the idea of the statesman as a "phronimos", a great-souled man, is an example to be imitated. The Phronimos might even approach divine status and be thought of as a God. We are clearly dealing here with a transcendental idea. Trying to prove the existence of this idea or ideal may be, for Kant futile, because it is the telos that is important--what will exist in the future--not what has existed in the past. We should rather, insists Kant, attempt to show how this idea or ideal can be thought. On the Aristotelian account we are entitled to ask how the idea or ideal came to be, i.e under what conditions.

Now whether or not the ideal or idea of God exists, I can nevertheless think of God and the power of divine agency. This thought, however, is probably more remote than the thought of my own existence and powers, which Kant pointed out, can in fact supervene in the experience of the sublime. Kant insists that the existence of God cannot be concluded from the mere having of the idea of God as some ontological arguments would claim. This idea cannot be constitutive and can only be regulative:

"which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if it originated from an all sufficient necessary cause."³²

Conceiving of the cause not as a materialistic form of substance but as a substantial principle, as both Kant and Aristotle did, serves to refocus the entire debate and allows Kant to reason his way to a being/principle that will ensure that a good will and good action will result in good consequences for all, namely a good spirited flourishing life. Aristotles conception of a "pure form" or principle is somewhat more abstract and theoretical and tends to identify God with all forms of pure contemplative thought. For Kant, however, the freedom of man was the most important of the three ideas of reason (God, immortality of

the soul, freedom) and practical reasoning was the most important aspect of his philosophical contribution to the Enlightenment:

"By the "practical" I mean everything that is possible through freedom. When, however, the conditions of the exercise of the free will are empirical, reason can have no other than a regulative employment in regard to it, and can serve only to effect unity in its empirical laws. Thus, for instance, in the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by our desires in the one single end, **happiness**, and in co-ordinating the means for attaining it. In this field, therefore, reason can supply none but **pragmatic** laws of free action, for the attainment of these ends which are commended to us by the senses; it cannot yield us laws that are pure and determined completely a priori. Laws of this latter type, pure practical laws, whose end is given through reason completely a priori, and which are prescribed to us not in an empirically conditioned but in an abstract manner, would be products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone, therefore, belong to the practical employment of reason."³³

As we have noted previously this form of reasoning is then used as a platform to argue for the importance of the idea of God on moral grounds. The question "Is there a God?" and "Is there a future life?" are, then, answered in relation to the questions that define the scope and limits of theoretical and practical reason, namely "What can I know?" "What ought I to do?" "What can I hope for?" and "What is a human being?" In the answers Kant provides us with to these questions the idea of happiness is a secondary idea related to the moral issue of whether one is worthy of happiness. In a world designed by a wise architect or author there will be a logical relation between what one is worthy of, and a good spirited flourishing life.

The role of Psychology in such an architectonic system must therefore be that of a science that is connected to Ethics and Politics and the world-views embedded in these practical sciences. Physiological Psychology is clearly situated in a context of exploration/discovery where the focus of the investigations is what nature has made of man. We have suggested that there is always a question mark hanging in the air over such investigations: questions relating to whether we have collected all the necessary evidence relating to the conditions of the phenomena being investigated. Questions which, if answered completely, are in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason.

Notes on Chapter 15

¹Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans, Kemp Smith, N., (London, Macmillan, 1929, P.12)

² Ibid. P.22

³ Ibid. P.22

⁴ Ibid. P.28

⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, James, W, (New York, Dover Publications, 1890, P.1)

⁶ Ibid. P.4

⁷ Ibid.P.5

⁸ Ibid. P.554

⁹ *Art as Experience* Dewey, J., (New York, Capricorn Books, 1958.)

¹⁰ *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty, M., Trans Smith, C., (London, Routledge, 1962, P.10)

¹¹ Ibid. P.10

¹² *Principles of Psychology*, P.8

¹³ *Pragmatism*, James, W, (New York, Prometheus Books, 1991, P.22)

¹⁴ *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, P.43

¹⁵ Ibid. P.54-5

¹⁶ Ibid. P.59

¹⁷ Ibid. P.65

¹⁸ *Phenomenology of Perception*, P.476

¹⁹ Ibid. P.477

²⁰ *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, P.93

²¹ Ibid. P.94

²² Ibid. P.105

²³ Ibid. P.141-2

²⁴ Ibid. P.310

²⁵ Ibid. P.311

²⁶ Ibid. P.312

²⁷ *Kant's Political Writings*, Ed. Reiss, H., (Cambridge, CUP, 1970, "Idea for a Universal History", P.50)

²⁸ *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure reason*, P.334

²⁹ Ibid. P.365

³⁰ Ibid. P.410

³¹ Ibid. P.471

³² Ibid. P.517

³³ Ibid. P.632

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Conclusion: "The End of All things": Religion, secularisation and Psychoanalysis

The Philosophy of Religion in the 20th century managed two major offensives against what many have regarded as the global force of secularism, and one or both of these offensives may turn out to be the decisive territorial gain for religion, ensuring its position in the globalising processes leading to Cosmopolitanism. Two of the Philosophers behind these offensives were Wittgenstein and Ricoeur. They both represent the challenges of Hermeneutics and Philosophical Psychology to the secularisation process. They also, I would argue, manifest the presence of philosophical cosmopolitan imperatives in the multi-dimensional globalisation process.

Popular commentators on the subject of the decline of the authority of Religion have claimed, perhaps prematurely, that God is dead (although no one has actually seen his body). The postulated first cause of all things, it is argued, is no longer efficacious in the world of mobile phones, television sets, computers, driverless cars, robots cutting the lawn, robots hoovering the house, internet diagnoses of physical and mental diseases etc. The major causes involved in what was hopefully an accidental death are:

1. The claim of Kant that God was just an idea in the mind.
2. The claim of Darwin that man who was supposed to be made in the image of God in fact evolved from the animal kingdom in accordance with the mechanisms of random variation, natural and sexual selection.
3. The claim of Freud that religious belief may have neurotic and psychotic characteristics, i.e. that the idea of God in man's mind is not an idea one finds in a healthy mind.
4. Economical systems that seemed to have done more for the poverty of billions of people than divine assistance could ever manage (Perhaps God died from an extended period of inactivity?).

It might also be of interest to point out that in the secular process, the human being seems to have disappeared or receded into the background in relation to the jungle of equipment functioning in accordance with the law of economic/technological efficiency. If a robot/computer can replace a doctor and a psychiatrist and win chess games against chess masters, then what hope is there for priests, teachers, philosophers and the rest of us ordinary mortals? Well, as was suggested above, there is hope, and it comes from Philosophy in general and Philosophical Psychology in particular.

Let us, however, examine more closely the so-called causes of God's "accidental death". Firstly, let us remember that Kant was a religious man who he did not attend Church regularly. Indeed, although his ethical system was logically autonomous in relation to religious authority, his system still needed God, (the idea in man's minds) to produce the good consequences of a good or flourishing life, which otherwise might not follow from pure and good intentions. The philosophical conclusion of Kant's argument is that both God and "the good" might be logically related ideas in man's mind, indeed, they may even be identical. This idea of the good being necessary for man to lead a meaningful flourishing life goes, of course, all the way back to Plato and Aristotle.

Darwin's ideas initially threw the religious world into a state of turbulence for a time, but theologians soon realised that all that was needed to survive the Darwinian storm was to claim that Evolution is a process proceeding in accordance with divine laws of creation. God's invisible hand was steering the process and the mechanism of random variation was not a real mechanism, but an illusion of man's fragile and ethically flawed mind. The embarrassing facts of the creation scene in the Bible needed re-interpretation, and some scholars began to argue that one should not interpret everything in the Bible literally. Reading the creation scene metaphorically and symbolically could allow space for the existence of mechanisms of natural and sexual selection functioning in accordance with the expression of God's will.

Freud's ideas, similarly, if one reads his texts closely may lead one to the conviction that when Freud claimed that a belief in God had the hallucinatory qualities of a schizophrenic delusion, he may have been talking about the way in which some people or even most people relate to God. Blindly rattling off one's prayers, or performing religious rites do, as a matter of fact, remind one of the obsessive compulsive's repetitious attacks on the world, but these repetitions also remind one of the healthy acting out of children who are trying to control the environment that is causing them anxiety.

Worshipping an invisible figure in public can seem strange, and Freud explains it partly in terms of the defence mechanism of displacement caused by excessive anxiety: a mechanism which substitutes a real ambiguous punishing/forgiving father figure with an equally ambiguous invisible father who promises relief from one's suffering, if one plays the game of religion. The second part of his explanation involves returning to the origin of the religious belief system as communicated to believers in civilisation. Primitive wishes in response to a primitive feeling of helplessness provide the temporary relief we need from the burden of existence in fragile civilisations. Freud may well himself have been ambivalent toward even mature attitudes involving religious conviction, as some commentators have claimed, but I am sceptical of this description for a number

of reasons, amongst which are the following: he claimed to be writing the Psychology Kant would have written if he had interested himself sufficiently in modern psychological matters. Freud did not definitely say that man would never be guided by his reason and place his hope and faith in some reasonable future. This might, however, be because he was reluctant to present himself as a prophet, for fear that mans destructive instincts may, as a matter of fact, overshadow his constructive instincts (Freud, died in 1939 at a time when the existence of civilisation was threatened ideologically). He may have suspected that the time might come when civilisation would be threatened by the power of weapons of mass destruction.

Perhaps, if Freud had lived in another time and another place, England or France, for example, we may have seen him launching the offensive against a wave of economic/technological or secular globalisation (his comments in his work "The Future of an Illusion" and his remarks on the USA certainly suggest he would have been one of the ideologues at the forefront of demonstrations against the way in which war and market economics has dominated all other globalisation processes). He certainly attempted to transform psychoanalysis into a global movement in the name of science and philosophical psychology.

Paul Ricoeur, after Freud's death, wrote both about the confession of evil in the religious context, and the confessions one could witness in the psychoanalyst's clinic. One implication of Ricoeur's work is that there appears to be a "symbolic function" of language which takes us far beyond the purview of the scientist in his pursuit of a certain kind of description/explanation. He, like Wittgenstein, believed that the route to the understanding of what Aristotle called, being qua being, needed to proceed more circuitously to its destination via language and objects. In the context of this discussion, many commentators have commented upon the "confessional" nature of Wittgenstein's posthumous work, the "Philosophical Investigations".

In Ricoeur's work "the Symbolism of Evil", it is claimed that the confession of evil is of interest for the philosopher because it is an utterance man makes about himself. A confession is an act of religious consciousness, but as yet is not Philosophy until it becomes an object of reflection. Myth, for Ricoeur, is not, as is the case with many analytically-minded thinkers, an expression of a primitive helpless mind filled with fantasy-laden wishes. Myth too, has a symbolic function, which is expressive of the power of discovery and revelation in the realm of Being. It reveals the bond between man and what he considers sacred and important. Ricoeur claims that "Evil is the crisis of this bond". The experience of sin, according to Ricoeur, is the ground upon which the feeling of guilt occurs but:

"The experience of which the penitent makes a confession is a blind experience, still embedded in the matrix of emotion, fear and anguish. It is this emotional note that gives rise to objectification in discourse: the confession expresses, pushes to the outside, the emotion which without it would be shut up within itself, as an impression in the soul. Language is the light of the emotions."¹

A myth is obviously partly a traditional response to suffering, and contains elements of a lamentation about that suffering, but it is also a language with a complex relation to being, the self, time, and imagery. That is why it has a non-confessional narrative structure. A confession of ones suffering, occurring in the realm of the symbolic, does not necessarily have to be embedded in a narrative structure. Yet it has, Ricoeur claims, a cosmic and ethical/psychological significance. Both myths and confessions require philosophical interpretation and hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur. Both constitute reflective instruments required for this work of interpretation. In a paper given at a conference on "Hermeneutics and Tradition", Ricoeur points out that time is lived, and used, in two different ways. Tradition transmits symbols, and myths and hermeneutics interpret myth and symbols. Interpretation, he argues keeps a tradition alive: "Every tradition lives by the grace of interpretation". He then points out that these two temporalities intersect in a third profound temporality which constitutes the elusive field of "Meaning". Symbols live in this sphere of the relation of a physical literal meaning to a figurative, spiritual ontological existential meaning. A symbol always says more than it says, and therefore is in constant need of interpretation. According to Ricoeur, the study of the time of symbols would be a much more important philosophical pursuit than, for example, the interpretation of myths. He points out in support of his thesis that a myth can never exhaust the semantic constitution of the symbol. Insofar as the symbolism of evil is concerned Ricoeur has the following to say:

"The symbols embraced by the avowal of evil appeared to me to fall into three signifying levels: the primary symbolic level of stain, sin, and guilt, the mythical level of the great narratives of the fall or the exile, and the level of mythical dogmatisms of Gnosticism and original sin.....It appeared to me...that the store of the meaning of primary symbols was richer than that of mythical symbols and even more so than that of rationalising mythologies."²

Much more can be said about the relation of the confession of the patient seeking a cure in relation to the confession of the religious man seeking salvation, but let us now turn to Wittgenstein's arguments and their claim to restore the lost object of religious discourse to the house of Deus absconditus in our robotic secularised cities. Firstly, the language of religion is not a factual language, nor is it a language of observation, or a language of cause, and effect. It is a language game, and as such, according to Wittgenstein, it is embedded in a form of life in which the participants operate with tacit presuppositions: not the tacit presuppositions of a science in which, for example,

it is assumed that the heavenly bodies which are only subject to infrequent observation nevertheless enjoy a continuous real existence, but rather the tacit presuppositions relating to the activities of a soul. Wittgenstein adds the following reflection to the claim that the human body is a good "image" of the human soul for example:

"Why is the soul moved by idle thoughts—since they are after all idle? Well, it is just moved by them. (How can the wind move a tree, since it is after all just wind? Well it does move it and do not forget it)"³

This is the philosophical idea of psychogenesis that Freud thought played a role in mental illness. Freud was one of the few psychologists Wittgenstein studied: perhaps both thinkers believed that surrounding the heart of our understanding was a kind of madness or soul blindness, the cure for which was therapy. But Wittgenstein probably did not subscribe to psychoanalysis as the sole route to understanding the human condition, for he turned to a higher power for his succour, namely Christianity. One year before his death we find Wittgenstein reflecting upon God and suffering, and suggesting that if Christianity is the truth about the human condition, then all the philosophy about it is false. He rejects the concentration on the argument that God's essence guarantees his existence, and claims that if one leads one's life in the right way a belief in God will naturally condense from the cloud of suffering that surrounds man. Donald Hudson, a religious philosopher, and commentator on Wittgenstein's work, points out that we should not expect the religious man to reason about his beliefs in the religious language-game in the same way in which the scientist reasons about his theories⁴. This line of thought receives some support from the above work, *Culture and Value*, where Wittgenstein claims that science sends one to sleep. A man believing in the Last Judgment may act every day against the background of the fear or promise of such an event. Is this not reasonable asks Hudson? Does not this practical belief system seem to be stronger than any hypothetical belief system any scientist can produce? The scientist has his set of commitments and expects that every event which occurs has an explanatory cause in a systematically uniform world-view in which moons and suns continuously exist. The scientist is building a system of knowledge which does not know what to do with transcendental truths. Wittgenstein realised this from his earlier work but let us conclude with a quote from Kant's "Religion within the bounds of mere Reason.":

"The nature and intrinsic limits of thought and human knowledge preclude any demonstration of the existence of God"⁵

And further on:

"non-existence cannot be demonstrated either"⁶

How then are we to interpret the avowals of the suffering souls of the Psalms or the suffering patients in secularised psychiatric waiting rooms? Surely their cries are not just facts being stated, not just the effects of causes, or the consequences of observations? Surely the realm of Hope and Faith that Kant referred to is the home of their language games? Surely their cries are symbolic? Surely these cries are relating to how the soul believes the world ought to be. This is the Kantian view of God, an idea that is necessarily connected to human moral activity: an idea that has its home in practical and not theoretical reason and as such it must establish a relation to both the moral law and freedom. On the Aristotelian view, God is pure Primary Form, a first principle that does not create infinite matter which has existed eternally but rather organises it, not in the way a builder building a house does, but rather the way in which an architect designs a house or an author composes a literary work. The ancient Greeks appear to understand this position and left the mechanical work of creation to the Demiurge. They also understood suffering and received some comfort from their ideal view of the Gods which served as terms of comparison. For them, the initiators of civilisation, the fear of the oracles prophecy was always on their minds: "Everything created by man is doomed to ruin and destruction". The only response to such a prophecy was to conceive the Gods in the spirit of arché, areté, diké, and epistémé and hope for "eudaimonia (a good spirited flourishing life).

Notes on Conclusion

¹ *Symbolism of Evil*, Ricoeur, P., Transl by Buchanan, E., (Boston, Beacon Press, 1967, P.7)

² *The Conflict of Interpretations*, Ricoeur, P., Transl. Ihde, D., (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974, P.29)

³ *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein, L., Ed. von Wright, Transl. Winch, P., (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988, P.41e)

⁴ *Ludvig Wittgenstein*, Hudson, D., (London, Lutterworth Press, 1968)

⁵ *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant, I., Transl and Edited by Wood, A., and Di Giovanni G., (Cambridge, University Press, 1998, P.vii)

⁶ *Ibid*, P.vii

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