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Shakespeares tragic plays contain historical elements and his historical plays inevitably seem to possess both tragic and moral elements. The explanations for these complex forms of composition require Aristotelian Hylomorphic theory which in turn rests upon two fundamental presuppositions, firstly “All men desire to know” (Metaphysics) and, secondly, mans activities aim at the Form of the Good” (Nichomachean Ethics). These presuppositions plus the structural framework of four kinds of change, three media of change (space, time, matter), three principles of change, and the basic terms and principles of all those sciences that fall into the three major Aristotelian classifications of theoretical, practical and productive sciences, all contribute to the background context which we ought to bear in mind when seeking to interpret Shakespeares works. History, however does not fall into any of the three major branches of science, perhaps because its concern, according to Aristotle, is about particular events and actions brought about by particular causes (” because of each other”).
Raymond Weil argues that History is nevertheless an important explanatory discipline because it uses the fourfold hylomorphic framework of causation/explanation that we find in the other disciplines. He emphasises in particular the presence of final and formal causes of the good life and a good political constitution. It is also important to emphasises that the basic term “psuché” is an important aspect of many of the sciences including History. The conditions necessary to produce the final cause of a good life, then, would require the formal means of a good constitution which would include elements such as a relatively large middle class using the principle of the golden mean to make political and ethical decisions as well as a well functioning legal system administering a form of justice that is both good-in-itself and good-in-its-consequences. Weils position seems to imply therefore that there are universal elements embedded in Historical Judgements. Hylomorphism would also require that the harmony of the different powers of the soul is necessary if the Form of the Good is to be manifest in that soul.
The Form of the Truth in Plato’s architectonic is a praiseworthy form, but it is nevertheless not as important as the Form of the Good, which is the most important “Form”. Both Forms are present in Shakespearean plays and this can be plainly seen in relation to Hamlets moment of “recognition” or “reversal” upon returning from his sojourn at sea in order to declare his love for Ophelia. He had, ca 12 years earlier, declared exactly the opposite, thus raising the issue of the truth value of these declarations. It seems that if we are to arrive at a sound evaluative judgement of Hamlets character that we must have some means of adjudicating the truth value of his latest declaration. We know that Hamlets earlier soliloquys testify to a concern for doing the right thing at the right time in the right way (areté) and his 12 years away at sea have matured the young Prince/university student sufficiently for him to arrive at this moment of “recognition” (which obviously involves both the truth and the form of the Good).
L.C. Knight points out that Shakespeare “uses” historical material” for the purposes of explaining “the fundamental principles of mans life” and this is also related to the realisation on the part of his audiences that politics and ethics are “one”. We argue that this argument, along with many others, are good grounds for reclassifying many of Shakespeares plays as “Moral-Political Histories”.
The famous Hamlet soliloquy is of course an important landmark in Hamlets journey of self-exploration which culminated in the moment of recognition upon return from his sojourn at sea. In conversing with himself Hamlet is seeking, in a manner similar to Socrates, the counsel of his inner spirit (daimon). Aristotle related this process to one of the purposes of Rhetoric:
“For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not”
This form of reflection is obviously connected to the inhibitive function of consciousness and to the active power of our wills. The more momentous the course of action deliberated upon is, the more complicated this process of reflection must be. Hamlets will is being prepared for a possible action of considerable magnitude, having implications for both his relation to his mother as well for the state of Denmark. There is a sense in which Hamlet clearly appreciated the complexity of his situation and this was reflected in the consideration of an act of self destruction. In such circumstances the balance of the mind was certainly disturbed by the unusual weight of the circumstances.
There is, of course, a considerable difference between the mature 70 year old Socrates calmly conversing in his cell about his own demise and Hamlets angst-laden inner conversation in which he even considers dying by his own hand. It would certainly take at least twelve years at sea, far from such troubling circumstances, for Hamlet to recover his balance-of-mind and arrive at his moment of “recognition”. Northrop Frye, in an earlier chapter, referred to the naturally inhibitive function of Consciousness and he claimed that this inhibitive inaction was equivalent to the death of action. This, of course gives us considerable insight into our modern conception of Consciousness. Hamlets language is indeed revealing. He fears amongst other things to:
“lose the name of action”
He links his fear with Consciousness and claims further:
“That conscience doth make cowards of us all.”
Now whilst Hamlet is clearly struggling with his own impulses and representations there is no need to see his rhetorical speculations in terms of our “modern” introversion-extraversion psychological classification system as Bloom seems to suggest, as part of his claim that it was Shakespeare who invented the idea of “personality”. Shakespeare, indeed has claimed that All the World is a stage and we the actors/persons don various masks, but he is also true to the principles of Greek tragedy which punishes dishonesty in no uncertain terms. Amongst the forms of the Good Shakespeares character are striving to achieve, honesty is one of the most important. We also recall encountering the council another university student receives from his father:
“To thine own self be true”
The power of being aware of oneself is of course an important aspect of the process of “coming to know oneself”. If lightning strikes a tree we become almost simultaneously aware of the truth that lightning has struck the tree. This is intimately connected to an awareness we have of my own mental states. There is, that is, an awareness of being aware, and this is an elusive mysterious power we humans possess. This power is partly represented by Kant as “the unity of apperception” where the goal of such a form of reflection is the truth, if our judgements are categorical , or the probable truth if we are dealing with the enthymemes of Rhetoric which are seeking to form a principle to guide us in our reflective process. This rhetorical process is mirrored in our modern courtrooms, in which, in spite of the dialectical opposition of the arguments of the defence and the prosecution, there is a concern on both sides to arrive at the principled judgements of either “Innocent” or “Guilty”.
Shakespeares choice of poetic language is indeed historical, and originates in Aristotelian considerations. Consider, for example, the following passage from Book III of the Rhetoric:
“It was naturally the poets who first set the movement going: for words represent things, and they also had the human voice at their disposal, which, of all of our organs, can best represent other things. Thus the arts of recitation and acting were formed, and others as well. Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through their fine language when their thoughts were simple enough, that language at first took a poetic colour, e.g. Gorgias. Even now most uneducated people think that poetical language makes the finest discourse.” (1404a 20-27)