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Kant’s First Critique is a work that explores and explains the boundaries of the mind as a whole by delineating the structures and functions of parts of the whole Kant names the faculties of Sensibility, Understanding and Reason. There is no doubt that Kant largely subscribes to the hylomorphic definition of being human as being a rational animal capable of discourse. Kant, however, obviously advances the thought of Aristotelian metaphysics by claiming that there are two realms of metaphysics: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. Copernican revolutions aside the major contribution of Kant’s Critical Philosophy to the enlightenment was his emphasis upon practical rationality and the idea of freedom at the expense of theoretical explanation and its seemingly endless generation of hypotheses in search of the truth. There was, however, more to come from Kant on the topic of the nature of our minds in his third Critique on the power of Judgement.
This work built upon the threefold divisions of the mind by a threefold division of of our cognitive powers: understanding, judgement and reason. Kant thus provided a much needed convolution in the landscape of our theoretical characterisation of human capacities and powers. It is these powers that tear us away from a merely sensible contact with our environment: a process that in the case of conceptualisation begins with the act of the unity of apperception, or act of thinking something about something. Heidegger called the act of thinking or saying something about something, the veritative (truth-making) synthesis. The conditions for such synthetic truths are thus provided for us: conditions which enable us to use concepts or “principles” or “forms” as a consequence of the “act” of thinking. The act of conceptualisation occurs in the context of the a priori categories of the understanding which produce categorical judgements ( e.g. S is P) and not hypothetical judgements (e.g. Is S, P? or Assume that S is P). The latter may of course occur in the context of exploration in which concepts or principles are “formed”. The truth-making synthesis results in judgements such as “Men are mortal”. There is no experiential verification of this judgement which of course would involve surveying ones environment to find an immortal man( an impossible feat because the Methuselah we discover may die tomorrow). The function of the understanding is purely categorical (knowing what life is) and conceptual (knowing what a man is). This judgement is also a candidate for what Aristotle called an essence-specifying definition. The “form” or principle of psuche (life) determines how we conceive of the human form of life, providing at the same time a matrix for a number of other related judgements– a matrix that also forms the context for another essence-specifying definition of man, namely rational animal capable of discourse. Psuche would, of course, be the element that ties all the elements in this latter definition together.
In the aesthetic judgement, however, we still encounter the ” S is P” form of judgement, but in this case the something that is thought about is not related to the world nor is it conceptual. It is rather, a claim about the universal judging self and the harmonious play of two cognitive faculties: the imagination and the understanding. The aesthetic object that is the occasion of this judgement, e.g. a particular rose, is initially intuited by the faculty of sensibility but the manifold of representations is not categorised and conceptualised : it rather retains its particularity and uniqueness. Instead ,the understanding engages with the life form of the rose and an awareness of the interactions of the imagination and the understanding forms in the mind of the appreciator of the rose along with a feeling of pleasure. There is, however, a categorical element to the judgement “This rose is beautiful” because we spontaneously claim that the rose is beautiful with a so-called “universal voice”. The pleasure involved is not one related to the physical experience of a sensation, but rather the kind of pleasure related to the learning of something. This pleasure is also disinterested. Practical desires and interests are excluded and this to some extent accounts for the reflective form the judgement takes. In reflecting upon this power or capacity for Judgement, Kant is in search of an a priori principle that can account for the structure and function of both aesthetic and teleological judgements. In this respect Kant’s investigation is a transcendental one. In the case of the aesthetic judgement the principle of the finality of nature suggests itself:
“Now this transcendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the Object, i.e. to nature but only represents the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon objects of nature with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience and so is a subjective principle, i.e. a maxim of judgement”(Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Trans. Meredith J C , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, P.23)
Involved in this process is an interaction of the cognitive faculties of the imagination and understanding which, in turn, is related to the supervening of a disinterested pleasure. The Aesthetic object that occasions this activity , e.g. the beautiful rose, of course has to have the appropriate “form” to cause the subsequent stream of events that eventually lead to the judgement “This rose is beautiful”.
The Critique of Teleological Judgement, on the other hand, argues Kant, is not capable of generating a constitutive principle and is, in contrast to aesthetic judgement, not a reflective judgement but a determinant judgement that attempts to use the cognitive faculties of understanding and reason to estimate the real finality of the object of attention in Nature. Here the aporetic question of the relation of reality to the categories of the understanding is encountered once again and standard realist and idealist(Berkeley) positions are rejected on the grounds of violating the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. We are here witnessing the use of transcendental logic, but no principle emerges from the discussion. Rather this adventure of criticism focuses upon what Aristotle would have called the final cause or telos of Nature. Kant insists that this telos or end of Nature is neither in us (as is the case with the aesthetic judgement) nor is it really in the Object (because all we can know about the object is related to the categories). In the spirit of Aristotle, Kant asks whether we are dealing with a special kind of causality or order of nature (Critique of Judgement, P.4). Though it is not clear whether we can “project” real ends onto nature, Kant argues, we can:
“…picture to ourselves the possibility of the object on the analogy of a causality of this kind–a causality such as we experience within ourselves–and so regard nature as possessed of a capacity of its own for acting technically: whereas if we did not ascribe such a mode of operation to nature its causality would have to be regarded as blind mechanism. But this is a different thing from crediting nature with causes acting designedly.”(P.5)
It is important to note that Kant insists upon a difference between an estimate of reality in accordance with a principle of judgement and a determination by an idea of reason that derives effects from their causes. No principle emerges from this transcendental investigation into the relation of teleological judgement to nature–merely an analogous causality to that which we experience within ourselves, which of course neither acts technically nor blindly. Is this a form of “projection” or not?
In the Third Moment of the Critique of the power of Aesthetic Judgement, Kant elaborates upon the notion of purposiveness which he claims can be characterised in the following manner:
“the causality of a concept with regard to its object.”(Critique of Judgement, P.61)
He uses the term “imagine” in the above reflection. The reference to the work of the imagination allows us then to claim, not finality in the object (i.e. that they have “real” ends), but rather merely to estimate a finality of form in the object. We, who are familiar with 20th century aesthetics, are accustomed to discussions in which “form” or “significant form” is defining for analysing the formative arts such as painting, sculpture, architecture etc. This 20th century discussion was distinctly hylomorphic and referred to the organisation of the material medium the artist is working with. In some cases one also was claiming that involved in the creative process a causality was operating that was analogous to that at work in the harmonious play of the faculties (sensibility, understanding). What we see at work in the work of creation of an art object is the organisation of the material of the medium in an attempt to imitate reality. This aspect is a central feature of the design or composition of the work of art. This technical work however is not represented as such and it is rather the intentions of the artist relating to the point of the work that are perceived in the object (given of course that one has the requisite knowledge of the medium and its possibilities).
The beauty of the work of art, however, Kant argues , is different from the free beauty of the rose. He terms the beauty of a work of art a “dependent beauty” and he includes in this characterisation the beauty of animals and the human body. Both of these life forms, he argues are concept-dependent beauties and thereby carry an interest with them in any activity of aesthetic appreciation associated with them. The idea or form of The Good is the motivating force for the artists intentions insofar as their “works” are concerned. If a human being is represented in a painting or a sculpture, then, there must be some kind of reference to mans moral virtue. In the Giorgione Painting “Tempesta”, for example, the man standing in the foreground against the background of a brewing storm appears at peace with his surroundings and with himself:
The causality involved in Teleological Judgement is illustrated in the idea or ideal of works of art which ought to be viewed, not in terms of any technical or “mechanical” causation, but rather in terms of a causation which is ideal or final. The contrast between technical/mechanical and final/ideal causes is characterised in the following manner by Kant:
“Thus a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the building of the house.”(Critique of Judgement, Part II P.20)
A house is an object nested in a network of instrumentalities but may also be viewed purely aesthetically in terms, for example of the mass-effect of its stone or the “blossoming ” of carved features on its walls. In this latter case we view all the parts of houses appreciated aesthetically as constituting a unity of the whole: a unity that is:
“being reciprocally cause and effect of their form” (P.21)
In these cases the formal and final causes of the whole are the primary organisers of the more technical and mechanical material and efficient causes. This kind of transcendental reflection is also important, Kant argues, in Political Philosophy in which the parts (the citizens, their character, and territory) are the material cause of the “form” of the organised state which they partially “constitute”. “Constitution” is an important political form for Aristotle which he conceived of in terms of “organic” form, thus linking the matrix of concepts linked with psuche to the estimation of political activity.
Kant’s discussion of teleological judgement and the necessity of teleological explanation to fully characterise the essence of a blade of grass rejects material and efficient “mechanical” explanation in his transcendental investigation. Involved in this rejection is appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and the matrix of concepts associated with psuche. The principle involved is, Kant insists, a reflective and not a constitutive principle, and this is a crucial difference between the forms of aesthetic and teleological judgement. Nevertheless, Kant argues, we are in need of this reflective principle in natural science but rational limitations ought also to be observed when using teleological explanations in the natural sciences. For example, introducing the idea of God from Theology will only destroy the integrity of both the natural sciences and Theology. Material and efficient causes, can, never be invoked in relation to the idea of God which is best characterised in terms of formal causation/explanation. This kind of confusion or transference of ideas from one domain of epistemé to another may have been responsible for the confusion that led to characterising God as the physical creator of the universe when the more neutral principle- related ideas of “architect” or “designer” would have been more appropriate. We have earlier in this work pointed to the fact that the Ancient Greeks did not succumb to this confusion and left the actual physical process of creation to the Demiurge. Nevertheless, the extent to which natural science ignores the importance of teleological explanation is the extent to which:
“…the nexus does not touch the constitution of things, but turns wholly on the combination of our conceptions.”(Part II, P.34)
Modern science has several times manifested the tendency to regard reasoning in terms of final or teleological causation, as a contradiction of the results achieved in “mechanical” explanation. The Scientist relies on a form of perception he calls observation, to ground his reasoning, and this appears to conflict with the more philosophical account of perception presented by Wittgenstein in his later work, where it was claimed that an ambiguous figure can be seen both as a duck and a rabbit depending upon the organising activity of the eye. If Wittgenstein’s account is correct then, observation may not be the royal road to understanding the essence of things because it requires some kind of organising principle itself: an organising principle that must be “formal”. Kant also takes up this discussion in relation to our manipulation of objects and events, and insists that there is no contradiction between the following claims:
“All production of material things and their forms must be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws.
“Some products of material nature cannot be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws(that is, for estimating them quite a different law of causality is required, namely, that of final causes)”(P.37)
Kant´s explanation for this is:
“For if I say I must estimate the possibility of all events in material nature….This assertion is only intended to indicate that I ought at all times to reflect upon these things according to the principle of the simple mechanism of nature, and consequently push my investigation with it as far as I can, because, unless I make it the basis of research there can be no knowledge of nature in the true sense of the term at all. Now this does not stand in the way of the second maxim when a proper occasion for its employment presents itself–that is to say, in the case of some natural forms…..we may, in our reflections upon them, follow the trail of a principle which is radically different from explanation by the mechanism of nature, namely the principle of final causes”( Part II P.38)
This, roughly speaking, is the position Aristotle adopts. Kant’s account is more elaborate and more complex, and rests on a conviction that explanations relating to the noumenal world of things in themselves, refer to a supersensible realm beyond what we can know. We can, however, think of this realm without knowing anything about its constitution. In the context of this debate it is worth recalling Christopher Shields’ essence-specifying definition of a star, namely:
“A star is a gravitationally bound ball of hydrogen and helium made self luminous by internal nuclear fusion.”(P, 98)
A number of materialistic scientific concepts are combined in this definition and we can be forgiven for believing that once we have studied the theories these concepts are embedded in, we must be coming close to knowing what a star is in itself. No one can deny that many misunderstandings may be avoided if one understands the above definition, but the suspicion remains, however, that if stars are the remnants of a cosmic explosion, they may yet be a part of a whole we only partially understand. Was, the universe a form of matter and energy at the inception of this explosion? What was the state of this universe before this explosion? These are questions that can be reflected upon in the spirit of Aristotelian and Kantian principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason
Returning to the earlier discussion relating to whether we can be said to “project” ideal causality onto the world, we find Kant claiming the following:
“For strictly speaking, we do not observe the ends in nature as designed. We only read this conception into the facts as a guide to judgement in its reflection upon the products of nature. Hence these ends are not given us by the object.”(Part II P.53)
So we cannot say categorically, Kant continues, that “There is a God”– we can only represent the world we experience as the product of a divine architect, i.e. of a God. There is, therefore, no alternative but to think about objects exceeding the capacity of our understanding in terms of the:
“subjective conditions necessarily attaching to our human nature in the exercise of its faculties.” Part II P.58)
Such reflections cannot just assume the idea of an unconditioned original foundation of nature. Instead we read into nature a form of finality: a matter of judgement, not of understanding. The problem with the linking together of mechanical and teleological explanation, is partly the problem of finding a common source for both. Kant claims that this source is the supersensible substrate of reality. Being part of the noumenal realm of Being, we cannot form a conception of this source, though perhaps we can in some sense indicate or show what we are reflecting upon.
Kant asks the question “What branch of knowledge does Teleology belong to?”, and rejects the alternatives of natural science and theology in favour of claiming that teleology is better characterised as the “method of critique” used by the faculty of judgement. This method, Kant argues further, proceeds according to a priori principles. This continues to be a philosophy of limitation which is well expressed in the following:
“For the mode of representation based on final causes is only a subjective condition of the exercise of our reason in cases where it is not seeking to know the proper estimate of the form of objects arranged merely as phenomena, but is bent rather on referring these phenomena, principles, to their sensible substrate, for the purpose of recognising the possibility of certain laws of their unity, which are incapable of being figured by the mind otherwise than by means of ends( of which reason also possesses examples of the supersensuous type) (Part II P.91-2)
Kant refuses to regard man as the peak of creation in the light of his frailty in the face of the mega-forces of nature and also because we harbour destructive tendencies that are more than capable of bringing the species to ruin and destruction. The only characterisation of man’s telos that Kant is prepared to endorse is his freedom in his choice of ends, especially those cases in which the free action conceived of is aiming at “The Good”. Kant also distinguishes between civilisation and its instrumental works (means to ends) and Culture and its categorical works (focussing upon ends-in-themselves). What is highlighted in this discussion is the critical distinction between good works of skill (techné) and good works of knowledge (epistemé). The latter rely on an absolute of “the good will” which:
“consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, in our attachment to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own.”(Part II P.95)
There are in these reflections an echo of a distinct concern of Socrates who never directly endorsed the “fevered” city of Plato’s Republic. He never produced arguments to abandon the picture of the healthy city he painted in the early books of The Republic: a city obeying one principle–the principle of specialisation (a city without warriors or philosophers). In the “fevered city” we encounter desires out of control, and privileged individuals oppressing others less fortunate than themselves, chaining them to a form of existence that is undignified. Kant’s solution to this problem is not to conceive of a city ruled by philosophers telling “noble lies”, but rather to conceive of a culture whose constitution contains laws which prevent the infringement of the freedoms of any individual. This, Kant continues to argue, can only occur if we develop a system of states that is cosmopolitan– a system which prevents one state infringing upon the freedom of another state. Without such a system “war is an inevitable outcome”(P.96).
Kant further argues that the role of the arts and sciences in such a culture is to prepare man for the adventure of freedom. The utilitarian pseudo-argument that mans telos or final end is happiness is dismissed many times throughout all three Critiques. The Critique of the Power of Judgement uses the following argument:
“The value of life, for us measured simply by what we enjoy (by the natural end of the sum of all our inclinations, that is by happiness) is easy to decide. It s less than nothing. For who would enter life afresh under the same conditions? Who would even do so according to a new self-developed plan (which should, however, follow the course of nature) if it also were merely directed to enjoyment? We have shown above what value life receives from what it involves when lived according to the end with which nature is occupied in us, and which consists in what we do, not merely what we enjoy, we being, however, in that case always but a means to an undetermined end. There remains, then, nothing but the worth which we ourselves assign to our life by what we not alone do, but do with a view to an end so independent of nature that the very existence of nature itself can only be an end subject to the condition so imposed.(Part II ftnt P-97-8)
The implication of this argument is that everything in nature is conditioned by the supersensible substrate, including our internal thinking nature. Man, that is, has a supersensible noumenal aspect that is manifested in his freedom and moral action, and this is well illustrated in Kant’s “parable of the waterfall” (a discussion of mans relation to “the Sublime”). Confronted by “dunamis” or the power of a mighty waterfall, mans first response is awe and wonder in the face of this force of nature but this, however, is quickly displaced by a positive estimation of his own power of freedom to act as a moral agent. This for Kant is the sublime unconditioned noumenon that lies at the heart of all conditioned phenomena. Happiness, Kant points out, is variable, and cannot therefore be the true end of human existence: it appears to vary within the same individual at different times of his life. If I am ill, my health makes me happy, but if I am healthy but poor, wealth appears to make me happy until fear of losing my fortune forces me to pursue power to preserve my fortune. This fear, however, is then replaced with the fear of losing my power. Happiness also appears to vary between different individuals: what makes Bentham happy does not appear to make Kant happy. Nevertheless, Kant maintains, happiness is part of the summum bonum of life, but only if it is a supervening consequence of a good will and moral activity. It is in relation to these kinds of reflections that man forms an idea of an architect or author of the world: an idea which ensures that the good-in-itself is necessarily related to good consequences (eudaimonia–a good spirited flourishing life). These ideas embedded in these reflections are regarded by Kant as subjectively practical but emanating from our reason as they do, they are nevertheless important and necessary and resemble principles that can regulate our existence. These ideas are also practically real and transcendentally possible and related to the principle of sufficient reason. This matrix of ideas and principles then forms the conviction that becomes part of our faith in a transcendental Being. Transcendent objects of thought are apriori and also:
“mere matters of faith”(Part II P.142)
This true reflective form of faith differs from the kind of faith that is built upon historical narratives and personalities. It is also in this region that the philosophical distinction between facts and values lie. Faith is:
“the moral attitude of reason, in its assurance of the truth of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge.”(P.145)
This is probably what Plato had in mind when he placed the idea or form of the Good above that of The Truth in the metaphysical reasoning he presented in The Republic. Kant elaborates upon this thought in terms of freedom, and claims that faith has its foundations in the practical reality and transcendental possibility of freedom. Christianity appears to lean very heavily on historical narrative and personalities but Kant has a great respect for this religion which also places emphasis upon mans moral life:
“But this is not the only case in which this wonderful religion has in the great simplicity of its statement enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer conceptions of morality than morality itself could have previously supplied. But once these conceptions are found, they are freely approved by reason, which adopts them as conceptions which it could quite well have arrived at itself and which it might and ought to have introduced.”(P.146)
Faith also relates to the idea of the soul, but there are great difficulties in the representation of this supersensible, noumenal aspect of ourselves which historically became characterised as “immortal” because it clearly is a representation that must be disconnected from the time-conditions of experience. This, however, does not entail that the soul is substantially timeless, unless by “substantially” one means “in principle”. One can claim that the soul is, in principle, timeless because its time conditions appear to be the same as the time conditions of ideas which must necessarily exist as long as there are humans thinking these ideas. Ideas, however, do not appear to possess the practical reality that actions do, and it is for this reason that Kant proposes that freedom proves its own objective reality:
“of the three ideas of pure reason, God freedom and immortality, that of freedom is the one and only one conception of the supersensible which(owing to the causality implied in it) proves its objective reality in nature by its possible affect there. By this means it makes possible the connection of the two other ideas with nature and the connection of all three to form a religion.”(P.149)
The surprising inclusion of freedom as an important component of religion has startling consequences when it comes to interpreting the historical narratives of the Bible. We discussed the parable of “The Garden of Eden” earlier in this work, and questioned the ecclesiastical interpretation which claimed that this was a story about “The Fall” of man from the Grace of God–a narrative about the disobedience of man partaking of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. On a Kantian interpretation, this story is obviously an anxious moment in mans history, because it is a moment in which instinct was left behind as an organiser of mans life, and a choice had to be made as to whether one ought to place ones faith in knowledge. This was clearly a moment of freedom, of emancipation, and characterising it as a fall from the Grace of God merely testifies to the primitive idea of God man must have had at this time. God is undoubtedly an important part of the supersensible noumenal substrate, and as such is going to present difficulties in the attempt to represent this form of Being. To recognise our duties as divine commands is testimony to the fact that whilst we are potentially rational beings, we are not as yet (as a species) actually so. Hence the command structure of the categorical imperative and ought matrix of concepts that lie at the foundation of our moral intentions and actions. Nevertheless it is still reasonable to pose the question “What is it that we have an obligation towards?”. There appear to be three possible answers to such a question:
- Being
- Ourselves
- to the potentiality of the species
All three answers may be correct if elaborated upon in a Kantian spirit. Conceiving of God as a Prime mover as Aristotle does is criticised by Kant on the grounds of it requiring a definite conception of a form of Being in relation to the Category of Causality. This, for Kant, is a confusion of different aspects of the thinking process. Aristotle also, we know, used the term “Primary Form” in the sense of “Primary Principle” to represent God and this formulation of the power of the divine appears to be more in line with Kantian thinking.
Kant proposes using the term “intelligence” to characterise the being of God and his “activity” and there is a clear risk of anthropomorphising the principle that is being referred to : confusing an idea of reason with something that appears to be connected (at least in the modern mind) with the categories of understanding. Hughes in his work on the Critique of the power of judgement equates intelligence with:
“the teleological cause of the object”(P.49)
If however purposiveness is also implied in this telos, then there is a risk of it being reduced to concrete purposes and this will confound any thinking which sees intelligence to be a manifestation of a principle (e.g. areté). Any principle equated with the “intelligence” of God would, of course be far beyond the reach of human understanding and reason. Our understanding is limited to representing this Being in terms of formal and final causes and presumably material and efficient causes or any form of “mechanical” characterisation would be otiose (using the principle of sufficient reason as the logical standard)
The presence of “analogous thinking” in any characterisation of the telos of living beings is elaborated upon by Kant in his claim that living organisms are both cause and effect of themselves: they cause, i.e. both their own activity and the reproduction of their kinds. The difference between the telos of living organisms and the teleological explanation of the divine principle is that in the former case the principle is likened unto a plan or goal of action, whereas in the latter case, there can be no conceivable separation between a plan and its outcome i.e. no separation between God’s contemplation of a change and that change coming about: everything is actual and the potential dissipates and this is the explanation of our earlier point that God, the principle, is not subject to experiential time-conditions. Both Aristotle and Kant believe that the telos or natural purpose of the living organism is internal to that organism. Such organisms are actualising their potentials under sequential time conditions. Taking the example of a rose, the principle of the telos of roses is internalised, but the question is whether this is related to the aesthetic idea of the form of finality of the rose that we find beautiful. These two aspects are clearly different since in the aesthetic appreciation of the rose we are not exploring the properties of the rose with a view to classifying it as such. We may however be appreciating the psuche of the rose. Now whilst life itself cannot be said to have a telos, different forms of life clearly do. The activity of the harmony of the faculties occurs only in relation to objects manifesting themselves aesthetically and this is clearly happening when we appreciate the life form of the rose.
Does nature as a whole have a purpose? Well, life forms would have natural purposes on Kant’s account and together would constitute a “system of purposes”. The question that arises is how to characterise Gods role in this system of purposes. Is the principle internalised in the system or does it stand at the boundary of the system as the physical eye does to the visual field? Kant’s challenge is a reflective one and not directed at understanding what by definition lies outside. There can then, be no definition of God and we are then challenged to follow Plato’s example when he could no longer give an account in terms of the principle of sufficient reason. Plato’s response to this state of affairs is to present us with analogies or allegories, and this is what we must do in our attempts to represent the God-principle. We ought that is to look at both nature as a system of purposes and the role of God in this system in terms of metaphor or analogy. The Being of God ,for example, can be represented as if it were an architect or supersensible intelligence. This amounts to claiming that the God-principle is a regulative idea in our minds. This complex form of existence of the God-idea or God-principle clearly is a contributory factor involved in the difficulty of maintaining a large community in which this principle or idea is revered.
Modernist conceptions of the world are bipolar—whatever exists must be subject to observation or manipulation, and if ideas can neither be observed nor manipulated in such a relatively primitive sensory-motor system, such ideas have no form of existence. We can, on this account, only have knowledge of what exists. Thoughts are parsed in this sensory motor system as particular items that could vary depending upon which private chamber of consciousness they reside in. They might have a particular psychological relation to the chamber they inhabit but they have the quality of sensations which can only privately “felt”.
For many the acid test of teleology is in the experiencing of life forms and the above account seemingly makes it impossible to see the manifestation of these life forms in their activity. This may to some extent be so in the case of being a human form of life and also in our attempts to “read” the behaviour of other animal life forms: analogous thinking may be required to understand some aspects of what we are experiencing. We humans, from hylomorphic and critical perspectives, stand in the middle of a continuum of life forms. We certainly need to apply analogous thinking to activity connected to the God-principle or God-idea especially when it concerns trying to understand the role of such a principle or idea in natures system of purposes. It could be argued that in some respect we “participate” in the “form” of the divine via the actualisation of our potentiality for rationality in a similar way to the way in which we “participate” in the “form” of animality in the context of attempting to understand the behaviour of non human animal forms of life. Our attempts to understand pure matter and pure form as presented in the Aristotelian system are also problematic because in the former case our sensory-motor and thought systems may well “disguise” the true nature of what we are experiencing, and in the latter case we are encountering a form that is not physically embodied. The brain (the most complex object in the universe), for example, according to Gerald Edelstam in his work “Bright Air brilliant fire” is “merely” organised carbon, hydrogen oxygen nitrogen sulphur phosphate and a few trace metals. It is, Edelstam argues, the organisation of this material that makes a brain a brain.
That we are dealing with analogous thinking is manifested in Kant’s first Critique when it is claimed that insofar as our search for, and reliance upon knowledge, is concerned, we are organising our experience rationally for the purpose of acquiring empirical knowledge via observation and conceptualisation. “Construction” is involved in this activity of processing by two different cognitive faculties and as we pointed out above this might “disguise the true nature of “things-in-themselves”–the supersensible substrate. How can we, then, even think such a possibility? We do, Kant argues have some limited kind of contact with this noumenal realm in our moral activity–contact with people as ends-in-themselves and contact via thought with a future kingdom of ends which better manifests these ends-in-themselves. Given the structure of our sensory motor activity and limitations of conceptualisation activity, we have no choice, Kant argues, but to use analogous thinking in reflections about nature in itself and the God principle in itself. Conceiving of this principle as a primary form or an intelligent architect ought, then, to be conceived of analogously or metaphorically because we are dealing with a non material non observational a priori “principle”. Being a principle entails that God’s “thinking activity” is “deductive” “moving” from wholes to parts instantaneously. Whether one wishes to call this strategy related to analogy “projection” or not depends to a large extent on what one understands by this term. The form of existence of this divine form of intelligence is both beyond our knowledge and to some extent beyond our capacity to think something about this form. This is why many thinkers, in an attempt to explain exactly what it is they have faith in, end up throwing up their hands in despair and proclaiming “God must exist!” Kant’s explanation also arrives at this conclusion via an account that stretches over a number of works including one specifically aiming at the presentation of theological difficulties with the problem of the existence of God(Religion within the bounds of reason alone).
The ” new men”, Descartes and Hobbes, regarded life-forms as “mechanical” and Descartes barbaric experiments on unaesthetised animals indicate a form of disrespect for life forms we have not encountered by Philosophers before. Such examples also testify to the extent to which mechanical explanations with the aid of mathematics fail to meet the requirements of the principle of sufficient reason. We should recall in the context of this discussion Kant’s claim that mechanical explanations fail even to meet this requirement insofar as explaining the existence of a blade of grass is concerned.
Aesthetic reflection places us at a psychic distance from scientific investigation in general and mechanical explanation in particular, partly because it is disinterested and partly because of its refusal to think in terms of possibilities and necessities (categories of the understanding). In many respects aesthetic judgement manifests an interesting combination of two of the major cognitive faculties in its representing activity. The particular is perceived and the imagination is engaged in a search for a universal that is not categorical. In this process we intuit(sense) the form of finality of nature, e.g. we do not perceive the rose as a botanist might but rather see it as a life form striving to preserve itself in its form of existence. Involved in this process of reflection is also the seeing of the rose as being the manifestation of the “work” of a divine intelligence. This form of speculative reflection leads us back(via a different route) to God seen under the aspect of the beautiful(as compared with the aspects of the Truth and The Good). Reflective judgement thus bears some relation to moral judgement which provoked Kant to claim that beauty is the symbol of morality and furthermore prepares the mind for ethical understanding. The life-form of the human being is the most interesting aspect of one form of aesthetic judgement perhaps because of this intimate connection with our moral natures. In this respect humans are not simple beauties such as flowers but nevertheless “partake” of the form of the beautiful. In judging that a human being is beautiful we are estimating this part of nature as if it were a work of art. We cannot, however look at all nature in this way because we are well aware of the devastating impact of forces of nature on human civilisations: tsunamis, earthquakes, and massive volcanic activity regularly cause widespread ruin and destruction in relation to humans and everything created by humans. We spontaneously and naturally judge such events to be in some sense “evil” exactly because of the fact that we “project” the good onto works of nature and in an act of further reflection attribute these good works to the divine artist. We do not normally attribute natural catastrophes and disasters to anything divine, however.
One of Freud’s thoughts in the context of this discussion orbits around the idea of religion being a “delusion”: he claims namely that religion is the unhealthy projection of psychotic minds. In earlier discussions of this claim we suggested that it was not absolutely clear what the target of the Freudian attack was. The fact that Freud claimed his Psychology was Kantian would suggest that Freud would not place the Kantian interpretation of nature as art or the work of the divine artist, in the same category. Freud may, that is, have been talking about “patients” and their religious tendencies to “Project” their anxieties and wish fulfillments into a being that in the end is a substitute for the father they wish they had. These patients appear to dwell permanently in the realm of an imagination plagued by anxieties and desires they cannot control. It almost seems impossible for them to move reflectively toward the realms of understanding and reason and do the work of interpretation needed for genuine religious understanding.
Kant’s characterisation of the divine principle or law-giver is in terms of omniscience, being all-good, all-powerful, all knowing, absolutely just, absolutely wise, eternal, and One. This might be how Aristotle conceived of Primary Form. There may however be other aspects of the divine form that escapes us. Spinoza, we know, conceived of God in terms of a substance possessing an infinite number of dimensions. We humans, Spinoza claims only know of God under two aspects: namely thought and extension.
On Kant’s gravestone there is a quote relating to the two things that evoke awe and wonder in the human mind: the starry sky above and the moral law within. Scientists, when conducting their experiments are not reflecting aesthetically upon the parts of the world they are concerned with, and furthermore they would not know what to do with the result of an experiment with humans which resulted if the subjects responded with awe and wonder at the experiment. Kant, however much respect he had for science and the manipulation and measurement of dependent and independent variables was Philosophically less interested in the confirmation or verification of imagined hypotheses and more interested in investigating aspects of being that generate awe and wonder. In his transcendental investigations into human and divine existence, judgement obviously played an important role whether it be aesthetic or teleological.