The Liberal order, according to Harari, is defined in terms of individualism human rights, democracy and the free market and is also a form of religion. Human rights as we learned earlier are figments of the imagination and Humanism, a term traditionally closely associated with liberalism, is also more or less defined in terms of a romantic solipsistic individualism which does not have very much in common with our traditional notion of an ethical humanism steered by law and reason. Ever since Kant associated ethics and human rights with freedom, freedom also became a more systematically characterised concept than it was when it was referred to by Hobbes as that which citizens have to partly abandon in order for the Leviathan or the commonwealth to provide security for nation states citizens.
As was the case with the difficulty of seeing the principle of the soul through a microscope or via imaging techniques we are now also informed that the free will cannot be detected with scientific instruments either. Looking for freedom with such instruments is of course what a philosopher would call a category mistake. Harari claims that the attribution of free will to humans is a fact and that is true but some facts are categorial such as “all men are mortal”: no observation would ever reveal the counterfactual that a man is immortal and trying to base this conceptual fact on purely observational grounds is failing to appreciate the logical and categorical nature of conceptual truths. Hume once tried this line of reasoning with the self and pointed out that we are not able to observationally detect the “self” and therefore the self did not exist. Kant pointed out a number of objections to this line of empiricist thinking , amongst which was the self or soul being an idea of reason(a principle) rather than a phenomenal thing to be encountered in the phenomenal world. He pointed out, in other words, that the initial premise that we can not observe the self is ambiguous. If the self is a principle which cannot be observed because it is a condition of what it as that we are observing than it cannot warrant the conclusion that there is no such principle or condition. Similarly if freedom is an idea or principle of ethical activity than claiming as the author does people are free because they “feel free” is incoherent. When people say they feel free it is a negative judgment which is in focus: the judgment namely that no one is preventing them from doing what they wish to, which in turn focuses attention on the fact that freedom is an idea or condition qualifying action and can not qualify sensation:actions and sensations are different psychological entities and even if sensations might peripherally be associated with action there is no logical connection between these logically different entities(See O’Shaughnessy’s “The Will: a dual aspect theory). There is even a difference in the causal origins of these two entities with action having an immediate psychological cause and sensation or feeling having an immediate physical cause. This discussion also accords well with the Kantian ontological distinction between “what happens to man” and “what man makes of himself”. therefore, all talk about there not being a self “present” in the stream of consciousness is an unnecessary spiritualist reification of the concept. One of the immediate psychological causes of action are, for example desire which certainly must be an occupant of the so called stream of consciousness, but one should not succumb to the scientific temptation of reducing action to mere bodily movement which can be observed, for two reasons: firstly there are mental actions such as trying to remember a name and trying to sustain a mental image. Both are mental actions sharing the logical structure of being active(one can ask people to stop doing them) and the relation to psychological rather than physical origins, secondly action is a concept that transcends the ontological realms of thought and existence and thereby is what O´Shaughnessy calls an apriori metaphysical concept which only a self conscious consciousness or language user is capable of comprehending. We know behaviourism is behind much of the confusion related to consciousness and the understanding of language. Having being forced to abandon experiments with humans because of the difficulty of controlling and measuring the variables, experiments with animals only succeeded in producing the limited results they did because of the presence of an animal form of consciousness and the consequent existence of teleological intentional behaviour. Attempting to generalise these results to humans failed because self conscious consciousness and language use is a higher form of life. O Shaughnessy points out how the way in which we linguistically demarcate the concepts of perception, action, and consciousness includes an ineluctable first person identification of the occupants of our stream of consciousness:
“While action and perception and consciousness have no tendency to cause any single phenomenon-or set-of-phenomena in one setting, they nevertheless have a characteristic “outer face” in the following sense. The simpler the organism in which they occur, the more they figure in causal transactions from inner to outer that are readily interpretable to a third person other. For example nearby perception by an insect of its natural prey or predator will very often cause movement: and this movement in this situation is readily interpretable. Then I would suggest that such an “outer face”, call it C phi must have been that via which the psychological item in question first came to the consciousness of some third person other.Yet it is one thing to know of and notice such psychological items in another via C phi, it is quite another to relate to them as does a self conscious consciousness. That is, to be in a position to notice and know of them/in oneself and another/ under linguistically demarcated concepts. This huge development depends on C phi- but also on the internal psychological setting of the outer phenomena, call it C psy. For example, physical action Phi gets thus conceptually demarcated via a C phi which includes “say” the presence of a quarry, and a C psy which includes desire. Now C phi and C psy are interdependent: indeed C psy rationalises C phi…In short the development of self conscious conceptualised knowledge of the physical act is made possible by C phi and C psy , and ultimately by C psy.”(Volume 1 p80)
C psy is inaccessible to the scientific method. Pretending that the firing of neurones is the desire for the quarry is a mind brain identification fallacy which is the only move available if one does not want to deny the existence of the internal phenomenon of desire. The science of Aristotle and Kant it should be pointed out had no difficulty in accommodating transcendental and metaphysical truths and did not need to resort to the spiritualisation of phenomena which cannot then causally interact with the physical world.
One of the major arguments used against the notion of the self is the following:
“Liberals believe that we have a single and indivisible self. To be an individual means that I am in-dividual(indivisible). Yet my body is made up of approximately 37 trillion cells and each day both my body and my mind go through countless permutations and transformations…..For liberalism to make sense, I must have one–and only one–true self, for if I had more than one authentic voice how would I know which voice to heed in the polling station, in the supermarket and in the marriage market…However, over the last few decades the life sciences have reached the conclusion that this liberal story is pure mythology…if I look really deep within myself the seeming unity which I take for granted dissolves into a cacophony of conflicting voices, none of which is “my true self”. Humans aren’t individuals. They are dividuals.”
The use and abuse of the term “liberal” in this work is similar to the use and abuse of the term “humanist”. If one connects liberalism to liberty and the positive concept of freedom then Kant must be the liberal par excellence in virtue of the fact that his reflections on the concept of freedom is the most systematic account we have. Kant of course reflects on the parts of the self which for him are sensibility, understanding, and reason. For him it would be perfectly consistent to maintain that someone could steal something in spite of hearing the voice of reason within telling the individual not to do the deed. When the individual finds himself in court and is asked why he stole the item he may like a good scientist cite a number of causes: he needed to pay his rent, his mother left him when he was 6 months old, his father became an alcoholic, he fell in with a gang of thieves etc. Now if the legal system were based on the causal principle of science the judge would have no alternative but to release the man. One cannot be blamed for ones choices if one has no control over them. But the criminal can be blamed: he heard the voice of reason and if he did not he ought to have developed his reasoning about his social existence to the extent that the voice did protest the deed. The criminal is blamed on the grounds of one of the key concepts of social science, namely freedom. The judge in sentencing him refers to the principle that the criminal could have chosen not to steal the item. He is sentenced that is for not using his freedom and reasoning powers. Now let us assume, incidentally, that our criminal is a scientist and as a Parthian shot shouts out that it was not he that committed the crime but some other person, the person he was six months ago is not the person he is today, literally millions of cells and chemicals are different in his body therefore he is different. This narrative indicates the irrelevance of scientific concepts in the realm of social science and law. We would not find Kant the liberal denying the validity of the assumption of the legal system that the criminal is the same person that committed the theft. The Sensible part of the mind may have been behind the action but the criminal will understand the reasoning of the legal system if he is not mentally ill. If he is mentally ill he may continue to insist that the voice telling him to commit the theft was not his.He may even complain about a cacophony of voices. There is a contradiction in insisting that the number of cells changing is logically relevant to the claim that there is not an individual self and many materialists have themselves attempted to patch up their faulty reasoning by reference to the functional continuity of the organs of the body that then may or may not be sufficient to claim the unity of the self. For Aristotle, the hylomorphic philosopher who acknowledges the truths of materialism, the functional unity of these organs were a partial explanation of the unity of the self, i.e. in modern terminology they were perhaps a necessary but not sufficient condition of the unity of the self. Functional unity, however commits one to teleology: the organ’s function is for the sake of the individual and many physical scientists do not want to be associated with this kind of “backward causation” as they incorrectly call this type of explanation. Teleological explanation is however very much tied up with our conceptualisation and linguistic demarcation of action. O’Shaughnessy points to instances of actions in which observation based descriptions of instrumental action would be confined to just the movements of the body. So when in walking to the shop to buy some milk, I say so upon being asked, and the scientist obsessed with observation claims that to be an illegitimate description of my action because all I can scientifically be said to be doing is walking. This after all is all that can be captured on his video of me on the way to the shop before being asked about the matter.
After discussing the respective different functional roles of the right and left hemispheres Harari claims that Daniel Kahneman’s experiments prove the existence of an experiencing self which remembers nothing(a moment to moment consciousness) and a narrating self which remembers selectively and is duration blind. It is this narrating self, the author argues that is behind the liberal belief that we have a single enduring self:
“Most of us identify with our narrating self. When we say “I” we mean the story in our head not the onrushing stream of experiences we undergo. We identify with the inner system that takes the crazy chaos of life and spins out of it seemingly logical and consistent yarns. It doesn’t matter that the plot is full of lies and lacunas and is rewritten again and again so that today’s story flatly contradicts yesterday’s.”(347-8)
The author goes on further to suggest that the self is a result of an imaginary story which we tell ourselves:
“just like nations, gods and money. Each of us has a sophisticated system that throws away most of our experiences, keeps only a few choice samples, mixes them up with bits from movies we’ve seen, novels we’ve read, speeches we’ve heard and daydreams we’ve savoured, and out of all that jumble it weaves a seemingly coherent story about who I am, where I came from and where I am going. This story tells me what to love, whom to hate and what to do with myself.. We all have our genre. Some people live a tragedy, others inhabit a never-ending religious drama, some approach life as if it were an action film, and not a few act as if in a comedy. But in the end they are all just stories.”
….which the author seems to be able to distinguish from the truth in some fashion that he thinks the people he is talking about do not possess the capacity to do. He assumes that the language located in the left hemisphere is one without a truth function which subjects putative facts to observational tests, testimony from other witnesses, different kinds of reasoning processes and different theories. If Aristotle is a liberal as he ought to be, given his suggestion of the importance of an educated middle class to the fate of the political community, why would he reject the above account so categorically? Here are some of the grounds he would use to reject the above account: Reason uses arguments and theories to determine the truth of putative beliefs which can occur uncontested in a narrative: Experience can be organised by narratives and also organised at a higher level by knowledge: My life is the true story of who I am where I came from what I am doing–it characterises my epistemic relation to myself. To the extent that I am capable of telling this true story is the extent to which I “know myself”.
Harari concludes this section with the following:
“The free individual is just a fictional tale concocted by an assembly of biochemical algorithms.”(354)
…thus dispelling the myth that a story is told by one free individual to another which needs to be done if one is to accept the totalitarian story of the future which we will be treated to in the next section.
The arguments of Kant pertaining to the dignity and worth of the individual have made no appearance in either of Harari’s works thus far. If Kantian liberalism has survived the totalitarianism of the last century then it must be because of these arguments. The author claims, however that:
“liberalism succeeded because there was abundant political, economic and military sense in ascribing value to every human being. On the mass battlefields of modern industrial wars and in the mass production lines of modern industrial economies every human counted. there was value to every pair of hands which could hold a rifle or pull a lever.”(p357)
This makes liberalism a utilitarian Philosophy which resonates with the political philosophies of Hobbes and the Mill’s. We are all familiar with the futile attempts of utilitarian ethics to explain the worth of an individual and his freedom. Attempts which at the political level justify the unjust tyrannising of the minority by the majority however insane their policies are and at the individual level will allow the individual who is mentally ill the freedom to destroy himself. Utilitarianism was a political philosophy inspired by the science of the 16th and 17th century that relied on a method of resolving wholes into their parts and attempting to re-compose them back into the whole(the former process being of course much easier than the latter) and it also relied on an assumption of linear causation applied best to the billiard balls of Hume cannoning off each other. Utilitarianism was science “applied” to social phenomena with a teleological twist: man pursues happiness it was claimed. The test of whether something was good or not was a consequential test and Bentham’s sovereign principles of pleasure and pain were the key indicators of a mans happiness. If a man was happy, irrespective of whether he met the Kantian condition of deserving his happiness, this was sufficient test of the ethical good. What are we to say of the happy man who then asks himself the Kantian question and upon realising he does not deserve to be happy is now unhappy? This unhappiness is after all a consequence of a consequence and if consequences determine what is good why should one particular consequence be preferable to any other? This is of course a variation of Aquinas’ double effect theory which is a standard objection to any consequentialist ethical theory.
Ethics is of course a figment of the imagination for Harari as is human rights which is tied not to mans imagined happiness but to his actual dignity and worth. In his reasoning about the utility of man for the economic or political system he notes that artificial intelligence is decoupling intelligence from consciousness and that there is no guarantee that this will not lead to man becoming superfluous at the point at which all occupations can be performed more efficiently by computerised robots. This is a serious prediction. Hannah Arendt pointed to the consequences of the industrial revolution when large numbers of men became superfluous in Europe and created the economic and political conditions for two world wars. It should, however be pointed out that it was precisely the political and economical utilitarian value of these men which contributed to their alienation. Educational systems did not suffice to convince the masses of unemployed that they possessed a value in being human.
Sometimes there is something of the air of a science fiction film hanging over these reflections. Firstly, the reflections ignore the variable of freedom and consent. Would people consent to having AI based teachers and doctors and politicians? Secondly it is not clear that algorithms will be able to capture the essential elements of teaching to take one example. Everyone in education knows how difficult it is to change one small component of the educational system: there just is no hope of agreement over what constitutes a good education. There must literally be hundreds of thousands of algorithms involved in the educational system and we look forward to seeing the conference which will discuss where to start. Let us however explore this totalitarian vision to its logical conclusion:
“As algorithms push humans out of the job market, wealth and power might become concentrated in the hands of the tiny elite that owns the all powerful algorithms, creating unprecedented social and political inequality….Alternatively, the algorithms might themselves become the owners. Human law already recognises intersubjective entities like corporations and nations as “legal persons”….5,000 years ago much of Sumer was owned by imaginary gods such as Enki and Inanni. If gods can posses land and employ people, why not algorithms?”(p376-7)
The author appears to believe that if we provided Google free access to our biometric devices, our DNA scans, and our medical records it would provide a better solution to the problems in our lives than the narrating self with its “cooked up stories. Google will help us make choices in the supermarket, in the polling booth and the marriage market:
“once Google, Facebook and other algorithms become all knowing oracles, they may well evolve into agents and ultimately into sovereigns”(p397)
“The new technologies of the 21st century my thus reverse the humanist revolution, stripping humans of their authority, and empowering non human algorithms instead.”(p401)
All of this will apparently be based on the life sciences conclusion that a living organism is just a collection of algorithms. This in its turn will transform medicine from an ethical project of healing the sick to an elitist project of upgrading the lives of the healthy. Elites will want these services, it is maintained and further:
“some elites may conclude that there is no point in providing improved and even standard levels of health for masses of useless poor people, and it is far more sensible to focus on upgrading a handful of super-humans beyond the norm.”(pp407)
These super-humans will, it is argued abandon their “liberal” roots and treat humans “the way 19th century Europeans treated Africans”.
It is difficult to treat some of these reflections academically because of their “imaginative” science fiction-like character against the background of the absence of philosophy, ethics, philosophical psychology, and law but the purpose of this review thus far has been to present this absent background. With this in mind it is difficult to believe that given our natures and the knowledge we have of what happened in history the last time we encountered the above mentioned phenomena when “science” was left to dominate the field of humanistic explanation, we will travel this totalitarian road again without recognising its landmarks. We are free to choose not to go down this yellow brick road.