Views: 1354
“It is the instinct of every living thing to persist in its own being”( “Notes” P.55)
This claim by Eliot is a variation of Spinoza’s claim that:
“Everything insofar as it is, endeavours to persist in its own being”(Ethics, Book 3 Prop 6)
Spinoza’s account may, however, be built on a more complex foundation than Eliot’s account. For Spinoza, the foundation stone of the mind, is the idea it has of its own body, and this is compatible with the hylomorphic claim made by Aristotle in which the material of a process always has a form determined by the principle of that form. We know that Aristotle in his work “De Anima” characterised the human soul in terms of potential and an actualisation process. The body, which for Aristotle, was a system of specific organs, has the potential to actualise into a soul which possesses three primary powers: firstly, the capacity for nutrition and reproduction, secondly, the capacity for locomotion and sensation, thirdly a capacity for discourse and reasoning. The essence-specifying definition of a human soul then, is, “rational animal capable of discourse”, indicating that these higher level powers build upon the lower level powers of sensibility and nutrition/reproduction. This does not, of course, mean that all human souls are actually capable of discourse and reasoning at high levels, but rather, that this is a potential that aims to be realised by the human form of life that we call the human soul. Here, it is a number of principles which decide what form the life-form is to take, as well as the complex relation of powers that are generated in this developmental actualisation process This process of actualisation will determine the level achieved by any human form of life. If this teleological process functions well, the result , insofar as Aristotle was concerned, was the ethical telos of leading a good spirited, flourishing life(eudaimonia). Such a life-form would be impossible in a state of nature (which is the condition of the animals) but rather requires a civilisation/culture that in turn requires cooperation amongst large numbers of humans if it is not to fall into a state of ruin and destroy itself. This cooperation often takes the form of “aiming at the good”, “aiming at the truth”, and aiming at the beautiful”: characteristics which Maslow claimed were very important cultural aims. Life, may have many meanings, argued Aristotle, but he also insisted that it was an end-in-itself, i.e. something that was both good-in-itself and good-in-its-consequences. This theme of the human form of life being an end-in-itself, would later be taken up in Kantian Critical ethical Philosophy, in the form of a moral categorical imperative. One of the formulations is that people be treated as ends in themselves and this creates the foundational argument for a universal theory of human rights. Respect for human rights, in turn, has become a cultural demand in all civilised societies.
It was, however, left to Freud to investigate the nature of the relation of the powers of the soul, and he used three principles to do this: firstly, the energy regulation principle regulating the physiology of the individual (including nutrition and reproduction) but primarily the nervous activity of his brain, secondly, the pleasure pain principle regulating the sensible level of the human soul, and thirdly, the reality principle regulating discourse and rationality in its various forms. For Freud it is the actualisation of a strong Ego that is the telos of human being: a being that spends such a long time in a state of immaturity(childhood, adolescence, etc).
These diversions from the initial claims of Eliot and Spinoza, testify then, to the complexity of creating the conditions necessary for leading a good-spirited flourishing life. In the light of such complexity, it is obvious that all we can do is aim at the Good in our activities. The master Arts which enable us to do this are, for Aristotle, Philosophy and Politics. For Spinoza, however, human enlightenment begins with the possession of an adequate idea of the human body. This is a position shared by Freud who formulated a psycho-sexual theory to explain the course the human actualisation process takes. Both Spinoza and Freud are in agreement that the complexity of our psyche is such that its form of consciousness is aware of its endeavour to persist in its being, and this awareness is manifested in the correlation of both inadequate ideas and adequate ideas with the activity/endeavours of the organism. Consciousness, for Freud, will then, be steered by all three of his postulated principles in various ways, but insofar as the reality principle is concerned it will be present in areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time), arché (the use of principles in discourse and reasoning), epistemé (the use of knowledge in ones “endeavours) and diké (attention to the cause of justice). This leads us to the Aristotelian conviction that the phronomos, (that great-souled man), is a man whose mental powers of understanding, judgement, and reasoning are all in harmony, and working in accordance with the reality principle.
Eliot wishes to argue that the above human endeavour to persist in being human is a feature of what he calls “regionalisation”, which he insists is a necessary feature of the diversity that he maintains is a healthy characteristic of any culture. He calls this “regionalisation”, a satellite culture, and there is a lengthy discussion of the relation of Wales, Scotland and Ireland to England (in the name of identifying the mutually related cultural mechanisms that are operating in this realm of regional forces). The judgement of History is called upon to testify the extent to which a people culturally contribute to the culture of the peoples of the world. Eliot takes up the role of Language and he is sceptical about the possibility of a world-language unless it has poetic power. These discussions sometimes take on nationalistic tones in the name of loyalty. It appears from this discussion, that the size of the region can vary from a local village, to a large country. If, for example, we are dealing with a country village, it is not always obvious that the lower income peasants will identify their condition with the lower income workers of the city. It does, however, seem obvious that, in wars, (when citizens from both categories find themselves fighting side by side against a common enemy), some loyalty is shared: is this a cultural loyalty or something pathological and nationalistic?
An interesting “regional” institution such as the University is an interesting case to eaxmine in the context of this discussion. The university is a meritocracy, and does not care whether you are an aristocrat from the city, or a peasant from the countryside. The University demands loyalty to, and a general respect for, knowledge and justice. In both of the above cases it is clear that unity prevails over differences. Eliot, however, speaks sceptically of this unity of Culture, and refers to those zealots crying out for a world-government on humanitarian grounds. He incidentally praises the Russians for being especially aware of the irreconcilability between cultures(P.62). Eliot accuses the zealots of being as much of a menace to culture, as those who are committed to violence. The grounds given for this judgement are the empirical grounds of the irreconcilability of certain religions, and the pointless colonisation of one culture by another( where that results in conflict and culture clash).
Eliot concludes with the following claim:
“As I have said, the improvement and transmission of culture can never be the direct object of any of our practical activities: all we can do is to try to keep in mind that whatever we do will affect our own culture or that of some other people.”(P.65)
This is an insightful remark and reminds one of the Aristotelian opening of his Nichomachean Ethics:
“Evert art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good: and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.”(NE Book 1, 1, 1-3)
This provides hylomorphic content to Eliot’s claim that the transmission of culture can not be “the direct object” of our cultural activities. Aristotle, interpreted in terms of modern linguistic Philosophy, my be alluding to the imperative use of language in claims such as “You ought to keep promises”. Promising is a practical activity and “keeping” them is more than a mere maxim expressing a personal intention. We appear here to be dealing with a principle(arché) which on Kant’s view can be justified by an appeal to the moral law as expressed in the various formulations of the categorical imperative. There is clearly an intended direct object in the above claim, namely that the promise must be kept. In the above quote there is also a clear link to the teleological relation of the intention to actions to be performed in the future.
Aristotle points to the transmission of three kinds of form which he claims is important to build and maintain a civilisation/culture. Firstly, there is the transmission of skills such as house-building, bridge-building, road building, and crafted artifacts that are in common use in households and businesses, villages and cities. Secondly, there is the personal transmission of ones family characteristics in the act of reproduction(thus creating the “material” for further transmission of other cultural values). Thirdly, there is the transmission of ideas such as occurs in teaching-learning contexts of all kinds, and this is perhaps the most important “form”of cultural activity for Aristotle.
Eliot also discusses India and its colonisation by the British, and he claims that the caste structure and the different forms of religion hindered the aims and process of unification. That fact, should not, of course, prevent agreement on the judgement that the unity of the country would be a good thing, as long as diversity was respected. Two other factors to take into consideration is the nature of mans inclination toward favouring his own interests over that of his neighbour, plus his proclivity for forming groups around such interests. Both of these have a tendency to produce internecine conflict. This is why a striving after The Good, and providing justifications for activities with such an aim, is of importance for both the phronomos and the Philosopher. Diversity and difference are facts that we need to take account of in this context, but the mere existence of such facts does not of itself justify the condemnation of all those “good” culture building activities, such as the passing of laws and education. The latter activity in particular requires a philosophical defence of the ideas upon which such activities are founded, e.g. diké(justice) and epistemé(knowledge).