Du Chatelet and Kant: abstract for conference “Dynamics and Reason”, in honour of the work of Du Chatelet.

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Sortie du Théâtre du Chatelet
Sortie du Théâtre du Chatelet by Auguste Louis Lepère (French, 1849–1918) is licensed under CC-CC0 1.0

The relationship between Du Chatelet and Voltaire reminds one of the Diotima-Socrates relation, where Diotima, according to the Symposium, gives Socrates a lecture on the relation of Logic to Eros. It is, however, the relation of the work of Du Chatelet to the work of Kant that is the theme of this conference, and it is the contention of this paper that Du Chatelet—being a follower of Wolff and Leibniz, was very much on Kant’s mind early on in his career when he was considering criticisms of his own form of rationalism.

We do find in Kant the two principles of general and special logic that Chatelet used in her form of rationalism, namely the principle of noncontradiction(PNC)and the principle of sufficient reason(PSR), but it must be pointed out that, the uses to which these principles were put in Kantian critical Philosophy(developed later in his career), were very different to the use we encounter in the work of Du Chatelet. We know that Kant, early on in his philosophical career, regarded himself as a rationalist, influenced by both the work of Leibniz and Wolff, but with his discovery of the importance of the role of sensibility in the production of many of our cognitive states, together with the encounter with Hume’s work which he described as “awakening him from his dogmatic slumbers”, the task of Kantian Philosophy grew in magnitude and included attempted syntheses of rationalist-empiricist conflicts in a manner that attempted to avoid many of the dogmatic theses of materialism and dualism.

Both Du Chatelet and Kant were influenced by Newton but Kant was probably more critical of those aspects of Newton that, in his view, attempted to say what cannot be said, e.g. that absolute time, in and of itself, flows. Kant argued, on the contrary, that both space and time are ways in which the sensible aspect of our minds organise our experience of the external world, and “internal” mental activity respectively. Kant certainly embraced the importance of mathematics in relation to one aspect of our relation to the external world, but he specifically claimed that Mathematics cannot be applied to thought and the activity of what he termed the “inner sense”.

My thesis is, that the underlying influence of the Kantian “Copernican Revolution” in relation to knowledge is that of Aristotelian Hylomorphic Philosophy, but it is an influence that is never directly acknowledged by Kant, This influence is , however, present in his whole approach to metaphysics and epistemology. This point is also evidenced in his terminology of “matter” and “form”, and in his reliance on many aspects of Aristotle’s “theory of change” and its complex account of 4 kinds of change, 3 principles of change, 4 causes(explanations) of change, 3 media of change(space, time and matter) and three groups of sciences(theoretical, practical, productive). This “Copernican Revolution” placed Kant’s work in the realm of the golden mean, between empiricism and rationalism, and between materialism and dualism, thus enabling him to give an account of reality as broadly-based as Aristotle’s, but somewhat deeper insofar as an account of the powers of mind were concerned.

For Kant, as was the case for both Aristotle and Plato, Mathematical reasoning was indispensable for the resolution of problems relating to the measurement of space and time insofar as they manifested themselves in our activities in the external world: problems that were essentially quantitative in nature. Its usefulness diminished in value, however, insofar as other categories of existence and understanding were concerned, e.g. the formulation of abstract knowledge-claims(e.g. All men(gender neutral use) are mortal) or the formulation of laws of thought and ethics(the PNC, PSR and the moral law). For example, one of the key aspects of Kantian Philosophical Psychology or Anthropology, is that in which we encounter the claim that the human form of life freely chooses(freely causes itself to do things) its beliefs and actions, and is thereby best understood as an “autonomous being” or an “autonomous form of life”. This leads us into the realm of practical science where the telos of action plays an important role in our explanations and justifications. This telos, then , has a complex relation to the other causes/explanations (aitia) of Aristotelian Philosophy.

We know the idea of God for both Wolff and Leibniz was an idea that belonged in the domain of theoretical reasoning, and we also know it was demoted by Kant in favour of the practical idea of freedom: an idea that demanded a metaphysical account very different to the kind of metaphysical accounts of Nature we find in the works of those dogmatic, scientific materialists who regard all journeys into the realm of the powers of the mind as “subjective”.

The Kantian revolution liberated Philosophical psychology/anthropology from its self-inflicted form of slavery, with the banner of the Enlightenment upon which is inscribed “Sapere Audi”(dare to use your reason). In this spirit, this combination of hylomorphic-critical philosophy, also gave rise to the possibility of a philosophically grounded concept of Human Rights which in its turn will hopefully provide all the Diotima’s, Du Chatelet’s and women philosophers of the future with a platform from which to speak and be heard.

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