A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Adam Smith(1723-1790) Vibrations, Moral Sentiments, and “An invisible hand”

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The Scottish Enlightenment: Part 1– A Romantic Prelude

The combination of the skepticism of David Hume and Descartes is a unique and disturbing cocktail that would take the genius of Kant to analyze and synthesize into positive philosophical doctrine. Kant in 1781, as we know embarked on an exercise of extracting the truth from both empiricist and rationalist positions whilst simultaneously criticizing the “Sentiment” of skepticism that permeated these opposing positions. Both forms of skepticism gave, in their turn rise to moral and political consequences that would last for centuries in spite of the attempt by Kant to neutralize the force of the sentiment.

Kant is rumoured to have viewed Smith’s theory of moral sense favourably but he cannot have failed to notice the influence of the skeptical attitude of Hume and the Empiricists that permeated the so-called “Scottish Enlightenment”. In his later work “The Wealth of Nations” Smith is clearly outlining a position which rejects the dogmatic imposition of what he believes are theoretical intellectual systems upon the economic and social interaction of peoples. He is sometimes regarded as one of the fathers of Liberalism but it is not clear that he is committed to the universal value of freedom that we find in the later Moral Theory of Kant. indeed Smiths economic theory paints a deterministic picture of the economic activity of a market driven by economic laws which one must stoically accept the consequences of.

The Scottish Enlightenment was very much influenced by Newton and Hume’s conviction that Newtonian Science should be the lodestar of future moral and social science. Smith was very much a part of this movement. His “Theory of Moral Sentiments” in particular used and modified Hume’s idea of the sentiment of sympathy as one of the atomistic building blocks of all social relations. For Hume Sympathy was an impression/sentiment that was shared by mankind and was the source of benevolent action. Newton believed in atomism and as we have seen from earlier psychological developments “sensation” was believed by many philosophers of the past to be an important psychological concept. That sensation or impression should become the “atom” of psychological theory for Hume was not, therefore, a particularly surprising development. The Romanticism of Rousseau’s social and political theory was tempered by a skepticism that regarded civilization as decadent and the arts and sciences produced by man a result of his amour propre(pride). Rousseau’s Romantic upbringing of the hypothetical Emile was an attempt, therefore, to install the appropriate moral sentiments in his literary creation. The Encyclopedists of France, which included Rousseau, were also intent upon a pluralistic view of knowledge and the psychological faculties that marked a clear attitude of resentment toward any authority and its dogmatic pretensions. Impressions, Sentiments, Association, and Imagination were in the cultural air everybody breathed. The invisible hand of Revolution was preparing the cocktail that would explode later in America and France.

Smith’s “atomistic approach to the explanation of phenomena is actually best illustrated in an essay entitled “Considerations Concerning the First Formations of Language”(1759) which by the way is one of the best illustrations of an imposition of a dogmatic intellectual system upon the phenomena of the social activity of man that it is possible to imagine. The essay begins thus:

“The assignment of particular names to denote particular objects, that is the institution of nouns substantive, would, probably, be one of the first steps towards the formation of language.Two savages who had never been taught to speak but had been bred up remote from the societies of man, would naturally begin to form that language by which they would endeavour to make their mutual wants, intelligible to each other, by uttering certain sounds whenever they meant to denote certain objects. Those objects only which are most familiar to them. and which they had most frequent occasion to mention, would have particular names assigned to them. The particular cave whose covering sheltered them from the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the particular fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be denominated by the words cave, tree, fountain.”

One cannot but be reminded here of the more modern thoughts of the Early Wittgenstein’s logical atomism in which so-called atomic propositions were concatenations or “associations” of logical names. This modern theory is the startling result of the above ultra-theoretical characterization of language. Smith was no logician even though he held a professorial chair in logic. He instead extolled the virtues of experience and common sense. He did so, however not in an Aristotelian spirit(which he claimed to be the case) but rather in the spirit of a theoretical skeptic who is careful to select which experiences to focus upon. Aristotle never produced a theory of the origins of language but had he done so it probably would have resembled that produced by Julien Jaynes in an essay entitled “The Evolution of Language in the Late Pleistocene”. The methodological commitment to an empirical approach that focuses upon an investigation into the practical origins of language is obvious in Jaynes’s account:

“Words are of such huge moment in the life of men that the acquisition of them and the ability to organize them into sentences that convey meaning must have resulted in very real behavioural changes: and these changes must have been reflected in the artifacts left behind… A differential lingual response to an object is a training of attention upon it. To look at an object and to name it at the same time allows a concentration upon it that otherwise would be absent. Without names for things, we cannot readily get our own or others attention to the right places or keep them there for very long…But the effect of language on behaviour goes much farther and deeper than orientation and attention. Stimuli, when labeled, are actually easier to remember. Children who can name colours better can remember and recognize them. And what is remembered is shaped by the terms that express it. Moreover, stimuli differences when labeled can be responded to in a much more encompassing way: behaviour can be reactions to relational concepts rather than to the actual stimuli themselves, something impossible without words…language thus allows us to code and compare attributes of objects verbally, thereby freeing us from the momentary perceptual impact of one attribute or another…”(A Julian Jaynes Collection, p93)

For Aristotle this would be interpreted as freeing us to think, freeing us for discourse and for the reasoning that occurs in discourse. This is decisive evidence for the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal capable of discourse. Jaynes presents to us in his theorizing an account of a developmental sequence from an animal condition all the way up the gradations of psuche to our potentiality for rationally justifying our beliefs and actions. In taking us on this journey Jaynes questions the thesis that men used substantive noun language when he lived in caves. It might be thought that the presence of tools is evidence for such a position but making tools do not, in fact, require linguistic guidance that relies upon a system of nouns. Art and techné have always been transmitted by imitation and there is no reason to think of more complicated procedures suddenly springing into existence. Jaynes supports his position by reference to the size of a brain needed to support a language composed of a system of substantive nouns(which for him is a relatively late stage in the process of language acquisition). Jaynes refers to the earlier stages by claiming a gestural origin of language in which incidental signals were differentiated from intentional signals. The time period for this stage was ca 400,000 BC, the brain size of man was definitely not sufficient to support a complex system of language and there is, therefore, good reason to suppose that in this largely, animal condition the signaling system(there are no grounds as yet to even call this a stage of language) was probably composed of 15-20 sounds or cries(as is the case with present-day anthropoids). These sounds would have been controlled at subcortex levels of the brain: at the level of the limbic system of the midbrain:

“The transfer to cortical control occurred, I suggest, by the evolution of additional frontal cortex…thus selectively suppressing and releasing the limbic centres for vocalization beneath it”(Jaynes, p99)

Once this occurred we would have been capable of the first intentional signal which .in true Aristotelian fashion, followed the principle of intensity differentiation, and was probably a cry or cream in response to the approach of danger. This cry was the “atom” of language and could in itself be modified via it’s ending to denote various forms of danger. Jaynes thinks that this period of language development probably lasted to 46,000 BC and in this context, he points to the shape of the skull of the Neanderthals as evidence for his claim: Neanderthal skulls indicated undeveloped frontal lobes which in turn indicate the absence of Broca’s area of speech activation. The next stage in the evolution of language was from the modification of endings to denote forms of danger to using sounds as commands, and this development takes us up to 25,000 BC long after the extinction of the Neanderthals. It is during this stage that Jaynes imagines attitudes of interrogation and negation occurring. It is around this time that we encounter the unique phenomenon of cave paintings which probably illustrates the next stage in the development of language, the invention of life nouns(hence the subject matter of the cave drawings). Jaynes characterizes this stage thus:

“Once animals–particularly those that were hunted–had nouns that could designate them, they had a kind of extra being, one indeed that could be taken far back into the caves and drawn upon the walls…The fact that such paintings only rarely include man drawn with the same life-like similitude may suggest a lack of words for different men”(p103)

After life-nouns, thing nouns emerged for pottery, pendants, ornaments, bronze carvings, harpoons, and spears. Jaynes believes that it is only at this stage that one could categorically state that the brain now possesses what he called “modern language areas”. Jaynes then argues that between 10,000 and 8,000 BC a population of communities stabilized in post glacial locations and nomadic forms of existence connected with high mortality rates was abandoned. It is at this point, he argues, that names for people evolved:

“once a tribe member has a proper name, he can in a sense be recreated in his absence, thought about.”(p104)

The evidence for this development is the proliferation of ceremonial graves. This, then, is a developmental account of language that not only accords with Aristotelian philosophical psychology but also with the Aristotelian methodology involved in the study of animals and their habits. This account also accords well with the principles and causes of the hylomorphic theory. This kind of account contrasts sharply with Smith’s the fundamentally empirical/analytical approach evoking the “atoms” of impressions and ideas to explain complex motor/behavioural phenomena– a move that in later philosophical psychology would be recognised to be a kind of categorical or ontological mistake given the fact that impressions or sensations are receptive phenomena(something that happens to man) and behaviour is fundamentally active(something that one does). By later Philosophical psychology we mean to refer also to Kantian “Anthropology” where this ontological distinction was clearly recognized.

Smith is more renowned for his economic theory than his Philosophical contribution in spite of the fact that he occupied the chairs of Logic and Moral Philosophy at Scottish Universities. He was undoubtedly caught up in the maelstrom the sentiment of the age when he produced his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”. In his theory, he paradoxically agreed with his sentiment of skepticism toward Aristotelianism but disagreed over the meaning of one of the central themes of moral sense, namely Sympathy. For Hume, we all shared this feeling as a matter of fact but for Smith, the act of sympathy required an act of imagination or projection of an attitude onto another. There is also the presence of another influence in Smith’s theorizing, that of Bernard de Mandeville which Hamlyn in his work “The Penguin History of Western Philosophy” characterizes thus:

“virtue and public good are in fact based on egoism and selfishness, not(as Shaftesbury maintained) on benevolence and public feeling. Indeed Mandeville claimed that society can be conceived as founded on the fact that each individual seeks his own interest.”(p207)

The distinctly innovatory element of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiment” is the introduction of an important distinction between a participator in social activities and an impartial spectator of these activities. This also confirms Professor Brett’s highlighting of observationalism as a major theoretical force during this period. A commitment to an observationalist methodology was predicated upon the drift of European Culture toward a more total commitment toward Scientific assumptions and methodology. newton’s theory was also parsed through thinkers such as David Hartley who according to Brett was the originator of Physiological Psychology:

“The views of Hartley upon sensation as a physical process were taken directly from Newton’s Principia. In brief, the object of sensation produces the idea of sensation by making an impression on the organism and creating a disturbance of the nerves: these disturbances are called vibrations and said to be “motions backward and forward of the small particles of the same kind as the oscillation of the pendulum and the trembling of particles of sounding bodies”… we are to assume that vibrations are equivalent to a consciousness of vibrations. This point was not seen clearly by Hartley…The activity of mind, here tacitly omitted, was to find its way back into psychology slowly and with difficulty.”

Such was the influence of Newton. Hartley combines the atoms of sensation assumption with an assumption of a law of association and produces a theory in which it is not ideas or things that are associated but physical sensations. Here we find no trace of hylomorphic theory in Hartley. Indeed his largely physiological theory of language becomes in later theorizing a focus of interest for psychiatry in general and Charcot in particular. On Hartley’s account words are firstly, impressions made upon the ear, secondly, the impressions of the action of the organs of speech, thirdly, impressions made upon the eye by written letters and finally, impressions of the action of the hand in the writing of letters. Such a physiological account of four different kinds of sensations was also incorporated into Freud’s writings on aphasia but without any reference to vibrations. Freud in his theories referred to what he termed a pleasure-pain principle that was largely connected to physical action and the mental action of imagination. Freud thereby placed feelings and emotions and the psychological things that happen to a man in a wider context of activity rather than the restricted arena of affection that arose from the theories of the followers of Newton.

Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments” is characterized by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a phenomenology of morals because of the reluctance of Smith to embrace any kind of rational or philosophical principle in the description or explanation of psychological phenomena. This kind of approach reminds one of the famous British and American Common Sense or pragmatic Philosophy that also similarly attempted to disengage with rational or philosophical explanations of everyday phenomena. Indeed Smith and other anti-intellectual thinkers realized that the atomism of sensations and the mechanism of association could never suffice of themselves to provide sufficiently acceptable explanations of the phenomena being studied and common sense was thus enlisted to assist in the process. Both Philosophy and philosophical Psychology were beginning during this modern ages stretching from the Philosophy of Hobbes and Descartes, to become theoretically technical and practically egoistic at the same time. Physical sensations and the mechanisms of association were both quantifiable and could therefore quantitatively describe the life of an individual striving for a difficult to characterize life of happiness. The difficulty involved here is essentially that of the difficulty of characterizing from an empirical descriptive point of view the normative nature of all discourse related to the activity of striving to achieve an ideal state. Smith was not, however, a proto-utilitarian in spite of being under the influence of his teacher Hutcheson who argued for the political importance of the concept of happiness: a concept that involved responding to the needs of an individual as well as the demands of society. The essential demand of the individual on his society for Smith and perhaps also for Locke and Hume was to provide happiness. Whether for Smith this was the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number is perhaps an open question. Is the judgment as to what accomplishes or fails to accomplish this goal a matter for the impartial spectator? Will the categories of quantity and relation be the prime categories used in the spectator’s judgments? What is clear is that the idea of “moral sense” is being formed beneath our gaze and in opposition to the ideas of practical rationality that had supported authoritarian structures for decades. It is also clear that Smith was not a moral consequentialist, claiming as he did that the intention of an actor was the fundamental component of a moral act. In Smith moral sense and common sense were being welded together by a commitment to the technical assumptions and methodology of Science without any awareness of the possible conflict involved. The American Pragmatist, William James, captured the power of a philosophy of common sense well when he said:

“For the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter: it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means”(Lecture one Pragmatism, p5)

When we add to the above the claim that James makes later, namely that Philosophy bakes no bread it appears that all possible connection between rationality and a flourishing life have been severed. Once this has been successfully accomplished.once, that is the ideal and its normative conceptually delineated telos have been dismantled, the man of common sense or the phenomenologist can without fear of contradiction maintain a skeptical attitude toward life, perhaps even a cynical attitude expressed by the words “Life is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury and signifying nothing.”

If happiness is the principle of self-love in disguise as Kant maintains then the logical consequences of such self-love may well be a politics of minimal government intervention allowing market forces to determine the ultimate direction of the movement of society. Smith was, of course, for some intervention and some redistribution of the resources of the society but the invisible hand very clearly had a society in its firm grasp.

The collapse of the standard of rationality was very definitely not something Aristotle would have agreed with although Smith appears to think his position resembled Aristotle’s. The descriptive phenomenological vignettes of the virtues of man in Smith’s work was coupled with a conviction that there was no overarching principle of virtue or practical rationality in Aristotle. This led to a relativistic plurality of competing values which was, however, an incorrect representation of Aristotelian ethics.. Aristotle’s definition of areté or virtue was “Doing the right thing in the right way at the right time ” and this was the basic principle that guided all reasoning about action. The feeling of happiness in Aristotle was quite clearly connected to the above basic principle and although in Aristotle there were many ways to achieve the flourishing life all of them would involve doing the right thing at the right time in the right way at crucial moments in one’s life. Aristotle’s impartial spectator would use this basic principle in judgments relating to whether one was leading a flourishing life or not. The idea of an impartial spectator using sympathy and sentiment in relation to the mental faculty of the imagination is a recipe for the relativism we would later encounter in common sense Philosophies such as Pragmatism. The conflict of sentiments, for example, was well documented by William James in his work “Pragmatism”:

“the history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Of whatever temperament ….I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergences of Philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament, a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament… he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-headed view of the universe, just as this or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does not suit it.”

Here James combines the psychological concepts of temperament and sentiment and arrives at a psychological view of Philosophy that managed to eclipse the totality of its achievements and it is difficult not to associate Smith with this unfortunate development. Perhaps Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists in France also played their part in the dismantling of the achievements of Philosophy. Smith himself was involved in the bitter dispute between Hume and Rousseau, the master of the discontents of civilization. Man was born free argued Rousseau but everywhere in chains. Both Rousseau and Smith would have agreed that politicians are not to be trusted to take decisions in the spirit of amour de soi. Amour Propre(pride, ambition, self-obsession) ruled the decisions of those that ruled us and as a consequence, we find ourselves discontent and in chains. This theoretically sentimental Rousseau who wrote a work entitled Emile that spoke so romantically about the ideal childhood of a hypothetical pupil but dumped his very real illegitimate children in an orphanage is an interesting mixture of the sentimental and the hard-headed to say the very least about this state of affairs. Smith himself demonstrates this strange ambivalence in his picture of an impartial spectator who, it appears, cannot use the principles of theoretical and practical rationality to make a decision about what is wrong and what is right. James’s remarks, of course, have managed to eclipse the Kantian idea of an impartial spectator/judge evaluating a philosopher, for example not by their temperament or sympathetic affections but by the arguments they use. Smiths man of sentiment has become many generations later a temperamental man whose judgment is biased by his own “Amour Propre”.

Kant’s Philosophy attempted to extract the truth from rationalism and empiricism and it presented a truly philosophical gestalt of the impartial spectator as a judge who knows and uses the law and the principles of the law to make judgments. But as history has demonstrated even Kantian Philosophy turned out to be merely the crest of a wave of rationalism that would soon break and be swallowed up by the waters of man’s sentiments and temperaments.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: David Hume–Observationalist and Associationist, Book Burner.

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Bertrand Russell finds in Hume a kindred skeptical spirit: a spirit that helped to shape the form of “modernism” we encounter in the twentieth century:

“To refute him has been, ever since he wrote, a favourite pastime among metaphysicians. For my part I find none of the refutations convincing: nevertheless I cannot but hope that something less skeptical than Hume’s system may be discoverable.”(p634)

Russell also acknowledges:

“Hume’s philosophy, whether true or false, represents the bankruptcy of the eighteenth-century reasonableness….. he arrives at the disastrous conclusion that from experience and observation nothing can be learned. There is no such thing as rational belief: “If we believe fire warms or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise”. We cannot help believing, but no belief can be grounded in reason.”

One cannot but think of the warnings throughout the ages against the widespread acceptance of skepticism and one cannot wonder what role it played in the events of what Arendt called “this terrible century” in which two world wars were fought to the bitter end and two atomic bombs were dropped on civilian populations. Early signs of the “dismantling” of the moderating voice of Philosophy came from the Philosopher that attended the same school as Hitler, Ludvig Wittgenstein.

The work of the early Wittgenstein, especially the ideas we find expressed in his “Tractatus”(1922) were an attempt to undermine the philosophy of the time in a manner typical of the form of analytical philosophy that was most influenced by Hume’s logical skepticism. The spirit of the age of the twentieth century was well expressed in Hume’s unacademic response to metaphysics:

“If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school of metaphysics, for instance: let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding)

The pictures from the gallery of events of the twentieth century surely include the burning, for example of the books of the Jews by the German spokesmen for the Philosophy of Positivism and ethical relativism. The “experiments” on Jewish children and events testifying to the flagrant disregard for the ethical and human rights of several ethnic groups are also to be found in abundance. The gallery would also include pictures of the indifference of men tried for the most heinous crimes against humanity of the century. Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem is one such picture. In this context, one should recall that Kant had warned us about the response of indifference to both dogmatism and skepticism. It produces men for whom anything is possible except thinking rationally about what they are doing.

Apart from these general observations on the consequences of widespread skepticism, one can also be confounded by what Hume meant when he pointed to the importance of “experimental reasoning” in philosophical inquiry. Did he mean experience and observation? If he did then we are left to ponder Russell’s claim that Hume believes nothing can be learned either of these activities. Fortunately, Wittgenstein in his later work questioned the skeptical relativism of a view that did not understand that a belief in the uniformity of nature was a ” reason” to believe in one’s predictions :

” 472. The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame–although after all, it is only in the past that I have burnt myself.

473. The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the fear that it will burn me”

“No belief can be grounded in reason” Hume has claimed and perhaps Wittgenstein appears partly to agree with this, stating that the belief is a “ground” for ones refusal to put one’s hand in the fire. It is undoubtedly true that in pure logic my believing that the fire will burn me does not follow from the ground, but it is, according to Wittgenstein, nevertheless, what he calls an “inference”. Hume in his “observationalist” mood might counter by insisting that one cannot see the cause of the effect of the burned hand: there is the event of the fire burning and then the event of the burned fingers but no one can see the causal connection which is merely a consequence of a habit of the mind formed by the constant conjunction of events(for most people it suffices to be burned once for the fear /belief to be installed) All I can see is one event prior to another, an event that is spatially contiguous to another but there is no impression of either a causal relation or of any substance possessing causal power. But how, then is it possible to “infer” the connection of the cause and the effect with such apparent certainty? The certainty is illusory, argues Hume, the certainty derives from priority, contiguity, constant conjunction and a consequent association of ideas in the mind. The connection which we believe to be necessary is merely an impression of the movement of our minds.

It was Hume’s avowed intention to become the Newton of the moral and social sciences and what we have encountered in the above is a psychological account par excellence of the “grounds” for me refusing to put my hand in the flames of a burning fire. The connection of the impression of the event of the burning fire with an impression of the event of pain suffices for me to withdraw the hand that was initially attracted by the expectation of a pleasurable contact with the flames. Fire is of course not a substance but rather an element caused by the causal interaction of substances in an environment conducive to the existence of fire but it does seem almost perverse to suggest as Hume does, that we cannot observe the causal properties or power of the fire. One reading of Wittgenstein’s position on this issue is to claim that Wittgenstein would agree to the use of the term “reason” in this context if it was being used in the Kantian sense of the embracing of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the phenomenon in question. Kant would not deny that it is possible to put one’s fingers in the fire as a response to the attractive property of the flames but he would probably insist that this is more likely to be the action of a small infant who has had little experience and formed no concept or “idea”(to use Hume’s terminology) of the pain associated with one of the causal properties of the flames of the fire.

Kant would also have taken issue with the Humean claims that temporal priority or succession could be used to define causality. On Hume’s account if there were a constant conjunction of the events of my walking into a warm room and sitting on a warm radiator this would suffice for a belief that the warmth of the room caused the warmth of the radiator which we all know to be false because we understand the causal power of radiators to warm rooms. In this case, in contrast with the above example relating to the element of fire, we are dealing with a substance possessing causal power. Kant in his analogies of experience clearly states that substance causal order and coexistence of substances are the “ideas” or a priori concepts which create order in the flux of our experiences. Kant also claims that Time cannot itself be experienced or observed but is rather an a priori intuition of the faculty of Sensibility which also organizes our experiences. The example Kant uses to demonstrate this point is that of a steamship seaming downstream of a river. In this “experience” I am necessarily aware, argues Kant, of the irreversibility of the ship’s position upstream in relation to its later position downstream. I am necessarily aware, that is, that its position upstream(and its causal properties) are one of the “reasons” or justifications for its being downstream. In the absence of these apriori intuitions and apriori concepts of substance and causality the world, Kant argues, would be merely a play of representations in the mind relating to no object or reality. That is:

“it would not be possible through our perception to distinguish one appearance from another as regards relations of time. For the succession in our apprehension would always be one and the same, and there would be nothing in the appearance which so determines it that a certain sequence is rendered objectively necessary.”(A194)

There would, that is, be no reason to prioritize the representation of the warm radiator over the warm room or the ship upstream from the ship downstream. There would be no “ground” or “reason” for saying that the cause came after the effect. Invoking Aristotle’s theory of change in this context would require referring to his three principles of change which are:

  1. That which a thing changes from(the ship upstream)
  2. That which a thing changes to,(the ship downstream) and
  3. That which endures throughout the change(the ship and its causal properties)

Humes account in the light of these three principles is deeply confusing. He appears to be claiming that we first experience temporal priority or succession between events and then as a consequence regard one event as the cause of the other on the basis of the priority (in time) of the first event experienced. This claim also, of course, flies in the face of the Kantian acknowledgment of the possibility of cause and effect coexisting simultaneously in our experience as is the case with something heavy causing an indentation when resting upon soft material.

Hume would, of course, deny that “perceptions”(“impressions” and “ideas” can be organized by reason and he would regard with suspicion Kantian synthetic a priori judgments such as “Every event must have a cause”. For Hume, it suffices to use his law of the association of ideas and the imagination to explain how we, for example, “think” complex ideas that we have never experienced before, e.g. the streets of New Jerusalem paved with gold or unicorns.

In the case of the example above of my deciding not to put my fingers into the fire , Hume argues, it is the laws of the association of ideas in concert with the principles of pleasure and pain that account for the “new connection” between the fire and the event of my decision not to act. Here, however, we encounter another conflict with the position of Kant who would claim that the “reason” why the child did not succumb to the temptation of the “attractive” flames was not a passive connection of events but rather the “active” thought of wishing not to burn one’s fingers. For Hume ideas are copies of impressions and it is difficult to attribute to Hume the change of ontological category from passive impressions and ideas and a passive process of association to active ideas which themselves possess causal power. Add to this Humean cocktail of explanations the facts that Hume denied not only the conceptual activity of the mind but also the presence of a self that is enduring and creative throughout one’s experiences and one begins to see the limitations of psychology without a subject.

What was it, then, in Hume, which awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers? What was it about empiricism that brought about the project of Transcendental Philosophy with its claims that God, the world and the soul are both empirically real and transcendentally ideal? One possibility is the empiricist attachment to the axiom that there is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses. Another possibility is the attraction of the role of the imagination in the building up of our experiences of the world. The imagination enables me to construct an “idea” of Paris that is not merely composed of my memories of my sojourns there. It almost seems sometimes as if the imagination is working freely without any constraints at all(that literally anything is possible) though Hume denies this and insists that it is subject to the laws of association in the mind. The mind, for Hume, simply moves mechanically from idea A to idea B in accordance with whether they resemble each other or are contiguous in space and time with each other. Ideas appear necessarily “relational” but what about relations in the world such as my books rectangular shape and its brown colour. Are these merely contiguous? Or are they simultaneously coexistent? Is the book brown because the bark of the tree is brown? What about pink books? The painter of a brown book might well be thinking about the causal property of the tree to produce books but Hume’s theory would be unable to explain this kind of relation. Indeed the general idea of a book is going to cause considerable problems for Humean theory simply because firstly, my senses have never brought me into contact with an impression of a book in general and secondly because if a complex idea composed of relations of ideas, and if these ideas are not “logical”(relating to substance and causal properties) but somehow related to quantity and number, then such a book is going to be very different to the books we experience in reality. Also, it is the case that in more senses than one a book is a denizen of the thought world, and belongs to the realms of understanding of the world and judgment about the world rather than the realm of sensibility which is only impressed by particulars.

For Hume, the connection of the shape of the book and its colour is tied together by constant conjunction and the mechanical work of the imagination functioning in accordance with the association of ideas. But how are we to account for the quality of abstraction of a general idea such as a book. In scholastic philosophy and perhaps also in Locke I abstract from particular impressions in accordance with a principle of “resemblance”. Hume both accepted and criticized this position, questioning the role of substance whilst agreeing over the role of the principle of resemblance in the process. In Hume, we also find interesting references to the role of Language in relation to our sensing particulars and understanding general terms. In some places in his texts, it appears as if a language is a set of names and a word functions as a label for an object. If we have impressions of the object the word is the name for a particular object, but on the other hand, if we have ideas of the object of a horse, for example, the associated word appears to function as a general term for all particular horses. So, saying that “Horses are quadrupeds” in modern logical discourse, is not a way of picking out a particular horse but rather a way of referring to a class of objects. Yet this is not the end of the matter for we also need to inquire into how this general term is constituted since in Hume’s work there is an explicit denial of the existence of general objects such as “horses”: so it appears that the general terms function in Hume is merely a label that we can apply to particular horses. Scholastic philosophy would have regarded “Horses are quadrupeds” to be conceptual truths relating the concepts of horse and quadruped to each other in an essential relation that provides us with a necessary truth about the substance we call “Horses”. In Hume, however, there are neither substances, natural kinds, nor concepts operating in a realm of thought ruled by reason and logical relations. Instead, we encounter the law of the association of ideas. Ideas are associated because of the “resemblance” of particular horses to each other but it is a commonplace observation of logicians that anything can literally resemble anything if we take relations into account. A sphere composed of black marble, for example, resembles both a sphere of white marble in terms of shape but also a square of black marble in terms of colour. This fact led many scholastic logicians to declare that resemblances must be concept mediated. A similar argument has been used by modern logicians (Peter Geach) to argue that differences are also concept mediated: identifying blue and yellow as different colours requires an understanding of the prior concept of the polychromatic. Concepts, then, appear to have the function of both allowing us to perceive resemblances and perceive differences. Modern logicians(e.g. Wittgenstein) claim that concepts require an active faculty of rules that will act as norms of representation enabling us to decide how we are to organize the sensible world of fleeting and transitory impressions.. There is no trace of such a faculty or power in Hume but perhaps we can find something resembling it in Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy where it appears as if Language can perform all the tasks that the Kantian faculties of the understanding and judgment can perform in the name of an “I think”. The only question to pose here is whether language can carry the burden of a discriminative power of a being that uses concepts to think and to judge.

This whole situation is further complicated by Hume’s view that since there is no possible impression of the self there can be no self that is active and thinking because there can be no impression of such a phenomenon. Just as I cannot perceive or reason that a sone has the causal power to shatter a pane of glass if thrown with some velocity so I cannot on Hume’s view perceive or reason about the active power of a self, thinking conceptually about the world or thinking conceptually about itself. One can neither have an impression of such a power nor arrive at it via the power of reasoning. Kant would claim that causation is an a priori concept of the understanding used in the reasoning process to organize what we see. He would also reject the idea of that the operation of the reasoning process can be reduced to the operation of a power of the imagination not connected to the ideals of truth and knowledge in the same way(although it must be admitted that the imagination plays a role in associating impressions under the auspices of the conceptually oriented faculty of understanding) The understanding does not follow rules in the way in which the understanding does. If, for example, I see a horse and think of a unicorn which is also a quadraped these two events are sequential and contiguous and on Hume’s account, the one event causes the other if these two events are constantly conjoined. The resemblance of both being quadrupeds surely suffices insofar as the imagination is concerned to connect the unicorn thought to the perception of the horse, although unicorns do not exist! The truth/knowledge function of the understanding and reason minimally involves giving assent to the connection of events. Take the case of my seeing the event of glass shattering, here surely I must give assent to the thought that it must have been shattered by a hard object moving at significant velocity and this thought in contrast to the image of the unicorn in the imagination is a thought of something that exists!. In this example, we see both reasoning and understanding operating in the form of an inference that cannot be doubted in spite of the fact that it is only in the past that such a conjunction of events has been witnessed. Hume and Wittgenstein are of course to be applauded for drawing attention to an assumption that is being made when we are making inferences such as the one above and Hume is undoubtedly correct in claiming that we cannot prove(in a mathematical way) the so-called principle of the uniformity of nature. In a more chaotic universe, of course, unicorns might be horses. Whilst, however, I live in this universe I will never actively assent to the proposition that unicorns are horses.

Hume’s paradigm of factual knowledge is, of course, related to having an impression of something but it ought to be noted that merely associating the impression of a cause with an impression of an effect appears to be a rather passive mechanical process and does not do justice to the active nature of our thought which has the goals of organizing our world, understanding why the glass broke and controlling the world. Causal necessity must be involved in the above scenario yet Hume denies this notion as he denies the causal power of kinds of objects and their capacities to destroy kinds of glass. If the world is the totality of facts and the self is somehow standing outside of these facts in virtue of being defined as nothing but a bundle of impressions then this would seem to imply that there can be no knowledge of something enduring through and organizing these impressions. There is also the question raised by Kant as to whether causal relations, causal powers and kinds of substances can be real on Hume’s account: a serious question is also raised as to whether on Hume’s account there can be a belief in the external world which for Kant is an all-important necessary condition of possessing a self.

Hume’s ontology is one of events, and his world definition of “world” must consist of a totality of events ad our knowledge of these events is primarily perceptual. In contrast, we have Aristotle’s world where there are builders building, doctors doctoring, teachers teaching and craftsmen crafting and none of these actors have doubts about the nature of their causal efficacy as agents in a world in which they are busy constructing with their powers of discourse, reasoning, and understanding.

Hume wished to become the Newton of the Moral Universe and apply the principle of “experimental reasoning” to the minds of men but the question which looms for his account is whether a world composed of disconnected events and contingently connected impressions can create any universe that humans could recognize let alone survive in.

Professor Brett refuses to regard Hume as a skeptic. He sees Hume not as the author of the position from which the lonely self of the solipsist was justified but rather as the agent that is ushering in a new scheme of ideas into a new era of empirical Psychology:

“If Locke’s “sensation” pointed to a res extensa and his “reflection” to a res cogitans, our new terms will shut out all such implicit references and leave only psychic events differing in the mode of appearance. Impressions are more vivid, ideas are less vivid. Such is the formula by which Hume notifies us that if we enter into our minds we shall find neither matter nor self but simply events. Here, then, we have, at the best, pure psychology or an analysis of mind undertaken in the spirit of positivism with no pre-suppositions: it remains to be seen whether presuppositions can be eliminated or whether the process does not amount to casting out some presuppositions in order to substitute others.”

This interesting reference to positivism pre-dates the logical positivism of the 1930s and also the seeds of positivism captured in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus from 1922. We know with the benefit of historical hindsight that the positivist movement lasted barely a generation and its demise was the result of attacks on a variety of fronts upon the combination of assumptions of firstly the world being a totality of facts and secondly the self, being a solipsistic bundle of impressions and ideas.

Looking at this development from a historical perspective one should recall the moment of the “divorce proceedings” between Psychology declaring its intentions to henceforth concern itself with the “Science of consciousness” and Madam Philosophy who wished a broader commitment to a broader set of assumptions. The “new Psychologists” wished for an account of man that was clearly inspired by the empiricists and the naturalists of the time(the end of the 1800’s)

William James was clearly influenced by Hume but his definition of Psychology as “The Science of mental life, both its phenomena and its conditions” viewed the body(not a theme of Hume’s theory) as a vital condition of the mental phenomena we experience whilst James retained a version of an ancient philosophical animus of the importance of the organizing theme of knowledge in any account of mans nature and agency.. For James, both mental operations of discrimination and association are necessary functions of mental life. Instead of talking about events he refers to “objects” which can, in turn, be analyzed into parts and also be brought together to form new compound wholes. It is, that is, objects that are associated and not ideas:

“Association so far as the word stands for an effect is between things thought of–it is things not ideas which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk of the association of objects, not of the association of ideas. And so far as association stands for causes, it is between processes in the brain–it is these which, being associated in certain ways, determine what successive objects shall be thought.”(p.554)

The reference to the brain actually provides a more believable mechanism of association and a more believable account of the way in which impressions and ideas are connected:

“If ABCDE be a sequence of outer impressions(they may be events or they may be successively experienced properties of an object ) which once gave rise to the successive ideas abcde, then no sooner will A impress us again and awaken the a, then bcde will arise as ideas even before BCDE have come in as impressions. In other words, the order of impressions will the next time be anticipated: and the mental order will so forth copy the order of the outer world.”

We see, then, what a slight change of conception of the term “association” can do for Hume’s theory especially when combined with a scientific naturalism that believes the brain to be the source of at least the lower mental operations such as perception, memory, and imagination. Moreover, we can see how James introduces activity into the mental world. Indeed, for him, activity is defining with respect to whether we can attribute mentality to any phenomenon of the inner world. For James, minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react. Mental activity is defined that is in the following terms:

“The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of mentality in a phenomenon.”(P 8)

Both sensory and motor ideas combine to form the objects of the mind. A skill, for example, is represented by James in the brain as a sequence of muscular contractions of which there is a sensation of each contraction. These sensational impressions exist below the level of conscious ideation which otherwise is usually present at the beginning of the activity, (e.g. seeing the piano) and at the end when one becomes aware of the completion of the activity. According to James, it is a different matter when we are learning a skill where much work is then done at the conscious level of ideation: we test each sensation by consciously comparing, choosing rejecting, etc. Even moving on to the next component in the sequence of the learning process is a conscious act.

There is no thematic concept of consciousness in Hume although he does speak of the importance of forming habits, which on James’s account can only be achieved through the active conscious awareness of what is right and what is wrong. This allows James to use the concept of a will that can consciously envision the activity it is about to undertake before the fact. It is this consciousness of the whole of the activity that then subsequently when the activity has begun enables us to know exactly where we are in the chain of events constituting the activity. If, for example, I am interrupted in the act of saying something I remember what I have said and what I am about to say in virtue of this initial conscious awareness of the whole. James also insists in this context that consciousness deserts all mental processes that no longer require analysis, i.e. comparison, choice, rejection etc. But this is not to deny the fact that for James consciousness is essentially active, essentially, as he puts it, impulsive. If it is the case I become conscious of an act I will to perform and then fail to initiate the act, this can only be the consequence, James argues, of antagonistic thoughts urging us not to do the act. What results is a Hamlet-like state of indecisive deliberation until one settles upon one or other of the alternative actions. This deliberative process may be rational and logical where arguments for the respective alternatives are considered, or the decision may, on the other hand, be purely impulsive and motivated by unconscious elements that override conscious thought processes. Hume, we know, refers to pleasures and pains as the driving forces of behaviour but in the realm of the habitual which he finds to be so important there is no consciousness of pleasure or pain: there is, as James puts it merely ideo-motor action. Indeed it is claimed that:

“the pleasure of successful performance is the result of the impulse, not its cause.”(p.557)

James, in this context, prefers the broader term of interest:

“”The interesting” is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the painful, but also the markedly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and even the simply habitual, inasmuch as the attention usually travels on habitual lines…. the impelling idea is simply the one which possesses the attention..”(p.558-9)

The notion of “ideo-motor” is an important concept related to voluntary conscious willing for James. This form of Willing for James is the name for the power of the mind to attend to a difficult object of thought and hold it fast before the mind.

On the issue of the existence of the self which Hume questions, James accuses Hume of neglecting the role of the judging “I” and the presence of the “I think” in relation to ideas and although Hume is praised for the acknowledgment of the diversity of mental phenomena that constitute a self he is as James says “throwing the baby out with the bath water when he denies that there is a thinking self.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Berkeley(The tree will continue to be when God is in the Quad)

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A complete understanding of the contribution of Berkeley’s Philosophical reflections on the development of Philosophy and Psychology requires an understanding of both Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of change and Kantian transcendental theory. Berkeley’s thought is generally classified as a form of idealism because it participates directly in the debate over the role of matter in the explanation of why the world Is as it is.

Aristotle’s hylomorphism is conceived of against a categorical framework of 4 kinds of change: substantial change, qualitative change, quantitative change, and locomotion. Substantial change and qualitative or feature change are both discussed in detail: the latter being what is called “accidental” change. Accidental changes do not refer directly to matter and are logically characterized in terms of possible qualities of things which are opposites, e.g. a bush is possibly either a red blooming bush or a green not blooming bush. The justification Aristotle uses for the characterization of these opposites is not observational. He appeals rather to the principle of non-contradiction:

“two features are opposite if and only if it is impossible for the same thing to have both features at the same time and in the same respect.”

This definition appeals to “the same thing” and this for Aristotle is the logical condition for the attribution of opposites to any enduring thing involved in a process of change. Aristotle also raises the question of how such enduring things come into being and the answer Aristotle gives to this question is once again not observational or empirical but rather logical and rational. The thing, to hupokeimenon, can be generated out of nothing, it must be generated out of something and this something must be its matter(hulé). Here Aristotle is defining matter technically as that which has the potential, power, or capacity to be formed into some kind(form) of thing. Matter is, then, the potentiality to be formed and is thereby one kind of cause or explanation of why a thing is the thing it is, of why, for example, it endures through a process of feature or quality change. Matter itself is not the sole explanation of why an enduring thing remains the came throughout a process of change. An acorn, for example, is a material cause of an oak tree but does not in itself survive the process of change which results in the oak tree: were the acorn to persist in its existence we would merely be discussing an accidental feature or qualitative change of the acorn: e.g. a transformation of the acorn from green to brown. Any particular acorn, argues Aristotle, will consist of both its matter and its form which together explain what an acorn is. The form of the acorn will provide us with what Aristotle calls the formal cause or explanation of the acorn. If the acorn finds its way into the earth and the transformation into an oak tree begins a third form of explanation, the so-called efficient cause explanation will be required for the kind of change that is occurring. If a fully grown acorn which in its turn produces acorns results a fourth kind of explanation will be required, namely the much disputed and controversial teleological or final cause/explanation.

It is important to note here, especially insofar as the understanding of Berkeley is concerned, that “form” for Aristotle has the meaning of archai or principle: it is not in the normal meaning a “part” of the acorn. Neither is it the case that for Aristotle “matter ” is a “part” of the acorn that exists. Matter is rather, a potentiality for being something.

We do not find in Aristotle the Platonic distinction between the idea of the oak tree and the oak tree itself. Insofar as the formal “idea” of the oak tree incorporates its essential definition or principle, this, for Aristotle, is just as real as the oak tree we may be resting against on a walk in the countryside

Insofar as quantitative change(the third kind of change) is concerned, numbers can also be a part of explaining the quantitative change of things, a change in the size of a thing, for example. Locomotion(the fourth kind of change), occurs when Socrates, for example, walks from the agora to the harbour in Athens.

Now, when we encounter Berkeley saying something as seemingly controversial as “matter does not exist”, perhaps we should pause before protesting. Perhaps, that is, we should test his Philosophy against a more complex categorical framework such as that produced above rather than in terms of a simple juxtaposition of opposite terms such as “materialism versus idealism” of the kind we find in some dualistic Philosophies. We should remember, that is, that Berkeley systematically attacked both the dualism of Descartes and Locke. We should also recall in this context his attacks on the crude materialism of Hobbes in which he did not crassly maintain “matter does not exist” but rather maintained that materialism is unable to explain the existence of material things adequately: a position that Aristotle would have wholeheartedly endorsed. Berkely’s response to these “new philosophers” is his doctrine of “Immaterialism” which maintains that there is no mind-independent material reality, There is, to concretize the position in a famous example, no tree falling in a wood without witnesses to the event. The reason this description makes sense, argues Berkeley is that the event can be conceived in the mind of an omnipresent God. The human mind is characterized by Berkeley in terms of thinking/perceiving. This cannot but remind us of the report of the effect on Socrates upon reading a work by Anaxagoras who claimed something very similar to Berkeley, namely that “All is mind”. This work supposedly played a role in the “Socratic turn” from investigating the physical world to investigating the world of our minds. Berkely was familiar with the Platonic dialogues and was one of the few “modern” philosophers to continue using the dialogue form to present his philosophical position.

In his works Berkeley claims that the combination of materialism and abstractionism are the primary causes of both skepticism and atheism, positions which encourage us to abandon our reasonable beliefs in the power of our senses to perceive the ordinary things of the world, the power of thought to entertain ideas, and the power of God. Of course, Berkeley concedes, we only indirectly perceive ordinary objects such as a train because the primary concern of our minds are “ideas”. This has caused many commentators to label Berkeley’s position as a “representational”: ideas “represent” external material objects. This, then, designates an important necessary property of ideas, namely that they are “representations” and it is this term that best characterizes the mind-dependent relation of ideas to sensible reality. This position also reaches forward to Kantian philosophy and transcendental idealism.

So, when Berkeley maintains that a tree cannot fall in a forest without this event “in some sense” being related to the structures of a mind, he is not making the absurd claim that we could never know that such an event occurred without being present at the falling of the tree, because we can, of course, imagine the event happening by inference from the sight of the fallen tree. Here the idea of the fallen tree can be connected to the idea of its falling via the “idea” of causation. Indeed, the very conception of “fallen tree” has the meaning it does in virtue of the fact that we have incorporated the above causal mechanism into our perceiving of the tree. This for Berkeley, however, would not be a pure case of perception because he believed that “the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately, for they make no inferences”. And just as causation must motivate an inference in the above case so must matter conceived of as composed of qualities that are independent of our minds. Since, however, our ideas(of thought?) can only represent causality and matter we cannot have any knowledge of this underlying reality of the ordinary things we encounter. because these ordinary things are composed only of our representations.

Dogmatic common sense would here approve of Dr. Johnson’s kicking a stone and declaring “I refute you thus!” but it is important to note in this context that Berkeley was not insisting that the tree did not actually fall in the forest or that Johnson’s stone does not exist. Both exist in relation to the mind of God. The transcendental idealism of Kant would not have rested its case on the idea of God but shares with Berkeley the conviction that there is an underlying reality which we can know nothing about, which lies on the other side of the limits of our reason. Another difference between the two accounts is related to the fact that Kant, unlike Berkeley, believed that common sense had a right to insist that everyday objects such as the stone and everyday events such as the falling tree are empirically real. Kant, however, like Berkeley, would claim that the final philosophical justification of this position must be mind-dependent. For Kant, this means partly constituted by the transcendental structures of the mind such as space, time and the categories of the understanding(substance, causation etc.). Kant’s insistence on the empirical reality of objects is defended in the following quote:

“When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear. I do not mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an appearance the objects nay even the properties we ascribe to them are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself…That does not follow as a consequence of our problem of the ideality of all our sensible intuitions–quite the contrary. It is only if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything being thereby transformed into mere illusion. For if we regard space and time as properties which, if they are to be possible at all, must be found in things in themselves, and if we reflect on the absurdities in which we are then involved, in that two infinite things which are not substances, nor anything actually inhering in substances, must yet have existence, nay, must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, and moreover must continue to exist even although all existing things be removed–we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusion.”(B 69)

Kant then goes on to confirm that “our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object”(B71) and he will thereafter on behalf of Berkeley refute Johnson’s refutation, by claiming that one might be able to kick the thing in itself but the correct description/explanation of what we are doing is going to be close to the one Berkeley gives: thereby agreeing with both Aristotle and Berkeley that matter can only be known by the perceptual form it takes, i.e. known as a pure potentiality, an actual X. Hume may well have played a negative role in awakening Kant from his dogmatic Wolfian slumbers but it was most certainly Berkeley’s arguments that assisted in the formulation of Kant’s critical Transcendental Idealism. Whether Kant would have agreed with the thesis that Berkeley’s commentators have projected upon him, namely that our knowledge of events such as the falling tree is merely a bundle of ideas(including causation) will largely turn upon whether we can regard “causation”, a category of the understanding, as an “idea”. For Kant, there is at least one difference between the sensible intuition of the tree lying in the grass and the more active inference of causation that is incorporated into the conceptualization of the “fallen tree”: and this difference is that the latter involves an active process of thinking that has a universal character–in contrast to the intuitive receptive process or perceptual contact with the sensible particular of the tree.

This Kantian criticism, however, should bear in mind that Berkeley was aiming his account at the camp of “new philosophy” that included Hobbes, Descartes, and Locke. He was, that is aiming to criticize the idea of a mind-independent reality by showing that it has logical inadequacies. He also believed that the “new philosophy” risked plunging one into the abyss of skepticism and its more abstract form of atheism. Both Descartes and Locke, for example, believed in the thesis that it was the primary qualities of size and shape which provided the substantial objective foundation for the more secondary so-called subjective properties of the objects we experience. This “new Philosophy” according to Berkeley both encouraged belief in unacceptable accounts of the relation of the physical material world to the immaterial mind and encouraged believers to begin to cast doubt on the idea of God.

In modern times we can see the atheist Merleau-Ponty agreeing with the former complaint in the name of the “new” modern philosophy of Phenomenology. In his work “the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues:

“That the thing is correlative to my body, and in more general terms to my existence, of which my body is merely the stabilized structure. It is constituted in the hold which my body takes upon it: it is not first of all a meaning for the understanding, but a structure accessible to inspection by the body, and if we try to describe the real as it appears to us in perceptual experience, we find it overlaid with anthropological predicates. The relations between things or aspects of things, having always our body as their vehicle. the whole of nature is the setting of our own life or our interlocutor in a sort of dialogue. That is why we cannot conceive anything which is not perceived or perceptible. As Berkeley says, even an unexplored desert has at least one person to observe it, namely myself when I think of it, that is when I perceive it in purely mental experience. The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it and can never be actually in itself because its articulations are those of our very existence and because it stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration which invests it with humanity.”(p373)

Berkeley’s response to skepticism was in the animus of both Kant and Merleau-Ponty. “Esse is percepi”–to be is to be perceived, Berkeley declares as part of his response to the skepticism of Descartes and Hobbes. In agreement with Kant, he maintains that there is no epistemological position which can relate my perception of rivers, mountains, and deserts to a postulated mind-independent existence of these entities simply because there cannot be any indirect representation of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley illustrates his position by pointing to the discussion of primary qualities by both of these authors. Size and shape, Berkeley argues, are not qualities of a mind-independent object but merely themselves perceptual ideas which as Berkeley points out varies with the perspective of the perceiver: square towers appearing round from a distance and the moon appearing to be the size of a sixpenny piece..

It is difficult to guess how Berkeley might have responded to Merleau-Ponty’s final justification of the existence of things as being essentially related to the existence of my lived body and its grasp of reality in its “Being-in-the-world. He certainly would have questioned the absence of God because for him, as was the case for Aristotle, the existence of rivers, mountains, and deserts in the physical world receive their final justification by being occurrences in the mind of God actively thinking them. Aristotle’s account also argues that the soul of man is essentially related to the existence of a body possessing psuche (life). Just how much of a “modern” philosopher Berkeley is could perhaps be determined by whether and to what extent he would prefer an Aristotelian or Kantian account to the type of account given by Merleau-Ponty.

In his work “Principles of Human Knowledge” Berkeley claims that human ideas are passive and do not possess any causal power. This is probably the cause of the attribution of the “bundle theory of ideas” to his theory. One consequence of the above claim by Berkeley is that no idea can guarantee the objectivity of any other idea because no active power can be attributed to any idea in any human mind. In psychological terms, ideas are here conceived of as generated by sensations in what Kant might call the faculty of Sensibility. They must if they are ideas of outside objects or events be generated or caused to occur by something outside myself. This cannot by definition be an idea on Berkeley’s premises. he also in this work dismisses the possibilities of a self possessing causal power and this leaves Berkeley with only one other possibility for a final justification of his position and that is a wise, powerful, omnipresent, benevolent God. It is here that the journeys of Berkeley and Kant part ways because Kant would embrace the above possibility of a self possessing causal power in his account of the transcendental justification of our explanations of events, objects, and actions. Kant would claim that the freedom of the human being is an expression of a causal transcendental power that enables us to conceptualize the tree lying in the grass as a “fallen tree”, and this active power in its turn provides us with an awareness of ourselves as active rational beings capable of making true judgments about the fallen tree. This idea of humanity being the causa sui of its representations in the mode of thought rather than the receptive terminus of passive perception is, of course, the mark of transcendental idealism. The question Berkeley would have immediately raised in relation to this account is “What has happened to God, the guarantor of the existence of everything in the world?” Kant was no atheist. He believed that three of the guarantors of the existence of the physical world were Metaphysics, mathematics, and natural science. Kant also believed that the theoretical philosophical attempts to demonstrate either the existence or the non-existence of God merely demonstrate the limits of our knowledge and reason, thereby forcing us into the realm of faith grounded in practical reason and the freedom of man as a noumenal being: a faith that acknowledges the moral law as the organizer of our lives. Man as a noumenal being, then, has answers to the four questions constituting the domain of philosophy: “What can I know?”, “What ought I to do?”, “What is man?”, and “What can I hope for?”. With respect to this last fourth question, one can suspect that the answers given by both Berkeley and Kant to some extent converge in the position that part of the answer is to be found in the Bible and in Christianity’s belief in the salvation of our souls. The reason why this fourth question preoccupies the mind of man to the extent that it does is due to the noumenal transcendent nature of man’s being–man for Kant and Aristotle is pure potential which can be empirically realized in either a virtuous or vicious disposition. Berkeley, on the other hand, does not have at his disposal the idea of a self with causal power, a self with the freedom to choose his/her destiny and might as a consequence have to embrace a determinism in which beings seem predestined to certain destinies because of predispositions or original sin or original goodness. Berkeley would also regard with suspicion the apparent “dualism” of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds of Kant’s theory. One and the same self cannot, he would argue be both a noumenal and a phenomenal self. Kant would respond to this by acknowledging that the distinction looks dualistic even if it is not so.

Brett in his work “History of Psychology” places Berkeley squarely in the Empirical British tradition of philosophy and moreover claims that Berkeley shares with the “new science” of his day respect for the methods of science which would later be embraced by the “new science of Psychology” in 1870:

“The Essay toward a New Theory of Vision”, first published in 1709 must be reckoned the most significant contribution to Psychology produced in the eighteenth century. It merits this title on two distinct grounds: for it was not only an original treatment of this topic but also a classic example of method….the first instance of clear isolation and purely relevant discussion of a psychological topic, and this penetration to the strictly relevant detail is, in fact, the secret of Berkeley’s success.”

One should bear in mind the date of Brett’s work, 1921 because it probably was not clear at this point that this separation of the paths of Philosophical Psychology and Scientific Psychology may have been a case of an unnecessary divorce. We have certainly gained a knowledge of detail we might not otherwise have been apprised of but this separation leaves us with the problem of reconciliation in the future if we wish to integrate this detail into the larger context of questions such as “What can I know?” “What is man?” and “What can man hope for?”

Brett correctly points out that Berkeley’s theory managed to rid men’s minds of lines and angles when speaking of perception and he praises this move because it does not commit the error of supposing that” perceptions were made of conceptual elements”. Brett continues:

“the prevailing emphasis on knowledge, on the cognitive powers, was a source of errors from which only genius could shake itself free.”

Now Kant would probably agree that geometry plays no significant role in the “perception” of the “fallen tree” but he would also insist that insofar as this incorporates a causal assumption, we must surely, therefore, be prepared to accept a conceptual component. Kant, of course, places perception in an epistemological context. Knowledge, he claims:

“springs from two fundamental sources of mind: the first is the capacity of receiving representations(receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations(spontaneity(in the production) of concepts). Through the first, an object is given to us, through the second an object is thought in relation to that given representation(which is a mere determination of the mind). intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, not intuition without concepts can yield knowledge.”(B74)

It would seem that if Brett is right and Berkeley is eliminating all conceptual knowledge then all that can be said of the tree lying in the grass is that in perceiving it we confine ourselves to intuiting this particular that is here and now and impressing itself on my visual field and my awareness. The interesting question to ask given Aristotle’s definition of man as a rational animal capable of discourse is whether it is even possible to “name” this particular with the otherwise general term “tree” given the conceptual elements assumed in such an act. If we cannot name the intuition then it seems that we have to confine ourselves to an experience of “this-here-now”. Even this, however, is ambiguous since one can still wonder where the “this” is? Is it on the surface of my eye, on the retina of my eye, or somewhere out there, in the vicinity of the “cause” of the phenomenon in the external world? Berkeley may not be able to answer this question given his commitment to immaterialism and his definition of an idea as largely receptive and as possessing no causal power.

Brett’s praise of Berkeley’s method is also problematic. Berkeley criticises the “new Philosophy” of Locke presumably partly because of its atomistic materialistic roots inherited from Locke’s mentor Boyle and partly because of the “new” scientific method of observation and experiment used by Boyle. For Brett the scientific method of Boyle must be science par excellence but it has to be pointed out that this method itself contains active a priori conceptual components that are intended to organise experience rather than are derivatives from experience: components that can only have their roots in the Kantian faculty of understanding which includes amongst other things “causality”. Brett does not mention the problem Berkeley has with simple judgments such as “The train cannot be heard or seen” because for example its tactile properties cannot be heard or seen. Neither does he mention Berkeley’s “methodical solution” t o this problem which claims that the tactile , visual and auditory ideas of the train are united in the mind of God. The Kantian solution to this problem would refer to the causal powers of the self, amongst which are included the transcendental unity of apperception, a unity of an “I think” which unites disparate contents under one experience in one mind. It is not out of the question that the faculty of apperception or the power of apperception owes its theoretical existence to this problem of Berkeley’s. Both philosophers would have agreed however, that failure to solve problems such as this one results in skepticism. Berkeley, unlike Kant, however, and like Descartes and Locke responds to skepticism with the dogmatism of the time, whether it be theological or scientific. It would take the genius of Kant to respond in an enlightened fashion to skepticism without resorting to dogmatism of any kind, retaining the importance of religion for the philosopher and the man in the street and without dismissing the importance of the science of both Boyle and Newton. Furthermore Kant’s transcendental Philosophy also retains an interesting connection and continuity with the most difficult aspects of Aristotelian Philosophy.

a Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: John Locke(1632-1704): The Republican Commonwealth, rational liberalism, and the pursuit of happiness.

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The term “Liberalism” has historically been interpreted in many different ways over the centuries but its core meanings must be connected to both Liberty or freedom and given the political history of the concept of freedom since its appearance in Plato’s Republic we are still confronted with ambiguity over the exact meaning of Liberalism in the twentieth-first century. Plato in his Republic referred as we know negatively to the concept of freedom in his critique of the democratic form of the polis. He paints largely a negative picture of how the sons of oligarchic fathers, corrupted by false ideas of the benefits of the wealthy life end up not respecting their parents or teachers, lounging about the agora plotting the downfall of the oligarchs in the name of “freedom”. Aristotle also viewed the early Greek form of democracy with suspicion and regarded this form as one of the three perverted forms of the polis. One of the key differences between the political Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle was that the former believed the polis is destined for ruin and destruction if Philosophers do not rule the polis or alternatively rulers embrace philosophical thinking. Aristotle, in contrast, believed that rationally constructed laws of the city plus a common understanding of the meaning and relevance of these laws would suffice to provide us with a well-run polis which could take three different forms: a benevolent monarchy(one ruler), a benevolent aristocracy(a few rulers) or a benevolent constitutional “democracy”. Aristotle believed that this last form was the best because he believed that the greater number of people involved in decision making produced better decisions. For both Plato and Aristotle, then, rationality and knowledge of The Good are the greatest enablers of the flourishing life for the citizens of a polis. For Aristotle, such a flourishing polis was the result of as natural a process as the actualization of any biological developmental process: a teleological process of actualization was involved in both kinds of developmental change. So, although for Aristotle it was, for example, important for citizens to freely choose what kind of life they should lead he was not what we moderns might call an “individualist”, i.e. he did not believe that an individual’s desires and needs should in any straightforward manner decide what form the polis should take. He understood that these needs and desires were of many different kinds but not all of them would play important roles in the institution of just laws designed for the purposes or telos of the common good. One can imagine, for example, that the socially constituted needs of love and belongingness, self-esteem, cognitive and aesthetic needs and all associated desires connected with leading the “good spirited” life of eudaimonia would be uppermost in the minds of Aristotelian lawmakers over generations of lawmaking. Individual, private and solipsistic needs for the egoistic pleasures associated with the removal of the inconveniences of life and the provision of the commodious lifestyle of the Hobbesian and Lockean citizens would not on Aristotle’s view be the concern of the lawmaker or the philosopher.

Locke’s brand of individualism or “liberalism” is partly characterized by Russell in his “History of Western Philosophy”:

“…the tendency of early liberalism was towards democracy tempered by the rights of property. There was a belief– not at first wholly explicit–that all men are born equal and that their subsequent inequality is a product of circumstance. This led to a great emphasis upon the importance of education as opposed to congenital characteristics.”(p578)

Russell is clearly referring partly to Locke in the above quote. In Locke’s “state of nature,” all men are equal and the point of law is to regulate naturally occurring inequalities. The fluctuating consequences emerging from the fact that some men create more propitious circumstances for themselves by their own labour and hard work will be protected under the law. In a certain sense, then. Locke’ s commonwealth or Republic is in a certain sense a “labour” government given that he defines property in terms of the investment of labour in it. In this conception, there is a significant philosophical shift from constructing the polis on an absolute categorical Good toward constructing the polis on instrumental forms of life whose endgame is the commodious lifestyle of the Hobbesian citizen. The life dedicated to the pursuit of happiness has its political authenticity confirmed in Locke’s Philosophy.

Locke, like many Philosophers before him, was politically active and this contributed toward his fame as a Philosopher extending his sphere of influence to wider circles of society. His work “Some Thoughts on Education” was a testament to this influence. it was reputed to be an influential work in Europe for over a century. Examining this work might enable us to decide whether Locke is a liberal in the Russellian sense.

Locke argued that any worthwhile educational system would possess three essential components: a focus on the development of a healthy body, a focus on the development of a virtuous character and a focus on the development of a “relevant” academic curriculum. With respect to this last component, Locke believed that it was time to challenge the scholastic view of Education in which the study of Greek and Latin texts played a prominent role. Locke proposed instead that pupils from both the aristocratic class and the “middling” affluent mercantile class study Modern Languages, Maths, Science, Drawing and Geography. It is, however, ironic that Locke’s largely anti-Aristotelian attitude toward scholasticism caused him to ignore the suggestion of the Liberal program of education that Aristotle provided us with: a program that was also largely ignored by the scholastics. Indeed, the focus on virtue and character in Locke owes its origins to Aristotelian ethical theory and was part of the canon of Practical science and its desire to understand man, suggested by Aristotle. The desire to understand Nature was embodied in the theoretical sciences that attempted to develop the intellectual virtues of man and the desire to understand man’s creations was embodied in the study of the Productive sciences. Indeed a full so-called “Liberal “educational program inspired by the Philosophy of Aristotle would look something like this:

Theoretical sciences(Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics, Physics( including biological sciences)

Practical sciences(Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Politics, Economics)

Productive sciences(mimetic arts, craftsmanship)

The above would be a complete program for an educated man and certain subjects would have to wait until manhood to be studied systematically, e.g. ethics). Character building for Aristotle was a long process. If there was a valid criticism of the above program it might take the form of suggesting that it does not strive to provide us with a complete picture of the world we actually live in: what Kant would later call an “orbis pictus”. Locke’s brilliance in his suggestions above might well then have awoken the world from its dogmatic slumbers but in so doing it might have also contributed to the abandoning of the more difficult aspects of becoming completely educated to the extent that Aristotle envisaged. Locke’s brilliance should also be measured by the extent to which, as an early Enlightenment figure, he anticipated some of Kantian metaphysics, Philosophy of mind and epistemology. In a work entitled “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, we find Locke arguing that there are important limits to human understanding in a manner very reminiscent of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”:

“…the first step towards satisfying the several inquiries, the mind of man was apt to run into, was to take a survey of one’s own understandings, examine one’s own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected that we began at the wrong end and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths, that most concern us when we loose our thoughts into the great ocean of Being, as if all the boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possessions of our understandings, wherein there was nothing that escaped its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities and letting their thoughts wonder into those depths where they find no sure footing–were the capacities of our understanding well considered–men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one: and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.”(Book 1 Chapter 1 , 7 N:47).

Yet these anticipations of the limitations of our understanding are themselves limited by the anti-Aristotelian “liberalism” of the times. Descartes had set the agenda for the modern world with his rational individualism and Locke, although regarded by many as an empiricist because of his insistence that all knowledge is derived from experience, is, at least insofar as Religion and Morality are concerned, middle of the road rationalist. He claimed categorically that the truths of Religion and Morality are logically demonstrable. He did, of course, object to the rationalist suggestion of innate ideas and somewhat paradoxically claimed that our minds are like white wax tablets waiting to be formed and shaped by experience. Yet, at the same time, we find him in his work on Education urging parents and teachers to be sensitive to both the inner capacities and powers of children(as well as the limitations of those capacities/powers)

Locke, was, however, clearly an empiricist insofar as his epistemological reflections are concerned and this is evident in the following passage from his “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”:

“Whence comes the mind by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this, I answer in one word, from experience: in that, all our knowledge is founded: and fro that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected upon by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas that we have, or can naturally have, do spring. First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them(i.e. the senses)..This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses and derived from them to the understanding, I call Sensation. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is the perception of the operations of our own mind, within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got: which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without: and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing and all the different actings of our minds: which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself: and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection.”(E ii, i,2-4)

Many philosophers and some psychologists have seen in the above words, the beginning of a movement to dissociate the subject from its rationality. Brett, for example, in his work “History of Psychology” discusses Locke in a chapter entitled “The Observationalist Tradition” and claims that Locke’s empirical training in medicine taught him to be especially skeptical of both traditional theories such as Aristotle’s and contemporary rationalist theories influenced by solipsistic Neoplatonism and Descartes. We also know that Locke worked closely with Boyle at Oxford, a scientist more concerned with methodical observation and experimentation than the broader metaphysical concerns of a Scientist like Newton from Cambridge. From a philosophical perspective, it can be maintained that Newton dealt with the “form” of Scientific thinking whilst Boyle was getting his hands dirty with its “matter”. Locke’s preference for the latter form of science in epistemological contexts runs, as we pointed out in a contrary direction to what we find occurring in Locke’s moral and religious writings. Kant in his synthesis of empiricism and rationalism denies that we solely know a posteriori about our own minds through inner sense. Knowledge of the phenomenal contents of our minds might well result from this type of reflection upon one’s experiences but the more important knowledge we have of ourselves, argues Kant, is what he calls a priori knowledge that is non-observational and not related to experience. This might be interpreted by empiricists as a commitment to innate ideas but such a position would be failing to appreciate the role of Aristotelian hylomorphism in the philosophy of Kant: failing to understand, that is, that we are dealing with the kind of capacity or power that locke himself was suggesting should be the concern of parents/teachers when they are educating their children/pupils. Kantian and Aristotelian powers are amongst the apriori conditions involved in the process of acquiring knowledge which seems to be one of Locke’s primary concerns in the educational process. The mind conceived as a white wax tablet from an empiricist point of view would still from a Kantian and Aristotelian point of view possess powers that would partially determine the form taken by the processes of experience. “Form” as we have pointed out earlier, for Aristotle is closely associated with the idea of a principle and Locke attacks the notion of innate principles in an anti-metaphysical spirit. Brett points to such an attack in his work. Locke, he argues:

“attacks the view that there are innate speculative principles such as the principles of identity and contradiction, and that there are innate practical principles, such as those of morals…He admits that there may be innate capacities, but asserts that the only grounds for maintaining that a truth is in the mind is that it is actually understood”

For Aristotle both the principles of identity and contradiction are metaphysical, i.e. it is in the nature of the world that a thing be what it is and not another thing or that a thing cannot both be what it is and something else. This, for Aristotle, is both the way we think about and understand the world and the way the world is: these are both transcendental truths and metaphysical principles. Locke, the rationalist must accept these points when he is reflecting upon moral and religious discourse. In epistemological contexts, however, he rejects the idea that intellectual powers are constitutive of our understanding. In such contexts, ideas, for Locke mean both “the object of the mind when it thinks” and “contents of consciousness” and the former of these alternatives fall away in the context of Sensation in favour of the content or material involved in the experiencing activity. This is also the case in the context of Reflection her the focus is on the material of the thinking activity rather than the capacity/power or the form/principle of thought.

To understand what is going on here we need perhaps to return to the form of Liberalism that Locke embraces. In some respects, it is a negative form of Liberalism, i.e. the form of Liberalism that begins as a reaction to the authorities of his time. Locke clearly regards the symptoms of his turbulent times as culturally problematic but his reaction may not carry with it an appreciation of the causes of the symptoms. He attached himself to a stream of Cartesian and Hobbesian criticism of Aristotle that probably to a large extent misunderstood the central principles of Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology. Locke embraced the criticisms of Aristotle without taking issue with the actual arguments against the position. At the same time as he was doing this in epistemological contexts, he was committing himself to a form of rational/logical demonstration insofar as moral and religious truths was concerned. His defence of his position was Cartesian:

“..perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge if we sought in it the fountain and made use rather of our own thoughts than other mens to find it…. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains makes it not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science is in us but opiniatreity, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not as they did employ our own reason to understand these truths which gave them reputation.”(E ii,i,23)

The above is no doubt directed at Aristotle and is not an argument for the abandonment of Aristotelian argumentation but at best psychological/sociological advice that it is best to understand the reasoning of Aristotle oneself rather than rely on Aristotelian conclusions blindly). Ironically, Aristotle himself would have agreed absolutely with most of what is said above and he would moreover point in emphasis to his definition of knowledge as justified true belief in order to support this position. Aristotle would claim that irrespective of whether we are discussing our own thoughts or the thoughts of others, the key to understanding is to see the complex relationship between what we are taking to be true and the reason or justification of what it is we are presuming to understand. If that is one relies merely on what is said and ignores why it is said one cannot be said to know.

Locke and Boyle were committed to the corpuscular theory of matter and yet we find Locke because of his commitment to the primacy of perception and observation in the process of the acquisition of knowledge, at the same time expressing skeptical doubt as to its certainty:

“But whilst we are destitute of the senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies and to give us the ideas of their mechanical affections we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation: nor can we be assured about them any farther than some few trial we are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain. This hinders our knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies…And therefore I am apt to doubt how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things scientifical will still be out of our reach”(iv, iii, 25)

This challenged Newton’s view of the physical universe and it would, in turn, be challenged by Kant who saw Newton to be steering a middle road between skepticism and dogmatism in the domain of natural science. It is worthwhile mentioning in this context the later experiments by Wundt in the name of the science of Psychology in the 1870s. the results were dogged by skepticism because they could not be repeated or indeed understood. As a consequence, the definition of Psychology as the “science of Consciousness” was abandoned in favour of the “science of behaviour” because consciousness could not be observed ad behaviour could(it was argued).

Brett claims that Locke’s psychology has to be extracted from his works but that his method is psychological. Does he mean to refer to the Cartesian skepticism we have encountered or the materialistic dogmatism we encounter in a discussion of the Sensations? Experiments relating to the different sensations of two hands held in the same water after experiencing different initial temperature conditions reveal only subjective Wundtian results. Locke calls such results subjective in virtue of only so-called secondary qualities of the events being involved. the primary qualities of such an event are, according to Locke, “nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies”. This argument is reminiscent of Cartesian discussions where a demand is made for clarity and distinctness. The problem with this argument is that it has to cohere with Locke’s claim that universal knowledge about physical things may be beyond human understanding. In Locke’s Psychology Sensation is clearly a physical process, or state that brings to the mind the material that determines the nature of its activity and although this may relate to the assumption of the motion of physical corpuscles or articles, Locke also says in his “Essay” (ii,i, 3) that

“when I say the senses convey into the mind I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there true perceptions”.

Clearly, sensation plays an important role in the production of truth and understanding. Sensation appears then to hover ambivalently between being a passive receptive phenomenon and an active power. Locke is clear elsewhere that Sensation is a power. A power that links up intimately to the power of judgment that will later be so important in Kantian thought. Memory also appears to be ambivalently active and passive. Which of these alternatives apply to memory will depend upon whether it is a memory of a passive sensation or active perception or motor activity. Active memory will compare the relations of things and the activities of naming and abstraction will be involved. This presumably connects perception via memory to language. We can detect in these remarks the complexity of an Aristotelian account in which powers relate to powers and powers build upon powers, transforming them in the process.

Somehow the Kantian use of the term “faculty” for a collection of these powers generated a simplistic criticism that falsely claimed, for example, that the act of willing could be completely explained by having been generated by a faculty of willing. Aristotle discusses not willing but the act of choosing in relation to voluntary action. He would certainly have denied that a complete analysis or explanation of choice could refer back to anything that was only a part of the mind. There is only the barest trace of Aristotelian thinking in Locke and this is evidenced in an almost complete absence of a holistic perspective of the person. We use the words “almost complete absence” because Locke is famed for his arguments relating to personal identity.

Locke’s argument characterises a person as:

“a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.”(ii, 27, 9)

and adds:

“As far as this consciousness can be extended backward to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the identity of that person: it is the same self now as it was then: and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.”(ii, 27, 9)

It is also important to point out in this context that Locke distinguished what a man is from what a person is:

“For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in the most popular sense, but of a body, so and so shaped…” (ii, 27,8)

This distinction between “man” and “person” and the reference to the relation of a body “joined to” a man raises the obvious question as to whether “man” is the “substance” and “person” a mode or attribute of this substance. How we answer this question largely depends on what we believe Locke finds objectionable in the Philosophy of Aristotle. We have discussed earlier Locke’s tendency to avoid committing himself to the scope of logical principles as applied to the realm of nature and a preference for the observation of phenomena. In the above quote, however, there is an unmistakable suggestion of Aristotle’s hylomorphic view of the body of a man and its relation to man’s mind unless of course, one believes that what we are seeing in the quote is Locke subsiding into a monistic substantialism of the kind we find in Spinoza.

Whatever is the case the above quote appears to be the holistic bearer of both bodily and mental aspects. Is man conceived of here as a substance or is he too a mode or an attribute of a deeper materialistic reality that we find in the early work of Aristotle before substance became to be conceived of more non-materialistically as a form or principle. Man, in Aristotle’s more mature work is defined holistically as a “rational animal capable of discourse”. The concept of a person as an individual going forth in disguise in an actors mask was a later contribution to the problems relating to the self that concerned Aristotle. A person conceived of in terms of the origin of the term “person”(which Locke thought it was important to consider) is indeed a figment of the imagination and as such can have no ontological status. If we drop this more imaginative origin of the concept of a person and conceive instead of a person as an individual, we still find ourselves in the realm of the powers of intuition/perception rather than the powers of reason and understanding that Aristotle would refer to in such contexts. There can, of course, be true universal judgments made about individuals such as “All men are mortal” and this should be contrasted with singular judgments such as “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is mortal”. There can also be logical relations between these judgments requiring the power of reason and understanding. One of the functions of the power of reasoning here is the connection of the universal to the particular. The logical relation between “man” and individual men is explored more logically in the following syllogism:

“All men are rational animals capable of discourse”

“Socrates is a man”


“Socrates is a rational animal capable of discourse”

This what the person or individual Socrates is.

Locke contributes to this discussion by insisting that Socrates will also know himself to be the same person over time in virtue of some cognitive function connected to consciousness or thinking and this is where the issue of personal identity arises. Socrates, for example, that he is the same Socrates that once thought investigations of the physical world would lead to knowledge and understanding of the world as a systematic whole. Socrates might have changed his mind on this issue but Locke’s account would not wish to insist that Socrates became a different person. So in virtue of what does he remain the same person? In virtue of his body being a recognizable spatiotemporal continuant? At the same time should we take the description “Socrates changed his mind” so lightly? He changed his mind when he read a work by Anaxagoras in which it was claimed that “All is mind”. For Locke, given his characterization of man, Socrates is certainly the same man when he changes his mind so radically. The question is whether he is the same person because he is the same man. To answer this question one might also ask whether it makes sense to say, for example, “I was a different person when I was a young man”. Of course, someone saying this might recognize that they are the same man and bear the same name but let us also in this context not forget that fundamental reorientations in our thinking might even give rise to a desire to change one’s names, from Saul to Paul to take one historical example. The question, then, is whether Socrates experienced the same kind of “conversion” when “he changed his mind”. Perhaps the extent of the change can also be measured by the extent to which one is prepared to accept the psychologically ontologically different description of what happened, namely “His mind was changed”. This suggests that Locke might have been right in regarding the “name” “man” as referring to what he called the species which he believes relates to the real essence of the human organism. Aristotle interestingly provided a broader definition which included what Locke would call mans “nominal essence”, namely ” a being capable of discourse”. It is, in this context, puzzling to find Locke saying:

“I think it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but “the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms”. The meanings of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them.”(iii, iv, 6)

In remark 5 immediately preceding the above we also find Locke claiming that some names can and some cannot be defined and this leaves us wondering whether Locke believes the term man can be defined. He settles the matter however in Book III, 6, 27:

“So uncertain are the boundaries of the species of animals to us who have no other measure than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is…..I imagine none of the definitions of the word “man” which we yet have, nor descriptions of that sort of animal are so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person, much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men everywhere stick by in their decision of cases, and determining of life and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that might happen.”

This last reference to “productions that might happen” we are being invited to conduct a thought experiment and imagine whether we would call certain physical variations of an individual of the species a man or not. This “experiment” is certainly shifting the grounds of the definition from Reason and Understanding (and their relation to knowledge) to Imagination and the kind of judgment we use in hypothetical imaginative contexts. Locke is asking us to imagine a possible world in which something might to a certain extent resemble a human physically with respect to some characteristics but not in others. He then asks us to exercise our judgment in naming the problematic individual. He does not discuss what we should do If our existing concepts do not suffice to name this individual but presumably the only solution is to find or invent a concept that we can apply. Fortunately for us, the regularity of nature and the relative constancy of species reproduction is such that the variations imagined occur very seldom. Even if an exception to this occurs and such an individual is produced reproduction will be unlikely and this knowledge might suffice for us to find the hunt for a new and different concept unnecessary. It is not absolutely clear but perhaps Locke is using this thought experiment to cast doubt upon the Aristotelian definition of man. Wilfred Sellars has argued in an essay entitled “Substance and form in Aristotle” contained in his collection “Philosophical Perspectives: History of Philosophy” that Aristotle’s definition of man is not an essentialist definition but his definition of the soul as being necessarily alive is an essentialist definition. Perhaps Sellars too is objecting to what could be regarded as nominalistic components in the definition. What is clear, however, is that for Aristotle ma is a form of animal life that is capable of discourse, thinking, and rational thought. It should be recalled here that “form” does not connect to the physical shape of the body of a man but rather to the principle of his existence, which is indeed his life. Were there in some possible world physical beings that were shaped differently yet were alive, talking and listening, thinking rationally one can wonder whether this would force us to conclude that these beings were men, human beings? Not necessarily. Whole regions of our discourse and reasoning are related to our bodies and what we do with our bodies which of course is partly determined by their shape. It can even be argued that the shapes of our bodies with their configuration of limbs and organs very much determine the shape or form of the cities we live in: we walk in the streets of the city, sit at home or in the libraries of the city we sit in cafes talking about the sights we have seen and the books we have read.

Man, for Aristotle is a form of life that is not “joined” to his body as Locke claimed above: rather the form of life “inhabits” its body, not in the way in which a pilot is inside a ship but in the way in which a skill inhabits a muscle or group of muscles or the way in which a thought inhabits a poets or philosophers words. A human body, Aristotle would argue is “formed” for not just walking and seeing, talking and listening, but also for reasoning, understanding, and judgment. Three-year-old seeing men walking, talking listening, reasoning judging might not fully understand what he is witnessing until education can “form” his understanding.

Locke, in his view of the physical world, is fixated at the level of imagination and its relation to judgment and cannot see the nature of the relation between the individual or particular and the general or universal. He has not understood how Aristotelian logic is built out of the building blocks of hylomorphic metaphysics. The “demonstration”

“All men are rational animals capable of discourse”

“Socrates is a man”

“Therefore Socrates is a rational animal capable of discourse”

contains the elements and the form of rational thinking. What we encounter here is proof of the understanding of general terms, proof of the understanding of particular terms and proof of the understanding of the relation of the universal to the particular. the above “demonstration” follows the laws of logic which are the law of noncontradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. Whether or not one wishes to regard these laws of thought and discourse innate or not because the powers of thought, understanding, and reason appear essentially connected to the human form of life almost seems irrelevant. The answer might turn upon whether one judges “life” to be “innate”.

Kant was influenced by Locke who, like the skeptical empiricist Hume, must have helped Kant the Wolffian rationalist awaken from his dogmatic scholastic slumbers and return to the Philosophy if Aristotle as part the project of uniting empiricism and rationalism into one philosophical position. In the process, Kant also found new relations between science and philosophy, religion and philosophy, morality and religion, etc. In his work “On Education” Kant largely follows a hylomorphic program stressing the importance of bodily and mental discipline and work as opposed to the emerging more modern emphasis upon play and recreation. “man is the only animal who is obliged to work” argues Kant, on p69. He continues thus:

“Men ought to be occupied in such a way that filled with the idea of the end which they have before their eyes they are not conscious of themselves, and the best rest for them is the rest that follows from work. In the same way, a child must become accustomed to work, and where can the inclination to work be cultivated so well as at school?”

Recalling the definition of the person by Locke as ” a thinking Intelligent Being and the virtual identification of thinking with the consciousness of itself we can at once see a difference of perspective being offered by Kant. Kant believes that work shall concentrate not on the self but an end. Men should not in their work become self-conscious, Kant implies. For Kant, a person is a particular whose principle ought to be understood in general more holistic terms. Men as individuals(particular beings) can, of course, be more or less intelligent and for Kant, this indicates that the extent to which we “isolate” faculties of cognition from each other is the extent to which they become inferior in comparison to when they are functioning as part of an integrated structure of faculties. The principal rule of Education argues Kant is:

“that no mental faculty is to be cultivated by itself, but always in relation to others: for instance the imagination to the advantage of the understanding. The inferior faculties have no value in themselves: for instance, a man who has a good memory but no judgment. Such a man is merely a walking dictionary…Intelligence diverted from judgments produces nothing but foolishness”(p70)

The above reference to memory is particularly interesting in relation to Locke’s theory of personal identity which has often been mistakenly associated with the view that memory is a criterion for the self being the same self in the present as it was in the past. Nestor is Nestor and Napoleon Napoleon because Nestor possesses Nestor’s memories and Napoleon possesses Napoleon’s memories rather than Nestor’s memories. If Nestor had Napoleon’s memories, it is argued he would be Napoleon. But then there is the interesting case of someone who loses their mind perhaps through a brain injury. What if there was a historian that suffered such a brain injury where the only thing that was retained in the memory system was “memories” of Napoleon’s life and deeds? One could further imagine that he was not sure about the status of these memories, i.e. not sure that they were his memories. What should we say? He has, according to the criterion of Napoleon’s memories. is he not then Napoleon? Of course, we should not want to make such a judgment and what this then reveals is that the presence of particular memories is not a sufficient criterion of the attribution of self-identity. This is not to deny that memory as it is incorporated into what Locke called consciousness or Kant referred to as the superior faculties may be a part of the account of self-identity. Kant, in his account of these higher faculties in “On Education”, has the following to say:

“Understanding is the knowledge of the general. Judgment is the application of the general to the particular. Reason is the power of understanding the connection between the general and the particular…When a young man, for instance, quotes a general rule, we make him quote examples drawn from history or fable in which this rule is disguised, passages from the poets where it is expressed, and thus encourage him to exercise both his intelligence and his memory etc.”(p71)

Kant then also introduces Language into this discussion:

“Things are so constituted that the understanding first follows the mental impression, and the memory must preserve this impression. So it is for instance, in language. We learn them either by the formal method of committing them to memory or by conversation–this last being the best method for modern languages. The learning of words is really necessary, but the best plan is for the youth to learn words as he comes across them in the author he is reading. What is learned in a mechanical way is best retained by the memory and in a great many cases this way is indeed very useful. The proper mechanism for the study of history has yet to be found… History, however, is an excellent means of exercising the understanding in judging rightly. Learning by heart is very necessary, but going it merely for the sake of memory is of no use educationally.”(p71)

The superior faculties for Kant, then, are Reason, Understanding and Judgment and all have their respective principles and are connected to each other via our relation to what is general and what is particular. Sensibility is regarded as an inferior faculty, having as it does perception memory and the imagination which when used in isolation are not educationally useful. Kant, says, for example, in relation to isolating the imagination:

“Novel reading is the worst thing for children since they can make no further use of it, and it merely affords them entertainment for the moment. Novel reading weakness the memory. For it would be ridiculous to remember novels in order to relate them to others. Therefore all novels should be taken away from children. Whilst reading them they weave, as it were, an inner romance of their own rearranging the circumstances for themselves: their fancy is thus imprisoned but there is no exercise of thought.”(p71)

But there is a consciousness of themselves (that may not include their own particular memories), which for Kant does not meet the requirements of education.

Memory and language must, then, be integrated into the superior faculties by degrees and Kant outlines the strategy of an entire school career as a means of illustrating the complexity of the task of integrating the faculties or powers of the mind. We should begin, he argues, by reconstructing a picture of the present conditions of the world(orbus pictus) and this should include botany mineralogy, natural history and geography and use instruments such as drawing, mathematics, and maps. Having done that the teacher should proceed to the earlier condition of the world and instruct the pupil in ancient geography and history. In both phases of this process, the teacher should be careful to prepare a way for the understanding that is able to distinguish popular opinion and belief from knowledge. The child that is, should not be encouraged to become conscious of themselves but rather become conscious of the correct ways to follow rules, e.g. the rules of grammar. We are still not yet at the level of what Piaget would call abstract operations but we being encouraged to use practical reasoning to search for the causes and the explanations for events that require explanation.

Kant then says the following:

“It is through reason that we get insights into principles. But we must remember that we are speaking here of a reason which still needs guidance. We are not dealing here with speculative reason, but only with reflection upon actual occurrences according to their causes and effects. It is in its arrangement and working a practical reason….In the culture of reason we must proceed according to the Socratic method…True, it is somewhat slow and it is difficult to manage so that in the drawing of ideas out of one child the others shall also learn something. The mechanical method of catechizing is also useful in some sciences, for instance in the explanation of revealed religion. In universal religion, on the other hand, we must employ the Socratic method. As to what has to be learned historically the mechanical method of catechizing is much to be commended.”(p80-81)

Self-consciousness does play an important role in Kantian education but here it is a universal and not a particular form of consciousness connected to my particular memories. It is the consciousness not of myself as a man but rather the consciousness of universal man implied in the universalization condition of the categorical imperative. In moral education the memory of what one did as a child(Napoleon burying a toy sword at the foot of a tree) before understanding the principles of morality will be largely irrelevant unless the memory concerned is linked up to a judgment of whether what was done was right or not: a judgment of what ought to be done. The moral judgment of oneself as a moral agent is thus guided by an ought system of concepts guided by the ideas of freedom and duty. Moral education will initiate the moral agent into the moral form of life and bring about an understanding that reasons from universal premises such as “Promises ought to be kept” to the particular actions involved in the keeping of particular promises. The principle of sufficient reason for believing that one ought to perform an ethical action, then, will operate by referring to both the universal premise, e.g. “Promises ought to be kept” and the particular premise in which a particular promise was made at a particular place at a particular time. This particular premise will have the logical form of a fact characterizes by is-statement that describes a particular action of a particular person or individual. Logically, it is important to point out that a statement of a fact or an is-statement could never of itself function as an argument for what an agent ought to do. This follows from Kant’s logic or practical reasoning but probably also follows from the virtue ethics of Aristotle: the virtues being part of the character of the virtuous man who does what he ought to do in the appropriate circumstances and at the appropriate time. Kantian ethics is deontological, meaning that an action is not good merely in its consequences but also good in itself meaning that it is good as an end-in-itself: worthy of being done independently of whether it is of any utility, for example, in bringing about my happiness. It is not clear that Aristotle’s ethics is deontological in this way and it may be that Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates in the early books of the Republic had to wait for the Categorical Imperative of Kantian ethics before it was fully responded to. If we remember he demanded that Socrates prove to him that justice is both good in itself and good in its consequences. Kant, therefore, would not accept instrumental, hypothetical imperatives as justificatory grounds for any moral action: not just any kind of ought judgment could find itself in the major premise position of a moral argument. The test whether the ought we encounter in the major premise position is a categorical ought is whether the negation of the action was either a practical contradiction or the action contributed to a world which was not worth inhabiting.

Now Locke believed that morality was an area in which it was possible to achieve rational certainty and this undoubtedly inspired Kant in his approach to moral questions. Locke’s moral justifications however were more tightly wedded to what Locke regarded as the demonstrable truths of religion. In his argumentation we find the presence of a natural law position reminiscent of Aquinas’ in which three assumptions are being made: firstly, that moral laws are founded in divine absolute universal laws, second, that these laws are revealed to human rationality, thirdly that these laws reveal themselves as divine imperatives. Kant’s position is very different rejecting as it does the theoretical dependence of morality upon religion. Kant’s position is also different in that it posits a humanistic practical idea of freedom that is in many important respects independent of the theoretical idea of God we humans possess. The domain of morality is autonomous for Kant. Indeed the practical idea of Freedom becomes the key idea for the Enlightenment insofar as Kant is concerned. Kant will also have been critical of the hedonism we find in Locke’s moral reflections. Many Lockean commentators such as von Leyden have suggested that natural law theory or moral law theory does not cohere with epistemological motivations related to happiness. For Kant the happiness principle is the principle of self love or self consciousness in disguise. He would not of course deny that humans desire happiness but to the extent that humans are moral agents is the extent to which they need also to feel worthy of the happiness that a flourishing life brings.

Locke shifts firmly into empiricism when he suggests that the feelings of pleasure and pain are the primary motivating forces of human beings. For Kant, on the other hand, it is the “I think” which accompanies all my representations. Locke appears to argue that “I feel” accompanies all our ideas and that without this accompaniment there would be no reason to prefer one idea, thought or action over another. It appears, then, that feelings about natural law trump thoughts about natural law. Feelings for Locke are also related to rewards and punishments. Locke’s empiricism is clearly at odds with his rationalism here and it will fall to Kant to place the subjective pleasure-pain principle and its love of itself in the realm of prudential, instrumental action guided by hypothetical imperatives. What conceivably sustained human prudence in Locke’s system was of course divine knowledge of the good but this would deny the humanistic idea of freedom that Kant placed at the centre of his theory. Locke does of course believe in authority that is rightful and that which is not but this in itself will not save the theory because “rightful” in the moral context is finally justified by a fact: the fact of our happiness. Locke’s theory otherwise is clearly teleological and as such must be at odds with rational deontological theories such as Kants’. In teleological theories sanctions loom large in any discussion where one demands to know what the right thing to do is–happiness is only one side of a two sided coin the other side of which is punishment at the hands of God.

The pursuit of happiness may, of course, be the epistemological empiricist imperative that defines our modern social and political condition. Hobbes and Locke constituted this condition by reference to “commodious living” and “property” respectively. Property is defined by Locke in terms of man’s body and its work. What makes Locke’s position a “proto-modernist” approach is its final reference to God who gifted the industrious and the rational with his world in order that it might be cultivated and improved. Neither Plato nor Aristotle would have elevated commerce and its pursuit of commodious living to such an eminent position. For the Greeks, the earning of money was a secondary art necessary for the creation and maintenance of private households. The public realm was constituted by areté, the doing of the right thing in the right way at the right time. This was the standard man was measured against in the very public realm of the agora. Man could be a pauper like Diogenes and wonder the streets barefoot like Socrates or the mythical Eros but if he fought bravely in defense of his polis and was otherwise a man of integrity(knew himself) he would be favoured by the Gods. Here there is no reference to commodious living or happiness, the principle of self-love in disguise. There are references to “eudaimonia” and there is a mistaken translation of this term into happiness but what this reference actually means is “the good spirited life”.

Hobbes, the empirical materialist, viewed our bodies as mere machines running on the fuel of pride and fear(self-consciousness par excellence) and this for some reason connected to the pride and fear of Science has in our modern world overshadowed the Greek and Lockean view of our bodies as temples housing the divine spirit.

The political ideas of Locke and Hobbes were then re-presented a century later by Adam Smith. Smith’s theories took us one step closer to our modern world by openly recommending that labour, work and the accumulation of capital(for which there were no limits) is the pathway to individual happiness. The secondary art has become the primary art and the stage is thereby set for a later moral inversion of what is good with what is evil.

For Locke, labour was the honourable means of pursuing happiness. Labour for him generates property(not capital) and property in its turn requires Law to protect it from being misappropriated:

“The great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealth is the protection of their property.”(Two Treatises of Government”)

For Locke, it was not, as it was for Hobbes, the war of all against all in a state of nature that leads to the social contract. It is rather the state of affairs of the restlessness of the human spirit and the haphazardness of social events where expectations are continually flouted that demands a central organizing agency. The contract is between the middle class and the government and it is almost as if the upper and working classes have disappeared into thin air or had been mysteriously absorbed by the middle class. Given Arendt’s analysis of the Origins of Totalitarianism and her reference to mass movements emerging from the organization of mobs, one can wonder whether the idea of classes absorbing other classes was part of the process of dismantling the idea of legitimate authority (legitimate =using knowledge and phronesis to rule. The social contract did not seem to have a paragraph pertaining to the right to education or the right to be led by educated leaders. Arendt in this context pointed to the risks of tyrannical rule(The Hobbesian Lion) when the political party system representing the interests of various classes collapses and a mass movement arises in the vacuum. Not for Locke, the Hobbesian Lion, the monarchical sovereign who will eventually become licentious and murderous because he is not subject to the law. Locke does not merely embrace the Aristotelian notion of (an educated?) middle class but his ideas also anticipate the ideas of Kant. Locke is a Republican(like Kant) and his Republic is a commonwealth in which “the many” engage in decision making of various kinds: decisions that regulate commerce and crime.. This decision making is judged publicly by the consent or rejection by “the many”, thus evoking the Kantian idea of freedom. In order to prevent the executive branch of government from disregarding the voice of “the many” Locke proposes a separation of powers whereby the executive branch of government is the instrument of the legislative branch(except in emergency situations such as taking the country to war). In an emergency, Locke argues, the executive lion can suspend habeus corpus and this judgment can only be questioned by the many “appealing to heaven”, an appeal, that is, to divine authority that if successful justifies a revolution: the ultimate consequence of a governmental breach of the social contract.

There is also an argument to be made for the position that Locke’s political philosophy contains traces of both his empirical epistemological theory of personal identity as well as his more rational ethical theory. The former founds the entire system on the self-love of the self-conscious individual working blindly(insofar as the common good is concerned). We are, Locke argues, a moral identity or personality responsible for making ourselves who we are through our own work. The source of value is the “I” or the “Me”, the sole bearer of human rights. This seems to be a curious combination of the protestant work ethic and the philosophy of existentialism which we know from the work of the existentialists had such great difficulty providing an ethical philosophy capable of founding the rights of Man. The individual being referred to, however, is not the lonely existential “I” trying to make sense of its own existence but rather an “I” which is somehow not subject to the power of the truth or the good, it is rather the “I” which regulates its possessions with contracts. Locke’s idea of the middle-class man is indeed a far cry from the Aristotelian conception of a middle-class man driven by areté and the common good. Both Locke and Aristotle appear to support meritocracies but the differences between them could not be greater. The Lockean system is the one that would be implemented in the coming centuries whilst the Aristotelian and Kantian systems would have stand in the wings of the world theatre waiting for better days in the future. Kantian ethical theory recognizes the årinciples of freedom and equality as the sources of human rights. Kant’s theory regards the realm of instrumental action in which work, intelligence and ambition lead to results that are incompatible with equality: lead to inequalities that can disadvantage large numbers of citizens and enslave them in an unjust system. Individual characteristics such as the ability to work hard, intelligence and ambition can only result in the value of equality if it is embedded in a categorical context of reason and understanding that demands everyone be treated as ends in themselves in a kingdom of ends. Kant’s Educational theory conceives of a kingdom of ends whee differences between classes will disappear in favour of a classless society brought about by a sophisticated educational system that is financed by the money we previously spent on wars: educational systems based on reason, understanding, and judgment. Work, intelligence and ambition will in such circumstances be transformed by the higher faculties of the mind.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Leibniz (1646-1716): The world-book of the best of all possible worlds

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Leibniz may be the patron saint of twentieth-century modal logic. We live, he argues, in the best possible world and modal logic helps us to conceive of the criteria or laws necessary to build such a world: a world fundamentally different to that conceived of by Spinoza who postulated One infinite Substance, Nature, or God. The world of Leibniz is that of a plurality of independent substances or monads each with its own particular view of the world. Monads are individuals with complex properties, each being a centre of divinity in the City of God and each carrying out a task of living in accordance with the laws of the City of God. Reason or Logic will lead us to these laws, assisted by an imagination that is capable of imagining an infinite number of possible worlds that God chose not to bring into existence. The chosen world manifests its divinity in substances, essences or monads that are not contradictory. Each individual substance, mode or essence is divinely conceived in accordance with what Leibniz calls a complete individual concept in which its essence is manifested without contradiction. The relation of such an individual essence is given in the following:

“if there is reality in essences or possibles, or indeed in eternal truths, this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual, and consequently it must be grounded in the existence of the necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, that is, in whom possible being is sufficient for actual being.”

In God’s mind, the thought, for example, of Alexander the Great will include everything true of the man, including truths relating to his essence and existence. Many possible world theorists like to characterize this in terms of a world-book that can describe the actual world we live in. The book will be composed of a set of propositions that is a subset of the propositions composing all the possible world books containing representations of all possible worlds. One can wonder, however, whether these propositions will be as proposed, merely descriptive and what we are then to do with propositions that explain why things are the way they are: whether a world-book could contain the proposition: “Every event has a cause”.

This idea of a divine intellect as a kind of library housing an infinite number of world books is however problematic given the obvious comparative judgments that can arise as a consequence of the curious claim that this world we live in is the best of all possible worlds. Our world-book, by implication, then, must be the best world-book in the library. The judgment “Every event must have a cause” is, of course, a transcendental judgment and brings to light a major Kantian criticism of Leibnizian metaphysics, namely, that it treats this judgment as analytic and thereby fails to recognize the synthetic component of this synthetic a priori judgment. indeed, according to Kant Leibniz’s system fails to recognize the role of the world of sense which helps to form the appearances of their underlying cause, things-in-themselves. Leibniz also fails to recognize as a consequence the subjective nature of Space and Time. Kant believes that Leibniz’s appeal to divinity is an appeal that becomes necessary in order to explain why a community of substances, essences, monads, existing in space and time can cohere in the divine mind via a law of pre-established harmony. Such a metaphysical position argues Kant, fails to adequately represent the workings of a human mind which requires the faculties of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. We form the world intuitively both the faculties of sensibility and its experience of objects, events, and states of affairs in reality. Such a mode of representation cannot synthesize all the real properties of the reality encountered. Furthermore, Kant maintains, we could never possibly experience the infinite gradations of this continuum of reality: our sense experience is not capable of detecting such fine distinctions. Leibniz would, of course, disagree with this position. In the realm of perception, he refers to the perception of the noise of the sea being made up of the smaller perceptions and noises of movements of water of which, he claims we are subconsciously or preconsciously aware. For Kant, what he calls experience doses not necessarily operate in this way: the “form” of the experience might be a complex of the intuitions of space and time and the sensations of the body caused by individual wants and movements of water as well as the rule or the principle organizing these factors into one unified and perhaps unique experience. This principle might include reference to the pull of the moon upon the waters of the earth and perhaps even the processes involved in the creation of the moon and so on ad infinitum to that point in space and time where there are energy and matter that can neither be created nor destroyed and perhaps even further back to the origin of motion of the universe. According to Leibniz the complete concept of the noise of the movement of water at Space S1 and Time T1 is only complete in the world book of the best possible world lodged in the divine library. Kant may well have accepted this as a possible metaphorical account of Nature, given the fact that we cannot in the finitude of our own minds comprehend the infinitude of Nature. An important aspect(for both Kant and Aristotle) involves the way in which we acquire knowledge of the world via the sensible receptive power of our minds in accordance with a transcendental law of causation operating externally in relation to our minds. When we actively organize the manifold of sensible representations, on the other hand, an internal causal principle is operating in accordance with our nature or essence which is striving toward more complete concepts, truth, and rationality. Individual Human Nature, for Leibniz, “expresses the universe after its own manner”. The human being is a complex made up of simple unextended immaterial elements that constitute the windowless monads which mirror the world in accordance with a divine clockwork that God is responsible for. Brett expresses this in terms of his concern for its implications for Psychology:

“..there are infinite degrees of psychic reality. Again if we pass beyond the apparent separateness of each living unity, we find a deeper principle of continuity: everything not only exists but it coexists, and its relations to other things are at once outer and inner. Confining ourselves to the application of this metaphysics to psychology we find it leads to the assertion that every unit which the materialist would call an atom, is a centre of force, a living reality. Instead of an atomistic doctrine, Leibniz propounds a theory that is only to be called individualistic. The idea of the soul gradually wins its way to the heart of the whole system: psychology becomes the clue to the universe. In this way, Leibniz ultimately builds up a philosophy that is ruled by the idea of conscious forces ceaselessly active. From Aristotle, he takes the idea of potency, from Plato he gets the idea of an individual spiritual essence. The two are combined in the new idea of the monad, which is pure energy known and interpreted through our own self-consciousness. the doctrine is novel because it is neither realism nor idealism, neither materialism nor spiritualism. Its affinities can only be indicated by calling it naturalism spiritualized. The ultimate elements are endowed with life and motion. The unconscious, what we call dead matter, is, therefore, only relatively unconscious:* it has the least possible degree of consciousness.”

Reference is made to Aristotle but Brett appears to be unaware of the extent to which Aristotle would object to the use of his tool of Logic in this way: to establish a conclusion that there are soul-like elements which are extensionless immaterial points of activity. Aristotle would maintain, as would Kant, that a concept of activity without something moving is an empty concept of Pure Reason. Kant’s criticism would resemble Aristotle’s in this respect. Pure reason postulating concepts independent of the objects they are concepts of, is one of the targets of his work “Critique of Pure Reason”. According to Kant, the kind of concepts Leibniz postulated are “empty” he demonstrated this in his reference to mathematical judgments such as 7+5=12. In such a judgment Leibniz postulates an implicit identity of 12 with 7+5 in virtue of the possibility of reducing each element to its numerical base, e.g. 7 is reduced to 1+1+1+1+1+1+1, 5 is reduced to 1+1+1+1+1, and 12 is reduced to 1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1. Kant argues cogently that this reductive process is not valid because the result 12 is not in fact thought in the operation of adding the units 5 and 7. This Kant further argues is evident especially in the case of the addition of large numbers that would require a complex operation of calculation in order to arrive at the result. This is Kant’s argument that arithmetical judgments involve synthetic activity connected to acts of counting and not an analytic reduction to identity statements. This kind of activity is not analytical and logical but rather what he terms synthetic a priori activity. This interpretation of mathematical activity is also to be found in both Plato and Aristotle in their judgments that mathematical knowledge is not proceeding from a principle(e.g. of non-contradiction) but rather towards a principle which because of its relation to the synthetic activity involved is a hypothetical judgment. Such knowledge needs to be distinguished from the knowledge that proceeds from a principle toward reality: giving rise to such categorical and transcendental forms of judgment as “Every event has a cause”.

Leibniz, however, as e know, is a modern mathematical/logical rationalist whose concept of Nature lacks the kind of content we find in the theories of the classical rationalists such as Aristotle and Kant. The Kantian view of “Nature” is outlined in great detail in the work entitled “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”. In this work, Kant points out, in an Aristotelian fashion that the concept of “Nature” has both a formal and a material signification. he characterizes this formal significance thus in his Preface to the work:

“if the word “nature” is taken merely in its formal signification(inasmuch as the word “nature” signifies the primal internal principle of everything that belongs to the existence of a thing) then there can be as many natural sciences ad there are specifically different things, and each of these things must contain its specific internal principle of the determinations belonging to its existence.”

He continues then to characterize the material signification:

“On the other hand, “nature” is also taken in a material signification to be not only a quality but the sum total of all things insofar as they can be objects of our senses and hence also objects of experience under which is, therefore, to be understood the whole of all appearances, i.e. the sense-world with the exclusion of all objects that are not sensible. Nature taken in this signification of the word has two main parts according to the main distinction of our senses: the one contains the objects of the external senses, the other the objects of the internal sense. Therefore a twofold doctrine of nature is possible: a doctrine of body and a doctrine of the soul. The first considers extended nature and the second, thinking nature.”

The “Science” of those empiricists referring only to the principle of induction is not, according to Kant, genuine science because this principle carries with it no consciousness of necessity as is the case with the rational doctrine of nature. Natural science on this view presupposes a metaphysics of nature or what Heidegger in his “Kant-Book” called “Metaphysica Generalis” and is the transcendental part of a metaphysics of nature, “Metaphysica Specialis”, on the other hand, can take the form of physics or psychology depending upon whether its object of concern is an empirical concept of matter or a thinking being. These “special sciences” are, however, only genuine science to the extent that mathematics is involved. This appears to eliminate the possibility of psychology being a special science because it appears to be impossible to apply mathematics to the phenomena of the internal flux of consciousness. It might, of course, be possible to apply mathematics to some kind of law of continuity of our internal activity if it could be shown that the latter was a form of quantitative change rather than qualitative or substantial change. This may have been what Leibniz was envisaging with his logic of the monads. A law of continuity without something substantial enduring to ensure the continuity is, however, problematic. Leibniz’s solution may to some extent have influenced Kant in relation to the concept of the unity of apperception that we find in Kant’s first Critique. Leibniz claimed the following in his essay entitles “Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on reason”:

“Thus it is well to mark the distinction between the perception, which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this inner state: the latter not being given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul”(Published in Leibniz selections, ed Philip Wiener(New York 1951) (p525)

Kant, both in his “Critique of Pure Reason” and in his “Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view” analyses this concept of what he calls the “transcendental unity of apperception” and refers to the very Cartesian notion of an “I think” that accompanies all representations of intuition and thought. Self-Consciousness is associated with apperception that is characterized again in Cartesian terms of clarity and distinctness. Kant claims that the program of Psychology in the future may well focus upon this activity of reflecting consciously upon one’s representations in relation to the more formal form of consciousness, i.e. the “I think” which is a manifestation of the unity of a mind that ensures the continuity and relatedness of a manifold of representations in one mind. If such unity did not exist the thought “There is snow in the woods” and “There are tracks in the snow” could well be occurring in two distinct and separate minds. Some commentators believe that the term apperception means “consciousness”. if this is the case the above distinction between formal or transcendental conditions and a more phenomenal reflective inner process must be acknowledged. This latter arm of the distinction Kant appears to attribute to Descartes. For Kant, on the other hand, the “I think” is a transcendental condition of the possibility of self-consciousness is a matter of logic. He points out in his work on Anthropology that Psychologists of his time were confusing these levels of analysis:

“the cause of these errors is that the terms inner sense and apperception are naturally taken by psychologists to be synonymous, despite the fact that the first alone should indicate a psychological (applied) consciousness and the second merely a logical(pure) consciousness.”(p33)

Kant’s criticism of Leibniz centred around the fact that the mathematician thought that consciousness was steered wholly by innate ideas and that there was, therefore, no clear and distinct sensible contribution to the cognitive activity of the mind. Kant may well have been thinking of Leibniz specifically when he wrote the above words in his work on Anthropology. The logical unity of apperception for Leibniz may provide the “I” with a necessary unity but fails to provide the representations of the mind with any content which for Kant is provided through the reception of the sensible forms of the objects of our representations. When I think, I must surely think something, Kant argues. This sensible content must then be organized by the categories of the understanding if the goal is to make a judgment which ought also to be regulated by the ideas of Reason.

Brett criticises Leibniz’s monadology in more Psychological terms(echoing Kant):

“According to Leibniz, every monad is impenetrable. It follows that nothing enters into or goes out of this metaphysical entity. Applying this principle to the problems of sensation(for the psychology of Leibniz is throughout applied metaphysics), we arrive at the conclusion that there can be nothing but changes in the states of the monads: passivity and receptivity is thus eliminated, and in their place nothing is left but the power of representing, the fact of presentation”.

Brett then extends this analysis into the realm of the Will:

“As merely knowing we reflect the known, but as living souls we are thereby affected, have feelings, struggle to maintain or reject, and so exhibit a “tendency to pass from one presentation to another”.

This looks to be an all too epistemological account of our practical activity but Brett wishes to point out what he considers to be a resemblance to the Aristotelian theory of practical deliberation. For Aristotle practical reasoning is a form of reasoning which carries with it the modal logical notion of necessity as applied to the realm of conduct and action. It is difficult to see the Aristotelian apparatus present in the Leibnizian metaphysical framework. We can, however, see the seeds of the Kantian absolute of goodwill but for Leibniz, the only absolute is located outside of the human will, in the will of God. Kant’s ethical emphasis on humanism and the autonomy of the will from the authoritarian ethics of religion would not be unconditional truths for Leibniz who regards God as the only ultimate measure or standard by which to gauge the goodness of the human will.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The God-intoxicated Spinoza(1632-1677).

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Rationalism has a long and convoluted history reaching as it does back to Pre-Socratic Philosophy. There is, however, a worthwhile distinction to be made between the Greek Rationalists and the “modern” rationalists beginning with the mathematician Descartes. Descartes form of rationalism forms a curious species of its own flirting as it does with Skepticism in its methodology. He is in search of a foundation that will provide certainty for our judgments and he employs in this search a method which he hopes will guide the activity of scientists in their search for knowledge.

Spinoza’s “Ethics” is a work that demonstrates in its form. at least a debt to the Cartesian Project, being composed as it is of axioms and definitions that determine the philosophizing that occurs in its five sections. Having said this these two philosophers, in spite of believing in the certainty of mathematical axioms and definitions have very different conceptions of Philosophy, Spinoza being the practical ethical philosopher in search of the knowledge of the Good and Descartes the theoretical metaphysical philosopher in search the knowledge of the true. Descartes and Spinoza inherit the scholastic obsession with Substance and Descartes oscillate uncomfortably between substance dualism and a reductive materialism. For Spinoza, on the other hand, there can be in logic only one substance, one Nature, one God, a position that reminds one of the poem of Parmenides invoking the goddess of truth “Aletheia”, a goddess of the unconcealment of Being which must include knowledge of the true and the good. In this context consider the following by Spinoza from his work Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione:

“After experience had taught me that all things which are ordinarily encountered in common life are vain and futile, and when I saw that all things which were the occasions and objects of my fears had in themselves nothing of good and evil except insofar as the mind was moved by them: I at length determined to inquire if there was anything that was a true good, capable of imparting itself, by which alone the mind could be affected to the exclusion of all else: whether indeed anything existed by the discovery and acquisition of which I might be put in possession of a joy continuous and supreme to all eternity.”

For Spinoza, as for Plato, both God and the Good appear to lie outside of our experience, outside of the sphere of operation of the imagination. Intellectual thought appears in this system to be necessary for the logical explication of Substance which has an infinite number of (essential) attributes. This is a logical attack on many Aristotelian concepts, including the central notions of hylomorphic theory, matter, form, potentiality, actuality, actualization process, and final cause. Spinoza manages to create a logical space for analysis that involves an investigation to what extent it is possible to regard Spinoza’s Substance as similar to Aristotelian form or principle. Spinoza, like Aristotle, certainly uses the Principle of Sufficient Reason in expressing the relationship between the modes or attributes of Substance: so to the extent that a reason for something can be a principle rather than merely a rule, is the extent to which we can concede that Spinoza’s idea of Substance appears to resemble Aristotle’s earlier thoughts on Substance. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is what the intellect uses to establish the essence of things naturally rules out any appeal to experience or the imagination. Spinoza claims that there is an infinite number of infinite modes of Substance but we as humans only have access to two these modes: extension and thought. There are also finite modes of substance that express their essence in the form of objects, events, and states of affairs and thought about objects, events, and states of affairs. For every object, event, and state of affairs, there is a thought and there are also thoughts about the smallest particles that can be seen or imagined. Individuals can, of course, be ignorant of these thoughts. The order and connection of extended matter appear to differ from the order and connection of ideas about extended matter: there appear to be, that is, both physical connections and relationships and conceptual connections and relationships. Note that this “dualism” is grounded in a logical monism. Both thought and extended matter are expressions of an infinite Substance that Spinoza calls God or Nature. God’s thought, being infinite, is obviously going to differ from finite human thought. God will always have adequate knowledge of all existence and essence in the world whereas our human inadequate knowledge requires the support of classification systems containing general terms referring to kinds of things in the world. God, on the other hand, thinks in terms of individual minds and individual men.

Substance, Nature, or God necessarily exist and it is necessarily true (de re necessity) that they exist. This is a very different conception of God to that found in religion where very often there is the troublesome image of God separated from his creation. This troublesome image led the ancient Greeks to postulate the existence of an intermediary Demiurge that created the world. Spinoza speaks of God being Nature and of both as being infinite in the sense that there is nothing that either God or Nature is not. God or Nature is causa sui, self causing entities and are immanent in the world. Many religions imagine God creating the world in Time which in logic, of course, implies that there was a time before the world was created, a time before God had performed this act and therefore a time when one could say of God that he had not yet created the world, thus disturbing our idea of his perfection. Our knowledge and classification systems presuppose a concept of linear time in which things come to be and pass away. God, however, is timeless and his thought is a pure activity that does not begin or end in time. It is therefore difficult to speak of the will of God and this is tied up with the idea of God being an immanent cause of an infinite number of infinite modes of Substance(of which we humans only know two: thought and extension). For an understanding of what is being referred to here, we need to look no further than the formal cause of Aristotle. The major difference between the two philosophers resides in the fact that Spinoza places more faith in Mathematical knowledge than does Aristotle. For Spinoza, the logical relationship between God and Nature is analogous to the relationship between a triangle and its essential properties(three angles, three sides). The possible weakness, however, of this Mathematical account is the possibility that the faculty of the imagination may have been involved in the formation of the axioms and definitions of Euclidean geometry. The “creation” of Non-Euclidean geometry proved to the satisfaction of many philosophers the fact that Euclidean axioms possessed merely a de dicto form of necessity rather than the de dicto form that Spinoza requires for the justification of his overall approach( An argument that both Plato and Aristotle appreciated)

But what, then, is God’s relation to the finite modes? For Spinoza, Gods essence is intimately related to Gods power and this is manifested in all “individuals” in nature striving to preserve themselves in their existence. Spinoza collapses the classificatory system of kinds and claims that even a speck of dust or a rock, are engaged in this “striving”, as is a human being. Both rocks and humans are modes of extension at different levels of complexity. Matter for Spinoza is not inert mass and even when it is at rest it possesses potential energy to move. Spinoza adds to his description of levels of complexity an account of the structure of complex bodies: they are composed of more simple individuals or bodies. An individual, for Spinoza, passing into or out of existence is merely a manifestation of a journey from the simple to the complex or the complex back into the simple. There is, for him, no drama surrounding the death of a complex human being as long as one has an adequate idea of what is happening as long as one is viewing the world sub specie aeternitatus. Death was more than an academic issue for the man who died at the age of 44 from damage to his lungs caused by glass fragments. he is reputed to have passed very calmly in Socratic fashion presumably looking forward to the dispersing of the matter of his body. For him what has died here is not Substance, i.e. substance has not gone out of existence. All that has happened is a modification of Substance and this is not to be feared. All that has happened is a complex individual has ceased in its striving to exist as that complex individual. The individual will not see what is happening to its body when it is dead because the mind will disintegrate.

We may also wonder what God’s relation to the infinite mode of thought can be. Thought is one of the infinite aspects under which we understand God. Medieval logic, under the influence of the early work of Aristotle on Substance, had begun to debate in very technical terms the form of the proposition which is that of a predicate predicating something of a subject, or, in other words, a form that states that substance possesses a particular attribute or property. The Aristotelian project, however, insisted that Science could only advance its positions by the classification of individuals into definable natural kinds discriminated by essential qualities or attributes. This is clearly a classification model dominated by qualities. One of the logical consequences of Medieval thought is that there have to be a plurality of substances which of course we can imagine to be the case but this is indeed problematic from the point of view of monism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Such a position raises the issue of finding some means to give an account of how these different substances interact with each other and when using the Principle of Sufficient Reason being able to give an acco8nt of what reasons there are for more than one substance existing. Even discussion of what it is that caused this individual substance becomes problematic because if something else caused this substance it could no longer meet the causa sui condition that Spinoza insists upon. This point is also involved in Spinoza’s earlier denial that if God and Nature are both causa sui neither could be the cause of the other. Finite modes such as triangles can possess essence without there being individuals that are triangular but God, Nature, and Substance, possessing as they do infinite numbers of attributes, admit of no separation of essence and existence(“The power of God is the same as his essence”(Ethics 1 proposition 33). As has been mentioned, however, two aspects of Substance present themselves to the human intellect in the form of Extension and Thought. The nature of their relation is complex but it can be said that for every extended individual(particle. even, object, state of affairs) there can be a thought about it, but we cannot conceive of thought as a modification of extension or vice versa. Spinozaäs view of extension was in fact far more systematic than the notion we find in the Cartesian position and it probably helped to pave the way for a new form of physical science based on Mathematical axioms and definitions of the kind we find, for example, in Newtons “Principia Mathematica”. In Spinoza’s system ideas have ideata or objects and this discussion brings us into the arena of the mind(body problem which so plagued Cartesian Philosophy. Given Spinoza’s refusal to countenance dualism we will not have to account for causal interactions between substances. One fascinating consequence of Spinoza’s monism, however, is that he regards the human mind as being constituted by the idea of the human body. We must be careful with this term “idea” which sometimes for Descartes merely meant “image”. For Spinoza, the term “idea” is a conception of a thing connected to assertion or negation: the conception of a winged horse, for example, asserts that horses have wings and the idea that there are no such things as winged horses are the refusal of the mind to assert that horses are winged. In real perceptual contexts seeing an actual horse will also involve asserting the existence of this individual before me stomping and snorting.

We will not find in Spinoza skeptical excursions into the Cartesian countryside of doubt. For Spinoza, perceiving something is asserting its existence. There is for him no bare coming into contact with the sense-data or images of men without an active application of these concepts which will involve some of the causes that have brought the horse into existence but only Gods thought contains knowledge of all the causes. Similarly, my knowledge of my own mind is incomplete or inadequate because I cannot completely survey the order that has brought it about. We can, of course, participate in this knowledge by understanding that my mind is the idea of an actually existing body. There is in Spinoza no significant reflective move, as there is in Descartes where there is a reduction of the idea of being a man to an idea that I am thinking about that man.. This latter thought has not special status in Spinoza’s account it is simply another thought about a fact in the world and possesses therefore no privileged status.

For Spinoza it appears as if every mental event asserts the existence of something. If, for example, I love somebody I assert the existence of that somebody. It also appears as if sensations are intensional: they are our way of being aware of the state of our body. Pain is asserting something about the body. We cannot fail to be reminded here of the Cartesian Meditation in which Descartes attempts to doubt the existence of his body. Firstly one could wonder whether it is possible to doubt the existence of a body in pain, and secondly, for Spinoza, such a doubt would be tantamount to doubting the existence of one’s mind. But, one may ask, what is this idea of the body and idea of? Firstly it is an idea of a finite mode of the attribute of extension. Our body, for Spinoza, must be a complex of individual composed of simpler bodies(whose history we are unaware of) and these will all possess the energy(motion or potential energy) required to strive to preserve their existence. The degree of energy these simpler bodies possess will also serve to keep themselves and each other in the relative positions(contact) they occupy. The complex individual in its turn will possess a more holistic power to strive to preserve its existence as a complex individual.

With a complex being such as ourselves, our striving to preserve ourselves in existence will have three psychological aspects: desire, pleasure, and pain. But the virtue of all our virtues is to preserve ourselves in the desired condition. All our activity is directed toward this Good which emanates(originates) not from an idea in my mind but from a bodily striving towards pleasure and avoidance of pain. the more complex a body is the greater is its powers. Animals, in comparison, are finite modes of life with fewer powers. They may, for example, not possess any idea of their minds–only human minds possess an idea of their bodies. Finite human beings, on this account, are not substances but rather possess essences which are expressions of substance and they are not self-determining entities given the fact that their existence is dependent upon external causes to themselves. We are, that is, only subsystems(parts) of Nature with a limited power of self-maintenance or conatus. Stuart Hampshire in his work “Spinoza” has the following interesting point to make:

“But the notion of conatus, or individual self maintenance, of which there is no equivalent in Descartes or in purely mechanical and atomistic cosmologies, is exactly the concept which biologists have often demanded as essential to the understanding of organic and living systems.”(p78)

Aristotle’s idea of “purpose” or “task” obviously surfaces in this discussion. For Aristotle different kinds of souls, all move for the telos of preserving their life and there is also a hierarchy of powers corresponding to more simple forms of life and more complex forms of life. Both Spinoza and Aristotle share the view that what we do is a function of our human nature. The most complex desire for Aristotle that manifests itself in human conatus is the desire for understanding which is also part of the process of imitating or participating in the activity of divine thinking and its comprehension of everything, the complete order of the physical world of extension and the logic of the relation of ideas in the realm of thought. Aristotle’s “definition of being human is we should recall “rational animal capable of discourse”. Here the “rational part of the definition refers as much to the potential for understanding as it does to the actualization of the rational in terms of the passing of laws and the understanding of principles or forms. We mention Aristotle in this context because many commentators believe that Spinoza was attempting to replace the worn out Aristotelian system which was standing in the way of the development of knowledge like a huge colossus. This may be a truth with modification.

For Spinoza, as for Aristotle the best life is the life of understanding what things are in themselves and why they are so. For Aristotle the virtuous life is one which actively pursues understanding in the realm of the good presumably because of an active emotion(to use Spinoza’s term) such as wonder. For Spinoza active emotions are to be preferred to passive emotions and he does not subscribe to the view that pure reason or pure intellect can be efficacious in sublimation of such passive emotions as fear and hatred. The active desire to understand(which is an active emotion for Spinoza) will be able to sublimate the passive emotions. Understanding the passive emotions of fear and hate for Spinoza, amounts to the extent to which we can understand the causes of these emotions whether in ourselves or other people. This will also involve understanding the consequences(effects) f hate and fear, e.g. aggression. Responding with aggression to ones hate or fear will, if one has an adequate idea of these emotions, only produce more hate and fear in the world, and as a consequence more aggressive destruction. When I have an adequate idea of myself these emotions lose their power over us. The emotion is thus transformed from a passion into an intellectual idea of the mind apprehended with clarity and distinctness. Powers are both actualities and dispositions to act. Insofar as emotion is a power and a disposition to act in a particular way toward an object and changing one’s apprehension of the object may be sufficient to change the passion involved. If we also focus on what caused the object or brought the object about I become aware of how the object could not be other than it is, become aware, that is, of its necessity. This kind of awareness is a movement toward the divine knowledge of adequate ideas apprehended clearly and distinctly, a blessed awareness of the world as a result of viewing the world sub specie aeternitatus. Psychoanalysis also uses this conception of object-relations and a more psychically distanced apprehension of the object in its therapeutic activity. Psychoanalysis also believes that understanding the nature of the object weakens its tendency to cause passive emotions in us. Love(Eros) is,, of course, a positive active emotion that for Spinoza is characterized in terms of conatus and more closely defined in terms of a striving to preserve the loved object in its existence(in its nature). Desire(consciousness of conatus) is logically prior to pleasure and pain and it would not be amiss to claim that the ultimate nature of thought ought to be defined by its desire to understand the world in order to preserve the nature of the organism and its hierarchy of powers.

The mind, for Spinoza, has its own purpose and nature and we have inadequate knowledge of its functioning, perhaps partly because we have inadequate knowledge of the idea of the body which forms the mind. Freud’s phases of psycho-sexual development may well have been influenced by this conception of the relationship between the mind and the body. Spinoza, like Freud, is committed toa close relation between the body and the mind. There cannot, for example, be a change in the body for which there is no idea and conscious awareness is not necessary. I may not, for example, be aware that I have a slight fever but I might be consciously aware of being thirsty: being aware that I am thirsty because I have a fever would be a move toward a more adequate idea of the changes occurring in my body. For Spinoza this connection of the idea of being thirsty with the idea of having a fever is a logical connection: the objects of these ideas cannot fall apart–of this, I must be certain, argues Spinoza. If we turn our attention away from the body and toward the world and the idea of ghosts in the world we might believe that the noise of a movement in a dark room was caused by the presence of a ghost. The cause of having failed dead people may be the cause which we are unaware of and becoming conscious of this cause could well suffice to rid oneself of the idea of a ghost in the room, as might the idea that all that is left of the dead is the matter of a decomposing body, i.e. the idea of the final and complete end of life of a being that has died suffices to remove the idea of a ghost moving in the dark. All these ideas of causes are designed to rid us of our habit of viewing the world sub specie humanitatis and designed to move us toward viewing the world or Nature sub specie aeternitatus.

Life, as has been pointed out earlier, is an Aristotelian issue which Freud pursued in his psychological theory, in particular when he referred to Eros, the life”Instinct” or drive. This echoes almost paradoxically the thoughts of Plato but it might also echo the thoughts of Spinoza in relation to conatus, suggesting in its turn an important issue in philosophical psychology, namely, the relation between the mind and its life(the title of a work by Hannah Arendt was “The Life of the Mind”). Brian O’ Shaughnessy in his work “The Will: a dual aspect theory” also suggests that the mind is in some sense “alive” and he claims the following:

“Life is necessarily the first ontological development amidst natural material objects–so that it may be that the only intrinsically de re necessarily vital phenomena apart from coming to life(and departing from life) are psychological phenomena. After all, psychologicality is the next great ontological shift after, and on the necessary basis of, the very first ontological movement, viz life. Then what do we mean in saying of the mind that it is alive? But what sort of thing is the mind? The mind consists, and exclusive of, the systematically and causally interrelated and often enduring phenomena of type psychological that occur in some animal.”(xix, vol 1)

O’ Shaughnessy shares then with Aristotle, Spinoza, and Freud the view that one of the key issues in the realm of philosophical psychology is the nature of the relation between the mind and the body. O Shaughnessy insists that the mind is dependent upon its owner, a person, and cannot, therefore, be a substantival entity, and the language being used here is reminiscent of what we encounter in Spinoza’s writings. Aristotle’s language is less related to the concept of Substance and more related to his later hylomorphic theory. For Aristotle life has a physical material substrate that is “formed” in various ways in accordance with various “principles” and this occurs at both biological and psychological “levels” using the mechanism of powers building upon powers in a process which Aristotle characterizes in terms of the actualizing of potentials. Spinoza simplifies this complex process with the use of his term “conatus”: he envisages the activity of preserving oneself in one’s existence as transformative as the organism becomes more and more complex, the culmination of this process being possibly the desire to understand requiring knowledge of various kinds. The goal of this process for Spinoza is to view the world sub specie aeternitatus. There is a concept of the individual in Spinoza but it does not resemble the solipsistic lonely individual we encounter in the Meditations of Descartes. The mind certainly is “alive for Spinoza in a way which would have been paradoxical for Descartes the mathematician. Psychological powers which include passive emotions such as hate and fear, as well as active emotions which have the power to sublimate passive emotions, produce the understanding required to view the world sub specie aeternitatus. These powers include the liberating of man from a state of servitude and form a rational moral attitude reminiscent of that which is aimed at in the New Testament of the Bible: that attitude expressed in the words of the apostles:”the truth will set you free”. According to Spinoza, we will no longer feel hatred for others when we appreciate the causal mechanisms operating in our social behaviour. The returning of hatred and violence with hatred and violence merely increases the level of hatred and violence in the world and our lives are consequently diminished rather than enhanced. This theme was resurrected in the work of Freud in the form of his “death instinct or drive “(Thanatos) almost on the eve of destruction(the second world war) and Freud’s work also served to play an important role in restoring the philosophical psychology of Aristotle and Spinoza to a central position in the arena of nineteenth-century culture. For Freud, the mind was a natural living phenomenon whose development could be charted in the way in which we chart the development of all living phenomena. The mind emerges from a body in the way a frog emerges from a tadpole. Failing to understand this complex process of development was failing to fully understand the causes of the mental phenomena one is confronted with in psychoanalytical therapy. Freud also focussed the light of his “science”(Philosophy?) on the phenomenon of the sick mind and replaced the “therapies” of the time(magnetism, hypnotism, hot and cold baths) with a more efficacious treatment for rational animals capable of discourse, namely a “talking cure”. The picture of 5000 women incarcerated in a mental institution in Paris was replaced with that of the Freudian couch and this was indeed symbolic of a more adequate idea of what to do with the anxiety that paralyzes a mind. Freud’s time was also a time of Science and scientific “products” in the form of technology were flowing into the Civilisation, transforming the world in accordance with a desire that wished to “master” nature. This desire was a part of a new and modern scientific view of the world that had two aspects to it. Firstly this view encouraged us to view ourselves and life forms as parts of the natural world like a wave or a flood and this secondly allowed us to lift ourselves narcissistically above such phenomena in a way that raised questions about our collective sanity. We were well on our way to believing that there was literally nothing that could not be done, i.e there were no natural limits to the ways in which we could transform our world and our lives. This was the environment in which Freud was working: walking a tightrope struggling to integrate the thoughts and assumptions of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and the Science of his time.

The concept of the will is only to be found in the work of Freud by Implication with the concept of “Libido” but it is to be found thematized in the works of Nietzsche and Adler. There was something standing in the way of identifying the will as a striving for understanding(in the name of the intellectual values for Aristotle and Kant) and in the name of our striving toward what we morally ought to do( the moral virtues for Aristotle and Kant). The spirit of Descartes and Hobbes appeared to prevail and prevent further analysis in the arena of philosophical psychology. This contrasted with medieval times when the will was a hotbed of discussion and the result of this was eventual stigmatization by the sanctions of the Church directed at Pelagianism. Kant managed to restore the validity of the concept in his Moral, Political, and Anthropological writings which were no doubt influenced by both Aristotle and Spinoza. In his work on “Anthropology” Kant pointed to the ontological distinction between those things that happen to man(e.g. passive emotions) and those things he actually does(e.g. assenting to something good, denying something bad). It is apparent that for Kant thought is an activity that lasts only so long as the activity lasts. Thought can be directed at the good or the true, asserting or denying them, with practical thought being directed to assenting to the good and denying the bad and theoretical thought assenting to or denying the truth. We find this division of the theoretical and the practical in the Philosophy of Aristotle.

The concept of the will is also to be found in Spinoza. Professor Brett has the following to say:

“For Spinoza, mind and body are aspects of a fundamental unity. The nature of the body is the cause of passions and affections: the nature of the mind is the cause of these ideas of bodily affections: and as these two, the physical and the psychic, events occur together, the emotions are states at once of mind and body. In this sense, and not in the Cartesian sense of interaction, the emotions. or affections are for Spinoza psychophysical. As the basis is a unity with two aspects, Spinoza begins with a tendency which belongs to that unity, namely the effort of self-preservation, the fundamental will to live or conatus quo unaquaeque res in suo esse(E., iii, 8). When this effort is referred to the mind alone it is called Will. Will is the name for the conatus when accompanied by the consciousness of its activity. When we regard it as arising out of the whole nature of man, mind and body, it is called “appetite”. Appetite can, therefore, be called the essence of man. If we add to this that appetite may be either unconscious or conscious we get the further distinction between appetite and desire(cupiditas), desire being appetite consciously apprehended as such.”(iii, 9)

Spinoza is also careful to motivate his account of the emotions by reference to the principle of sufficient reason. In constructing his philosophical framework he claims:

“I call an adequate cause whose effect can clearly and distinctly be perceived through it.”( p84)

A distinction between acting and suffering is also required:

“I say that we act or are active when something takes place within us or outside of us whose adequate cause we are…On the other hand I say we suffer or are passive when something when something takes place in us or follows from our nature of which we are only the partial cause.”

Spinoza then proceeds to define emotion :

“By emotion I understand the modifications of the body by which the power of action in the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these modifications.”

Emotions, then, are of two kinds, active and passive, depending upon whether the ideas that accompany them are adequate or inadequate. Adequate ideas, as we have noted above, acknowledge adequate causes or conditions. The fear we experience at the thought of a ghost in the dark is real until further reflection dissipates the fear, resulting in the denial of the reality of the experience. The whole complex culminating perhaps in the thought”There are no ghosts, they are a figment of the imagination!”. Here the mind moves from a passive suffering state to an active higher state of perfection. What we are witnessing in the above “experience” of a ghost in the dark is the imagination “constructing” an object from the perceptual input of a sound in the dark. In Proposition XII (Origin and Nature of the Emotions) Spinoza then claims the following:

“the mind, as much as it can, endeavours to imagine those things which increase or help its power of acting.”

But why, after positing the idea of a ghost does the mind then posit the inexistence of the ghost?:(Proposition XIII)

When the mind imagines things which diminish or hinder the power of acting of the body, it endeavours as much as it can to remember things which will cut off their existence.”

Spinoza also calls attention to an important limitation of the imagination: (Proposition XIV):

“..the imaginations of our mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies.”

Fear, then, is directed more to the state of the body of the experiencer of fear than to states of affairs in the external world that have produced a sound in the dark. Fear is obviously related to pain which is defined by Spinoza as the movement of the mind to a lower state of perfection. The supervening of the idea that “Ghosts do not exist!” would then obviously be associated with the pleasure of relief and this defines a return to a higher state of perfection.

Brett summarises Spinoza’s position well in the following quote:

“The primary emotions are three in number: Laetitia (joy) tristitia (grief), and cupiditas (desire). These are not strictly coordinate but related rather as substance and accidents. Desire is the determination to action which arises directly from the tendency to self-preservation. Joy and grief are attributes of this fundamental state, arising from consciousness of success or failure in the effort. As the effort to attain fuller life is itself the very process of being(ipsa hominis essentia), joy and grief are the conscius equivalents of increased and decreased vitality(iii, II). The actual pleasure or pain are parts of these emotions, being strictly the corporal parts of the whole consciousness of increased or decreased vitality….The emotions, strictly speaking, involve an idea of the object: love, for example, is a mode of consciousness(cogitandi) as including the idea of the object loved. Thus appetite and desire differ as a blind impulse from conscious pursuit. Similarly, a mere feeling is blind and in that sense unconscious(devoid of any idea): emotion is a higher state involving more mentality. But emotions are inferior to intellectual operations because at this leel the ideas are “inadequate”, confused by the intrusion of factors due to the body.” (iii, 3)

So the transition from the fearful thought “Ghost!” to “there is no such thing as ghosts, they are figments of the imagination!” is a transition from emotion to intellect in spite of the fact that a type of pleasure might be involved. If pleasure is involved in the latter thought it is an intellectual kind of pleasure(unrelated to pain or relief from pain according to Plato). It is at this point that we learn about our passions and emotions and attain the state of virtue, the true telos of desire, the highest form of conatus. This takes us back to Aristotle and even further to the Delphic Oracle’s challenge to Socrates and everyone to “Know thyself!”. But it also links virtue to the Will and what is good, the completely timeless idea for Plato. Spinoza, however, avoids the dualism of the mind and the body that we encounter in the Philosophy of Descartes, by claiming that the idea of ghosts not existing is united to the emotion of pleasure in the same way in which the mind is united to the body. The idea of ghosts not existing is good in the sense that it is connected with a power of acting in the agent that does not have an external cause. Such an idea causes me to seek the real cause of the noise in the dark. Consciousness is evoked by Spinoza again in the section entitled “The Strength of the Emotions”, PRoposition VIII:

“The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain, insofar as we are conscious of it.”

This knowledge through the power of acting (conatus) connected to it, is also in need of an account of what the perfect or imperfect, the good or the bad is. This section is particularly important in that it engages with an issue of historical and philosophical importance, namely, the Aristotelian notion of a final cause. The example that Spinoza uses to illustrate his position on this issue is perhaps unfortunate in that it is the idea of habitation related to the instrumental means of building a house. He chooses this example because it is evident to all that the idea of the house must be present before the power of acting of building the house is utilised. If this is the case, argues Spinoza then the idea of a house is an efficient and not a final cause. It is not absolutely certain that Aristotle is his target here but many philosophers have taken this to be the case, including A Kenny in his ” A New History of Western Philosophy”(Vol 3).

It is important, however, to remember that Aristotle’s discussion of final cause occurs in the context of examples of organic growth or human action involving cognitive development and the kind of changes being talked about are, for example, in the former case, the transformation of an immature organism (a tadpole) into a mature organism (a frog). the complete apparatus of hylomorphic theory is required in such cases if we are to completely explain the phenomena being described including, for example, the concepts of potentiality and actuality, form and matter, things retaining their identity through change and kinds of change. When therefore, in relation to his example taken from the realm of productive science, Spinoza claims that “nature does not act with an end in view”(p142) he is confounding the limited concept of biological nature(psuche) with the more all-embracing view of an infinite perfect God that is not moving from a state of imperfection toward a state of perfection. The example that Spinoza uses to found his case, that of the idea of habitation and the building of a house certainly involves a transformation of bricks and stones into a place of habitation that can be explained by a preceding idea but this is not the kind of transformation that Aristotle is discussing in his remarks. he would be the first to acknowledge that the material here is not necessarily connected to the product: it could well have been used, for example, to build a wall and an oven and these materials have been manipulated by external so-called “efficient” causes. In Spinoza’s language, these bricks and some may have themselves possessed a conatus, a striving to exist as bricks and stones, but neither for Aristotle nor for Spinoza could there have been a striving on their part to become a house. The elimination of the essences of kinds of things may be behind the example Spinoza felt forced to choose to illustrate his point. This also has an unfortunate effect upon Spinoza’s discussion of the good and the bad which he claims:

“..means nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things mutually. For one and the same thing can at one time be good, bad and indifferent. E.g., music is good to the melancholy, bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the deaf.”

The correction of this instrumental relativism will have to wait until the Philosophy of Kant where the instrumental desire for perfection will be questioned as a foundation for ethical thinking. In Kant’s ethics, we will find ourselves returned to a deontological conception of the good and the bad: a conception which is founded on an absolute conceåtion of a good will that has the power of universalizing the principle of one’s action into a universal law. this end-in-itself transcends the power we use to preserve ourselves in existence and is on the contrary projected outward as an imperative to treat others as ends in themselves dwelling in a community of ends.

Brett levels this criticism at Spinoza:

“..there is in Spinoza another vein of thought often overlooked. As he moves away from the Cartesian dualism and toward the concrete unity of the agent there is more and more evidence that Machiavelli and Hobbes areinfluences to be reckoned with, and the reflective reader will continually catch echoes from these writers as he follows Spinoza’s treatment of the fundamental conatus, or notes how rigidly he excludes the moral values when he deals with strength of motives.”

Given the above attitude toward the Good expressed by Spinoza in relation to music, it will also fall to Kant to restore a deontological view of the aesthetic Good when he claims that in aesthetic appreciation it is the form of the finality of the object that is an important constituent of this fundamentally “disinterested” yet subjective aesthetic attitude.

Spinoza is often accused of both atheism and pantheism. The former accusation probably is founded in religious malice but the latter is probably an accurate description. It is however, a strange form of pantheism that excludes the aesthetic attitude as conceived by Kantian Philosophy.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Descartes’ Cogito and the pilotless ship.

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In the Meditations we encounter Descartes sitting beside a fire in a Heraclitean setting and perhaps in a Heraclitean mood. He is presumably wondering how, if everything is changing all the time, we can be certain of anything we think. Six meditations in six days are the form he chooses to characterize his position. Descartes the Catholic has one eye on the Bible and one skeptical -scientific eye on all the falsehoods he has believed in his lifetime. This Heraclitean skepticism and scientific commitment which influenced Aristotle but did not overwhelm Aristotelian thought determines the content of these Cartesian Meditations. Descartes doubts his senses because they have in certain circumstances misled him in the past, doubts the existence of his own body, and he even doubts his awareness that he is sitting in front of the fire because he might be dreaming. After all how many times in a dream did we believe that something was happening only to wake up and realize that we had been dreaming? His skeptical method, however, was not cynical. His doubts were designed to prepare the soil for the search for a first principle. He eventually gives the senses the benefit of the doubt and convinces himself that he is awake through a reasoning process which refers to a proof for the existence of God and subsequently a claim that God is good and therefore incapable of deceiving mankind. God, it also turns out, is a guarantee for certain kinds of knowledge such as geometry and arithmetic and this, in turn, allows us to be certain we are sitting in front of a fire in virtue of the extension and motion of the matter we are thinking about. Descartes cannot, however, rest at this point as other philosophers have, he is forced to question whether he can be certain that he is thinking. He convinces himself that he must be thinking exactly because in order to doubt that one is thinking one must be thinking. This is still not sufficient to be certain that I am not being deceived by an evil demon. God is also called upon to guarantee the first truth and foundation of all Philosophy, cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am. The major difference between Heraclitus and Descartes is that the latter, some commentators have claimed, is reflecting in a Neoplatonic metaphysical environment in which dualism(and not hylomorphism) was the dominant response to materialism. Much research has been focussed upon Cartesian dualism and the division of the physical world from the world of thought but some of this research ignores Descartes’ attempts to build two bridges between these two “worlds”. Firstly, thoughts can present themselves to us as clear and distinct and the prime example of such a thought would be “I think therefore I am”: such a clear and distinct thought relates backward to a thinker, an “I”, and forward to existence in the world(although clearly reference back to the thinker is more important to Descartes than intensionality). The second bridge is more controversial and was probably built reluctantly in the course of a debate with materialists in which Descartes was asked for the location where the mind-world met the body-world. Descartes, to his credit, insisted that this was not a philosophical question but more like a scientific question but the waves of the debate rose so high that he reluctantly conceded that this material location might be in the pineal gland of the brain.

The spirit of the times of Descartes can perhaps be summarized by three legacies from Ancient Greece and Medieval times. Firstly, there was widely spread skepticism about whether there could be such a thing as knowledge considering the disputes there were between the scientists as to what science was and the disputes that occurred in religious debates consequent upon the Reformation, about what can be known in religious contexts. Secondly, there were also quite naturally a continuation of the age old disputes between materialists, dualists, and Aristotelian hylomorphism. Thirdly, in many circles of society Stoicism was the ethical position many of the educated classes fixated upon including Princess Elisabeth, one of Descartes’ correspondents.

Bertrand Russell in his work “History of Western Philosophy”(p550) argues that Descartes is relying on two principles in his Philosophy: the so-called cogito argument which concludes with the principle “I am a thing that thinks” and “All thoughts which are clear and distinct are true. He also claims mysteriously that the reference that Descartes makes to the “I” is at most a grammatical point(Russell does not attach the same philosophical significance to grammar that we find in the work of the later Wittgenstein). Reference to the “I” should, according to Russell be dropped in favour of an ultimate premise which reads, “There are thoughts”. This seems, however not to capture all of the metaphysical nuances of the Cartesian position. Kant perhaps came the closest to capturing this significance with the following words from his “Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view”:(p.15)

“The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person…..But is noteworthy that the child who can already speak fairly fluently, nevertheless first begins to talk by means of the “I” fairly late(perhaps a year later), in the meantime thinking of himself in the third person(Karl wants to eat, to walk etc.). When he starts to speak by means of “I” a light sees to dawn on him, as it were, and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking.–Before he merely felt himself: now he thinks himself.”

Notice firstly that Russell wished to dispense with this first-person point of view in favour of a third person point of view which might make it difficult to account for what Kant saw to be an ontological difference between feeling(that which happens to man) and thinking(that which man actively does). Russell does, however, point intuitively to the fact that reference to the I as a thing is a regression back to the schoolmen and scholastic philosophical reflections on the obscure notion of Substance. It was perhaps this reliance on Substance that closed both the bridges between the two worlds and gave us the impression, according to Russell, that we are witnessing a completion of a Platonic project which was the first to suggest the presence of two independent and parallel worlds. There is something to this criticism but perhaps not as much as Russell believes. Plato’s dualism, we know also built a bridge between the physical world in which oak trees are created and destroyed and the intellectual world of the so-called forms(which Aristotle thought of as principles) that determine the nature of oak trees and everything physical that we encounter. According to Plato, on the physical world side of the bridge the oak tree “participates” in the world of forms. This word may indeed suggest that the image of two “worlds” is merely a metaphor and “participates” may merely mean to “manifest a principle”.

Here again, we encounter the problem over the concept of Substance we encountered in earlier scholastic philosophy where the interpretation was perhaps materialistic rather than in terms of the Aristotelian interpretation that regarded substance to be a form or principle. Interpreting Substance materialistically obviously leads to questions relating to the location of this substance: questions relating to a location where the two worlds meet or coincide. Aristotle in his early work “Categories” adopted a materialistic interpretation of the notion of Substance which was subsequently abandoned in his later works as his hylomorphic theory formed. Descartes never developed his thoughts in accordance with hylomorphic theory but he did oscillate dualistically between a scientific/materialistic and philosophical non-materialistic interpretation. One consequence of the materialistic interpretation was the viewing of the intellectual world of ideas as deterministic. Plato perhaps avoided this problem by claiming that the ideas or forms of the intellectual world were timeless but we see no such move in Descartes’ philosophical work(although as a Catholic he must have believed the soul to be immortal). This also left a question mark hanging over the ontological status of men, were they angels, rational organisms or Hobbesian automata? Descartes is perhaps, however, saved from this particular dilemma when he interprets the notion of substance more “spiritually”. Willing, for example, for Descartes is a form or a mode of thinking as is sensation, perception, and imagination. In the “Meditations” he asserts categorically that the mind can function without the brain…“for clearly there can be no use of the brain for pure intelligence but only for imagination and sensation.” For Descartes, it is clear that some modes of thinking involve the body and some don’t. Yet we also know that Descartes refuses to divide the body and the mind, claiming a unity which shall not be pictured in terms of a pilot inside a ship. Here Descartes is very Aristotelian in his approach to this problem. Brett has the following to say on this topic:

“…there is no unity in the doctrines of Descartes. The fact is obvious. The only task that remains is to distinguish and identify the various lines of thought that here converge. At one extreme we have a purely rationalistic element. The essence of mind is thought, and the fact that some ideas are declared innate makes the doctrines of descartes a spiritualistic psychology. Here we have a continuation of pure scholasticism. At the other extreme we have a naturalistic element. Apart from the innate ideas, the content of consciousness is furnished from the body through the passions: this is an empirical element…The dualism which he maintains is primarily scholastic, and so, indirectly Aristotelian. It is not correct to say that Descartes “had defined mind in opposition to Aristotle, as exclusively thinking substance”. Aristotle never supposed that mind as such was anything more than a principle of thought. In fact Descartes and Aristotle were remarkably alike,”(p370-1)

Aristotle would not have accepted the Cartesian account of animal life and it is highly doubtful that he would have agreed to the Cartesian distinction between the primary mathematical qualities of things and other sense based qualities. He certainly would not have agreed to the claim that Mathematics was our principal guide to the understanding of the forms embedded in the physical external world. Descartes is regarded as the father of modern philosophy but he is equally influential in the field of science for many different reasons: firstly for his insistence on the importance of Mathematics for scientific investigation, secondly for his claim that in the realm of physics there must be some conservation of quantity law, thirdly that empirical experimentation was probably necessary to establish to distinguish between different competing explanations of natural phenomena. The idea of theoretical models of reality might have its origins in these ideas. The burning issue to be resolved here is whether even here he would appeal to the role of God to guarantee the certainty of knowledge in science. Many philosophers, including Bernard Williams in his book on Descartes, claims that the philosopher intended his system to work without any divine intervention or guarantee. He claims that it was Descartes intention to free science from any theological constraints. In an interview with Brian Magee for the series “The Great Philosophers” Williams claims that the Cartesian belief in God was nevertheless genuine and not fake. His belief in God, in other words, was both clear and distinct. Kant distinguished between these two criteria by claiming that for something to be clear was probably a perceptual claim in which one distinguishes one object from another whereas a distinct idea refers to the more complex conceptual relation of representations to each other. Moreover, Williams claims the following in the same interview:

“We use, and certainly science uses, some kind of dualism between the knower and the known, the idea of a world that is independent of our process of knowing it,” (“the Great Philosophers p.92)

This suffices for us to claim what both Wiiliams and many other philosophers throughout the ages have claimed, namely that Descartes moved epistemology to the centre of the philosophical stage. A move that endured until twentieth century analytical Philosophy when logic and language was also moved to the centre of the philosophical stage, leaving Aristotle and Kant to wait in the wings for better days, One of the Cartesian images most influential in Scientific Psychology is the following taken from Williams in the same interview:

“Another question that is put to you dramatically by Descartes is “What am I?” We can imagine ourselves as other than what we are. We have a power of extracting ourselves imaginatively from our actual circumstances. We can imagine ourselves looking out on the world from a different body. We can imagine looking into a mirror and seeing a different face, and not being surprised. And this gives me the idea, a powerful idea that I am independent of the body and the past that I have. That is an experience basic to the Cartesian idea that I am somehow independent of all these material things.”

This has been an enormously influential argument and has contributed to the triumph of dualism over both Aristotelian hylomorphism and Kantian transcendentalism in spite of the fact that both Aristotle and Kant would have pointed to the inadequacies of the above argument from the point of view of rationality. Kant would, for example, deny that such imaginative ideas possess the properties of clarity and distinctness and Aristotle would have questioned whether this kind of imaginative abstraction had any significant relation to the continuity of our body and our memories.

The quote above by Brett claims that for Descartes ideas were innate. It is not clear that this is a correct representation of Descartes’ position. The resolution of this problem largely depends upon the extent to which the philosophy of Descartes resembles the hylomorphism of Aristotle. For Aristotle perception, imagination, remembering, using language, and reasoning are all powers which are only “innate” in the sense that they determine the kind of soul or principles that constitute the essence of being human. It is not a simple matter, as we have seen to correctly characterise the commitment both to a materialistic conception of substance and a commitment to a position similar to Aristotle’s. In the former approach, we can see the Cartesian deterministic explanations of other life forms and sometimes this dominates, especially when God is introduced into the picture. If that is, God has given us all our powers then it can seem as if we humans are clockwork dolls which only need to be wound up and released into the world.

Some modern Psychologists, influenced by the argument from imagination introduced above regard Descartes as one the first proponents of the importance of consciousness in the account of what it is to be human. But it can be argued that insofar as sensation, perception, and imagination may well be key components of consciousness, these are not fully fledged intellectual powers for Descartes: they are modes of thinking that are not necessarily rational.

Russell in his response to the skeptical method of Descartes claims that his method is only useful if there is a stopping point. There are two such points, Russell argues, indubitable facts and indubitable principles. Russell insists, however, that Descartes’ indubitable facts are “his own thoughts” and this is a denial of the Aristotelian stopping point of rationally arrived at principle. Russell prefers instead to see the influence of Platonism and Christian Philosophy at work here. We can see the influence of Christian Philosophy in the use Descartes makes of God to guarantee the clarity and distinctness of his facts. God guarantees not only that we are not dreaming, sensing something real when awake, and thinking, but also the veracity of subjects such as geometry and arithmetic. Descartes argues in several places for the existence of God and this might be a sign that God is not a Principle that is the source of principles as is the case in Aristotelian philosophy.

Another aspect of the Cartesian Meditations that we need to consider is the fact that we find the individual Descartes meditating on the world from the point of view of an individual sitting in front of a fire, conjecturing on whether he could be dreaming that he is sitting in front of the fire. This, it could be argued, is a picture of an individual material substance testing his individual powers of thinking in the face of the world. Thus conceived, the world created in these 6 Meditations is a testament for Solipsism and this is further confirmed by the Cartesian insistence that those works created by individuals of genius are preferable to the things created by communities of workers. Buildings created by individual architects are preferable to those produced by teams of architects. Ancient cities sprawling across the landscape are to be less admired than those designed by one city architect. Systems of Philosophy are also best created by an individual genius, which of course Descartes took himself to be.

Descartes did not possess a library and did not, therefore, read his predecessors’ thoughts systematically. The Solipsist perhaps reasons that the only world to know and care about is this one of his that exists now. The past is the past and is as such unreal and is not part of the here and now. Everything is possible in the future even the wish of one of the new men Cecil Rhodes to colonize the planets he observed in the heavens. Descartes may have been one of the first of these “new men”(along with Hobbes) imagining that they have different bodies and may have believed himself to be an innovative genius in the field of philosophy but the fact of the matter is that, as Russell pointed out, much of what he claimed was to be found either in Aristotle or the scholastics working with a respect for the past and tradition in their respective communities. It is worthwhile also to point out in this context that a singular focus on epistemology, logic, and language provided the impetus for the difficult-to-classify philosophies of Russell and Moore as well as the impetus for the rationalism of Leibniz and Spinoza.

Descartes used the image of a tree to illustrate the respective areas of Philosophical thinking: the roots of the tree represented metaphysics, the trunk represented physics and the branches of the tree medicine, mechanics, and morality. This is a different system to the Aristotelian threefold conceptualization of Philosophy as divided into the Theoretical Sciences, the Practical Sciences, and the Productive Sciences. There is, despite its presence on the branches of his tree, no systematic attempt to discuss morality in the Cartesian writings, merely scattered remarks suggestive of an instrumental view of the reasoning operative in this arena. This would seem to entail instrumental views of virtue, and the happy life especially considering the fact that Descartes was careful to avoid any suggestion of a final cause/ teleological explanation of this realm of our lives.

In one of his latest works “Meditations”, however, this image of a tree of knowledge is supplemented by an image of the search for the truth in the form of the construction of solid, stable foundations for a house. Both images are of course Biblical, the latter being based on the parable warning one not to build one’s house upon a foundation of sand. The Science involved with this latter image is that of Architecture, a sub-branch of mechanics and Descartes’ advice here is :

“to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations”(AT 7:17, CSM 2:12)

In line with his skeptical method the message he is communicating here is that construction must follow destruction. Gassendi, in his objections to this skeptical strategy asks Descartes in correspondence why he found it necessary to “consider everything as false” including the extreme position of imagining a deceitful God. In reply to this objection Descartes defends himself by an appeal to the authority of “everyone”:

“Can we really be too careful in carrying out a project which everyone agrees should be performed”(Replies 5)

A reference to the anti-authoritarian atmosphere of the times perhaps. In the course of the ensuing construction we are persuaded to regard the knowledge of ourselves as more certain than our knowledge of what is happening when a piece of wax is melted by a fire. According to Descartes my awareness of myself is more clear and distinct for the simple reason that when I think something(even when the thought is false) it is not possible that the being that is doing the thinking can fail to exist. Here thinking is the very essence, form, or principle of the mind and this position is very similar to that we find in Aristotle’s reflections on this issue. Thinking is the a priori form of the mind. Descartes the rationalist is also anticipating the rationalism of Kant, at least insofar as this aspect of his metaphysics is concerned. Kant, however, saw it as part of his philosophical mission to find a position that could unite both empiricism and rationalism: a position that would enable us to characterize the importance of Ethics, Aesthetics, and Religion in a systematic account of man and his communities.

Perhaps the final test one should apply to the Philosophy of Descartes is whether it has in any sense advanced the understanding of Philosophy over the millennia since the work of Aristotle. Perhaps a Kantian conception of Philosophy can assist us in answering this question. Kant claims that Philosophy ought to provide us with answers to the following four questions: “What can I know?”, “What ought I to do?”, “What can I hope for?” and “What is man?”. Now whilst some aspects of Cartesian thought provide us with some kind of answer to the first question there is some doubt as to whether there are answers to the other three questions which are superior to the answers we find in Aristotle.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: “The New Men”: Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes

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The Renaissance begins at the end of the fifteenth century and the weeds of modernism begin to flourish and take their various forms, determining the cultural landscape. We noted in the previous lecture that the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were times of trouble and general challenges to authority left many institutions mortally wounded.

The Art of the early 16th century Renaissance, however, was a positive phenomenon and embodied memories of the importance of the human soul, but these memories were fading fast over the centuries. By the time we come to the twentieth century, we find art critics like Adrian Stokes needing to appeal to Psychoanalytical theory in his efforts to explain what he called “The Image in Form” and the relation of the image of the body in Art to the image of the soul in Art. Renaissance Art, in his view, is best illustrated in the mother of all Arts, Architecture. His view of Art begins with the pure outwardness of Space which he finds best symbolized in buildings such as Laurana’s courtyard of the ducal palace in Urbino. Stokes analyses the mass effect of this work and compares it to Roman and Baroque works which reek of manic grandiose intentions. There is the suggestion that what he classifies as “QuattroCento Art” is best expressed by those Italian artists who were perhaps more inspired by the Hellenic and Stoic view of Naturalism rather than the modern form of Scientific Naturalism that was establishing itself in the culture. The science of this time appeared to be dedicating itself to a mission of denuding the particular of all reference to the human soul. The QuattroCento spirit is, it could be argued, founded in an Aristotelian idea of the form that is being organized in material. Michelangelo, in the context of this discussion, is an interesting exemplification of this QuattroCento spirit. Responding to the mania of his time with his depressive tendencies and Aristotelian spirit he produced human sculptures in worked marble(“the warm stone” that bore the projection of his humanistic fantasies. All of this rings a strange chord to us Northerners accustomed to the temporal play of light in amongst the branches of the trees of the woods we dwell in. Our gazes are pulled in Gothic fashion upwards following the soaring trees. Not for us this steadfast horizontally planted steadfast gaze at what is in front of our eyes and in the front of our minds. Our Northern thoughts must flow like music and embellish our perceptions and “express” our personalities. This is the environment of the craftsman rather than the QuattroCento artist: a craft that follows not the categorical aesthetic imperative of the QuattroCento artist but a craft that follows the technological(scientific) imperative with an interested attitude that disqualifies it as an aesthetic activity, in the eyes of Kant. Even in the Renaissance, we encounter the battle of the imperatives.

Bertrand Russell in his “History of Western Philosophy” claims that the mental outlook of the modern is best characterised by two structural factors: the diminishing authority of the Church and the increasing influence of Science. Russell is undoubtedly correct in his reference to these macro-systemic processes but we wish to maintain that at certain periods in the history of the modern period(the Enlightenment) philosophical and aesthetic attitudes such as those expressed in the Renaissance and which originated in Greece are also factors to be considered in our modern accounts of modern man.

We have reflected much upon the erosion of authority in the church but worse was to come in the sixteenth century. Science and its “Northern naturalistic spirit” was going to make itself felt in no uncertain terms. Professor Brett notes the beginnings of the seismic shift to come in a work from 1501:

“in 1501 Magnus Hundt, Professor in Leipzig wrote a book on the “nature of man”, and made use for the first time of the term “Anthropologia“. In these words we see the process by which the naturalistic treatment of man developed its later forms.It is impossible to read Hundt’s book without feeling that it belongs to a new period….The soul is treated briefly and in epitome only: the centre of interest seems to have shifted from soul to body and in place of psychology we have the rudiments of descriptive zoology.”

The trend continued and as the concept of the soul was found guilty by association with religion, gradually the same kind of explanation was demanded both for physical and mental phenomena. This in its turn contaminated ethical discussions. In another work from 1574 by Levinas Lemnius entitled De Occultae Naturae we are exposed to a form of relativism that surely must have astonished the clergy and the religiously inclined. Lemnius maintained in this work that moral conscience varies with mode of life, age, and state of health. His account was purely an explanation in relation to a totality of facts without any recourse to either principle or the effect of principles on one’s mode of life.

Bertrand Russell in the section of his work cited above pointed to an interesting “modern” distinction between practical and theoretical science, a distinction he makes in terms of the difference between trying to understand the world and trying to change the world. He argues, probably correctly, that the latter view has increased in influence and that science has become more pragmatic, more utilitarian. This development, together with an interesting emphasis upon self-reliance and individualism connected in some way with casting aside the “chains” of religion produced an interesting Renaissance cocktail that not only resulted in the ethical relativism of Lemnius but also produced the political relativism of Machiavelli who undertook “to study life as he found it before our eyes”(Brett “History of Psychology” p.306). Machiavelli in his writings resembled a sociologist or a social psychologist more than a philosopher, and as Brett pointed out:

“For him the individual is the first object to be considered: man and circumstance are the two factors which explain all events and all social conditions. Society appears here only as a repressive agency from which the genius or the man of power escapes.”

Bertrand Russell praises Machiavelli’s honesty in a time of political dishonesty and appears not to recognise in him the modern image of Thrasymachus from Book 1 of Plato’s Republic. Thrasymachus was perhaps the first political realist to claim that when the stronger rule a state in their own interests such a state is just. The justification Thrasymachus gives for his position an argument based on the observation of past and present states and the behaviour of the politicians ruling these states. He argues that is, from something that is the case to something that ought to be the case. Machiavelli provided us with a modern variation on this theme based on the same poisonous observation that what is the case ought to be the case. Machiavelli was very much a child of the Italian Renaissance. He would dress in special clothes in the evenings and retire to read about ancient courts and statesmen, imagining himself in discourse with them about their times and his. Platonic philosophical cities or Augustinian Cities of God were not for him: “He who thinks that what should be instead of what is, learns his ruin rather than his preservation”(“The Prince”). The Prince, his individual par excellence should in his eyes, pay more heed to the people than to the Nobles whom he shall murder if they stand in his way. But listening to the people is only for the purposes of manipulating and deceiving them in order to keep their allegiance. This is Political Realism(Naturalism) at its worst but it was a clear expression of the process of the dissolution of Morality that inevitably accompanied the dissolution of religious authority and Aristotelian learning. Political realism of this kind requires of the Prince that he by sly as a fox and as fierce and cruel as a lion. These were the qualities necessary if one was to exercise power over Modern man whom he characterized as unscrupulous egoists. It is almost as if Machiavelli believes (as is perhaps the case with Russell too) that conscience insofar as it belongs to the realm of what one ought to do is not as real as what is the case(what they actually do). The world of intentions is very uncertain in chaotic political environments where the power game and the predictions that follow from it has replaced the ethical attitude of what ought ethically to be the case. Not for Machiavelli, the Greek attitude that it is exactly in such power-laden environments that Knowledge of the Good and good intentions are crucial for the stability of social and political life. For Machiavelli, as for Thrasymachus, practical reasoning has only one objective form and that is the form of what Kant called the technological imperative which can only view actions as means to an end, placing necessity not at the end of the chain but at those points where the means physically and causally bring about their effects. The technological imperative is a chain of efficient causes and is the practical correlate of the theoretical/causal reasoning of Science. These two forms of reasoning formed an unholy alliance in the minds of many many ethical and political “realists” in the “modern period”. This instrumental form of reasoning is contrasted in Kant with the Categorical imperative in which good intention is what is logically related to the good consequence. The Categorical Imperative can be seen as the Kantian response to Glaucon´s challenge to Socrates in the Republic to prove that justice is both good in itself and good in its consequences. The Categorical Imperative, that is, embraces both forms of the good. Machiavelli’s reduction of the good in itself to good consequences ruled by the realm of the technological imperative would have been met with the Socratic objection that such a position confuses Justice with Power.

Bertrand Russell claims that Francis Bacon was regarded as the originator of the expression “Knowledge is power”: and he points to the phenomenon we are attempting to highlight: namely the shift from a categorical form of theoretical reasoning to an instrumental form of practical reasoning in many regions of our discourse, including Science. Bacon was truly one of the “new men” combining political ambition with Science. As a young man, Bacon was supposedly subjected to the teachings of Aristotle at University though we do not know to what extent his teachers understood the intricacies of Aristotelian thinking. Shortly after this experience he entered Parliament and became an advisor to the Earl of Essex and it was not long before he displayed his Machiavellian disposition in matters of state. We find him both advising Queen Elisabeth 1st to be more tolerant to the Catholics and later being part of the committee drawing up the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. As Attorney General Bacon was not above using torture in order to obtain convictions. His “illustrious” career(Solicitor General, Attorney General, Lord Chancellor) ended under a cloud of suspicion when he was fined and shortly imprisoned in the Tower of London for taking bribes(23 charges of corruption)– a situation that Bertrand Russell in Thrasymachian fashion excused with the words, “the ethics of the legal profession in those days, were somewhat lax”(History of Western Philosophy, p526). Bacon is also reputed to have participated in the treason trial of the Earl of Essex(presumably testifying against him).

Francis Bacon is described by D W Hamlyn in his Penguin History of Western Philosophy as one of the “new men”. This is in many respects a true and important observation. He was both a man of Science and a man of Politics underlying these roles was a Sceptic and suspicion was the prevailing spirit of his life. Educated at Cambridge University he studied Aristotle as we mentioned but irrespective of the quality of the understanding of Aristotle by his teachers it might also be the case that his skepticism prevented the viewing of Aristotle’s Philosophy in the humanistic spirit in which it was conceived. Two typically skeptical criticisms leveled by Bacon at Aristotle were, firstly the questioning of the claim that sense experience presents things we perceive as they are in reality, and secondly, that the Aristotelian system of categories also does not correspond in any objective way to the things we encounter in our sense experiences. Aristotle did not merely rely on his categories or the four kinds of change in his complete account of change in the world, he also relied on his fourfold system of “causes/explanations” to further articulate his account. He claimed, for example, that some explanations for things being as they involve so-called material explanations, i.e. are explanations of sensible phenomena in terms of what things are made of. It is true that there existed no table of elements during the times of Aristotle and he conceived of the elements as earth, water, air and fire being combined and separated by the processes of hot and cold, wet and dry. In this context, it should also be pointed out that Aristotle was no stranger to atomistic thinking and whilst he might have thought that the sensible form of a thing was more of a guide to its real nature than the swarm of atoms theory, he understood that matter might be infinitely divisible( composed of smaller and smaller elements. He might not have conceded, however, that this was any ground for believing that there are atoms in the sense of indivisible elements. Insofar as the criticism that categories of thinking about things do not “correspond” with these things is concerned, Aristotle’s later conception of substance(substantial change for his is one of the categories of change) was transformed into that of “form” or “principle” and principles for him occur in a context only of explanation or justification: a very different context to that of the “description” of a thing in which one might well include, qualities, quantities, and sensible relations.

Bacon ignores much of the above account and approaches Aristotle with reductionist tendencies and this spirit is manifested in his discussion of how he believed heat could be reduced to motion. By motion he did not of course mean what Aristotle meant by “change”. Change, for Aristotle,included apart from substantial change, quantitative change, qualitative change, and locomotion(change of place). Bacon in his reflections appears to ignore substantial and qualitative change as well as the Aristotelian notions of formal and final “causes/explanations”. He produces no convincing argument for the elimination of these aspects of Aristotelian theory, merely a sceptical frame of mind that refuses to find any space for the toleration of theories that were abstract and needed deduction to bring them down to the physical, concrete level of physical reality where motion could be unmistakenly experienced in the way that principles involved in the practical context of discovery could not. The new men with their new science emerging from the era of scholasticism had become weary of abstract distinction occurring in debates and discussions of the inhabitants from Academia although one would have thought that the Aristotelian distinction referred to earlier, namely that between contexts of explanation/justification and the contexts of exploration/description would have been sufficient not to evoke the spirits of Plato and Neo-Platonism.

Bacon was in favour of a separation of Science and Philosophy on the grounds of induction which for him was defined not in terms of the enumeration of individual cases(e.g. Plato is mortal, Aristotle is mortal, Therefore all men are mortal) but rather defined via a methodical process of tabulating phenomena in order to eliminate irrelevant elements– a method of falsification rather than a method of confirmation: a method, namely, that relies on arriving inductively at a principle in a context of discovery rather than proceeding from a principle in a context of explanation/justification. Science and empiricism are fellows from the same society and both are skeptical toward certain forms of philosophizing. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that Bacon found no difficulty in believing that nature is revelatory of a divine purpose. Balking at the idea that induction needed Logic and Metaphysical theory as part of the process of hypothesis formation and testing is in need of further explanation. Russell claims that Bacon did not sufficiently emphasize hypothesis formation and points to the importance of the deductive journey from hypotheses to their consequences(the logic of the technological imperative).

Bacon the skeptic, the Machiavellian believed that there were 4 kinds of habits of mind in society that cause people to stray from the truth. he refers to these habits in terms of “idols”: “Idols of the tribe” are related to reliance upon senses, feelings or beliefs, “idols of the cave” are of a more personal nature and relate to an individuals personal happiness, “idols of the marketplace arise from the ambiguity or meaninglessness of the language men use in their discourse with one another, and finally “idols of the public theatre” in which philosophical theories are presented misleadingly as true. In this final category, he places Aristotelian theory, arguing that this kind of theory removes us from the arena of experience and the new inductive methodology of the new science which he called Instauratio Magna. In spite of his Bacon’s skepticism Hamlyn insists that Bacon’s conception of science presupposes metaphysical assumptions of its own which are thinly veiled in his use of the Aristotelian term “form”. Paradoxically, in spite of the quantitative bias of Baconian science we also find the curious suggestion that there is some kind of relation between forms and the qualities of things, It is important to add here, however, that Bacon was not yet a modern Scientist because he did not use or master the tool of modern science, namely mathematics which the rationalist thought to be essential to both the context of exploration/description as well the context of explanation/justification. For Bacon, however, Mathematics was a part of a Platonic realm that has been sealed off from concrete experience and for that reason would not survive the skeptical guillotine.

Bacon believed that Scientists have different roles in what he called the Mansion of Solomon. The science of the soul has a room in this mansion as part of the department of what he called “Philosophia Humanitatis et Civilis” where we will find men studying the body and the soul as well as the study of man as a citizen. The workers working in this mansion are, in accordance with the inductive method, engaged in a laborious collection of evidence that Brett describes in the following manner::(p350)

“a laborious collection of evidence about individuals should result in a concept of man formed in a purely empirical fashion and designed to show the actual nature and limits of human capacity. This part of the scheme reflects the influence of that movement toward scientific anthropology which had already begun. After these should come the study of the union of soul and body, including the study of expression(physiognomics) and the interpretation of dreams. The general object of these two branches of study is to determine in what way and to what extent the humours and temperament of the body affect the soul: also how the soul affects the body.”

Bacon’s inductive investigations resulted in the division of the faculties of the soul into three : memory, imagination, and reason and these three faculties in turn formed the basis of the subject areas of history, poetry and philosophy, each of which attempted to avoid the detrimental influence of the 4 “idols”.

Kant in his work “Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view” divides the Mansion of Solomon in a different way, arguing that the study of the human being results in only two kinds of knowledge: Physiological knowledge of what nature makes of man(Bacon’s effect of the body upon the soul is part of this) and Pragmatic knowledge which is:

“the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself.”(Introduction p. Xiii).

It is not clear whether this idea of what man “should make of himself” would count as the kind of investigation that Brett would count as Scientific. This kind of investigation which Kant engages upon is a conceptual and theoretically-laden affair that is not tied directly to observation. Indeed Kant specifically claims that observation even of the most systematic kind is not sufficient to establish or found the kind of knowledge we encounter in his “pragmatic” investigations.

In his work “Novum Organum” Bacon recommended amongst other advice following the path of Galileo in the rejection of Aristotelian assumptions whilst he also paradoxically suggested rejecting any appeal to abstract mathematics as part of the scientific tribunal of justification. The path of the scientist, Brett argues on behalf of Bacon is:

“he must collect countless instances under different conditions. All the realms of nature must be scoured by teams of sedulous research workers. Well attested facts must be recorded in a central clearing house without any “anticipations of nature” or provisional hypotheses. Rather, these facts must await the judgment of the man who can give an “interpretation of nature”. Method is the key. Method will guard against our inveterate tendency to generalise too soon, to “anticipate” nature.”(p351)

Brett’s conclusion, like Russell’s, is that Bacon failed to understand the role of hypotheses in Science to generate deductions that can be tested. Both Philosophers and Bacon failed to understand how Aristotelian principles could produce an Anthropology that was largely faithful to Aristotelian principles: e.g. the Kantian “Anthropology”. For Brett, it appears that Psychology is a disguised form of epistemology that is fundamentally scientific in its essence: it is, that is, a matter of collecting all the well-attested facts and allowing scientific laws to “emerge” in the process of exploration. Such an approach is, of course, antagonistic toward the approach in which hypotheses are generated from what we know apriori about the soul or the mind. This seems to ignore a well-known distinction characterized in both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy which the new men with their new science disregarded: the distinction, namely, between proceeding from a principle in order to explain(the context of explanation) and proceeding towards forming a principle in one’s practical investigations (the context of exploration/discovery). Bacon refuses to recognize this distinction because it leads, he fears, to “hasty” generalizations. The major consequences of his program, however, were an obsession with a largely instrumental method using technological imperatives. Bacon’s political influence was undoubtedly a major factor in the preference of what Brett called Bacon’s “dogmatic methodism” over the empirically-rational Aristotelian approach that both acknowledged the importance of induction and its limitations in physical investigations, classification systems, and concept formation. The rational element in Aristotle’s theorising also acknowledged the importance of intellectually based a priori assumptions.

Hobbes(1588-1679) was also an empiricist but he differed with Bacon over the importance of Mathematics which he began to appreciate whilst he was studying at Paris University. On one of his later sojourns to Paris Hobbes also came into contact with Descartes’ “Meditations”. Hobbes is reputed to have taught mathematics to Charles second before he became King. His scholarly abilities in this field, however, have been questioned in debates he had with a professor at Oxford over the “possibility” of squaring the circle. D W Hamlyn does not believe that Hobbes was a true revolutionary in the field of philosophy in the way in which Descartes clearly was(History of Western Philosophy p129-130). Hobbes views, it has been maintained are merely a natural development of ways of thinking that began earlier in Renaissance times. Whereas Descartes’ thought was original in its acknowledgment of the relations of reason, thought, mathematics and God, Hobbes was a straightforward materialist, a determinist, and an atheist who wished to square the circle of politics with an epistemological anti-metaphysical attitude toward philosophical psychology and social phenomena. Hobbes may have been the originator of the concept of artificial intelligence when he claimed that life is nothing but motion of beings possessing parts such as limbs, organs etc. and if this is the case there is nothing to prevent us from considering the movement of machine parts in the same way, as an artificial form of life. Motion in its turn causes sensations and all the qualities of objects are reducible to motion. Our sensory life and imagination are also reducible to motions of the body as is thought and the succession of thoughts which Hobbes believed was subject to the laws of association. Reason was regarded skeptically as being merely a means of calculating the motions developed in the history of man by his industrious activity. Emotions such as desire are merely motions towards and away from things. The will, or intention to do something was for Hobbes, the same as desire and this entailed a denial of the existence of free will. Both the world and the will are determined. We see this philosophical psychology clearly at play in the application of these ideas to social and political phenomena. Men, he argues, live naturally in a state of nature, in a state of war of all against all, a state of fear for one’s life until that point when they cooperate to form communities in accordance with a social contract with a sovereign or a leader. For Aristotle, the formation of communities is a natural organic phenomenon but this is not the case for Hobbes: the whole process is artificial. Only bees and ants cooperate naturally, Hobbes argues. The human sovereign in this highly artificial state of affairs must both possess and exercise power with overwhelming force: “Covenants without the sword are but words”. Is Hobbes’s sovereign a despot? He clearly believes that despotism is better than anarchy and there is nothing of the nuanced account of Aristotle where we find accounts of six kinds of government of which tyranny and monarchy are but two. Indeed, Hobbes even denies the distinction between tyranny and monarchy: a tyrant, he argues, in the spirit of Machiavelli is but a monarch that is unpopular. Hobbes’ description of political activity and institutions is very clinical and bears a great deal of resemblance to his account of artificial life. Russell claims that Hobbes is the first of modern writers on political theory. Even the Hobbesian account of language is in the same spirit and remind one very much of the doctrines of later logical atomists. All words are the names of individuals. Names combine to form sentences. There is a clear resemblance of these thoughts to the Logical Atomism of the Early Wittgenstein. Words function as signs that can mislead and deceive if not used correctly. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, Hobbes never distinguished the causal relations of signs to things outside in the world and to each other from the logical and conceptual questions of the relation of the signs to the world. For Hobbes, reasoning about how to use language would be merely a matter of instrumental calculation: the calculation of means to ends. Brett summarizes Hobbes’ contribution to the development of Psychology in the following terms:

“Hobbes saw that it was mans capacity for using symbols in deductive reasoning and in descriptive language which distinguishes him from animals, together with the theoretical curiosity that goes along with it. But he even suggested a mechanical explanation of language in his crude causal theory of signs. This was a grotesque failure because he never properly distinguished logical questions and the reference of signs from causal questions of their origin. Similarly, he gave a mechanical explanation of choice. Will, he held, simply is the last desire in deliberating which emerges after the oscillation of impulses. Here again in his writings on the free will he never properly distinguished questions about the justifications of actions(their reasons) from questions about their causes. A person who deliberates rationally about means to an end will be influenced by logically relevant considerations. For him, there is a difference between good and bad reasons for a course of action. Now any mechanical theory, even if it has recourse to minute motions, must face the glaring inappropriateness of giving causal explanations of such transitions which involve insight and the grasp of relevance.”

Hobbes like Bacon desired power and knowledge was merely an instrumental means to this highest end. He projected this attitude onto mankind:

“So that in the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death”

This could indeed be the motto for the new society of new men that was forming before our eyes. Hobbes was also one of the modern thinkers responsible for postulating a middle class whose instinct is to desire commodious forms of life and much modern political liberalism has attempted to create political and economic policies designed to create the conditions for leading such a life. This cannot but remind one of Hannah Arendt’s characterization of modern man in her work “Origins of Totalitarianism. She points to the combination of the attitude of “Anything is possible” and the desire of new men like Cecil Rhodes to “colonize the planets he saw in the sky” as being at the roots of totalitarianism. Knowledge in such a world is a means to a diffuse striving that probably does not have an end.

These modern men are in a sense, a different kind of man compared to Aristotelian man gazing at the heavens and the phenomena of life and wondering”Why?”: wondering why we live and die or wondering how to live. For the latter man beginnings and endings are important in our attempted explanations and justifications, for the former “new men” life is infinitely continuous, which is of course a kind of denial of the relations between beginnings and endings, livings and dyings. Freud is a thinker that springs to mind in these kinds of discussions as does his image of the clash of the cultural giants, Eros and Thanatos: the life and the death “instincts”. Freud’s work “Civilisation and its Discontents” poses the question as to whether the work we put into maintaining and creating our civilisations is worth the effort. Presumably behind the posing of this question lies a view of the modern world and its “new men”. In the early work of one of his countrymen, Ludvig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus Logico Philosophicus” we encounter the intriguing challenge to consign to silence all those philosophical matters of which we cannot speak. A sterling challenge considering the fact that all value, aesthetic, ethical, and religious fall into this category of what cannot be said. Wittgenstein of course later abandoned much of this logical atomism and even the scientific spirit of philosophising in a work which no longer saw the use of language as the work of bringing atoms together into meaningful configurations. “Philosophical Investigations” looked upon language as an Aristotelian form of life and attempted to restore the work of Aristotle and perhaps also the work of Kant to contemporary debate: attempting , in other words to replace the “new men” with classical or enlightenment men.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The Challenge to Authority and the Franciscans. (Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon William of Ockham)

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The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were times of troubles. Some historians have called this period a time of crisis. A little ice age, a series of famines and plagues were not the least of our troubles, reducing the population of Europe to less than half its previous levels. Popular revolts and internecine conflicts between nobles and the monarchy were common in the wake of the Western Schism in the Roman Catholic Church and the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, the hundred years war(1337-1449) and the Magna Carta. Shakespeare captured the spirit of the post Magna Carta times in a speech by a monarch of the period, Richard II(Act 3 Scene 2):

“No matter where. Of comfort no man speak. Lets talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs, Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth Lets choose executors, and talk of wills And yet not so- for what can we bequeath, Save our deposed bodies to the ground And tell stories of the death of kings- How some have been deposed, some slain in war Some haunted by the ghosts they have deposed Some poisoned by their wives, some sleeping killed All murdered–for within the hollow crown That rounds the mortal temples of a King Keeps death his court.

Ones man’s crisis is another man’s transformation and applying these terms to long periods of time is more an art than a science. The seeds of the above discord were sown in the thirteenth century where we can see the more sensitive nerves of our culture inflamed with infections caused by the search for political and social stability. The search appeared to have come to an end with the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215: a document that ensured the protection of a limited set of rights for the barons and the poor as well as subsuming the ruler’s authority under the laws of the time.

Roger Bacon(ca 1215-1292), a Franciscan thinker, was in many respects a symbol or an omen of the new order of freedom and the rise of Science unleashed by the Magna Carta in England. He could well have been one of the rebellious barons dissatisfied with the degree of implementation of the “Great Charter” given his attacks on authority figures. Kenny in his work “A New History of Western Philosophy”(vol 2)(p80) points out that Bacon claimed that there are two necessary conditions of scientific research: a study of the languages of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic, and a knowledge of mathematics. His definition of science was in terms of the methods of induction and experimentation and for him, the field of knowledge was dualistic and bipolar: either deductive and rational(which he associated with authority) or experiential(reality tested practice) and experimental. It is the latter of these poles that takes us beyond authoritative theories of Philosophers like Aristotle. He does not, however, given his claim relating to the necessary conditions of scientific activity, appeal in the way modern scientists were to do later to the role of mathematics in scientific investigation. The category of the quantitative was to play a greater controlling role than the category of the qualitative. Bacon was more Aristotelian in his approach in spite of his authority complex. It can be argued that Bacon, in fact, was a pioneer of qualitative experimentation in which the Aristotelian ideas of principle and substance are still in a limited fashion, operating. M Schramm(1998) claims that Bacon was the source of the view that takes laws of nature to be important(of the kind presumably that one finds much later in Newton’s “Principia Mathematica”). The context in which Bacon conducted his research was neatly formulated by Brett in his “History of Psychology”(Chapter 9 The Challenge to Authority):

“During the first three-quarters of the thirteenth-century scholarship was estimated more highly than originality. The work of interpreting Aristotle absorbed the energies of the great writers, and for a time little or no attention was paid to nature. Here was a flaw which gave an opportunity for both criticism and reconstruction. The times were not favourable to either procedure, but efforts were made in both directions. The problems of mind and matter could be regarded as problems of nature and opposition to traditionalism naturally presents itself as an appeal to two great sources of knowledge, experience and experiment. From this point of view mysticism and natural science may be regarded as aspects of one tendency, for mysticism is based on an idea of experience, and science on the idea of experience. Mysticism is represented in various degrees by Bonaventura, Gerson and Echart: Roger Bacon and Vitelo are the most prominent in the sphere of science: while Duns Scotus, Ockham and others represent the development of thought in more strictly theological circles. Brett also points out in a footnote that both mysticism and science represent in their different ways challenges to authority. It should also be recalled that Roger Bacon, the Oxford scholar and the Cambridge scholar Newton shared an interest in alchemy. Bacon’s principal focus in Science was, however in the field of Optics where he combined an interest in Alhazen with a dynamic view of nature: a view of a world in which things interacted untouched by our intellectual ideas of them. It is in this view that we see a clear movement away from Aristotle and a movement toward a world view defined as a totality of facts subject to laws discovered inductively and experimentally. This view combined with his interest in the black art of alchemy may have caused the clerical authorities to imprison Bacon for heresy towards the end of his life.

St Bonaventura(1221-74) was the authority in charge of the Franciscan order. He took issue with many of Bacon’s thoughts being himself influenced by St Augustine and St Anselm. He was not a pure Platonist, however, claiming that the future of theological reflection lies on a path between the works of Plato and Aristotle. He was a devout pious man who found himself in an environment which was beginning to distrust systems and definitions. In him, we find the connection that theology is less connected to knowledge and theory and more related to practical reason and the will. His work was very traditional and he tended in spite of his views on the future of reflection to merely reproduce many of the ideas of earlier Neoplatonism, a less than surprising fact considering that he was an authority figure himself.

The next generation of Franciscans was led by Duns Scotus, “Doctor subtlety”. According to Kenny(vol 2 p86) Scotus was critical of both Aquinian and Aristotelian ideas relating to the so-called analogous application of predicates such as “Good” to God, maintaining, on the contrary, that the meaning of “NN is good” and “God is good” is essentially the same. Scotus, however, agrees with both Aquinas and Aristotle that there is a sense in which God is an infinite being. According to Russell Scotus was a “moderate realist” and a Pelagian(p458 “History of Western Philosophy”), claiming that we know our own actions without needing proof for them. On a theoretical plain, Scotus proposed a very early principle of individuation which claims that there is no difference between being and its essence which breaks with an established Platonic view that identical twins, for example, are identical in being human and their different locations in space have no essential significance. According to Scotus being in different spaces is sufficient to regard the twins as different beings. In passing we can perhaps note that Aristotle would have regarded both of these positions as possible, the twins being qualitatively different(different persons) but in terms of their humanity substantially the same. Modern scholars, like Bertrand Russell in the light of the aforementioned reflection attribute to Scotus a rejection of the idea of substance.

Scotus’ theological doctrines, however, were more tied up with his conviction that faith is a moral rather than a theoretical matter: concerned with the good related to action rather than the true related to Knowledge. This, in turn, connected Scotus’ excursions into the realm of philosophical psychology and his reflections here for some psychologists heralded one of the first accounts of the relation between consciousness and attention. He, unlike them, however, places his reflections in a concrete practical context. Brett characterizes Scotus’ position thus:

“The treatment of the will as basis for right action is more satisfactory. Scotus makes a genuine attempt to explain the actual relation between knowledge and purpose. The cognitive part comes first: we have the idea before we consciously use it as means to an end. But there are two kinds of thinking(cogitatio): first thoughts are merely events, the appearance in the soul of ideas, among which one is clearer than the others. This is the material upon which the will acts: its function is to retain the indistinct thoughts directing itself to them, and controlling their relations to the central power of thought.”

Brett points out the originality of these thoughts in contradistinction to Russell’s earlier comments relating to the lack of originality in the scholastic tradition. There is also in the above quote an echo of Descartes later reflections on the clarity and distinctness of ideas.

The last of the Franciscans, and the last of the scholastics, was William of Ockham(1300-47) who could also be regarded as an original mind in that he embraced scientific knowledge and logic at the expense of metaphysics. He attacked Aristotle’s system of ten categories and replaced them by two and he used the Aquinian terminology of “first intention” and “second intention” in original and useful ways. He was among the first to give a linguistic account of the world believing amongst other things that names were mental acts of an individual. Concepts in our minds, on the other hand, form a language system that is universal and is expressed by all the languages of the world. For him, everything in the world was particular existences and universals only existed in the mind in the form of natural and conventional “signs”–the former being the thoughts of the mind and the latter being the words we use to express these thoughts. Linguistic terms of the first intention refer to nonlinguistic items(particular existences) in the world and terms of the second intention relate linguistic terms to each other. Ockham disagrees with Scotus over the issue of substance because, as Hamlyn points out on page 120:

“Ockham believes there exist only substances and sensible qualities of them: and nothing in the facts of language or of thought, which relies on natural signs, really suggests otherwise.”

This form of substantive empiricism rests on a basis of intuitive cognition of particulars and perhaps calls into question the basis of the existence of “signs” that dwell n the mind in a fashion reminiscent of “modern” logical empiricism(Quine). Quine, we may recall evoked “stimulus meanings” and “observation sentences” and claimed that they in some mysterious way were connected in a web with theoretical statements.

Aristotle has by this time all but disappeared in these successive waves of challenges to Authority launched by the Franciscans, who dominated much of the thirteenth century and some of the fourteenth century. The “reinterpretation” of Aristotle did however, establish itself in the University of Oxford in particular and to some extent in Paris but it also has to be pointed out that the universities themselves were schismatic, containing both religious and secular scholars, containing both Franciscans and Dominicans. The Dominicans were slower than the Franciscans to accommodate their reflections to growing secular concerns. In this respect, the Franciscans appear to have won the day with a combination of naturalism and mysticism.

As we approach the Renaissance we see an increasing emphasis on logic and science to the exclusion of the more systematic theorising of Aristotle. Our opening remarks relating to Richard II(1367-1400) talked of the death of Kings and it is almost certain that Shakespeare saw this to be symbolic of wounded authority and greater processes at work. The Holy Roman Empire lasted for a thousand years until 1806 but the nature of its authority was a markedly different and diminished affair at the end of this largely Franciscan period.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The Reinterpretation of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas.

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One of the major considerations to bear in mind when one is engaged upon the task of the evaluation of Thomas of Aquinas’s contribution to the Scholastic tradition of theorising in the 13th century is the nature of the relation between Faith based Theology and Rationalist Philosophy.

Aquinas was largely educated by the Church in what was referred to as the liberal arts, a tradition of training reaching back to the sixth century, a period in which Aristotelian ideas were conspicuous by their absence. The closing of the philosophical schools during the sixth century was the end of a process of the eclipsing of the sun of classical knowledge. Monastic education did, however, realize that there was a need for the supplementation of Scriptural studies with other areas of study such as logic, rhetoric, and grammar(the trivium) and arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music(the quadrivium). This proliferation of subjects originally taught in monastic and cathedral schools eventually contributed to the establishment of the institution of the university. This development was probably aided and abetted by the historical conditions of the twelfth century outlined in Bertrand Russel’s work “History of Western Philosophy”:

“Four aspects of the twelfth century are especially interesting to us:

  1. The continued conflict of empire and papacy.
  2. The rise of the Lombard cities.
  3. The Crusades, and
  4. The growth of scholasticism. All these four continued into the following century.”(p422)

Secularism continued to grow in influence and although the scholastic philosophers were all involved in one way or another with the Church and subject to regulation by ecclesiastically constituted committees, the works of Aristotle were increasingly being favoured over the works of Plato. By the time we arrive at the establishment of the Universities which would be partially modelled on the secular guild system we encounter a reformation of the liberal arts program in the light of Aristotelian ideas. When Aquinas began to study at the Universities of Naples and Paris Aristotle was referred to as “The Philosopher” and the spirit of his work would dominate university curricular for hundreds of years.

Russell points out that the scholars of the twelfth century were very active and creative when the conditions allowed them to be. During these times one was witnessing the birth of globalization forces of empire building and international trade. Political and economic forces struggled for power with the churches’ global ambitions sometimes in the form of military conflict. There was also resistance to the forces of globalization in the form of a re-emergence of city-state systems(the Lombard cities).

The scholastic atmosphere of the twelfth century was dialectical: debate and disputation were encouraged by the emerging system of the universities. Indeed, the first European University, the University of Bologna, embodied this scholastic dialectical spirit of it being a secular Legal Institution devoted to defending the rights of the people against both Empire and Church. It was most famous for its Constitutia Habita a decree which guaranteed the right of the traveling scholar to academic freedom(within certain limits). Bologna shared with the Universities of Paris and Oxford a commitment to a belief in the principle of apprenticeship as the road to mastery of an area of study: a principle that was partly examined and tested by disputations with opponents(a residue of the Greek dialogue?) Successful completions of a course of study of the trivium and quadrivium were conditions of entry into these largely secular humanistic knowledge driven institutions.

As mentioned earlier Aristotle was “The Philosopher” in the thirteenth century and the dominance of his ideas would over hundreds of years into the future intensify activity in all the subject areas of his writings, but probably the greatest interest was taken in restoring the validity of natural science: an area that had largely been discarded by the classical theologically inclined Platonists. Aquinas found himself at the beginning of this cycle of development and his interest in Aristotle was probably strictly regulated by the Dominican brotherhood that he had joined. As we have noted in previous chapters previous thinkers had attempted to elevate the power of reasoning to the same level as the power of faith in a supernatural power but these thinkers did not dare to embrace Aristotle’s philosophy in the way in which Aquinas attempted to do. It was far too early in the cycle of development of Aristotle’s influence for Reason and Understanding to replace Faith and Belief in certain areas of philosophical investigation.

According to A Kenny in his work “A New History of Western Philosophy”, the thirteenth century:

“…was a time of uncommon intellectual energy and excitement. The context for this ferment was created by two innovations that had occurred early in the century. The new universities and the new religious orders. Bologna and Salemo have claims to be the oldest universities in Europe. But Bologna had no permanent university buildings until 1565 and Salemo’s academic glory quickly faded: moreover, both were specialised schools, concentrating on law and medicine respectively. It was at Paris and Oxford that the institution really took root.” (Vol. 2 p.55)

Kenny maintains that both universities and parliaments came into existence at the same time: if by university we mean:

“a corporation of people engaged professionally, full time, in the teaching and expansion of a corpus of knowledge in various subjects, handing it on to their pupils with an agreed syllabus, agreed methods of teaching, and agreed professional standards.”

Medieval Universities quickly developed into hybrid organisations in which the Humanities were taught in the spirit of the Socratic examined life and the Aristotelian Contemplative life but at the same time the subjects of theology, law, and medicine were taught in a more instrumental spirit.

The thirteenth century was clearly a time for synthesis. One interesting fact to note , however, is that the five great scholars of the century were all members of the religious orders of the Dominicans or Franciscans. Add to this the fact that despite the increasing attitude of tolerance toward the pagan Philosophy of Aristotle in the University of Paris in 1210, lectures on Aristotle’s natural philosophy were forbidden and orders were issued in the form of papal bulls for these texts to be burned. Under such circumstance,s it was highly unlikely that any interpreter of Aristotle could commit themselves to “The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” in any attempted synthesis of Philosophy and Religion. Aristotle was in a sense persona non grata in the instrumental world of Theology where truth and knowledge were communicated in a utilitarian spirit. Yet it is important to note that were it not for this utilitarian spirit of teaching in three out of the four faculties, Modern Science might never have emerged a few centuries later. Also, interestingly one can speculate that if Medicine which was also being taught in a utilitarian spirit , had followed a more principled Aristotelian path, it may have become the Queen of the Sciences and the Prince of the Humanities.

Aquinas perhaps has earned the right to be called the great synthesizer in one of the great ages of Synthesis. His synthesis was an attempt to bring about an integration of Aristotelian ideas with Christianity, each of which could in its turn claim to be the synthesis of positions in their respective ages. Had the conditions been different, one might argue, the Aquinian synthesis might have been more in favour of Aristotelian principles rather than being in favour of the standard Neoplatonic and theological “interpretation” of Aristotle. This state of affairs haunted the Universities up to the time of Kant and the Enlightenment. Kant, as we know was the first philosopher to publish works in his mother tongue German rather than the prescribed language of Academia, namely Latin. It is worth noting that the so-called father of Modern Philosophy, Descartes, wrote in Latin that only God could guarantee that his life was not a dream. It is also worth noting that Descartes inherited the antipathy of the theologians toward the rational principles of Aristotle. One interpretation of the Aquinian synthesis was that its purpose was to put Aristotle in his place, and subordinate reason to Faith and revelation. D W Hamlyn has the following to say on this topic:

“Aquinas was the great synthesizer, able to use the newly discovered Aristotle to produce a philosophical system by which reason could be set alongside faith. There are for Aquinas revealed truths, and where philosophical considerations conflict with revelation–as is the case, for example, when Aristotelian principles lead to a denial of a first creation–Aquinas has no hesitation in siding with faith.”

Hamlyn goes on to point out that with respect to certain less sensitive issues of what he calls “natural theology” Aquinas felt confident enough to explain and justify such phenomena by means of Aristotelian principles:

“Aquinas’ account of the natural world is almost strictly Aristotelian, based o the reciprocal principles of matter and form, things occupying various degrees between the extremes of prime matter and pure form.”

In this context certain analytical scholastic issues surfaced in his writings, for example the question of what it is that makes a thing one and what is is that individuates things from each other. Here Aquinas appealed to quantities of stuff occupying different spaces(one of the lodestar principles of modern science) as being the major principle of individuation in the material world(materia signata quantitate).

Hamlyn also suggests that Aquinas might be guilty of projecting an idea of God as a supernatural being onto the writings of Aristotle which actually pleaded for the notions of form, principle or pure act above that of any being. But even if this is the case Aquinas was careful to point out that he rejected the Ontological argument of Anselm which in his view conflated existence in thought with existence in reality. We can, he argued, only use attributes which are used to describe the external world to analogously describe God. In other words, positive properties such as God’s goodness, omniscience, omnipotence etc, can only be known by analogy. But we also find Aquinas using standard Aristotelian arguments such as the proof that there by necessity must be a prime mover behind the actualization process that actualizes potentialities: i.e. movement or change in the world has to have an unmoved mover or an unchanged changer. It is in this realm that we encounter the possible metaphysical conflicts between Aristotle and Aquinas for whom the creation of the world is not similar to the Aristotelian teleological designer of the world(or the demiurge of Plato) who is working within the framework of the other three types of cause(efficient, material and formal): The Aquinian God, on the contrary, creates the world from nothing. No proof of the existence of God could ever suffice here because it is a parts of Gods essence that he possesses such an incomprehensible power which only the religious attitude of faith is able to “understand”. Reason and its arguments could only ever analogously or symbolically represent what it is that we “understand” in accordance with this attitude. Attitudes are related to beliefs in that they are ways of believing whatever it is we believe. At some level, of course, Aquinas “believed” Gods essence and existence to be identical and given what an attitude is this is not something that we can believe in the way we believe it to be true that man is a rational animal capable of discourse. “Man” in this proposition is a name for some kind of thing in the world which can be differentiated from other kinds of things by the definition of his essence in terms of the 4 kinds of change, the 4 causes of change and the three principles of change. God cannot be a name in this sense but if “God” is not a name for something how do we designate his presence? Aquinas turns to the Bible to answer this question and abandons philosophical investigation into the matter. A burning bush on Mount Sinai tells Moses that the name of his God is Yahweh and explains the grammar of the term with the words “I am that I am”. What can Moses have “understood” in this experience? What attitude of mind was created by this experience? Initially his state of mind was probably fearful and if Heidegger in his work “Being and Time” was correct in his assumption that every state of mind is accompanied by an understanding or comprehension of its object this state must have been transfigured or transformed into a faith state with its understanding: an understanding to be unpacked in terms of an enigmatic character of “Being-in-the-world” which involves active projection of one’s own possibilities as well as an interpretation or appropriation of what it is that is to be understood. What we are concerned with, in other words, is a work of interpretation aimed at understanding a mode of Being-in-the world.

We know that Aquinas was studying and interpreting texts as part of his University training and in so doing would have reflected upon the grammar of the language for God many times. The question to raise here is whether these reflections were engaging at all with the metaphysical/hylemorphic theory of change of Aristotle. What has been said above is indicative of the fact that the answer to this question is that Aristotelian ideas probably played a minimal role in his interpretative reflections. In order to illuminate the reason for such a state of affairs let us turn to the writings of a modern Aquinian, Paul Ricoeur, in the hope that we can provide ourselves with a more nuanced perspective of the dilemma Aquinas faced in his attempts to integrate the powers of faith and reason.

Ricoeur began his excursion into the territory of religion or the “realm of the sacred” with an examination of the language involved in what he called “The Symbolism of Evil”. In this work, he noted that the logic of the analytic philosophers could not satisfactorily give an account of the kind of meaning involved in the confession of our sins or faults. This, Ricoeur argues, is clearly a meaningful activity. The words make sense but it is not at all clear what they refer to. In the most primitive case of the confession of sins we feel, as Ricoeur put the matter, “defiled” and this attitude involves our viewing our relation to the sacred as analogous or symbolic of the spot or stain that spoils the surface it affects: we are, that is, seeing this evil act of ours as a stain on our good character. But why one might wonder, cannot one merely say “I am evil?” This impossibility reaches right to the heart of the meaning of the “Good” and its relation to our human essence. Could it be, one may wonder, that we are dealing with the same kind of problem when, according to Aquinas, we cannot directly attribute the quality of “goodness” to God. We are, after all, according to the Bible and Aquinas created in the image of God which of course eventually raises the question of Original Sin. If God could never, in accordance with his essence, will any evil act then on this account neither could man. Adam in the Garden of Eden, on an Aristotelian account, wishes for knowledge as a stage on the path to greater understanding for man, the rational animal capable of discourse. Indeed one can wonder whether if Adam had not disobeyed the divine commandment not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge, would he have been considered the first man, i.e. the first rational animal capable of discourse? This myth is clearly paradoxical if we believe with Plato and Aristotle that Knowledge of the good is divine. God, of course, does not know the good in the way that is possible for us–he is the good(“I am that I am”). We, the image, can only “understand” the good via the route of understanding ourselves, and we can only do this via the Scriptures and the Myths of the poets who only speak of the sacred indirectly in a symbolic language that only those capable of the attitude of faith can decipher. It is the power of the symbol that “reveals” the truth (Aletheia). We moderns may well have lost the ability to, as many commentators have put it, naively believe in “The Good” and therefore respond to this state of affairs by requiring proof if we are to believe in its existence. We can, that is, no longer innocently believe but must take a critical route, perhaps via the hermeneutical philosophy of Ricoeur or the hylemorphic philosophy of Aristotle if we are to restore the possibility of once again living in the realm of the sacred. For Ricoeur, this possibility requires the work of the imagination and its projection of these “possibilities” and it also requires a view of language as the source of the meaning we are projecting and interpreting. We need, in Aristotelian terms, to be “capable of (this kind of) discourse”.

On an Aristotelian view of the Garden of Eden drama it is an interesting observation to make that were Adam and Eve to be guided by “the discourse”(?) with the serpent to consider eating the apple it would call into question their humanity insofar as this must be evidence that they do not appear to understand the discourse of God as superior to that of the serpent. But, also on an Aristotelian view of the operation of the emotions in the sphere of voluntary actions, could we not consider an intermediate case of Adam and Eve both being, as it were, “drunk” with curiosity and subsequently eating the apple in a state of delirious consciousness, not fully aware of what it was they were doing? If this tale were to replace the original, would it carry any symbolic significance: universal significance? What would be required to universalize the new Aristotelian account.? Some means would have to be found to represent not merely what is happening in the environment of the Garden of Eden but the reason why whatever is happening is happening ( the reason for the actions of Adam and Eve): that is why what was done is either a good or an evil act. Being drunk with an emotion is of course not necessarily a positive state of mind on the Aristotelian view of incontinent behaviour: curiosity, that is, is not always positive and this may be a cautionary tale. Animals are sometimes killed by their curiosity and sometimes this occurs in situations where if they knew the reason(explanation/justification) for the phenomenon(and its consequences) that is arousing their curiosity, they might engage in a behaviour of repulsion instead of a behaviour of attraction. So, to take a concrete example, even if the apple on the tree that is eaten is poisoned and Adam and Eve die as a consequence of eating it, this story would be merely a juxtaposition of a number of facts unless knowledge of the Good was somehow imparted to give it deeper meaning: knowledge, for example, that for humans, (rational animals capable of discourse, passing laws, worshiping the sacred, doing philosophy) a premature death is an evil. But this would be a humanist’s tale and not carry the kind of universal significance related to the sacred that the religious attitude requires. Somehow the religious lesson to be learned is in another realm, the realm of the universal sinfulness of man(in comparison with the universal goodness of God?) so drunk with curiosity that he cannot or will not heed the words of God. Perhaps the message from the realm of the sacred to modern man obsessed with his material possessions, technological inventions, and facts is that there is a lack of clarity over the nature of his desires and the beliefs involved in “the facts”, i.e a lack of clarity concerning the kind of world we live in which is sometimes symbolically described as “the valley of the shadow of death”, without knowledge of why we dwell in such a world. The ancient Greeks provided us with prophecy’s of doom about this world: “everything created is doomed to ruin and destruction”, and perhaps the Biblical tale of the Garden of Eden is providing us with an extension of this prophecy with the more optimistic message “unless we worship in the realm of the sacred”. Plato in his work “The Republic” tried to sugar coat this ancient prophecy by claiming that we could at least save our cities, if not ourselves if philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers. For Aristotle, this political message may have been wishful thinking and on his account, it appears that the best we can do in the face of a doomsday scenario is to live a life of contemplation and cultivate the virtues via the use of reason. This kind of engagement with the world is a contrast to the religious life of medieval times which is characterized by a kind of melancholic withdrawal from the life of curiosity and all its consequences. Aquinas himself aspired to this religious form of life, perhaps satisfying the curious spark within by exploring the hinterland of his psyche with the millions of words he wrote. The end for both Aquinas and Aristotle was not evil as such because for the former the soul would outlive at least the death of the body and the day of judgment would determine whether the soul had actualized its full potential or not. For Aristotle, my world ends with the death of my body and even if the principles of the powers of my soul continue to exist in some sense there is no longer any concrete connection between these principles, powers and “me”. There is absolutely no reason to believe that Aristotle would accept the thesis that Eudaimonia was only possible in “the next “Life” “. For Aristotle, an individual’s very natural life comes to an end with his very natural death. Aristotle would have defended this position by reference to the principle of non-contradiction which applied to this form of reasoning would conclude that it cannot be true that there is another life after the death that defines the life that has come to an end.

Insofar as the nature of the soul is concerned Aquinas relies on a complex interpretation of the Aristotelian claim that thought and reason require no organ for their activity. Aristotle’s intention were anti-Platonic, designed not to prevent the spiritualization of the soul and emphasize is qualities as a principle or power. Brett in his work “history of Psychology” suspects that Aquinas is sometimes Platonising Aristotle:

“The soul is defined as both form and substance of the body. The idea of form is drawn from Aristotle but the medievalists believed that form is dependent on its substance and is annihilated when the substance is resolved into its elements: in other words, that a form is an attribute. Consequently, to save the soul from such dependence, the scholastic doctrine makes it a substance that gives form. As such the soul is, for immediate observation, the organic principle of life which cannot be divided from the organism: but it is also at the same time separable as substance and Aristotle gives place to Plato when we pass from the organism to the soul in and for itself. Meanwhile this much is gained: the soul and the body, in other words, the organism may be taken as the object of independent inquiry. In this way, philosophy and religion acquire independent spheres or subject matters: and this is important because the sphere of Philosophy, is thus segregated and comes, in practice, to be a true science separable from theology.”

A substance in Aristotle’s work “The Categories” was tied to particulars that later on in his full-blown hylemorphic theory became combinations of form and matter and form which formerly related to the shape of the particular now relates to the principle of the particulars essence and existence. It is clear that “substance” can be logically related to the principle of a thing but then the art of maintaining this position resides in not sliding into a dualism which spiritualizes the soul(if the particular we are talking about is an organism) and this substance dualism differentiates it significantly from the way in which two principles might differ from one another. This point has implication for the subject of study insofar as both Philosophy and Theology are concerned. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy claims that Aquinas described the relation between Philosophy and Theology thus:

“The first and major formal difference between philosophy and theology is found in their principles, that is starting points. The presupposition of the philosopher: that to which his discussions and arguments are ultimately driven back to are located in the public domain as it were. They are things that everyone in principle can know upon reflection: they are where disagreement between us must come to an end. These principles are not themselves the products of deductive proof which does not, of course, mean that they are immune to rational analysis and inquiry–and thus they are said to be known by themselves(per se as opposed to per alia). This is proportionately true of each of the sciences where the most common principles just alluded to are in the background and the proper principles that are the starting points of the particular science functional regionally as the common principles do across the whole terrain of thought and being…..By contrast, the discourse of the Theologian is ultimately driven back to starting points or principles that are held to be true on the basis of faith, that is, the truths that are authoritatively conveyed by Revelation as revealed by God. Theological discourse and inquiry…is characterized formally by the fact that its arguments and analyses are taken to be truth bearing only for those who accept Scriptural revelation as true.”

This position is supported and confirmed by Aquinas in his work “Exposition of Boethius’ On the Trinity”(q5,a4) in which it is claimed that there is in addition to the Theology of faith a Philosophical Theology in which the focus of attention is the metaphysics of a subject or its first principles. Aristotle, that is, would claim that the world can be traced back to first principles via the methods and theories of the Philosophers and also independently of any putative revelatory experience of the kind Aquinas maintains happened to him. In this discussion there does appear to be space for the position that maintains that “revelation” may be an independent avenue of access to first principles but that fact may be merely a consequence of the actualizing process involving reasoning processes operating over long periods of time. If this position is sound then there does appear to be grounds for insisting that both kinds of Theology mat be merely different aspects of the study of first principles.

Martin Heidegger in his work on Kant claims that that Metaphysics in Kant’s work is divisible into Metaphysics Generalis and Metaphysics Specialis and that Theology is part of the latter, making it in some sense dependent upon the Philosophical account of Metaphysics. Kant in this respect is following Aristotle in insisting that (Pure) Reason is the source of our finite understanding of the first principles of Metaphysics. This raises the question : What faculty or power of mind supports or connects to our faith in a superior being? Paul Ricoeur argues that the route of revelation requires symbolic language and the operation of the imagination.

One of the advantages of Philosophical Theology over Scriptural Theology is that in the former case one can know what one is talking about when one is talking about first principles. In Scriptural Theology it appears that we can somehow apprehend the essence of God but yet not know this essence because of the fact that we are not God, we are merely images of God. The way in which we apprehend the essence of God is via knowing that the proposition “God exists” is true in virtue of the knowledge that the predicate of the proposition is included in the essence of the subject. This appeal to language is unsurprising given the commitment to the symbolic language of the Scriptures where God is referred to symbolically. Formally, Gods essence implies his existence in both thought and reality. Spinoza in his work characterized this essence as a substance containing an infinite number of modes. A mode, for Spinoza, reveals an aspect of the substance of God. This is not an Aquinian position but rather a refinement or evolution which actually diminishes the importance of the Aristotelian view of God as a pure form or pure first principle which Aristotle characterizes in terms of a thinking contemplative being engaged in essential thought about himself. In the Scriptures, on the other hand, God appears to be concerned about us. This evident in his appearing as a burning speaking bush to Moses, in his sending his son Jesus to save us from ourselves. The chosen channel of communication of the Scriptural message is the symbolic language of the Bible understood by those whose Faith, Hope and Love enable them to interpret its messages correctly. This God is what he is. But what is that? Adopt the religious attitudes of Faith, Hope, and Love and presumably one will find out. How does one acquire such attitudes? They are according to Aquinas theological virtues and all virtues are acquired via the Aristotelian process of finding a golden mean between various extreme forms of conduct. Here we encounter two different accounts, one theoretical and one practical and it appears to be the case that Aquinas places more importance on the theoretical when he attempts to demonstrate the existence of God in his work “Summa Theologiae”. Referring directly to Aristotle’s “Posterior Analytics” Aquinas claims that there are two phases of demonstration: demonstrating the existence of the subject matter and demonstrating its essential properties. He then argues, somewhat paradoxically that philosophy can demonstrate the existence of God but not his essential properties which can only be attributed symbolically or analogically. This is paradoxical because in the Metaphysics Aristotle clearly argues that Theology is a theoretical science whose subject matter(God) is separate from nature. Aristotle in this work also clearly identifies the primary being with a primary good, namely rational thought thinking about itself(thinking about thinking). One cannot here but be reminded of the characterization of God in the Old Testament of the Bible, “I am that I am”. We are clearly in the realm of what Aquinas would call “logic” which deals with what he terms “second intentions”(concepts or ideas and the relations between them). Were Aristotle to have been confronted with this Biblical characterization he may claim that understanding here may hinge upon how one interprets the statement “I am that I am”. It could be interpreted as a factual physical albeit eternal presence(and not therefore subject to the prophecy that “all created things are doomed to ruin and destruction” in virtue of possessing the status of “creator”. Or alternatively the statement “I am that I am” could be interpreted in terms of a rational thinking presence that explains and justifies itself. On this latter interpretation, he is what he is, good, rational and causa sui (something that causes himself in all the causal forms Aristotle proposes). He is also eternally present and the cause of all change in accordance with the Aristotelian schema of 4 kinds of change and 3 principles of change. All of this Aquinas must in a sense deny because we are speaking here of the essential attributes of God which, according to his account cannot be characterized rationally but can only be given via the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love in the context of the theological symbolical language of the Bible.

Perhaps it could be argued that the Aristotelian account of God and the Biblical account are two “aspects” of the same “Being” and that the logical reasoning of Aristotle in the “Metaphysics” actually presents God in terms of the “second intention”(as rational thought) far more clearly than the symbolic language of the burning bush or the symbolic language of the New Testaments description of the life and death of the son of God (requiring for their full understanding the religious attitudes of faith, hope and love).

Paul Ricoeur maintains interestingly that Biblical texts have referential intent and are world revealing in the sense that Heidegger claimed great works of art are revealing–“aletheia“. This is only so, Ricoeur argues, if they are read in a critical spirit. He does not mean by critical what Aristotle or Kant would have meant, however. The world is not revealed through rational thought, Ricoeur maintains, but rather via the use of a productive imagination which through the lens of a symbolic language and a process of interpretation can project a possible future good life. The texts disclose to the interpreting subject a new mode of Being-in-the World and along with this a new understanding in a reader that may as a consequence be conscious of being reborn or “converted” in the process. Ricoeur also takes up in this context the fact that normal consciousness is in a sense a false consciousness that is in need of displacement: it is a wounded ego that is in need of teleological reform. To fully comprehend this state of affairs we must risk, Ricoeur argues, entering what he calls the hermeneutic circle: be, that is prepared to abandon rational thought in favour of a form of thought that is more dialectical. We need that is to use faith hope and love in order to understand and to understand in order to have faith hope and love. This complex form of understanding is practically oriented towards one’s life and engages with our conceptual world via intuitive imaginative content.

We also encounter the above teleological “conversion” in Kant’s account of religion and its role in the categorical imperative. For Kant our moral understanding is guided by imperatively structured thought(mirrored in an imperative language structure) that also displays a symbolic dual layer of reference corresponding to what we ought to do and why. This however only covers one aspect of a categorical imperative that also refers to a hoped-for cosmopolitan kingdom of ends in some distant future where the wills of ethical agents will communally follow the moral law. For Kant, however, this is not a consequence of the imagination but rather a consequence of the use of practical reason.

Ricoeur argues in a work entitled “Figuring the sacred” that religious language operates in a manner very similar to the way in which poetic language operates, namely by refiguring the world in terms of the possibilities connected with the good. The language used in this poetic way operates much as psychoanalytic therapy does by disorienting a wounded cogito and reorienting it towards a new world of possibilities. It is the performative nature of the language–its imperative mode–that is here revelatory. The language is, in other words, active and cathartic and its “second intention” is to introduce the listener/reader into the realm of the contemplative sacred world. Symbolic language of all forms, argues Ricoeur testifies to what he calls a “logic of superabundance” rather than a logic of rigid univocal meanings where the truth no longer as the Bible prophesies “sets you free”. It is this logic that for Ricoeur, also sets dialogue free and allows what he calls “open dialogue”. We find this logic not just in poetry but also in our myths: myths that analytical logic finds to contain merely sedimentations of falsities and a world estranged from analytical reality. Myths, according to Ricoeur use the linguistic devices of stories and narratives to enable the imagination and its expressive language to communicate its messages and morals. Such stories need, however, as they were in Greek times, to be submitted to a critical discipline if they are to become “instruments” of rationality. This critical discipline is not, however, the same as that proposed by analytical logic or science. In the latter, we are often persuaded to discard the products of the imagination(and practical reason) in favour of a theoretical commitment to a method and a world conceived of as a totality of facts without philosophical principles. Hypothetical, provisional theories awaiting the next best revision, is, no one will doubt, an excellent inductive process which with a dialectical twist can probably help us to reconfigure new concepts but such theories remain at the level of what Aquinas would call the “first intention” and will because of these facts forever remain in the realm of the context of exploration and discovery. Such a view of the world leaves the context of knowledgable explanation and justification hanging in a metaphysical limbo: a limbo that for the scientists are filled with the ghosts of myth, poetry, and ethics.

The above account contains the elements of what Neo-Kantians would call the transcendental imagination, pure intuition, pure reason, and understanding: an account made possible by Aristotelian critical philosophy. Aristotle was rehabilitated as an authority figure by Aquinas in an act of reinterpretation which perhaps was not entirely true to the spirit of Aristotle’s legacy but it did manage to keep the legacy alive long enough for a new and better reinterpretation by Kant whose critical philosophy was rapidly overshadowed by the challenge of the Hegelians in the spirit of something new and different(something “sensational”). Just as Science and analytical logic were to move into the cultural vacuum created by Aquinas in the name of Theology, history was to repeat itself after the Hegelian deconstruction of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and create a Philosophical vacuum based on an inadequate reinterpretation of both Aristotle and Kant. This state of affairs allowed Science and analytical logic to “colonize” all the realms of culture. Now whilst it would be unfair to characterize Aquinas’ position as “modern”, one can still maintain that it shared with modernism a Philosophical Psychology that did not engage as significantly as it should have with Aristotelian Metaphysics and Aristotelian writings on the soul. This was perhaps nowhere so apparent as in his treatment of the role of perception and imagination and their relation to reason and the understanding. According to Kenny the mistake of Aquinas was to regard the imagination as an “inner sense”:

“Many philosophers besides Aquinas have classified memory and imagination as inner senses. They have regarded these faculties as senses because they saw their function as the production of imagery: they regarded them as inner because their activity unlike that of the outer senses was not controlled by external stimuli. Aquinas indeed thought that the inner senses like the outer ones, had organs–organs that were located in different parts of the brain. It seems to be a mistake to regard the imagination as an inner sense. It has no organs in the sense in which sight has an organ: there is no part of the body that can be voluntarily moved so that we can imagine better, in the way in which the eyes can be voluntarily moved so that we can see better. Moreover, it is not possible to be mistaken about what one imagines in the way that can be mistaken about what one sees: others cannot check up on what I say I imagine as they can check up on what I claim to see.”( “A New History of Western Philosophy”, p.235)

All this can be granted without hesitation but where then is the correct positive characterization of the imagination? Kant’s philosophy may provide an answer to this question. He referred to the Transcendental Imagination and the process of schematizing our concepts independently of experience. In the Critique of Judgment Kant also refers to the way in which the imagination works in aesthetic contexts, where it is the form(the principle) of the object which is the focus of our activity. This activity resembles to some extent the activity of conceptualization. Aesthetic experience, however, is disinterested and only directed to the form of an object. If this is the case then it would seem to follow that we cannot regard the imagination as in any sense sensuous. It is also interesting to note that the imagination in practical ethical contexts may not be object directed but be focussed on whether an action can be universalized or not. This issue is decided in the realm of thought where the first step, for example, of ethical reflection, is to find the principle( or form) of the action before being processed by reason in terms of the logic of universalization.

Aquinas’ view of the intellect includes the power of the mind that earlier thinkers(excluding Aristotle) referred to specifically as the will. For Aquinas it is the will that separates the animal psuche from the human psuche. Animals, we know, eat instinctively but humans sublimate this activity with the help of a will, an intellectual faculty that uses the power of an interior command to achieve external actualisation of activities or actions. It is most importantly the connection of this activity to contemplation and rationality and linguistic characterisation that constitutes its voluntariness. Aquinas’ account of practical reasoning otherwise is Aristotelian: an action is a conclusion of practical reasoning which begins with a universal ought premise. Only if we can give reasons for the goodness of the act will it be perfectly voluntary and rational. Aquinas thus subscribes to a theory postulating a logical relationship between the will and the act, between a command and its execution. There are also echoes of Kant in his account of deciding what we ought to do:

“In contingent matters, reason can go either way… and what to do in particular situations is a contingent matter. So, in such cases, the judgment of reason is open to alternatives and is not determined to any one course. hence humans enjoy free decision, from the very fact of being rational”. (“Summa Theologiae 1a 83 1c)

Brett believes that this step of the individualisation of the intellect was necessary to overcome the influence of Arab philosophy which thought of the intellect as ” a universal superhuman intelligence in which all human beings partake”. Brett continues:

“From the given definition it follows that intellect is individual: each persons intellect is no more than the individuals actual intelligence. After this cosmic dualism is cleared away there remains the dualism within the individual. The Aristotelian treatment of the soul is not satisfactory to the Christian philosopher. For him, the soul must both be separable from the body and immortal. the proof of these points is not a part of psychology: the assertion of them affects psychological theory in the consequent difficulty of uniting that kind of soul to a body. The difficulty is obscured by speaking of the soul as the form of the body, with the added qualification that the form is, in this case, substantial. That is the point at which the Theologian forsakes Aristotle…we ultimately come to the question, “How is the unity possible?” For the powers of the senses and of the imagination are organic, but the intellectual powers are not organic: there is, therefore, a dualism to be overcome and since explanation must be given of the way in which the sense experience is taken up in the higher work of the intellect.”

Jonathan Lear in is work “Aristotle: the desire to understand” points out that Aristotle abandoned the view of soul as substance that was presented in the work “Categories”:

“However when Aristotle wrote the Categories he had not yet developed the concepts that would enable him to conceive of a particular like Socrates as a composite of form and matter. He knew that Socrates had an essence but he had not yet come up with the idea that the essence was the formed aspect of Socrates, his body being the matter. Indeed, Aristotle had not yet developed his technical concept of matter which he developed only when he came to explain how change was possible…. He was able to regard particular animals and plants as composites of a potentially living body(the matter) and a soul(the form or first actuality of a potentially living body)(p.270-1)

There is therefore no reason for the Theologian to forsake Aristotle if the ultimate goal is to ascertain the whole truth and nothing but the truth. There may, however, be reason for the philosopher to suspect Aquinas of a form of dualism that Aristotle might have been guilty of in his earlier work, the Categories.

It would not be appropriate in a discussion of Aquinas to omit a discussion of Natural Law theory which is normally attributed to the Dominican scholar. D W Hamlyn characterises Aquinas’ view thus:(p112)

“Aquinas is also notable for a theory of natural law. Aristotle’s moral theory is naturalistic in the sense that it sees the good for man in terms of what is part of human nature, and of what is natural for man to aim at, as rational beings. Men, as political animals and in society are governed by human laws, which are, in a sense, a sort of image of the divine law that governs the universe. But individuals can be regarded in themselves as an analogous system subject to laws which govern the relationship between their parts. The law that governs this is natural law, and it lays down what must be done to further the ends of man. As such, this law, as is the case with human laws, is prescriptive but the basis of what is prescribed is to be sought in what is natural(or supposed to be natural) for human beings. Aquinas thus attempts to derive the moral laws that govern human conduct from a conception of human beings and what is natural for them. Whether this sort of “ought” can be derived in any way from this sort of “is” is still the subject of debate among philosophers.”

Among philosophers of analytical persuasion ought to have been added to this characterization. Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas would have claimed that the initial premise of the premises of a practical syllogism should be an “is-premise”. The Good by definition is a teleological concept and thereby future-oriented. This essential feature is registered in a practical syllogism by the initial premise being a universal ought premise, e.g.

“Everything sweet ought to be tasted

This is sweet

This ought to be tasted.”

And the final action gives rise to an action that must necessarily be done unless as Aristotle points out one suddenly becomes physically unable or drunk with emotions of strong anger or appetites for something else. Emotions shut this rational forward looking faculty down. The point to note in the above practical syllogism is the universal (Everything) oughtpremise which in this case prescribes a good for the body(sugar = energy?) but such a universal premise could equally well aim at a good for the soul or the human being as a whole, e.g.

“Promises ought to be kept

Jack promised Jill he would return the money he borrowed from her

Jack ought to pay the money back”

The action here too ought to follow the reasoning process and we know from the writings of Aristotle that there is in any particular case a possibility of incontinence if the body or the soul is overwhelmed with emotion. Analytical philosophers have been prone to argue that if Jack does become overwhelmed with the desire to gamble all his money away, this suffices to compromise the universal validity of “Promises ought to be kept”. This position fails however to understand the role that facts play in this kind of reasoning. The fallacy of confusing an is fact statement with an ought founding ground is the same fallacy that Socrates encountered in his dispute with Thrasymachus in book one of Plato’s Republic. Thrasymachus was asked to define Justice and he did so by appealing to a principle, namely that strong rulers rule cities in their own interests, and appealing to a number of observational facts(this is and has been done in present and past democracies, tyrannies, oligarchies etc). Rulers passed laws that were in their own interests and thereby protected their power. socrates rightly objected that without knowledge of the Good(A Universal ought-premise such as “All rulers ought to pass laws in the interests of the common good”) the lawmakers would probably mistakenly pass laws that were not in their interests. This law together with the individual-related law “Promises ought to be kept” are the kind of natural laws Aristotle(who saw society and the city-state as a natural organic extension of human nature)and Aquinas was referring to. Man is for both of them a rational lawmaking, promise-keeping animal capable of discourse.

Aquinas understood the above complexities and might have objected to Hamlyn’s words: “This law as is the case with human laws, is prescriptive, but the basis of what is prescribed is to be sought in what is natural (or supposed to be natural) for human beings”. Such a formulation Aquinas would argue, opens the flood gates of logical descriptivism and enables one to argue on the basis of the assumption that “Everything natural is good” the following:

Everyman is naturally irreligious

Therefore being irreligious is good

and correlatively

Being religious is unnatural

Therefore being religious is not good.

The Fransiscan logicians who followed Aquinas would of course be seeking to undermine Aristotle because they despised the so-called pagan Greek Philosophy and to the extent that Aquinas was an Aristotelian was the extent to which he too was pagan.

Indeed, these forces were to prove overwhelmingly powerful because Aquinas may have been the last standard bearer of the Philosophy of Aristotle until the philosophy of Kant several hundreds of years later.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness:The Arab Proto-Renaissance,( Ibn Sina, Ibn al-Haytham ,Ibn Roshid), Aristotelian and Kantian Scientific Theory.

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The influence of the Arabs during the medieval period is somewhat of an enigma. Many scholars have been characterized as Neoplatonic in spite of the fact that there was a tangible presence in their work of Aristotelian ideas especially in the arenas of logic and philosophical psychology. Bertrand Russell in his work “History of Western Philosophy” ventures into East-West philosophical and religious relations and claims the following:

“The distinctive culture of the Muslim world, though it began in Syria, soon came to flourish most in the Eastern and Western extremities, Persia and Spain. The Syrians at the time of the conquest(634 AD) were admirers of Aristotle, whom Nestorian preferred to Plato, the philosopher favoured by the Catholics. The Arabs first acquired their knowledge of Greek Philosophy from the Syrians, and thus, from the beginning, they thought Aristotle more important than Plato.”(p416)

As mentioned above, however, it was in the theoretical spheres of logic and philosophical psychology that the Arab scholars were most active. It was not clear, for example, how the Arab preference for Nestorianism(the thesis that there were two beings present in the Incarnation of Jesus) could be a consequence of the Aristotelian monistic hylemorphic theory. Nestorianism could be many things amongst which are:

1. A belief in a Platonic form of a dualism of the mind and the body. or

2. An Aristotelian belief that man is both an animal(irrational) and rational.

The essentially encyclopedic approach to knowledge displayed by wide-ranging Arab interests of this period prevents a categorical stance on this issue. With some exceptions, they appeared to regard Philosophy as merely one subject among many. Avicenna, Ibn Sina, embodies this spirit, being the author of an encyclopedia and producing work in philosophical psychology that has a distinctive empirical character. Given the fact that his fame was principally gained in the field of medicine practicing as a doctor his preference for Aristotle over the more theoretically inclined Plato is understandable. He is noted amongst analytical philosophers for his work on the problem of Universals and here his views were clearly in some ways related to Aristotle, claiming that universals are before things, in things, and after things. One of the major differences between Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories as we know resides in a differing view of the character of the forms: Plato claiming that, for example, the natural objects of the external world “participate” in some sense of the term in their form and Aristotle countering this proposal with the view that the form partly resides in the external natural object.

Avicenna’s approach to the work of Aristotle was also encyclopedic and he divided his attention up into areas of logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Anthony Kenny, in his work ” A New History of Western Philosophy” argues that Avicenna’s work in metaphysics is “a thoroughly thought out original system”(p38). The system begins with the claim that a grasp of universals and principles by the active intellect complements a more receptive mind that requires information from the senses of the body. The system discusses the nature of God in terms which will reverberate long into the twentieth century, claiming a unity of the concepts of essence and existence. God is a being, it is argued whose essence logically entails the being’s existence in an eternal realm in which the world has “emanated” from God. The move from a principle to the realm of existence it constitutes is recognizably Platonic: the form of the oak tree is constitutive of the physical oak tree. Insofar as God is concerned the Platonic system may appear at first sight to be more complex than the Aristotelian given the intermediate role of the Demiurge in contexts of creation, and there arises here a question about whether “emanation” is a term that ranges over three entities, God, the Demiurge and the physical world instead of the Aristotelian proposal of a two-term relation which given his position that the principle or form of something can be “in” that thing suggests a relation of mutual implication between the two terms. If this is the case, the notion of “emanation” which suggests a one-way implication between three terms may not satisfactorily characterize the Aristotelian position. Avicenna’s own account, however, postulated no further than 10 different terms or levels of intellect in a heavenly realm beyond the fixed stars. Emanation in this contexts appears, however, to be a central notion giving a distinctly Neoplatonic impression. The correct characterization of these different systems may be of more than academic interest given the fact that Avicenna claimed to use Aristotelian justifications for the practices of polygamy, the subordination of women and many other Islamic social practices. The Aristotelian component of his reflections, however, were not appreciated by many conservative Muslims. Professor Brett in his work “The History of Psychology” has the following account which may illuminate some of the aspects of the debate:

“The history of Arabian Philosophy is mainly a record of translations and comments. This judgment commonly passed on the philosophy as a whole, applies with still greater force to such topics as may be called psychological…..there is no clear line of demarcation between the psychosophy which is allied to theology and those views of the soul which are more definitely scientific….In the union of psychosophy and psychology it is easy to see that the most salient feature of Arabic traditions is the union of Neoplatonic and Peripatetic views. Plato and Aristotle were believed to be fundamentally identical….a strong infusion of Neoplatonism corrupted even the doctrines that were declared most distinctively Aristotelian.”

Neoplatonism can take many forms, some close to the position of Aristotle and others more remote, so it is difficult to fathom Brett’s meaning when he claims that Neoplatonism has corrupted Aristotelianism. There appear to be two confounding variables in this discussion. The first is that of the extent to which Aristotelian metaphysics constitutes acceptance of large tracts of Platonic metaphysics but also the extent to which it constitutes a rejection of dualism and the relation of “emanation”. The second confounding variable is that of a negative attitude toward Arab philosophy because of its embrace of Neoplatonism. This second variable could, in fact, be neutralized by embracing a more positive attitude which includes a more positive suspicion that there may be more genuine Aristotelianism in Arab Philosophy then has been suspected throughout centuries of interpretation and commentary.

Maintaining his negative attitude toward Arab Philosophy Brett goes on to claim that the Arabs use Aristotle in philosophical characterizations and explanations of the nature of man but use a Platonic superhuman view of other intellectual powers in the universe and these “emanate” from the supreme divine unity and goodness of the One(a dualism of theosophy and psychosophy). It is not exactly clear as to why Brett does not wish to maintain an objective distance to the texts of Arabic Philosophers and test the hypothesis that they may have understood more Aristotle than we give them credit for. Here is a clue as to why Brett is reluctant to await the judgment of scholarship on this issue:

“In the Arab as in the Christian doctrines of the soul there is a painful lack of experiment: empirical tendencies only emerge occasionally and remain undeveloped: this was the weak point in the natural sciences, and psychology as a natural science was, in this respect, no exception.”

Involved in Brett’s position here is the scientifically motivated desire to reduce higher functions of thought to lower sensory-motor functions in order to justify the scientific method of observation and the manipulation of variables in scientific experiments. The extent to which, however, that theories embodying non empirical generalizations and transcendental principles such as causation actually help to determine which variables to manipulate, which effects are to be observed and which confounding variables need to be neutralized is the extent to which it is impossible not to adopt something resembling a Kantian Metaphysical Philosophy of Science.

Kant’s theory contains an architectonic view of the relation of levels of scientific activity. Throwing a rock parallel to the ground produces, argues Kant(after a large number of “experiments”) an awareness that the path the rock will be a curvilinear one back to the earth. The reason the path of the rock presents itself as it does to the perceiver will vary in accordance with the variables of the mass of the rock, the velocity imparted by the thrower, the resistance of the medium of the air and the pull of gravity upon the rock. The actual path of the rock, including its velocity, can be calculated mathematically by using the above variable system which is the result of empirical generalizations generated by a large number of experiments.

Now we know that Newtonian science called itself natural philosophy and there are sound reasons for this. Newton for example abstracted from one concrete variable, namely the resistance of the air and introduced another transcendental variable of causation, thus postulating two further levels above that of what could be physically observed or experienced. In the first case he called this level metaphysical and in the second he called the level transcendental. Both levels were regulated by logical relations between their elements. The metaphysical level and transcendental levels were in fact well illustrated by Newtons first(logical) law of motion: Every object continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by some other force. A rock thrown in an environment where there was no air resistance or effect of gravity would on this theory continue resting or moving in a straight line: a phenomenon that no one has observed or experienced. This law of motion also incorporates another variable that transcends experience, the variable of causation which is characterized by the proposition “every event has a cause”. Such metaphysical and transcendental principles are in fact ways of thinking about phenomena and require nonexperiential nonobservational philosophical and logical justifications. Furthermore, on the Kantian account, this transcendental principle of causation also has Aristotelian application to forms of life that act as they do in accordance with a principle of internal causation, e.g. a dog jumps over a fence circumscribing as he does to a curvilinear path that is only partly explained by the laws of physics. The other part of the explanation of this phenomenon will refer to the above internal cause, i.e. to the desire and effort of the dog.

Einstein, as we know refused to believe in the universality of objects traveling in straight lines in a virtually propertyless empty space and insisted, contrary to Newton’s theory, that space in the vicinity of massive objects has at least one property, namely that it is curved. This cast a shadow over Euclidean geometry but not over mathematics in general. The question to ask here then is: is a straight line something metaphysical in a negative sense, needing to be neutralized as a concept by the transcendental proposition that everything must have a cause: even in the case of space which has been caused to be curved. One assumes that in this context the metaphysical element of Einstein’s theory would be best characterized in terms of nonEuclidean geometry. If this is the case then we can confirm that at the very least, Einstein’s science is more Kantian than it is empirical, more defined in terms of its theory then the so-called scientific method. As we may recall Einstein did not conduct any experiments to arrive at his theory or to confirm his theory. He formed his theory first and then left it to others to confirm via experimentation. Kantian science is in fact merely a refinement of Aristotelian science and the question that is being raised in this discussion is whether this is what Brett means by science when he accuses the Arabs of possessing a weak conception of natural science. The evidence, however, is to the contrary, Brett embraces a more modern empirical view of science that at best only explains its technological achievements and not the thought of Newton or Einstein.

Alhazen, Ibn al-Haytham(965AD-1039AD) was certainly interested in science having written over a hundred treatises on mathematics and the physical sciences. His most famous work was entitled “Perspectiva” or “Optica” and dealt with problems arising from the works of Ptolemy and Damianus. Alhazen thought of the eye as a physico-psychological system and embraced the Aristotelian theory of the intromission of light(light transmits sensible forms from the external world to the eye). Alhazen disagreed with Aristotle, however, over the mechanics of this transmission claiming that from every physical point on the object rays of light are sent to every point on the surface of the eye. Alhazen conducted experiments to prove that light travelled in straight lines and also argued against the use of observation in astronomical investigations. Einstein’s theory, as we know, argued that light would only travel in straight lines if no other cause such as the gravity of massive objects did not cause it to bend toward the source of the gravitational power.

According to Mathias Schramm, Alhazen in his experiments:

“was the first to make a systematic use of the method of varying the experimental conditions in a constant and uniform manner.”(Habilitationsschrift, Ibn al Haythams Weg zur Physik(Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1963) quoted by Rudger Thiele Historia Mathematica(2005) 32, 271.

The experiment in question concerned a light spot formed by moonlight through two small slits diminishes in intensity when one slit is progressively sealed.

Bronowski in his work “The Ascent of Man” claimed Alhazen to be the only original mind produced by Arab science. Bronowski claims that Alhazen was the first to recognize that the visual field was structured by an awareness of distance which is given by what happens when the cone of rays that come from the outline of an object grows narrower and narrower as the object retreats in the visual field and grows larger as it advances toward the perceiver in such a field. According to Bronowski, scientists paid no attention to this discovery for 600 years and it was left to Renaissance artists like Ghiberti to “rediscover ” this idea. The use of what the artists of the Renaissance were to call “Perspective” was used by Ghiberti, for example in his plans for the bronze doors which were to be placed in the Baptistry in Florence. The discovery of perspective for the painter enabled painted space to display the third dimension of depth thus providing it with a space for life. Once distance is represented in the form of depth everything suddenly appears to occur in an arena of movement thus increasing the “life” of the painting. All this was possible, according to Bronowski, because

“The Greeks had thought that light goes from the eyes to the object. Alhazen first recognized that we see an object because each point of it directs and reflects a ray into the eye. The Greek view could not explain how an object, my hand, say, seems to change in size when it moves.”

As mentioned above Alhazen was in fact influenced by Aristotle in this matter but it is not the first time in history that a scientist has misunderstood Aristotle’s role in the history of science. This point would, of course, become more significant if it were the case that Aristotelian hylemorphic theory eventually proves to be more important than one suspected as science develops in the future, i.e. if and when science develops beyond the materially oriented method obsessed activity we are witnessing today. Aristotelian hylemorphic theory is certainly a part of the Kantian metaphysical foundations of natural science. This observation indicates the problem with understanding exactly Alhazen’s contribution to the history of science since we cannot attribute a complex understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics to him, given the fact that he is more inclined to use mathematics than logic for the solution of scientific problems.

The curtain raiser to the subsequent scientific debates that led to our modern position was a philosophical debate between Descartes and Hobbes which in its turn polarised into a conflict between Empiricism and Rationalism, a debate that haunts philosophical and psychological debates to this day. Kant attempted to intervene in this train of events and produced a brilliant synthesis of the positions: a synthesis that led more towards Aristotelian rationalism than to British Empiricism. Some commentators might liken Alhazen’s contribution to this debate in terms of being a precursor to empiricism. An interesting observation to make in this context is that Alhazen’s experiments were restricted to the material physical world where it is relatively simple to control and manipulate variables( e.g. his spot of light experiment) and where the description of what is occurring is relatively unproblematic. Aristotle we know was one of the first biological scientists and whilst he engaged in scientific activities such as the dissection of the bodies of dead animals in order to investigate their organ systems, there was no attempt by Aristotle to conduct animal experiments perhaps because he realized that in order to control all the necessary variables one would need to place the animals in unnatural environments which would negate the purpose of acquiring knowledge about the animal. Kohler, the Gestalt psychologist, for example, experimented with apes in captivity but even in these restricted circumstances encountered problems with giving theory-free behavioural descriptions.

Even a simple matter such as giving a description of a place was a problem for Alhazen because of his anti-Aristotelian commitment to what some critics called his “geometrisation of space”. It is hardly surprising therefore that in spite of Alhazen being regarded as a polymath there is nothing of biological significance in his writings. Given the fact that the Aristotelian concept of psuche or soul as a principle of living movement is nowhere to be found in Alhazen’s writings, it is a fair criticism to point out that he was not by any stretch of the imagination a philosophical psychologist. The only region of the mind or consciousness he was concerned with was perception, the lower of the cognitive faculties.

Averroes, Ibn Roshd,(1126-98) was a member of the Spanish Arabian School and according to Bertrand Russell, was an unorthodox Muslim who objected to the Neoplatonism that dominated philosophical debate:

“Averroes was concerned to improve the Arabic interpretation of Aristotle, which had been widely influenced by Neoplatonism. He gave to Aristotle the sort of reverence that is given to the founder of a religion–much more than was given even by Avicenna. He holds that the existence of God can be proved by reason independently of revelation, a view also held by Thomas Aquinas.”

Not only can the existence of God be proven, according to Averroes but according to Brett it can also be proven that:

“there is ultimately only one soul, that the individual reason is no more than a temporary manifestation of that generic or Universal soul in the same sense that Humanity may be said to be manifested in the human individual. This is not so much a religious as a logical doctrine.”

The human soul is thus a temporary form of existence compared to the eternal form of existence which is God. Human reason is here passive in comparison to divine active reason, i.e. God has an active form and humanity has a passive nature. In hylemorphic theory humanity is the matter in the equation formed by God. Viewing God non-materialistically implies not conceiving such a being as a physical designer manipulating physical variables but rather in terms of an abstract principle working in ways we could never completely understand. Like Avicenna, Averroes believes in the eternity of the world but this in itself is not incompatible with the coming to exist in a time of existing beings–in human form for example–which in terms of the divine principle that has caused it, can itself be regarded as eternal(by association).

Bertrand Russell claims that Arab thinkers of this period were not original thinkers on the grounds that they merely transmitted the thoughts of others. This, however, may be a gratuitous criticism of a historical period in which the cultural task appeared to be the reinterpretation of Aristotle in order to restore an Aristotelian platform for the development of Philosophy and Science(a platform similar to that which we encounter in Kant’s Philosophy of science). This point would, however, be rejected by Russell because he believed that Aristotle’s metaphysics was in many respects an obscure and confusing work.

Given Brett’s avoidance of Aristotelian metaphysics in his characterization of Aristotle’s scientific method in the following quote, one might imagine that he would, therefore, deny any connection with Kantian Philosophy:

“Aristotle is often extolled as the founder of scientific method. His claim to this title rests on a single misconception of science which dies very hard–the view that science is a vast body of knowledge accumulated by a laborious and systematic process of classification and definition….His deficiencies as a scientist can be traced back to Plato’s influence on him–to his retention in disguised form of Plato’s theory of essences and to his doctrine of final causes.”

What Brett is failing to see here is the complex web of description and justification we encounter in the work of Aristotle: four kinds of change(Substantial, Qualitiative, Quantitative, Locomotion), three principles of change and four cause of change(material efficient, formal and final). Brett mentions two of the 4 causes and ignores the other two. He also speaks incorrectly of Quality as being for Aristotle the basic quality of reality thereby ignoring the other three kinds of change in reality. It is Kantian philosophy that best develops the Aristotelian web in a direction which Brett(given the above remarks) ought to object to. But he puzzlingly instead claims the following:

“The course of history affords an interesting parallel to the development from Kant to Hegel, the former being more definitely Aristotelian, the latter an admirer of Neoplatonism.”

The cloud of confusion increases, however when we recall what Brett later in his text has to say about the philosophy of Kant:

“Kant’s second contribution to the German tradition of psychology was his contention that science is characterized by mathematical as well as by empirical description. His celebrated fusion of the empirical standpoint of Hume with the rationalist standpoint of Wolff involved the aphorism that an empirical inquiry is as scientific as it contains mathematics…It introduced the craze for measurement in psychology..”

The above characterization clearly ignores Kant’s reliance on the Aristotelian web of description and justification and it places emphasis upon an aphorism relating to the fact that the Chemistry of Kant’s time lacked mathematical support and also at the same time, emphasizing Hume’s empirical standpoint which incidentally claimed that causation cannot be objectively observed in the world(in contrast to Aristotle’s view). Placing the modern scientific craze for measurement at the doorstep of Kant may well be overestimating the roles of Hume and Descartes the mathematician and underestimating the roles of Descartes the rationalist and Aristotle the hylemorphic metaphysician.

On the question of consciousness, Brett has the following to say:

“The idea of consciousness in general was ready to hand in the Neoplatonic tradition. The Aristotelian basis to which scholasticism returned in the thirteenth century was firmer ground and the rejection of the pantheistic tendency was in accordance with the general character of Christian monotheism.”

The idea of consciousness which the modern scientific psychologist appeals to has its roots partly in the empirical and rational rejections of Aristotelian hylemorphic theory and partly in the rejection of the Kantian synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. Dualistic assumptions are clearly operating in the separation of consciousness from the world it is conscious of. Both Plato and Descartes were dualists, the latter being a disguised materialist who claimed the mind and the body meet in the physical organ of the brain, the former being committed to a soul that could detach itself from a physical body in a manner that is absolutely mysterious. In both cases the division of the physical world from consciousness is irrevocable. Both Aristotle and Kant avoided the pitfalls of dualism and its half brother materialism and it is not a simple matter to see how to parse their thoughts into the language of consciousness. The work of Freud, paradoxically appears to offer the best account of consciousness as a realm extending over the operating domains of three principles, the energy regulation that is responsible for our waking states, the pleasure pain principle which is responsible for pleasurable and painful modifications of consciousness and the reality principle which Freud claims is occupied with the real problems of love and work.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The Carolingian Renaissance(John Duns Scotus(Eriugena))

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The Carolingian Holy Roman Empire included the instituting of a school for scholars that began with the figures of Alcuin and John Duns Scotus but was not strictly speaking meeting the criterion of a renaissance laid down by Adrian Stokes, namely a period of intensification of all forms of religious and philosophical activity. Aristotle’s Philosophy was in this period systematically inhibited in its development by Christian and Neoplatonic influences. This was evident in the restriction of the role of philosophical psychology in the ethical and theological studies of the period. A supernatural soul remains largely an Augustinian entity not in any way related to animal life. The body and external nature are other areas of neglect in this tentative revival of Philosophy in the context of Religious studies. The revival proper probably can only be said to have begun 50 years after the death of Alcuin with the arrival of John Duns Scotus, also known as, Eriugena to the court of the grandson of Charlemagne, Charles the Bald. Eriugena was born and educated in Ireland and arrived in the court with a good working knowledge of Greek. His learning was admired and he was quickly engaged by the Archbishop of Reims to refute the ideas of a troublesome monk by the name of Gottschalk who had been vociferously claiming that predestination defined the fate not just of the blessed and the saints but also of sinners. Eriugena used philosophical argument rather than faith-based argument to claim that the concept of predestination was otiose because God ‘s knowledge was complete and could not be characterized in terms of an incomplete form of knowledge, namely foreknowledge or pre-knowledge(which would imply temporal incompleteness). Eriugena’s argument was found wanting by the Church authorities who eventually condemned the priest on traditional grounds of faith which reasserted the doctrine of the predestination of the blessed but rejected the claim that this also applied to sinners. The argument of Eriugena was also in fact condemned in a Council meeting a few years later.

Professor Brett in his work on the “History of Psychology” has this to say about this mercurial figure:

“The greatest speculative mind of the ninth century was John Scotus Eriugena… Eriugena seems more like a rhapsodist who has specialized in philosophic tradition..Eriugena was the Charlemagne of philosophy..in him is born again the tendency to pure romance which was the beginning of speculative thought…His thought struggles between two ways of looking at life, neither of which he will wholly abandon. Of these, one is the empirical obviously suggested by the Aristotelian element in Eriugena’s education: the other is the Neoplatonic theory of logical inclusion which, by putting the particular in the universal made the unwary think that it was possible to get the particular out of the universal before it had been put there. So, Eriugena becomes, as a result of his Neoplatonism, a realist and declares for the supremacy of reason. At the same time, he keeps his belief in the individual and is compelled to give a place to the will which is not beneath that of reason. These two are therefore coordinate, but in a sense, it is the will which has the superiority, for the reason only lights the way, while the will is the agent, the power.”

This position whilst not recognizable as Aristotelian because of the centrality of the concept of the will is nevertheless beginning to look decidedly pre-Kantian. It departs from Kant in declaring that the will of God is, of course, superior to the will of man but the motivation given by Eriugena for this state of affairs is that God does not fit into any of the ten Aristotelian categories of Being. This is in its turn then connected to the surprising and perhaps ecclesiastically claim that God is “Nothing”–a position that might have contributed to Eriugena’s condemnation by an ecclesiastical council. Eriugena’s learning, however, was sufficiently admired by Charles the Bald for his patronage to continue requesting translation of Greek texts into Latin amongst which were those of Pseudo Dionysius. Whilst translating various works Eriugena was also engaged in the writing of a five-volume work entitled “On Nature”(Periphyseon) which Anthony Kenny in his work “New History of Western Philosophy” characterizes thus:

“There are, according to Eriugena four great divisions of “nature”: nature creating and uncreated: nature created and creating: nature created and uncreating, and nature uncreating and uncreated. The first such nature is God, the second is the intellectual world of Platonic ideas which creates the third nature, the world of material objects. The fourth is God again, conceived not as creator but as the end to which things return… Where do human beings fit into Eriugenas fourfold scheme? They seem to straddle the second and third division. As animals, we belong in the third division and yet we transcend other animals. We can say with equal propriety that man is an animal and that he is not an animal. He shares reason, mind and the interior sense with the celestial essences but he shares his flesh, his outward self, with other animals.”

The soul according to Eriugena controls the body even post mortem when its particles are scattered and dispersed by the four winds. Somehow it is known by someone somehow that these particles were under control of the soul they once belonged to. The dualism is non-Aristotelian and stark. The fourth division refers to the end of all things, space, and time. In this Platonic matrix human nature is an intellectual idea found in the mind of God. Humans, however fail to understand their relation to this timeless idea because they are trapped in a body that dwells in a spatiotemporal physical continuity grasped only by the senses of the body.

This work was always going to fall into disrepute with the ecclesiastical authorities who were extremely suspicious of reasoning detached from the teaching of the scriptures. The above reasoning seemed to be a mixture of the philosophical and the mythical that was clearly pagan. Eventually, in 1225 Pope Honorius 3rd ordered all copies of the Periphyseon destroyed. Clearly, the Neoplatonic aspect of the work placed God outside the chain of Being, making it difficult if not impossible to characterise the nature of God. All that can be said by man is that God is a Nothing or alternatively what God is not. This obviously suggests that reason is superior to a revelation which would not have been good news to ecclesiastical scholars who believed that the nature of God could somehow be “revealed” in the mystical process of revelation. “The content” of such a revelation would presumably be truth and goodness and these terms normally understood have opposites, i.e. falsity and evil, but it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to attribute or relate these opposites to God. Eriugena’s work, on the contrary, controversially, yet interestingly, suggested that Evil and Sin have their roots in the freedom of the will of man, who, in his hubris turns not to God for salvation but toward himself for solace. Men are many but God is One and the only conceivable fate of the many is to join at the end of all things, space, and time, with the One.

These insights into the role of freedom and the will from the point of view of Philosophical Psychology were unfortunately buried under the initial confusion of Ecclesiastical scholars attempting to correctly evaluate the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysis. A confusion that might have lasted until Aquinas finally managed to turn the Church’s attention away from Neoplatonism and toward the work of Plato’s major interpreter and critic, namely Aristotle.

Bertrand Russell in his work “The History of Western Philosophy” claimed that the Carolingian Renaissance was a revival of limited significance because any real new beginning would have dealt with the abuses of the monastic system and the clergy who exercised a powerful influence over the everyday life of men not to mention kings. Priests, for example, were claiming to perform the miracle of transusbstantiation at every mass and were also thought to possess the power to determine whether one belonged in heaven or hell and yet simultaneously were involved in simony and concubinage. During this time there was as yet no full-blooded revival of Aristotelian thought and this was evident in for example the influence of Eriugena’s work which was largely mystical, fitting well into an age which expected revelations of the miraculous. In hindsight Eriugena’s work appeared to many commentators to herald philosophical movements to come: movements as broadly differentiated as those of Spinoza and Hegel and perhaps also one can detect the presence of analytical philosophy. Eriugena claimed in this latter context, for example, that reason was connected to a fourfold method of division, definition, demonstration, and resolution which aids our investigation into the search for the truth. Juxtapose this with a mystical approach to philosophical investigation inherited from Eastern Christian scholars and leaders and the breadth of Eriugena’s writings begin to become apparent. In the eyes of the Church, however, he was the subject of deep suspicion and the combination of his attachment to the concepts of the freedom, the will and the methodical pursuit of the truth rather than a commitment to the interpretation of Scripture, led to him being accused of Pelagianism.

Yet it is clear to the objectively minded scholar that we have on the one hand a clinical analytical mind performing a kind of “philosophical surgery” on concepts such as predestination, and on the other a heaven gazing mystic speculating on there not just being a possibility of the transubstantiation of God into the image of Jesus but also a transubstantiation in the reverse direction of man becoming God-like. This juxtaposition would not have been possible in a mind committed to the assumptions and definitions of Aristotle. It was only possible for a mind embracing a very plastic Platonic matrix. Aristotle is conspicuous by his absence except for the negative claim that God is not to be described in terms of the ten Aristotelian categories and also possibly the claim that God is “the form of all things”. This latter claim is somewhat paradoxical, however, given the belief Eriugena held that God is formless, a non-being or in a certain sense a nothingness. Gods mind, then, appears sometimes to be understood in terms of a Platonic undivided form containing the principle of all things: a form in which Being and Goodness are united. Everything in the universe “emanates” from this matrix which has in itself no spatiotemporal characteristics. Spatio-temporal sense perception rather is a manifestation of a “fallen” mind as is the exercise of man’s freedom. The sense in which freedom is the reason for man choosing to sin is however obscure and yet we know this is what Eriugena claims is the case. There will be a return after the fall of all things, space and time, to the matrix of God’s mind and in this process, the image of God will dissolve into his reality. echoes of Heraclitus’ idea of Logos are also to be found: man is rational and yet he is not, he is free and yet he is not, he is spiritual and he is not, he is an animal and yet he is not(cf Heraclitus claim that the road up and the road down are the same). Is this dualism or is it dual aspectism? We know the work Periphyseon has been accused of many things including the collapsing of the ideas of God and the creation into one another thus violating Biblical recorded revelation and wisdom. Some Platonists have also accused Eriugena of failing to recognize that the creation was the work not of the gods but of the demiurge. Some critics have also wondered how, if God is nothingness, could something come from nothing? One of the more serious ecclesiastical accusations, however, was that of Pantheism and this might have led to the work being placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitum in the late 1600’s to be finally removed from censure only in the 1960s. This did not prevent nineteenth-century philosophers, however, from reading Eriugenas works and declaring him to be the father of German Idealism. It is interesting to note that the spirit of Aristotelianism failed to permeate this movement and resulted in Hegel finding it necessary to turn the philosophy of Kant upside down on its head, leaving Kant’s Philosophy in the shadows as Neoplatonism(with the aid of Christian dogma). had once done to Neo Aristotelianism.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The Age of Reinterpretation, Part One( Andronicus of Rhodes, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Boethius)

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Professor Brett claims that at least insofar as Science and Psychology are concerned, between the deaths of St Augustine in 430 and St Thomas of Aquinas in 12 74, there was very little meaningful activity to speak of. This may not be an accurate historical description of the activity of this period given the fact that there is an argument to be made for at least one meaningful and major shift in Philosophical thinking, namely that from Neo-Platonism to Neo-Aristotelianism. This shift had implications for the domain of Philosophical Psychology and the concepts of the Will, Cognition, and Consciousness. In defense of Brett, it should, however, be remembered that he wrote his work in the 1920s and that the significance of Aristotle’s Philosophy was still in the process of being fully appreciated. After a decline from the halcyon days when men spoke of “The Master of those that know”, “The Teacher of all our teachers” and simply “The Philosopher”, (with a little help from Kantian and Wittgensteinian Philosophy)we may only today be in the process of restoring Aristotle’s reputation to its rightful place in the realm of Philosophy.

We shall however follow Brett in his classification of this period as “The Age of Reinterpretation”:

“A great deal happened between the death of St Augustine and the death of St Thomas, but it cannot be seriously maintained that much happened which was of any great importance to the history of Science in general or Psychology in particular. The papacy emerged as a temporal power and heralded an age of politicians, administrators, and systematisers. The spirit of Gregory entered into the thought as well as into the action of the Church. Occasionally, as in the case of a St Francis or an Abelard, the spirit of adventure or of criticism returned to challenge the institutions and learning now hallowed by tradition. But in the main, it was an age of reinterpretation, adaptation, and endless wrangling over minor questions.”

As was pointed out in line with previous comments and objections relating to Brett’s underestimation of the importance of Aristotelian thinking, this was certainly an age of reinterpretation of Aristotle and his significance for thought not just in the arena of Philosophy but also in the realms of culture and education. Brett also, however, makes an interesting observation in relation to a shift that seems to be occurring from the authority of critical discussion of a canon of individual thinkers to the authority of schools and institutions. This, if true, amounts to a significant reinterpretation of the concept of authority which may in its turn partly explain many anomalies in the development of Philosophical Thought.

At the beginning of this period extending from the death of Augustine when the Vandals were besieging the gates of Hippo, an Ecclesiastical Council had been called by Emperor Theodosius 2nd because a conflict of interpretation of the Bible had arisen between the patriarchates of Constantinople and Alexandria, two of the Cosmopolitan centres of the World at the time. The dispute was over whether Mary, the putative mother of Jesus, was a human being with human nature and if so how such a being could have conceived of a divine being like Jesus: the so-called issue of divine incarnation. This issue, having arisen in the context of dualistic assumptions was unsurprisingly resolved Neo-Platonically by insisting that Christ was a Being that must have possessed two natures, an earthly human nature, and divine god-like nature. This satisfied the delegates from Constantinople but not those from Alexandria who were hoping for another decision. A second Council meeting was convened and in this, it was decreed that a Being can only have one nature: the so-called doctrine of monophysitism. This, of course, was motivated by underlying Aristotelian concerns which saw the contradiction lurking in the decision from the first Council and it signified an interesting challenge to the prevailing Neo-Platonism of the time. This phenomenon was probably not assessed in these terms because it also signified a deeper conflict, from the Christian point of view, between pagan philosophy and Christianity. To the extent that Aristotle was recognized as lying behind this, it was due to the fact that his work had always been regarded more skeptically than that of Plato’s because of his naturalistic commitment to monism and the sources of life. This particular drama was merely the continuation of another drama played out during the lifetime of St Augustine when another conflict between Aristotelianism and Christianity had arisen when a Welsh Ecclesiastic named by the Romans Pelagius shockingly questioned the doctrine of Original Sin. Pelagius proposed the principle that there is a sense in which one must choose to be sinful: a notion that is more in accordance with the contrary assumption(to that of Original sin) that human nature is essentially Good. This view spread like wildfire and was especially embraced by Eastern Theologians. St Augustine did his best to limit the influence of this position by declaring it heretical. This position was not, however, formally ratified by the Church until the Council of Orange in 529 long after his death but just a short time after Justinian became emperor and began to deal with the “threat” of pagan Philosophy to the Christian faith. These two “incidents” testify to the growing influence of Aristotelian Philosophy. This, in spite of the difficulties both religious and linguistic of translating his works accurately into Latin.

Neo-Platonism had managed to subsist side by side with Christian dogma because of a shared belief in a dualistic metaphysics. Plato’s Philosophy, however also shared with Aristotle a belief in human reason and the “form of the Good” which Religion was skeptical of. Plato, however, did not, as did Aristotle, believe in the essential mortality of the soul. Aristotle’s denial of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the name of the principle of life which claimed that life was a journey towards its own extinction probably marginalized his role in the theological/philosophical debate about many metaphysical, ethical, political and psychological issues. Up to and perhaps including the time of Boethius, Greek texts could be read in the original but that skill was on the wane as Latin became the language of communication and academic discourse. After the death of Boethius Greek texts, with the possible exception of Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Organon( The Posterior Analytics was probably not included). Although the Latin language was almost universal in the West we should remember that St Augustine died in 430 at a time when the Vandals were besieging Hippo just 20 years after the Visigoths had sacked Rome. The fall of the Roman Empire was approaching and there was no sign of the advancement of the cause of the City of God.

Boethius was born a few years after the fall of the Western Empire. Many historians regard this event as the beginning of the so-called “Middle Ages” for which the reasons given range from the influence of Christianity on the Roma Psyche to the pressure of the influence of the Barbarians(Vandals, Goths, German tribes etc) from the North and West. Without wishing to deny the importance of these psychological and external influences, we are suggesting a third factor, a real causal role for the influence of Ideas, a factor that both Plato and Aristotle would agree with. Gibbon, the historian, pointed to the declining of moral virtue among the Romans and this is undoubtedly a correct observation but it is a phenomenon which in its turn must have a cause. The cause in question could hardly be Christianity as such(the so-called “turn the other cheek mentality”). Perhaps a more fitting causal candidate would be an assumption or assumptions of Christianity such as the dualistic theory of the Good, invoking as it does the view of man as a “fallen being” more inclined to sin than to virtue, living in a Manichaean world where evil is a real presence. In relation to such a state of affairs, the Platonic and Aristotelian explanations would merely refer to the absence of the Good. St Augustine, we should remember embraced a Manichaean division of the city into earthly and divine elements and this pagan form of dualism was still a major cultural influence during his time. Recall again the fact that the Vandals were poised for attack outside the gates of Hippo while St Augustine was writing his work “The City of God”. It is tempting to speculate on whether the work is pointing a finger at the weaknesses of a dualistic account of the Good. Later Philosophers like Kant would in such a discussion emphasize the logical nature of “ought-statements”, emphasize that is, the logical nature of an ought statement which is temporally oriented to the future and to the changes in the world to be brought about in the future in accordance with both an idea of the good and a good intention: making the suggestion the good is somehow concretely real in the present situation contentious, to say the least, (Evil similarly becomes an abstraction, but a negation of this abstract “Good”). Much human discourse is, of course, naturally directed to this future state of affairs and the relation of our ideas to what we intend to bring about. What this discussion draws attention to is the possible claim that a dualistic account of the Good might have played a part in the so-called “moral decay” of the Roman spirit Gibbon claims to have observed (Whether this dualism is Christian or pagan(Manichaeism)). This might have been a defendable state of affairs had there not existed a monistic/holistic theory of the Good such as that presented by Aristotle. In this context, we are reminded of Heidegger’s observations on the nature of the Latin language, namely that it is not an academic language like Greek. It is rather, Heidegger insists, a language of imperialism and conquest. The most magnificent image of the above two discussion points is the image of the Roman God, Janus who, we recall has two faces oriented in different directions. Hannah Arendt in her work “Between the Past and the Future”characterizes the spirit of Janus correctly in terms of the synthesis of the view of the past(the backward historical glance) and the future(the forward-looking eschatological glance). In her work on St Augustine, however, she chooses to focus upon the backward-looking historical glance which seeks after the origins and beginnings of things rather than the forward-looking ends toward which much of our discourse and many of our actions point. She points to the mental faculty of the memory and claims that it is associated with the search for explanatory origins which Romans, in contradistinction to Plato and Aristotle, believed had a first beginning in time. Aristotle’s commentary on such a state of affairs would reject the ideas of beginnings and endings of time and see the face staring backwards as rather staring into the eternity of elapsed time. The Romans given their history(and their language) would see the face oriented toward the future as concerned with the future of the next battle(Janus means “gateway” and was therefore placed at the city gate through which the troops marched off to war and through which they returned in victory and defeat). Obviously, the wished for victory was not in accordance with the “turn the other cheek mentality” of the Christians. Neither is it in accordance with the Aristotelian forms of future-oriented teleological explanation relating to eudaimonia, or the flourishing life.

Janus, of course, is an excellent image of dualism and its application to the life-world and time of man and perhaps there is a synthesis of the future and the past that can be made sense of in the Aristotelian theory of time and its relation to the life-world of man, the rational animal capable of discourse. Insofar, however, as the Roman interpretation of the image of Janus is concerned, there is no categorical form of rationality to be used to ensure the outcome of a war and furthermore where war is the preferred form of life for a nation, only superstition can regulate the activity. This superstition was reflected even in the rituals adopted for leaving and returning to the city and these rituals were attributed to the fantasied desires of Janus.

An Aristotelian interpretation of this image would also refer to time but not in terms of dualism. For Aristotle Time is the measure or number of motion in terms of before and after. The faces, that is, refer to the demarcated aspects of the passing of time into the before and after. It is only, Aristotle argues when two different nows have been demarcated that conscious awareness of the passing of time occurs. Time is that which exists between the nows, just as the infinite continuum of a line is formed by the demarcation of the points forming the beginning and end of the line: here the length of the line is analogous to the duration of time between the “nows” that have been pronounced. The external world is also required in order to assist in the measurement of all the activities in the life-world, for example, the regular motion of the earth turning on its axis or the regularity of the orbit of the earth around the sun. On this interpretation, the two faces exist in the present( in the middle of the line or a distinct point somewhere on the line). Obviously, not any kind of motion will do since regularity requires repetition which in turn suggested to Aristotle that circular motion was the best standard of measurement. He assumes that this form of motion has always been present and will always be present and therefore belongs to those things in the universe which are permanent and eternal. In terms of our historical awareness, say of the fall of Rome, the Aristotelian account, would maintain that the number of times the earth has revolved around the sun would measure the time elapsed between then and now. There is an argument that circular motion cannot be truly infinite because that would require that each part of space traversed would have to be different from any other that had been traversed but this is probably not the kind of perfection imagined by Aristotle which requires the circumscription of the regular motion in a relatively proximate space: any other notion of an infinite linear motion would not meet the criterion of “regulating” our experience. This line of reasoning entails that there cannot be, as the Roman conception of time and history would appear to require, a first origin in time which is not itself “in time”: anything in time requires a “before and an after” as well as a spatially circumscribable motion in space. An absolute beginning in time would suggest that the analogy we proposed earlier, namely that of a linear infinite continuum, is the real measure of time, which also conceivably could come to an end in the future. Is it toward this end in the future that one of Janus’s faces is oriented towards? This spatialization of time has also left its trace in our modern world with the replacement of Aristotelian circular clock faces by digital clocks where the recurrence of the same numbers denotes the circularity of the regularity of time.

Needless to say, there was no Greek equivalent for Janus in their house of divinities. For Aristotle, the future-oriented face would have symbolized a very peaceful gaze searching for eudaimonia, or the flourishing life and given that he regarded a flourishing city-state as necessary for actualizing this potential for man, perhaps the gaze is also searching more objectively for this future city-state. Aristotle distinguishes himself from Plato in this conception of a perfect state. Plato we know, at least in his Republic, required the presence of warriors, to keep order and to fight wars whereas Aristotle would have argued that a flourishing city would be one which best met the reasonable needs of the citizens and used their powers of reason and creativity to best effect for the common good.

If we now turn our gaze forward toward St Thomas and the Arab interpretations of Aristotle, what do we see? This is what Brett sees:

“Scholasticism has become a byword to designate quibbling over the details of a system whose basic assumptions are never seriously challenged. Gone was the bold speculation of the Greeks: gone, too, was the intense concern over ways of living which characterised the philosophy of the Stoics, Epicureans, and early Christians. For the schoolmen or the Arabs wisdom lay in the past: Aristotle was the great philosopher. Averroes and Aquinas disagreed on many points but their disagreements were mainly concerned with the correct interpretation of Aristotle. The task of the thinker resembled that of the administrator. Ideas, such as the hierarchy of Church officials, had to be welded together into a secure and final system that would resist strains from within and corruption from without. Everything had to be sifted, cross-examined and put in its appropriate place. Patient logic was applied to all the details: only the basic assumptions were logically unassailable because divinely revealed.”

Firstly, Aristotle’s Philosophy does not encourage a preference for forms of explanation rooted in the past unless the circumstances require that kind of explanation. (He was probably the first Philosopher to refuse the power of tradition and systematically submit his predecessor’s thoughts to a regime of criticism). The circumstances would refer to firstly, the kinds of change involved(substantial, qualitative, quantitative, locomotion), seondly, the principles of change, namely that there is something or state the change is from and something or state a change is towards and finally something which endures through the process of change. Wisdom, for Aristotle, was connected to the kind of explanation one gives to questions that are being asked about phenomena. If for example, one is asked to explain an action that no one understands, for example, if one is asked to explain why one gave all one’s money to charity and gives an explanation in terms of the needs of others being greater than one’s own, then the needs of others being met are obviously something that lies in the future and not in the past and the above is a typical example of a teleological explanation. Oracles often made prophecies that involved teleological explanations, e.g. “nothing too much” and this was picked up in the Aristotelian account of virtue in terms of the golden mean. Virtues obviously contain teleological components or as Kant would claim they involve “ought statements”. Wisdom, for Aristotle, did not necessarily lie in the past. Indeed given his account of time the past only acquired significance once an “after” has been designated, Brett’s designation of the reason why Aristotle was gaining in importance in this era may have been insufficient. Aristotle’s Philosophy was a principle-based philosophy. It was never systematic in the sense construed by Brett in the quote above. If Aristotle’s Philosophy was systematic it was not the system of an administrator. The relation of principles to each other do not resemble the relation of a hierarchy of officials. Aristotle’s ideas had logical relationships to each other and to the extent that scholastic philosophy paid attention to this logic against the background of his hylemorphic theory is the extent to which they too could be regarded as Aristotelians. Revelation would, for Aristotle, not be a supernatural phenomenon beyond what it meant to say or think that one’s processes of inductive observation and deductive reasoning led to an “understanding” of what one was thinking about. Introducing the idea of divine understanding in these contexts would for Aristotle merely obscure what is being understood from a human point of view(the point of view of a rational animal capable of discourse).

One can, of course, wonder how Aristotle’s Philosophy managed to survive the onslaughts of Christian disdain for over a thousand years up until the time of St Thomas of Aquinas. Part of the answer lies in the continuous activities of the Peripatetic school in the Lyceum until it was closed by Justinian in 529 and part of the answer may lie in the translations and commentaries of two leading Aristotelian scholars, Alexander of Aphrodisias(the last of the major figures of the Peripatetic school) and Boethius(the last of the Roman Greek-speaking scholars). It should be bourne in mind, however, that Peripatetic scholars since the time of Andronicus of Rhodes were forced to engage dialectically with Stoic, Epicurean, Neoplatonic and Christian scholars. The reactions and interactions between these streams of scholarship were not easy to map. There was obviously a close relation between Aristotle’s ethical/political writings and the Practical Philosophy of the Stoics but there was considerable disagreement over the compatibility of Stoic determinism and Aristotelian Metaphysics. This disagreement centred upon the significance of the role of Stoical “assent” and whether it was “determined causally” or rather a self-centred free and new beginning implied by the Aristotelian principle of life. Aristotle, as we know, claimed that the principle of life resides in the “form” of a living body that possesses a number of potential and currently active powers, some of which he regarded as “mental”. He would not have denied that physical insults such as a spear in the heart or in the brain would suffice for the principle to cease to function permanently and thereby he agreed that there would be what he called material and efficient causes responsible for mental activities such as “assent” or “acting virtuously”. This admission, however, he would have regarded as compatible with an insistence that the better explanations of mental powers and activities would involve what he called formal and final causes that would invoke nonphysical variables.

Some commentators claim that the scholastic tradition of “interpreting” the works of Aristotle began with Andronicus of Rhodes who used the sound exegetical principle of explaining Aristotle with reference to Aristotle’s own principles rather than those of Neoplatonism or Christianity. Andronicus used this strategyto distinguish Aristotle’s works from those of his pupils and also to place the works in a pedagogical order that is still used in collections of Aristotle’s works today. Alexander of Aphrodisias was the last of the Peripatetic scholarchs to continue using the above exegetical principle as a counterweight to the weight of Roman Culture and the Universal ambition of the Latin language (both of which appeared to favour the dualism of Neoplatonism and Christianity over the categorical and logical monism of Aristotle). Alexander’s commentaries and general writings contributed to the role of Aristotelianism in what we are referring to as the “Age of Reinterpretation”. His writings were translated into Latin and therefore engaged with the prevalent Neoplatonic Christian, Stoic, and Epicurean texts. Many of his commentaries are now lost but his best-known commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the Soul, Sense Perception, Prior Analytics, Topics, and Meteorology have survived.

Boethius continued the Peripatetic tradition of writing commentaries on the works of Aristotle, in particular on Aristotle’s “Organon”. He is not mentioned by Brett in his work but he deserves mention for four reasons. Firstly, he was, as we mentioned previously, the last of the Greek-speaking scholarchs in the Roman World. Secondly, because of his commentaries. Thirdly because of his Socratic fate- protesting his innocence throughout his imprisonment and up to his execution. Fourthly because of the work he was writing whilst awaiting execution: “The Consolation of Philosophy”. Bertrand Russell in his work “The History of Western Philosophy” classifies this work as Neoplatonic and this may be questionable. The work unquestionably has an air of a Platonic dialogue about it but here are definite Stoical ethical themes and there are even suggestions of Aristotelian themes relating to the theoretical and practical divisions of Philosophy. This latter suggestion is even today the subject of controversial debates.

The Consolations of Philosophy begins with Boethius sitting in his prison in Pavia, regretting his misfortune after having been elevated to one of the highest administrative positions in the government of Theodoric. A Lady representing Philosophy visits the prisoner. She is wearing a tattered and worn garment with the representation of a ladder bearing greek lettering upon the top and bottom of the ladder: on the top is the Greek Theta(standing for theoretical divisions of philosophy), on the bottom is the Greek letter P(standing for the Practical divisions of Philosophy). She is the bearer of some philosophical works and she casts aside the books of Poetry on his bedside table. Boethius is manifestly by turns depressed and indignant. In response to this, she presents arguments illustrating the illusory values of material fortune and compares fickle fortune to divine providence which lies behind the mystery of the spiritual and ethical government of the world. She conceives of herself as bringing medicine to the sick spirit of Boethius: “The times call for healing rather than Lamentations”(H R James translation).

This is reminiscent of Plato’s Symposium in which Socrates in one of his speeches evokes the memory of one of his teachers, the Lady Philosopher, Diotima, who he represents as giving him a philosophy lesson in relation to the concept of Love and the Being Eros who has been conceived of as a God. She reminds Socrates of the parentage of Eros, namely a poverty-stricken mother and a resourceful father and she also claims that this is not the circumstances of a divine being. indeed she pictures Eros as padding about our cities barefooted in the search for spiritual sustenance of various forms. The moral of her tale is also significantly related to the origin of the word Philosophy(lover of wisdom). Much time has elapsed between the two works and between the lives of Socrates and Boethius and the lessons learned from the two Ladies appear to differ. Socrates learned to love Philosophy whilst Boethius learns instead to be consoled to his fate. Of course, Boethius, having served as a minister in Theorodic the Goth’s government, would have knowledge of his king’s paranoia and the kind of death that awaited those who aroused his wrath. There would be no sipping from a cup of poison and gentle slipping away from the world for him. His was to be a Gothic death at the hands of a sovereign who believed that Jesus did not have a divine nature. Boethius was subsequently regarded by many Christians as a martyr and was venerated as St Severinus. He left little of ecclesiastical value behind him but his commentaries on Aristotle earned him the title of the first of the scholastic Philosophers. His final work “The Consolations of Philosophy” was popular for centuries.

The schools of Athens and Alexandria were still active at the time of the death of Boethius. Two or three years after his death the Emperor Justinian came to power and the Schools in Athens were closed in 529 probably because of the conflict of pagan doctrines with Christian dogma. In the following 270 years, the Roman Empire continued to diminish in territory and power but dualistic views of Christ and the Soul still overshadowed the hylemorphic monism of Aristotle. Indeed, even the doctrine of Christ possessing a single will was condemned by a Council under the influence of Maxim the Confessor in 649 AD in Rome and again at a Council held in Constantinople in 681.

Life and Society outside of the Roman Empire were also changing. the prophet Muhammad died in 633 and a wave of conquest swept over the world that included the capture of Carthage as well as the defeat of the Gothic Christians. Charlemagne managed in 768 to drive the Muslims back to the Pyrenees and expanded the Roman Empire into a Holy Roman Empire embracing all the Christians of Continental Western Europe. He established a school for scholars where Alcuin of York is supposed to have resurrected the writings of Aristotle in Latin, though in the context of the Christian scriptures.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: St Augustine, De Civitate Dei and De Civitate Terrena(The City of God and the earthly city): Arendt, Aristotle, and Kant.

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Existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger, Jaspers, and Arendt have argued that we are thrown into the world and two questions immediately surface as a response to such a claim. Firstly, which world are we thrown into? This question arises because for Augustine there are two worlds: De Civitate Dei(the City of God) and De Civitate Terrena (the earthly city) and when the Day of Judgment arrives these two cities will be divided. Secondly, and relatedly, if, as the Bible suggests our existence is the beginning of a story, does this fact of being created(thrown into the world from our point of view)take precedence over the end of the story, namely the expectation of our inevitable death. In other words, if the focus is on the remembrance of the constitutional beginning does this reverse the polarity of the world for those whose lives are dominated by an anxious expectation or fear of death.

Much of course depends upon the context these questions are posed in. It is doubtful whether Aristotle’s work played much part in the intellectual development of St Augustine perhaps because of Aristotle’s acceptance of the existence of prime matter and its formless infinite essence which actually permits the conceiving of an infinite number of possible worlds each of which is constituted of the actualization of different forms. Self-knowledge and knowledge of God were in one sense inextricably intertwined in Aristotle’s metaphysical account of Man and his relation to Being. This account poses the question “What is man?” and responds to this question with a hylemorphic theory that condensed itself into the definition of man as a “rational animal capable of discourse”. The presence of the term “animal” may, of course, have caused Augustine to dismiss Aristotelian theory in favour of a dualistic theory which separates animals from man because it was man and not the animals whose lives(psuche) were created by the breath of God in accordance with some divine logos. It was probably blind belief in the literalness of the account of the creation of man in the Book of Genesis that was responsible for the fact that it was Plato’s more dualistic account of the relations of the soul to the body and the intellectual world to the physical world that caused a state of affairs in which Platonism was the Philosophy of choice for the religiously inclined. This in spite of the fact that we see in the Timeaus a Platonic move in the direction of the work of “the worldly” Aristotle.

But it ought to be remembered that St Augustine himself was the product of a spirit of an age in which many different schools of Philosophy and sects of religion were proliferating and competing for attention and supremacy, including Gnostic sects such as Manichaeism. Manichaeism was a dualistic theory that believed two bipolar forces were engaged in a struggle for control of the world: the force of Good and the force of Evil. St Augustine, for a period of time, embraced this Persian variation on a Gnostic theme just prior to being his being inspired and converted to Christianity by Neo-Platonic writings and the Bishop of Milan in 387 AD. The ideas of St Paul were then destined to mingle with the Platonic theory of forms. The co-mingling of these ideas from different universes of discourse was regarded as inconsistently eclectic by Hannah Arendt in her evaluation of St Augustine in her later works, including “The “Life of the Mind”.

St Augustine was neither Greek nor Hebrew. He was essentially a Roman-inspired by Romans, e.g. Cicero. He was also bewitched by the language of Latin( regarded by Heidegger as an “Imperial” language of power). For example, he attempted to juxtapose an idea of free will with what Arendt called the greatest of his academic sins, the belief in predestination. A notion, incidentally, not entirely inconsistent with being “thrown into the world”(with one’s human powers). Combine this with a view of time in which memory of the past plays a more significant role in the life of man than future expectancy and we are beginning to see a philosophical psychology forming that will have troubling implications in the future. A philosophical psychology very different to that of Aristotle in which the question of the existence/essence of man is transposed from the Aristotelian “What is man?” to the Augustinian question “Who is man?”. The former of course requires rational theory whilst the latter requires only memory of beginnings. From an Aristotelian or Kantian perspective, the transposition is a move toward ambiguity and confusion: it is a move away from philosophical psychology toward a more “scientific ” form of Psychology.

Ambiguity and confusion are not however present in the Augustinian dualism of the carnal and the spiritual will which in turn are connected to a dualism of earthly love(cupiditas) and spiritual other-worldly love of God(Caritas). The man who loves in this spiritual way is, of course, an inhabitant of two worlds: De Civitate Dei and De Civitate Terrena. He is at home in the former world and a “stranger” in the latter. What prevents this dualism from degenerating into Manichaeism is a Platonic commitment to the overarching role of the knowledge of the Good: a conception which regards evil as the absence of good and therefore as in some sense logically dependent upon the good. Unsurprizingly a dualism of selves is also involved in this account. Arendt, in her earlier work “Love and St Augustine”(p30) comments upon this latter dualism in the following way:

“The “good” of which man is deprived and which he therefore desires is life without death and without loss. Good as the object of love(as desire) is nothing but the manifestation of this “good”. By anticipating eternity(the absolute future) man desires his own future self and denies the I-myself he finds in earthly reality. In self-hatred and self-denial he hates and denies the present, mortal self, that is, after all, God’s creation. The criterion of right and wrong in loving is not self-denial for the sake of others or of God, but for the sake of the eternity that lies ahead. From this, it follows that man should not love in this life, lest he loses in eternal life…..To love God means to love oneself well, and the criterion is not God but the self, namely the self who will be eternal.”

The spiritual self loves God the best and will, therefore, dwell in eternity with this gender-neutral Being. The above discussion orbits around “who” the self of self-knowledge is and it has undoubtedly been influential in setting the terms of many debates in contemporary Philosophical Psychology. Arendt, in the above passage, it should be noted is herself evolving in her work toward a future position in works entitled “The Human Condition” and “The Life of the Mind” : a position that has much in Common with the Greek Philosophers for whom the resolution of the enigma of the flourishing life was resolved with the idea of areté, virtue(doing the right thing at the right time in the right way). This resolution, for her, was best manifested by human action in public space for the sake of a common good: a position that does not necessarily exclude one’s own welfare or the welfare of one’s neighbour. This might be construed as a move that takes us into the spiritual realm as defined by Arendt and perhaps by Augustine: a realm of discourse in a universe of pluralistic agents and concerns reasoning about “the good” as best they can, given that they have limited knowledge about the Civitas Dei and themselves. Pluralism is, of course, a key Aristotelian political category that was used to criticize the uniformity of life in Plato’s Republic. As Arendt’s work moved away from her dissertation on Augustine and towards her work entitled “The Human Condition”, we find her attempting to move away from what Kant called the principle of self -love in disguise and Augustine regarded as love of the earthly world in which the self and the present is dispersed in the many activities of the Civitas Terrena. The love we encounter in Civitas Dei, on the other hand, is a love of God which is absolutely devoid of the more conditional goods we find in the Civitas Terrena. The Spiritual life for Arendt, similarly, takes place in a city in which three kinds of human activity are ruled not by rationality and reason but by action in a public space: action that is inspired by one’s conscience. The other two types of activity, labour, and work, appear to be more Aristotelian than Platonic and appeal in the case of labour to the physiological and biological rhythms of the body and in the case of work, a pluralistic dispersion of the self in a manifold of activities in a world we love and fear to lose. In the Republic the freed prisoner who becomes enlightened once he understands the form of the good is persuaded to return to the realm of shadows in the cave(Civitas Terrena) thus bringing light in the form of knowledge to Civitas Terrena. The light may be extinguished however as was the light of Socrates in the Athenian Agora. In the same vein, we may reflect on the extinguishing of the light of Jesus. One of the consequences of these historical lessons may be a reluctance to engage epistemologically with Civitas Terrena. It is not absolutely clear that either the Platonic commitment to Reason and rationality or the application of the Aristotelian hierarchy of “forms of life” can be available to Augustin in virtue of his commitment to divine love or Caritas in the context of man’s being a question for himself. The transposition of the question “What am I?” to “Who am I?” in the context of both dualism and an extreme commitment to interiority(“go not forth: withdraw into your own self: in the inward parts of man dwelleth truth”) is a problematic transposition. Add to this the usurpation of the methodology of Reason in favour of Divine spiritual love or Caritas and we are in the midst of a dualistic theory of knowledge that Professor Brett in his “History of Psychology” characterizes thus:

“The work of St Augustine id dominated by aims which partly assist and partly retard his inquiries. As a philosopher, he seeks for truth, for knowledge that is without presuppositions and wholly certain and this he finds only in inner experience. In the writings of St Augustine, we find a second influence, the theological bent, which employs revelation as the guarantor of truth. Knowledge is, therefore, divisible into two main classes according as it is derived from revelation or from introspection. In the sphere of metaphysics, the nature of inner experience is made the starting point for the construction of a metaphysics of knowledge, and this is Augustine’s main interest. Subservient to this is the life of the self, the nature, origins, and faculties of the soul: which also attract the attention of Augustine for reasons both philosophical and theological. For the study of psychic life, the power of accurate introspective observation is supremely valuable: throughout the work of Augustine we find this power exhibited in a remarkable degree.”

The stage is hereby set for all the forms of solipsism we encounter in modern Philosophy and Theology. The search is on for the principium individuationis. We will confine ourselves in the inner cave of our Will and regard the external world as a perceptual/imaginative affair where the nature of matter is only to be understood via the controversial mechanism of revelation. Of course, matter for St Augustine subsequent to his Neo-Platonic readings and his baptism and conversion is no longer attributed to the process of creation by the evil forces in the world. It is rather a result of the process of creation by divine activity but our relation to matter via revelation remains problematic. It is also problematic that knowledge via introspection is construed as a form of observation. This commitment to such a dualistic methodology also raises a question in relation to the soul/body issue which remains hopelessly mystical in the framework of dualism. As we mentioned previously, Aristotelian hylemorphism and its characterization of a two-substance relation to a framework of different kinds of life-principle governing the life forms of different organisms is conspicuous by its absence. Psuche, for Augustine, is simply a substance derived from divine activity. Brett has the following to say on this issue:

“The soul was created by God at the time when the body was created. Its creation and its birth are distinct events: as nothing was created after the 6 days of creation. The soul must have been created then. The breath of God by which Adam became animated or endowed with anima, was the act by which the soul was transmitted into the body….the body he(St Augustine) regards as wholly dependent upon soul so far as its life is concerned: its  vegetative functions are not possible without soul, and the body itself has importance only as the medium of sensation and as that which the soul must rule.”

The assumption of a dualism of substances is apparent but becomes more so when one considers that at death the Biblical metaphysicians claimed that the two substances can un-mingle and become separate substances again. Aristotle would have questioned this dualistic account and it was to combat all forms of dualism or its half brother of materialism that Aristotle formulated his hylemorphic metaphysics. For him the body and the soul are unseparable as the shape of the wax is inseparable from its material. Death, insofar as hylemorphic metaphysics is concerned is defined in terms of the absence of the power of the body to move any longer. The “part” of the soul, if that is the correct expression to use here, that is directly involved in the movement of the body, is the will. The relation of this willing part of the soul to the part that contemplates truths known by reason is ambiguous and unclear in the Augustinian system. Neo- Aristotelians and Kantians would probably, in contradistinction to dualism, claim that the will’s function is to bring about the reality or truth of what was actively desired or intended. Even in Plato’s work the “knowledge of the good” mitigates what can be construed as a dualism of physical action and contemplation.

Brett completes his analysis of St Augustine by using modern psychological terminology such as “consciousness”, object of attention” and “selection”:

“This is the first point at which we see how Augustine makes the Will the most important element in life. The simplest act of apprehension involves some degree of Will, for in it are compounded three elements: the mind is conscious of itself(memoria), aware of many possible objects of attention (intelligentia), and selects one with which it identifies itself (voluntas). The world for St Augustine is the place of countless voices, voices of nature calling to the soul: but only those are directly heard toward which the soul exerts itself in the will to attend, and more than all these is the voice of God whose eternal presence is an external appeal to the human will.”

Presumably the voice presents itself in both introspection and via the mysterious process of revelation and the soul being a substance can only have its essence revealed not in an act of apprehension(introspection) but also in some experience of revelation. The Will is related to God via Caritas or the spiritual form of love. Complete knowledge is impossible for the soul until it is capable of this spiritual form of love for God which is also used in one’s relations to one’s neighbour. All knowledge is primarily knowledge of God and secondarily knowledge of the spiritual self under the aspect of Caritas. Brett summarises the position clearly:

“In this exposition, we recognize Platonism penetrated by Christian mysticism. For Augustine, the activity of the mind presents a mystery to be contemplated and studied but not to be solved. He realizes (after Plato) that the turning around of the soul is the essence of education, but he thinks it is not enough to face the light: the eye can see what it does not know, but the mind does not so much as see that which it is not forced to see. If this is true of the mind, it is still more true of the spiritual eye. In the physical world seeing is believing: in the intellectual sphere belief is the condition of seeing. The soul cannot see before it is cured of its diseases, and therefore knowledge is impossible before the soul is in a fit condition. For knowledge is not like gold or silver: these we may know without having: knowledge we must have as part of our very being. The beginning of true knowledge then is not learning, but the will to learn, the disposition to exert the inner force…This disposition is really given by the grace of God: it is a mystery: but Augustine indicates a way of attaining knowledge, namely submission to authority by which he that would learn becomes fit to learn.”

Presumably the above requires acts of contemplation and perhaps this is a manifestation of submission to God’s authority: submission to a Being we know so little about and whose presence we intuit at the very best of times through a glass darkly. This in its turn suggests that we must travel in a circle of believing in order to understand and understanding in order to believe: a journey without a clear view of our destination: ” a mystery to be contemplated”! The interesting beginning of this journey is “the will to learn” given to us by another mystery, the grace of God which the above exercise of dialectical reasoning fails to reveal the essence of. Kant interestingly decries the usefulness of dialectical reasoning which in his view inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of contradiction. In Kant’s view, to take one example, there is no resolution to the antinomy concerning whether the world has a beginning in time or not. There is, however, a form of philosophical contemplation which for Kant is revelatory of the power and freedom of the human soul to know the good. This “revelation” occurs in the domain of the soul concerned with willing when contemplation of the essence of the rightness of its past, present or future action is at issue. In this form of contemplation Kant argues that if I can will that the maxim or principle of my action can be thought to become a universal law then the action contemplated is/was/will be virtuous. there is nothing mystical about such acts of contemplation and there is further nothing problematic about the idea that a good will is the universal foundation of all virtuous action(defined by Aristotle as doing the right thing in the right way at the right time). Even Kant’s idea of God loses its mystery when he claims that the idea of God is the guarantor for the belief that a virtuous life will be in some non-materialistic sense, a flourishing life. It is, of course, something of a mystery as to just how this consequence follows from its conditions but it is a mystery that the religious man understands. This understanding moreover brings with it a spiritual form of contentment with his existence that transcends all earthly forms of suffering. This is probably what Plato and Aristotle would have thought of as “contemplating the form of the good”. The strength of the Kantian account also points to a weakness in the account of Augustine when it comes to his discussion of the relation between the earthly city of Babylon(De Civitate Terrena) and the spiritual city of God(De Civitate Dei). Introspection and revelation appear, in different ways, to remove us from the spheres of public and political judgment and action, whereas the kind of ethical contemplation of Kant (applying the test of the categorical imperative to all ethical action) appears to transport us to a very objective kingdom of ends containing the flesh and blood bodies of men implementing and obeying laws in an ethical spirit which meets the requirements of the type of practical reasoning involved in the application of the categorical imperative. Furthermore, there is a distinct element of realism in Kant’s proposed Kingdom of Ends. A conceived state of affairs that, according to Kant will take one hundred thousand years to actualize and manifest itself. For Kant, in contrast to St Augustine, there is no God choosing souls to love him, no divine policy of predestination, and no unnecessary substantification of souls with problematic relations to their own bodies. Kant’s view of the body is hylemorphic as is his view of the soul which he would not have regarded as a spatio-temporal continuity(principles have spatio-temporal application and continuity in that application but not materialistic continuity.

St Augustine, as we know, denied that the soul is in any sense “in time”, since it is eternal and immortal. Yet immortality suggests continuity of some kind. What kind of continuity does Augustine imagine is operating here? Brett characterises the matter thus:

“Augustine believed in the immortality of the soul. Time, he said is only the extensive measurement of experience, a distentio animi. The soul is not in time but time is rather the form in which the soul is presented to itself. There is consequently no difficulty in the idea of immortality, so far as time is concerned. The real problem is to find some reason for this continuous reality of the soul. Augustine finds it in the fact that reason is truth, and truth as such is not in a class of things to which change or corruption has any relevance. As we, in fact, say now, change is a category of the mind and not a category under which the mind can be brought. In fact all our ideas of things are forms of reason and when true are eternal. The soul which has(or is) eternal truth must itself be eternal.”

There is not much that Kant would be opposed to in the above account. Aristotle though would probably object to change being characterized solely in terms of the category of the mind. He would insist that change is real and Perception of change is testimony for such a position. Both would, however, accept that reason and truth, insofar as they are the aspects under which thought occurs are continuously real and have no material spatio-temporal existence. Both would also agree that principles insofar as they are necessarily products of reasoning and truth are eternal and immortal in the sense that they are not materially related to the categories of “being-in-time” or “being alive”. Rather, Principles are “unconditional” in the Kantian search for all the conditions of existence of spatio-temporal phenomena. Reason, in other words, is the power the mind has to arrive at the totality of conditions of phenomena as well as the unconditional “ground” of these conditions. Such power belongs, at least as far as Aristotle is concerned, to the human being as a holistic entity defined in terms of “rational animal, capable of discourse”. Our psychological powers, as opposed to our physical powers, are attributed to the soul and are manifestations of principles, or in Kant’s terms, these principles are the unconditioned “ground” of the totality of conditions relating to the exercise of such powers. The relation of the physical powers of the body such as sensation and perception to the powers of the soul such as imagination, discourse and reason is what a Neo Aristotelian or Neo Kantian philosopher would regard as an aporetic question with no simple solution only so long as one continues to conceive of the soul or mind as some kind of substance, rather than as a principle of explanation. Neo Wittgensteinians such as P.M.S. Hacker also regard the human being or person as the logical bearer of the above powers. He discusses this matter thus in his work “Human Nature:the Categorical Framework”:

“What, then, is the relationship between the mind and the body? The mind/body problem is insoluble. For it is a hopelessly confused residue of the Platonic/Augustinian/Cartesian traditions. It cannot be solved: but it can be dissolved. The mind is not an entity that could stand in a relationship to anything. As we have seen, all talk of the mind that a human being has and of its characteristics is talk of the intellectual and volitional powers that he has and of their exercise. The body that a human being is, the living organism, has and exercises those distinctive intellectual and volitional abilities that we speak of when we speak of peoples minds. But the body that a human being is said to have when we speak of human beings as having beautiful or athletic bodies, is not the kind of thing that could be said to possess intellectual and volitional abilities…. These characteristics are not the kinds of thing that could make up their mind, recall things to mind, or change their minds.”

Hacker goes on to compare the above relation not with the principle and what it regulates or the unconditional in relation to a totality of conditions. He uses an allegory of a word (insofar as it has a set of usages) to the phonemes it is composed of. The former is the holistic phenomenon conceived in terms of the usages of the word concerned in discourse of various kinds.

Wittgenstein, as we know, complained about St Augustine’s theory of language, suggesting that perhaps it was behind the misconception of language as composed of a set of names that he had presented in his early work “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. Wittgenstein’s later work rejected his earlier theory of the meaning of language in favour of a theory that focused on the actual use of words and sentences in various forms of discourse. Each form of discourse was like a game we play with rules which we learn to use when we acquire language in our childhood. These language games are embedded in very Aristotelian sounding “forms of life”(human activities). Amongst the grounds, Wittgenstein had for the repudiation of this aspect of his earlier work was the accusation of postulating a solipsistic linguistic soul and one is left wondering whether this “power of projecting” the language structure of what appeared to be a private language user was also a result of the influence of Augustine.

St Augustine’s account of the relation between the soul and the body proceeds via the relation of the sensations the body experiences and the truth about reality that those sensations “reveal”. Brett characterizes St Augustine’s position in the following way

“The mind strives to see the truth. In sensation it sees truth through the body, which is the only way of apprehending some truths.”

On this kind of account, sensation and perception are intellectual powers that play an important part in the “revelation” of the nature of the physical world. This creates a possible defensible realm for the knowledge of external material objects. Augustine goes on to insist, however, that the experience of “externality” is a delusion. Brett summarizes this point thus:

“Knowledge is always of an object and seems to keep the object away fro the observer: in perception there is an outer object, and science is no more than a system of such perceptions. But the perceptions themselves are not outside us:they are really ourself in action, and they illuminate themselves until the inner light increases or breaks up the darkness of ignorance. At that point man became conscious that the relation to outer objects is unsatisfactory. What a man knows truly he makes part of himself….. After science with its delusion of externality, comes wisdom: here knowledge reaches its highest development, but the nature of man is still not wholly formed:so long as the reason is a dry light it is partly abstract but when the will identifies itself with the known, when Love is added to wisdom, every element in mans nature is fused into a unity, the unity is complete and the development is finished.”

So, the Will involved in the love of God has the final word. The introduction into this account of the important role of the Will anticipates the Wittgensteinian later picture of language as active. It also anticipates the Kantian emphasis upon practical reasoning and its close relation to what he called the noumenal soul or mind as well as the relation of theoretical reasoning to the Truth. the problem with the Kantian position is of course to give a clear account of the relationship between practical and theoretical reasoning given the conviction that Kant had that, in dealing with practical matters we are also dealing with the Truth . The difference between the Kantian and Augustinian accounts is that firstly, for Kant the practical form of reasoning is not just related to oneself and ones neighbour but also to the ethical and universal principle of the categorical imperative: and secondly that for Kant, the attitude of mind characteristic of ethical action was not Love but the more psychically distanced attitude of Respect.

Insofar as religious attitudes are concerned Kant does discuss the concept of a holy will(the supremely good will) in relation to Respect but it is important to remember in this context that the ethical philosophy of Kant is characterised by Kant as autonomous and organized by the principle of freedom rather than the idea of God . Kant, however, sees a place for Religion for explaining the relation of leading a good life in accordance with the categorical imperative and the human expectation of a consequence in the form of a flourishing life. Freedom, for St Augustine, insofar as it is construed as the power to cause oneself to spontaneously begin something new and unique, is denied to man and reserved for God who is free to choose those souls whose destiny will flourish during their bodily lifetimes. The awkward logical consequence of this aspect of Augustine’s thought is that it seems that the earthly city is a divided city. There are those that dwell spiritually in the city of God whilst simultaneously dwelling in the earthly city, the “predestinates” as Bertrand Russell calls them in his work “The History of Western Philosophy”. Those who are not yet or cannot ever be predestinates, are “reprobates” in Russell’s terms. Religion and the earthly city seem to be involved in an “unholy alliance”. The opposing Kantian view of unethical activity in the earthly city is that the law will blame any reprobate for their unethical activities: i.e. the individual will be held responsible because of the principle of freedom which claims that every individual is free to choose their actions. This for Augustinians would be a form of Secularism that rejects predestination and all its implications. With reference to the Philosophy of Aristotle it is important to point out that in contrast to the Kantian form of secularism, religious attitudes were well 9ntegrated into the Greek city-state system. These attitudes were encoded in the law and everyone expected the gods to be respected in the Agora. Kant, in contrast to St Augustine, avoids a religious eschatological end or telos in favour of an earthly cosmopolitan world free of bureaucratic religious institutions, which simultaneously manifest respect not just for each other but more abstractly for the rule of law and even more abstractly the idea of God.

The major obstacle in the path of Cosmopolitanism is of course Wars between nations which Kant views as anathema to cultural development. It is therefore somewhat surprising, in this context, to note that St Augustine actually formulated the concept of a just war and criteria for its fulfillment. For Kant wars were unethical but inevitable given the fact that Reason was only potentially present in the species of man and until this potentiality became actualized the antagonistic nature of man would have to learn by the experience of the wasteful and destructive forces of war. Kant, in response to this state of affairs, did, however, suggest an institution that might help in the prevention of war and war-crimes, namely a United Nations with an international legal system and law courts. This seems initially to be the dream of an idealist until one is informed of the fact that Kant thought that the Cosmopolitan state of affairs he envisaged was ca one hundred thousand years in the future.

St Augustine also theorized about the nature of Time. Time, he insists has been created by God and therefore must have a beginning. This is in marked contrast to the account of time we find in Aristotle which is infinite with no beginning. Augustine’s account is however more related to Philosophical Psychology than it is to epistemology, metaphysics or the philosophy of History. For Augustine human time is characterized thus:

“There are three times: a present time about things past: a present time about things present: a present time about things future”(Confessions xi 20,26: xi 28,37)

The past, argues Augustine, is in itself unreal, and exists only from the perspective of a present memory of what has happened to me and what I have done. The future too, is also unreal and exists only from the perspective of an expectation of what will happen to me and what I want to do. The latter mode of action relates to our desires and contains the key to ethical action because it is in the name of Caritas that I love God and am forgetful of my solipsistic wants and wishes. The state of Caritas is only achievable by predestinates who hope to emulate the divine state of mind of God. Such a state involves, of course, transcendence of any human conception of time.

Augustine appears to be asking us to hope for immortality and in so doing transcend human nature. Arendt however undermines the future aspect of human expectation(which includes the expectation of death):

“it is memory and not expectation(for instance the expectation of death as in Heidegger’s approach(that gives unity and wholeness to human existence. In making and holding present both past and future, that is, memory and the expectation derived from it, it is the present in which they coincide that determines human existence. This human possibility gives man his share in being “immutable” “(Arendt, Love and St Augustine B: 033 192)

In an interpretative essay included in the above work Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelins Stark made the following comment on the above quote:

“Arendt also notes that the return to the Creator through imitation “is not a matter of Will and free decision: it expresses a dependence inherent in the face of createdness” …Mans dependence relies exclusively on remembrance–memory is the “space” between past and future in which the “questing search” for the Creator takes place. Memory is equated with consciousness defined as a fundamental mode of dependence and cited as proof of the gap between essence and existence and the fact that God is both “in” and “outside” man” “(p168)

It has been clear throughout this discussion that there are characteristically two worlds for St Augustine: the divine fabric of the world of God and the world created by the efforts and desire(love for the earthly city) of man. The first is an atemporal entity and the second is necessarily temporal with all the accompanying disadvantages. the above quote points out that God is both inside and outside of man and this provision ensures that this dualism is not problematic although the relation between the two worlds appears to require further explanation. It is in this connection that St Augustine’s philosophy of History emerges as questionable. There appears in this account a more problematic dualism between a linear history of existence evolving toward unique and unrepeatable events and the Platonic/Aristotelian conception of universal and cyclical forms that constitute the continuous oneness and goodness of Being. The former is present in his tendency to use the Bible as a source for the linear approach. Obviously there is one and only one unique and unrepeatable creation, one and only one coming, departure and resurrection of Christ and these perhaps demand the operation of the epistemological mechanism of revelation if we are to understand these events for what they are. This approach, however also requires the epistemological mechanism of introspection if my memories of unique events and uniquely related events are to become a part of my understanding. And yet we also find in Augustine the aspect of a progress toward an eschatology with a universalistic end in the oneness and goodness of Being.

In Civitas Terrena there is a universalistic eschatology that will end in a Day of Judgment in which those that have had the grace to renounce their selfish desires will be saved and those with more worldly bodily related desires will be damned. History, for St Augustine is clearly, then, both a history of Civitas Terrena and Civitas Dei: the result of which will be a separation of the City of God from the city of man.The Day of Judgment will obviously be conducted in accordance with the forms or principles of virtue in general and justice in particular.

So, paradoxically, Augustine eschatology is rational and universal in nature but the rationality involved evokes Aristotelian and Kantian ethical principles. There is also more than a hint of the Platonic allegory of the Cave in the vision of the liberation of souls who through a combination of earthly work in search of the divine Caritas find their way out of the realm of the shadows and darkness into the divine light of Bring.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Neo-Platonism and Plotinus

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Plato took upon himself a synthesizing role in relation to the Pre-Socratic philosophical positions of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Materialism, and Sophism. The strategy of Plato favoured the position of Parmenides but obliged itself to provide explanations of the world of material flux and change. Some commentators mistakenly saw in Plato the presence of a dualistic assumption that divided the world of thought from the sensory world without the means to reconcile the two supposed opposites. In fact Plato had provided in his dialogue, the Republic, a metaphysical explanation for the relation of the physical sensory world and the world of thought. The world of thought possessed the logical character of the oneness and goodness of Being expressed in the Form of The Good, whereas the physical sensory world possessed the character of the flux and change of the many. The latter world was not however hermetically sealed from the world of thought but was in the relation of “participation”: the oak tree we experience, for example, was an entity that could come into existence and pass out of existence in virtue of the relation it had to the eternal changeless form of an oak tree in the realm of the oneness and goodness of Being. We should also bear in mind that Platonism was itself a Philosophy in the process of evolution or development from the earlier open-ended Socratic dialogues in search of essentialist definitions to the middle more theoretical dialogues featuring the Theory of Forms and finally to the later dialogues including “Parmenides” and “Timaeus”. The Theory of forms from the middle period faced a crucial argument to the effect that it lacked a logical justification given the fact that the forms were many and thereby differed from the oneness and goodness of Being: the theory that is, lacked metaphysical justification. The Timaeus resolved this issue by claiming that the Forms were emanations from the Parmenidean oneness and goodness of Being in a derivative realm Plato referred to as Mind or “The Intellect” which actively worked with the Forms: this is the realm of the activity of the Demiurge. Souls in turn then “emanate” from the Intellect(the highest activity of life). Soul contains then two principles, firstly a power of reason that can understand and contemplate the forms and a material principle of desire for material ends. This latter principle defines the non-contemplative activity of the soul in terms of a deficiency, a want for something it does not possess. When engaged in this mode of change the soul uses the cognitive and action systems at its disposal to achieve the ends desired. Cognition, however, best expresses the Forms of the Intellect although affective states also “image” the activity of the Intellect in virtue of a cognitive recognition or consciousness of the affection. Cognition cannot however directly reveal the oneness and goodness of Being as evidenced by the need for Plato in the Republic to use allegories to symbolically represent this realm. The difference between the activity of the Intellect or Demiurge and the activity of the Soul is that the former activity is internal to itself and the latter requires some external end to achieve a state of quiescence. This internal activity of the Intellect is characterized as contemplation and to the extent that the Soul is capable of contemplation of the Forms is the extent to which it is capable of participation in divine activity, thus moving closer to the ultimate oneness and goodness of Being. It is necessary to point out that on this account the external material concrete world is the least real of all the philosophical entities being discussed in Plato’s theory. This physical material world is also by definition the least Good of all the entities that have been caused to exist by the oneness and goodness of Being. Matter only becomes evil when it impedes the divine contemplative activity of the soul from contemplating the forms.

The above was largely the position adopted by Plotinus(born ca 205AD, died, ca 271AD) and communicated in his teachings some 600 years after Plato. It appears that he was also further convinced that the writings and teachings of Aristotle were sophisticated elaborations upon the Platonic position, even if there were problematic deviations such as the insistence that the forms were, in some real sense “in” the external physical world. Life forms of various kinds, for example, were on Aristotle’s account, potentialities actualizing in accordance with the principles of their kinds. For Plotinus these life forms all emanated from the oneness and goodness of Being, they revealed the “workings” of Being through the Demiurge and its divine thinking. In this arena of description and explanation, there is obviously a risk of a dualistic characterization of reality without appeal to these higher realms of Thought and Being. It is not clear whether Aristotle would have accepted all of the details of the above account but it is clear that it is not merely knowledge of the Form of the Good (as presented allegorically in the Republic) that is the prime mover in the system. Aristotle believed that one approached the oneness and goodness of Being through Theory and not allegory. He believed that is that our knowledge of 4 kinds of change, in reality, can be explained by four kinds of explanation of these changes which will appeal to three principles. This is, amongst other things, how we human souls have “access” to both the activity of the Demiurge and the oneness and goodness of Being. This account of Aristotle is perhaps an elaboration upon the Platonic insistence accepted by Plotinus that Being can only be characterized negatively, in terms of what it is not, which for many created the impression of its non-existence or even an impression that statements relating to the meaning of Being were contradictory. This impression was less likely to occur whilst the term “aletheia” (unconcealment) was an important element of the theoretical account, because it strongly suggests that Being can be accessed or be “discovered” in a process that seems to be more related to the ancient concept of “meaning” rather than our modern conception of truth that appears to acquire a relation of correspondence between the dualistic elements of thought and material reality. Aristotle is an important contributor to this debate about the nature of Being because he claimed that Being had many meanings and the theorizing about these meanings appeared to be best investigated by the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction.

Thinking of the Forms which would in logic be regarded as necessary truths implies that the negation of these truths could not be possible in this realm of meaning for the simple reason that it is not possible to think contradictions. Contradiction, therefore defines or circumscribes the limits of thought. Human souls, as we know, sometimes believe we are thinking about something even when we possess contradictory beliefs or when we regard the compatibility of two forms as impossible or contradictory. This testifies to our finitude and the fact that we are mixed beings composed by the Demiurge of thought and material. We only approach the level of contemplation once we rid ourselves of all contradiction and can finally in a contemplative state mean everything we think. If we are further able to mean everything we say we embrace the Logos of the divine. Heraclitus, as we know believed he had achieved such a state.

Brett, in his characterization of Plotinus’ commitment to what he regarded as Neo-Platonism insists that whereas Plato conceived of the oneness and goodness of Being in terms of practical human activities, Plotinus turned his back on the world of change and human activity and attempted instead to describe and explain the state of timeless meditation which all humans should strive to achieve:

“The atmosphere of Neo-Platonism is at once more impersonal and more subjective. Plato diffuses an atmosphere of practical activity, and thinks chiefly of the good life as a system of human activities. Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism turns his eyes away from the world of change and action to the inner life of timeless meditation. For Plato the world that lies beyond the senses was a justification of human effort: it was primarily an answer to those who saw in life nothing but ceaseless change that made effort vain and progress only a synonym for process. For Plotinus the supersensible is the spiritual world of the mystic…… The mysticism of Plato ends with insight into the reality of life: the mysticism of Plotinus begins from that point, abstracts the reality from life and views existence as a state from which man strives to flee that he may depart from it and be with God.”

The mystic state for Brett, combined with the term “subjective” minimises the role of theory in both Plato and Plotinus. The term “subjective”, for example, is loaded with scientific materialistic assumptions to the effect that Being is material, concrete objective reality best “discovered” by the scientific method and its activities of observation, measurement, and experiment. Modern Science, that is, retreated from philosophical description and explanation and reversed the polarity of Platonic and Aristotelian theorising on the grounds of the reduction of Being to the two Aristotelian categories of “Quantity” and “Relation”: ignoring the two other fundamental categories of judgment namely Substantive Judgments and Qualitative judgments which are about substantial and qualitative aspects of Being respectively. Qualitative change we know was later in History to be in its turn reduced by empirical and analytical Philosophy to primary and secondary qualities in the spirit of the reversal of the polarity of Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy. Primary qualities were “objective” essentially quantitatively and relational and secondary qualities were “subjective”. It is not, however, beyond the realms of possibility that this process of the abandonment of Platonic and Aristotelian theorizing about Being was compromised by Plotinus’ tendency to focus on the state of contemplation in abstraction from the “activity” of the soul in both its thinking and acting. Brett also wishes to place some of the responsibility for Plotinus’ drift toward mysticism and subjectivism on the shoulders of Plato:

“The change hinges upon the interpretation of Plato. If emphasis is laid upon Plato’s idea of the body as the tomb of the soul: if contemplation is valued before action; if the whole process of education is regarded exclusively as the liberation of the soul, the origin of Neo-Platonism can be seen at once. The divergence of Neo-Platonism lies mainly in the metaphysical view of intellect s a cosmic reason. The Stoic doctrine of universal reason had been really veiled materialism: nevertheless, its “pantheism” only required a fresh interpretation of reason to emerge as a theory of all-embracing intellect.”

Brett is here omitting the influence of Aristotle in the intervening period between Plato and Plotinus.This together with his projection of the prejudices of materialistic science upon the metaphysical(“first principle”) aspect of this discussion needs also to be borne in mind. The idea of cosmic reason was embraced by Aristotle as part of a comprehensive theory that could in its turn be used to respect scientific concern for describing and explaining a change in quantitative and relational terms(subjective-objective were “relational” categories). This Aristotelian theory stretched from the Oneness and goodness of Being which was Primary Pure Form, all the way down to a position of pure primary material. Primary Form on this account can in no way be correctly related to the relational term of the “subjective” or the consciousness of a being who introspects upon its own “contents of consciousness”. Aristotle is in his theory characterizing a great chain of Being which includes the Forms and the soul and the material of the body of the soul as well as the material of the external environment of the soul. This “metaphysical attitude” of Aristotle can not meaningfully be characterized as “psychological”. It is rather a philosophical position arrived at through the various philosophical methods of elenchus (Socrates), dialectical reasoning as well as logical reasoning and explanation. The Metaphysics of Stoicism may well be problematically materialistic as Brett is suggesting in that its notion of causation was unnecessarily deterministic and this might in a sense follow from the limited view of causation we find in Plato who appears to believe the idea of “formal cause” suffices to describe and explain everything that needs describing and explaining. Aristotle criticized this position and elaborated upon the role of causation in description and explanation in terms of his famous “four causes” schema. Recent scholars(Jonathan Lear) have pointed out that the Greek word “aitia” is connected to knowledge and explanation. Jonathan Lear, therefore, writes about the four different fashions of characterizing cause in descriptive and explanatory contexts.

The interesting question to ask in this context is whether Plotinus subscribed to the Stoic view of deterministic causation or whether he would have regarded the Aristotelian view as more accurate. in this context we should also remind ourselves of the fact that a revered teacher of Plotinus in Alexandria, Ammonius Saccas, was both an expert in Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy. Saccas saw in Aristotelian Philosophy a natural continuation and sophistication of Plato’s Philosophy.

Plotinus’s position is problematically characterised by Brett in the following manner:

“This Neo-Platonism is therefore no mere reproduction of Platonic doctrine. It is to a large extent an independent construction by reason of the new standpoint adopted. Plotinus has a new idea of the rational life as something distinctively subjective. Out of this arises his virtues and vices: for it leads to a deeper view of thought and at the same time makes impossible that trans-subjective use of thought on which he builds a metaphysics not unlike the vagaries of Gnosticism.”

Subjectivizing Plotinus in this way is indeed problematic. Is Brett really suggesting that Plotinus decided to ignore the great chain of being argumentation contained in both Plato and Aristotle in favour of an idea of the “subjective” that was not in currency at the time? We also know,by the way, that when virtues and vices arise out of a subjectivity thesis, ethical relativism is the inevitable consequence: a consequence which both Plato and Aristotle would have dismissed as a misunderstanding of the nature of ethics.

Brett, as we pointed out previously ignores the resemblance of the Platonic position to that of Aristotle’s and this raises a question about the validity of categorising Plotinus as a Neo-Platonist. Perhaps, then, the litmus test of the correctness of Brett´s categorisation lies in Plotinus’ view of the soul and its relation to the external material, world. In a section entitled “The Activities of the Soul” we find the following account of sensation –the link between the external world ad the soul:

“Sensation is defined as the reception of forms in the matter which accompanies soul. It is the process by which forms are placed at the disposal of the soul. Knowledge is always an activity of the soul: sensation as such is not knowledge but a condition of the attainment of knowledge about material things. The independent character of the soul appears still more clearly in the sphere of knowledge. The soul uses the organs of sense as its instruments: it is itself unaffected: external impressions are made upon the sensitive soul by objects, but these impressions involve no self-recognition, no consciousness. The impressions are stored in the affective soul until the cognitive soul turns toward them and chooses to behold them. Plotinus here modifies the Aristotelian tradition. He deprives the senses of any function but that of transmitting forms which are the potential objects of cognition…When the soul exerts its activity and turns towards the things of sense, it perceives: this action may be described as facing toward the external world.”

It is not exactly clear how Brett conceives of this modification of Aristotle’s views especially in relation to the role of the senses and sensation in knowledge. Brett goes on to point out that Plotinus accepts Aristotle’s accounts of sensation, imagination and calculative reason and he also points out one crucial difference between the two accounts. Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, anticipates the role of the brain in this process. Another difference concerns the use by Plotinus of the so-called introspective method to arrive at the idea of self-consciousness lying at the intersection of the experience of objects and the unity of a soul which in its activity admits of no distinction between subject and object.

For Plato, there is no ontological difference between the changes in the world occasioned by the perceptual activity of the soul of the particularities of the world and the activity of a contemplating subject which is unchanging and universal and good in itself. The difference between an Aristotelian account and a Platonic account of the nature of the particularities in the external world is that these particularities, in the case of Plato, “participate”(in some sense) in the forms they are temporal representations of and, in the case of Aristotle, living particularities embody one form actually and other forms potentially. For Plato the particularities of the external world and the body(the different organs of the body) are in terms presented by the Republic instantiations of the “Many”, whereas thought in terms of the forms and their connectedness in the Intellect is instantiation of the “One”. The particularities are ever changing and belong to the world of Becoming existing separately in a differentiated world discriminated by sensation. the Soul, according to proof in Plotinus(Ennead 4,7,(2)) belongs on the other hand to the world of thought and Being. The body is composed of the material particulars: earth, air, fire, and water or compounds of them. Short of being organized by an internal principle or a form, these elements, even if they should occupy a shape in space, they will be merely accidentally juxtaposed have been brought into such a state by external processes. Such material will feel no sensations nor experience memory of sensations but will only be in a state of continual flux from moment to moment. If, for example, we are speaking of the juxtaposition of a number of grains of sand in a desert, this spatial unity will be disrupted by the first desert wind. Such temporal unities will not be able to contemplate the beauty of existence or the injustice of the dispersion of unity. Plotinus likens the soul to a musician and the body to the strings of a harp that would not be plucked unless in accordance with the principle of a melody that guides the movements of the fingers of the musician. These points and arguments are Platonic and Aristotelian and with the exception of Brett’s points relating to the brain, self-consciousness, and introspection, there seems to be little that is new. There is no doubt that Plotinus probably acknowledged that we humans have an awareness of what we are doing and thinking but this awareness must have taken the form of knowing what one is doing and this knowing must surely have been non-observational. Introspection, of course, has been many things to many theorists but in all its non-Cartesian forms, it has been connected to some kind of internal observation of the self(which possesses the kind of unity, principle or form that cannot be observed). The modern Scientific subjective-objective distinction is also often introduced into the debate with no awareness of its reliance on a materialistic assumption. This in its turn is anathema to the implication of Platonic and Aristotelian positions which maintain that principles on the thought end of the chain of Being are responsible for explanations of the kinds of change and activity associated with human Souls. In the metaphysical terms embraced by Plotinus, it is clear that the oneness and goodness of Being is the cause and explanation of the Intellect and its creative activity in relation to the forms. This intellect or Demiurge, in turn, is the cause or explanation of life forms such as Souls that are embodied and organized materially in various ways. The Soul is therefore obviously related in various ways to matter, the last entity in the chain of Being. In other words, material is the least organized and most chaotic of all the entities in this chain for which the oneness and goodness of Being is the source of all explanation. Science, of course, as we have noted, reverses the polarity of explanation and locates the source of description and explanation in the events of the external material world. This in spite of the fact that the very idea of what constitutes an event is in question even within the scientific community.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition and Consciousness: Early Christian Fathers(Clement of Alexandria)

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Cosmopolitan cities seem to be able to diversify and intensify human life, culture, and society in unexpected ways. Adrian Stokes, writing about the general conception of the Renaissance as a rebirth of pagan and classical forms remarked that this exciting period, (embracing a large number of cosmopolitan centres), is better conceived as an intensification of all forms of life, culture, and society. The Arts, Science and Philosophy and all forms of explorative human activity re-emerged just two centuries after the reintroduction of Aristotelian Philosophy into the cultural arena(Latin had become the language of Academia and Aristotle after having been banished to the wilderness by the Church was suddenly in favour). The Renaissance is also the perfect Platonic image of an emergence from the darkness of the so-called “dark ages” in which the dialectical battle of the giants of Platonic dualism and materialism suddenly produced a kind of Aristotelian synthesis in all regions of human life. Synthesis was the order of the day where earlier unities, both theoretical and practical had fallen into fragments. Aristotle’s recipe for the construction of a large middle class(a synthesis of the rich and poor) was back on the agenda of cosmopolitan cities. The recipe focussed unfortunately on the material conditions of the middle class rather than the ethical and political formal conditions relating to virtue and education. Art used Science and questioned Religion politely and Science forged ahead with its program of investigation building the Empire of influence which was to come. The seeds were being sown to question the influence of Philosophy in general and Aristotle in particular. Aristotle had in his politics argued on both grounds of experience and academic grounds for the formation of an educated virtuous middle class that would synthesis the best ideas of democracy and oligarchy into a constitutional form of government that would serve only the common good and not the interests of any particular powerful group in the polis. His was a philosophical vision of a flourishing life for all the citizens of the polis. He, of course, meant something more than the Hobbesian materialistic/scientific conception of a middle class striving for economic prosperity and commodious living which at the beginning of the modern period was to override Aristotelian political and ethical wisdom. It is interesting to note in this context that the spirit of synthesis did not sufficiently combat the forces of materialism and dualism as was evidenced in the Philosophy of Hobbes in England and Cartesian dualism in France. Both movements, for obvious reasons, criticized Aristotle perfunctorily thus re-creating the fruitless dialectical debates between the materialists and the dualists that preceded the reemergence of Aristotelianism prior to the Renaissance. These philosophical discussions were to rage for over 150 years before materialist Empiricism and Cartesian dualistic rationalism was synthesized and transcended by the Philosophy of Kant. Kant’s Philosophy embraced a number of Aristotelian assumptions relating to philosophical psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics in order to produce what many commentators called “a brilliant synthesis of empiricism and rationalism”. Kant. we should also recall was a citizen of Königsberg, a bustling cosmopolitan centre, and it is not particularly surprising to find Kant arguing on both ethical and political grounds for a global cosmopolitanism regulated by an institution similar to the UN that was formed after the second world war. We cannot go into the arguments in detail here but suffice it to say that Kant embraced a number of concepts and principles from the Aristotelian theory of change and hylomorphic theory thus continuing a tradition of thinking about the world born in the bustling cosmopolitan centre of Athens.

Alexandria was also a bustling cosmopolitan centre of activity. The times that Clements of Alexandria lived through were also times of questioning in particular in relation to the issue of the relation of knowledge and faith. The second century AD must have been experienced by both intellectuals and the populace as “Renaissance-like”, ie. they must have witnessed, for example, an intensification of all forms of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Judaism, Christianity and last but not least the various flourishing sects of Gnosticism. Clement responded to this cultural chaos as a synthesizer. Professor Brett characterizes the man and his work in the following way:

“Some regard him as Platonic: others emphasize the Stoicism of his attitude: to some he appears an amorphous collection of doctrines. The evidence seems to support none of these views: for while the language of Plato, the ideas of Stoic writers, and the vagaries of Philo, jostle each other in every passage: there is an independence which rules them all–he has the disregard of a true believer for the niceties of expression: his eagerness to state his belief seems to break out into each and all of the possible types of formula: salvation and resurrection are the theme which make the language of philosophy seem meagre and elementary.”

We should remember that the above words were published in the 1920s during a period when both Gnostic and Aristotelian academic scholarship was in its infancy. Indeed Gnostic Scholarship at the time of Brett’s writings appeared to focus upon principally the Christian critial view of Gnosticism that was, in fact, emerging during the time of Clement. Gnosticism regarded the God of the Old Testament(OT) as the equivalent of the Platonic demiurge. The demiurge was supposedly the designer of the forms matter would take in a process of creation begun by a higher God. Matter had no form or principle of organization and was therefore chaotic in its nature. The Demiurge was provided with the principles or forms to be used in this design process by the higher divine unknowable thinking God and did the best that could be done with chaotic matter and the divine spirit, given the essentially instrumental nature of the task. The Demiurge is therefore not wholly good and we see this in the OT when Adam is lied to in relation to the consequences of eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Adam ate the apple and was not destroyed as was promised. Adam and Eve multiply and out of their kin is formed all the peoples of the world but the Demiurge selects the Jews as a “chosen people” and punishes and rewards them in what to many Gnostics has seemed arbitrary and whimsical given their view of the utilitarian demiurge. The destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD, for example, must have seemed to many Gnostics to be divine Justice and proof that the Demiurge had failed to create a world in which the forms could liberate the divine spirit in man. Many Gnostics at this point began to see man as superior to the utilitarian demiurge. The myth of the Garden of Eden now receives an almost philosophical interpretation and Eve’s actions receive a more central and sympathetic interpretation, celebrating the free, exploring, adventurous spirit of man shaking off the chains of an arbitrary authority(Perhaps this was connected to the discovery of the Gospel of MaryMagdelene testifying to Mary being the first witness of the resurrection). After Adam and Eve eat the apple they become aware of a new principle of knowledge and are punished by the Demiurge for disobeying his commandment. Man emerges from this (in the eyes of the Gnostics), as a questioning, knowing and thinking being superior in nature to the instrumental utilitarian demiurge: The eyes of man are now seeking for the divine agency the Demiurge is serving. The resurrection of Jesus celebrated by the Eucharist of the communion relies on the mysterious Christian belief in transsubstantiation, a belief not accepted by the Gnostics because of their belief that the resurrection was not an actual reincarnation but merely a symbolic event intending to point to the continuing existence of the spirit of Jesus. For the Gnostics, the resurrection does not necessarily point to another world beyond this but can symbolize instead a human rebirth within the course of human life: a rebirth that occurs in the form of an awakening from a materialistically inspired life as if from a dream.

Clement, disagreed with elements of this gnostic position and adopted the Stoic view of the appetites of the body, not viewing them as evil as the Gnostics but rather viewing them as indifferent and dependent upon the nature of the will responding to the call of the appetites. Clement agreed, however with the Gnostics that the Will, is not a “fallen” will: it is good because its source is in not the Demiurge but rather the divine agency the Demiurge serves.

Clement is, in many ways a Renaissance-like figure synthesizing many positions into his own and we agree with Brett’s judgment that his importance has been underestimated in the area of Psychology. We are arguing here, however, that Brett in his turn has underestimated the work of Clement because he has not understood the Philosophical importance of many of his ideas.

In his work entitled “Paedogogus” Clement claims in Socratic and Aristotelian fashion that sin is involuntary(because the will is good) and can be removed or redeemed only by the wisdom of Logos or the true word(see the Gospel of St John, the gospel the Gnostics most identify with). Sin is, insofar as Clement is concerned, very much concerned with knowledge and not so much concerned with evil intention, thereby confirming the Gnostic/philosophical interpretation of the myth of Adam and Eve in “Paradise”. This entails that philosophy is at the very least a necessary condition of leading the religiously inspired life but philosophy is clearly insufficient for Clement because the love of God (the master of the Demiurge) and faith in his existence is also required if one is to be truly “saved”. Clement claims in his work the “Paedogogus” that Christ is the incarnation of “logos”(the true word or explanation) and the task of man initially is to imitate the life of Christ until the “awakening” occurs and man is free to rationally choose the true way him/herself. The awakening is also construed Platonically in terms of a transposition from a world of shadows in which we are imprisoned in an enlightened world. Yet reading Clement one cannot also be reminded of Kant’s ethical claim of the importance of a good-will as well as the Kantian psychological distinction between the active will(embodied in the things we do, the actions we perform) and passion(the things that happen to us).

There are other clear signs of the influence of the Gnostics in Clement’s work. He claimed that women can also be mediums of the transmission of the true word of the Gospels and their narratives of the life of Christ. Although he would have been less than sympathetic with the Gnostic divine trinity of father, mother, and son.

Another important influence upon the work of Clement was not just Platonism but Greek Philosophy in general which had been cast into the wilderness by religious authorities. Brett elaborates upon this influence in the following quote:

“Knowledge and action are so closely united in the doctrine of Clement that the solution of these questions must begin from a statement of the rational activities. The higher reason has a power of choice on which depend the search for empirical facts, instruction, and complete knowledge. Thus the progress of the soul is made dependent on the will to know. At first, there is complete ignorance and the individual is placed in a world of desires and imaginations with no guiding light of reason. Hence the commission of sins. For want is natural to man: and from want arises desire which leads to sin: vain imaginations also lead astray. In both cases the moral guilt arises from the fact that the will gives assent: only by this act of will is sin constituted, and therefore it is just in the fact of sin that freedom is demonstrated. On the other hand, the will is not essentially sinful: it is from God and must be good: so that the cause of sin must be looked for outside the will. Clement finds the cause in false images, snares, and delusions that mislead the soul…Sin is the triumph of darkness over light, of ignorance over knowledge. The way of salvation, then, can only be the way of knowledge.”

Some Gnostics, of course, would argue that if the will is good and sin comes from the outside then there is nothing to feel guilty about, i.e. the culture of sin as guilt would have been a mystery for the pure Gnostic for whom the end was enlightenment. Yet Clement does interestingly claim that the foundation of all mental life is assent to truth which can only take place via an act of the will. This clearly synthesizes knowing and acting in the mind in a way that had not occurred since the Philosophy of Aristotle where approximately the same account was presented in the framework of a biological account of the mind that we will not encounter again until the work of Freud and O Shaughnessy in the modern period.

O´Shaughnessy’s “The Will: a dual aspect theory” is a fundamentally naturalist account of the biological life of the mind that sees one half of the mind(the willing half) to be composed of desire, intention, and act and the other half(the knowing half) to be composed of sensation, perception, and knowing where knowing involves not just assent to the truth but also the capacity to justify the power or capacity of knowing that is exercised. The two halves are integrated with each other and consciousness is involved with both halves. Cognition aims necessarily at an external manifestation of its knowing in a demonstration of its knowledge and action is conducted with the intention or preparedness to learn from the consequences that flow from the action. It is quite fascinating to see that the Philosophical Psychology of Clement was very similar to this(without the scientific component of “naturalism”) and it is equally fascinating to see the resemblance of Clement’s ideas to those of Immanuel Kant, in particular to Kant’s account of the will which also ended in an appeal to faith as the final tribunal of justification for acts of will in domains of action where the consequences are uncertain. Clement’s appeal to freedom also preempts the Kantian concept which founds an ethical system that appeals to the good will and good intention as defining for the essence of ethical action. Kant, as we know was religious but he demanded that his ethical system be autonomous and he placed his faith more in the concept of freedom than in the concept of God, which he also appreciated had a place in the life of mankind.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Philo, Early Christian Fathers(Paul and John), and Gnosticism.

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It has often been observed that the Hebrew and Greek traditions occupy different difficult to reconcile dimensions of our cultural heritage. It has been claimed that the roads leading from Jerusalem and the road leading from Athens into our modern cultures are different parallel roads without intersection points. Alexandrian Jews, however, seriously question this early hypothesis partly perhaps because they were Greek speakers and sought in the writings of ancient Greek Philosophers confirmation of the articles of their faith. Professor Brett has this to say:

“The Egyptian Jews appear to have formed a mixed society mainly Hellenic in manners and language, but still thoroughly Jewish in temper. For this community the Greek version of the Septuagint was made somewhere about the year 250 BC. Into the disputes on the nature and authority of this translation, the version of the Septuagint, there is no need to enter: it is sufficient to remark that it was a version not wholly free from innovations. Even if there were no self-willed theorists among the translators and no direct intention to give the Scriptures a Stoic or Platonic colouring, there must have still been many an instance when the change from Hebrew to Greek words involved a change of atmosphere that amounted to a change of doctrine.”

This piece was written of course long before it became clear to scholars that there were translation difficulties with even the translation of Greek philosophical terms into Latin because the Latin terms carried cultural commitments to the Greek terms that were not shared by the Greeks.

The Book of Wisdom ascribed to Solomon, to take one example of the difficulties of translation, involved preachings by Ecclesiastes that appeared to traditional Jewish scholars to contain a number of mistranslations. Philo’s position in this debate was that there were aspects of Judaism that needed correction by Greek Philosophy and there were also aspects of Greek Philosophy that needed reinterpretation in terms of Judaic wisdom in relation to the doctrine of the eternal life of the soul. Such eclectism would have seemed to Aristotle to be a form of madness but as we know Aristotle’s philosophy at this time was conspicuous by its absence. Philo’s preference for a Platonic form of dualism ranging over the mind-body problem and the reality-appearance problem essentially ignored Aristotelian solutions to these problems. in Philo, as in Plato, we also encounter a penchant for allegorical illustrations in his interpretations of the Scriptures.

The Creation Myth of the Old Testament(OT) involving the image of God breathing into the body of man is a central image for Philo from which follows in almost Pythagorean spirit a hierarchy of beings living in a world in which the very air is inhabited by spirits that are divine and can in their turn “fall” from divine grave and inhabit human bodies until the moment of their salvation is nigh and they can be restored to the kingdom in the heavens. Prior to divine inspiration and the entering of these spirits into their bodies, humans lead an animal-like existence steered solely by their appetites and their senses.

Brett claims that the Stoics have influenced Philo but the influence is probably more complex than Brett envisages in the following quote:

“From this point, Philo develops the Stoic aspect of his doctrine. All things that exist have power of some kind: at its lowers level there is the power of self-conservation called Habit, which is found in motionless objects such as stones. The next degree is the power of growth, which is a higher form of self-conservation, found in plants, for example. The third level is that of soul-life where we find perception, representation of ideas and impulse. The common element in this scale is spirit, in the sense of air… Man, as last created, sums up all these forms–he has the various forms in his bones(analogous to the rocks of the earth) his hair and nails (analogous to the plants) and in the sensitive soul. Man is this a microcosm: he has a material organism illuminated by the mind just as the macrocosm is a vast organism illuminated by the sun. The study of man and the study of the universe can be conducted on parallel lines, and to some extent, the knowledge of man is a knowledge of God”

Brett had earlier pointed out that the Stoics had simplified Aristotle’s 4 cause schema of explanation into two and reduced the idea of the actualisation process( a process of development) to a kind of monism(reminiscent of Spinoza’s Substantialism). We can also see in the above quote an echo of Spinoza’s conatus, a power that things possess to preserve themselves in their existence. The thoughts of the Stoics, characterizing the Platonic dualism of thought and extension as aspects of an infinite substance from which everything originates is a position that is only distantly related to the thought of Aristotle. The Stoic system of classification is not that of Cartesian thought and extension but rather a dualistic system of action and passion which in its turn indicates an ontological commitment that everything that is real is so in virtue of either being capable of action or capable of being acted upon. We can already see that, in this transformation of the thought of Aristotle, the idea of form or principle has disappeared as has the idea of chance. The Stoic substance, even if it includes the will as part of a deterministic substance leaves no space for free choice in human voluntary action. Mental activity, as we know from the Stoics is also reduced to knowing and feeling and the Aristotelian notion of deliberation connected to phronesis(the power of reasoning practically) is also conspicuous by its absence. In the Stoic investigation of the powers of the mind, we encounter a confusion of the power of the imagination with passive sensation. We also find “principles” or regularities such as the association of ideas masquerading as principles of reason. The positive result of this opening up of gaps between perception, imagination, and reason, is that we encounter in this account the first indications of a concept of self-consciousness. This concept was a bridge between experience and reason. There is an argument for regarding this moment as one of the moments of a beginning of our modern “cognitive psychology” that was later to become obsessed with the so-called “subjective” perspective of the individual. This notion of the self-sufficiency of the individual and his experience was, of course, a result of the notion of self-sufficiency Aristotle discussed in relation to phronesis or practical reasoning.

We argued in the previous chapter that Stoicism was not a self-centred ethical philosophy given its commitment to the role of conscience and duty tied to its telos of a cosmopolitan man but it is clear from the above discussion that the Stoics were in the throes of building an alternative skeletal frame of philosophical psychology that would later in its turn be transformed and used with a vengeance in the creation of Modern scientific Psychology. Philo’s work was supposedly influenced not just by Stoic materialism(substantialism) but also by Platonic Psychology of the Spirit. Plato’s influence is also encountered in Philo’s hope for an enlightened(sun-like) spiritual inspiration as sometimes occurred in dreams which may symbolically represent in their images the invisible powers that hold our world and our universe together. In Philo, we see an advanced spiritualization of our rational powers as a stage in the abandonment of rationalism but there was in this process, however, an anchor in the Ethical law of Moses that probably prevented an Epicurean drifting into the straits of relativism. We find, however, no attempt to seek to articulate in any detail the role of the will or self-consciousness in the process of replacing man’s rational power.

The question that arises as a consequence of this developmental process of the substitution of reason for spirit is, what the early Christian Fathers will do with this cultural inheritance.


ST Paul and St John

One could detect in the writings of Philo echoes of Aristotle even if the ideas were significantly distorted because of Stoic materialistic and deterministic assumptions and also because his doctrines were given a baptism in a cauldron of what Brett called “Lofty passions” striving to understand a God that was perfectly rational. In Philo Philosophical Psychology was illustrated with a Platonic form of allegorical thinking in “symbolic pictures”. For Philo, the road to salvation is not the road taken by travelers arguing over the truth of statements but rather the road taken by travelers seeking divine signs of the invisible in the visible experience of the surrounding landscape. St Paul, we know traveled the road to Damascus and had such an experience of the invisible that spiritually transformed him. Writing after such a spiritual transformation Pauls writings have very little, if any, Aristotelian content. Paul clearly distinguishes between the mind controlled by reason which for him fails to survive the death of the body and the soul as immortal spirit related to God not via knowledge but via a “moral vision” that presumably can only be explicated by “symbolic pictures”. A moral telos was, of course, the theme of Plato’s Republic but the constituting mechanism was not a moral vision given in symbolic pictures but rather an idea of the Good arrived at and defended via various methods of reasoning. The constituting mechanism of spiritual conversion or salvation via symbolic pictures appears to lack the power or capacity to universalise the object of the pictures and this ensures that the writings of Paul at best are dedicated to achieving individual salvation, ie. they contain recipes for individual action and judgment tied to individual revelation or vision in a spiritual mode. This mechanism would have been obscure for those living at the time of Aristotle who was beginning to become suspicious of those that experienced visions. For the Plato of the Republic his three famous allegories of the sun, the divided line, and the cave symbolized two realities: the physical sun and the mental idea of the good. These allegories differed significantly from the allegories we find in myths and the Bible in that they are embedded not in narratives concerning the origin and destiny of the universe and man but rather threads of argument woven together for the purposes of revealing to us humans the meaning of Being. This latter use of language is an advanced form of use compared with that which the passionate religious soul uses in his efforts to understand himself and his world.

Paul Ricoeur has analyzed, for example, the confessions the religious soul makes of his own defilement, sin, and guilt and the analysis reveals that this use of language concerns what man considers sacred: symbolic confessions of evil denotes, according to Ricoeur the experienced disruption, fault, or breach in mans relation to what he regards as sacred. Ricoeur, in the context of a discussion of the symbolism also refers to Hegel’s teleologically oriented philosophy of religion, and claims that symbols reach out to the future destiny of man that will be revealed by a world spiritual meaning.  Ricoeur also discusses how symbols reveal an archeological dimension that takes us back to the origin of mankind and the origin of meaning. Was the origin connected to acts of creation of the universe and man by a supernatural being? Was there a first man, like Adam who after receiving the breath of the creator failed to follow his law thus accounting for all future evil in the world? This is one message of the OT which with this myth of what happened to the first man lays the groundwork for an individualistic interpretation of the spiritual life of man. This, of course, is a very different spiritual outlook to that of the Greeks for whom mankind began not with an individual but with a race of men, that, in order to live successfully together required laws of their own making emanating from the rational part of their mind( the only effective means of controlling the spiritual and appetitive aspects of mans mind). The New Testament(NT) Gospels testify to a continued individualization of man and the continued absence of reason in their accounts of the psychology of man. The NT, however, appeals to something new and unique in its words:

“In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”(John 1:1)

Language, the medium of communicative action, is brought into the discussion but the above words whilst being assertive and expressive of a kind of truth that is spiritual, are not argumentative. John continues at 8:32:

“And you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.”

Jesus avoids any confusion by clarifying that what is being referred to here is not truth in any sense suggestive of academic truths about the external world but rather truth in relation to the individual salvation of all of his listeners. His was a message urging his audience to heed and obey the word of God if they desired to be free of the bondage of their own personal sins. It should be pointed out, however, that whether or not there is an academic argument for the idea of the Good in relation to the idea of Freedom, the rational investigation of these terms is not on the agenda of either the OT or the NT. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that one of the grounds for a discussion of the relation of these two terms is a Philosophical Psychology that has identified the individual will as an important element of action. The explanation for this state of affairs, however, lies with two factors: the abandonment of rationality and the Stoic connection of the will to the will to survive.

The way in which language is used in the NT in combination with the above two factors overshadows the accumulated wisdom of Philosophical Psychology. The telos of reason or rationality of the individual is, as was the case in the OT, replaced with the theological goal of the salvation of the individual through individual works( in the spirit of faith in God and the words of his prophets). With the absence of reason and the consequent devaluation of the importance of knowledge in the sense of epistemé, a vacuum of justification emerges that is filled with powers of mind such as the Imagination and its connection to the Emotions. Juxtapose the Imagination with Language and we are confronted with the “symbolic pictures” referred to by Brett. These pictures may, of course, be factually true(true descriptions of the life of Jesus, for example) but the symbolic structure of these “pictures” place these descriptions in a realm of meaning where the descriptions also refer to the intended relation of man to the sacred. As we know, however, even the mere factual descriptions of the life of Jesus have been a matter of controversy ever since the discovery of alternative Gnostic Gospels. This is an issue of knowledge or epistemé or truth about the external world and probably unrelated to the kind of inner truth or insight that Jesus was referring to in John 8:32. The Gnostics as we know promote truth perhaps in a wider sense but definitively in relation to an inherited and transformed philosophical psychology. The Gnostic Gospel of Thomas, for example, claims that Jesus also said the following:

“Jesus said, “if you bring forth what is within you, what you bring forth will save you. If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth will destroy you”

The idea of something within having such destructive power reminds the modern reader of Freud’s death instinct, Thanatos, that is biological in origin but also responsible for war and all forms of human aggression. This in turn is reminiscent of the position that Freud adopts in his “Civilization and its Discontents” where all of Culture is a battlefield in which the giants of Eros and Thanatos struggle for supremacy. A more potent image of ” world spirit”, conjured up more or less on the eve of the second world war is difficult to find.

One of the Gnostic texts discovered near Nag Hammadi: the “Testimony of Truth” gives a controversial interpretation of the Myth of the Garden of Eden( an interpretation incidentally that Aristotle certainly would have approved of.) The interpretation views the whole series of events through the eyes of the value of knowledge and the speaking serpent in the Garden. The Serpent does not use symbolic pictures but probably something resembling an argument to suggest that knowledge is necessary for the future development of Adam and Eve. God is accused of being malicious and holding grudges. Unsurprisingly, this text and many others were regarded as the blasphemy of heretics by many members of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The Serpent convinces Eve who convinces Adam. The kind of knowledge at issue here is not clear but it is probably not epistemé. It is probably more akin to the kind of knowledge the Delphic oracle challenged man to acquire, namely self-knowledge which according to Gnosticism is the path to divine knowledge or knowledge of God.

Pagels in her work “The Gnostic Gospels” quotes the Gnostic Teacher Monoimus:

“Abandon the search for God and the creation and other matters of similar sort. Look for him by taking yourself as a starting point. Learn who it is within you who makes everything his own and says “My God, my mind, my thought, my soul, my body. Learn the sources of sorrow, joy, love, hate…If you carefully investigate these matters you will find him in yourself.” (p18)

This is clearly a matter of intuitive knowledge or what some have called insight acquired via experience subjected to a kind of self-observation or process of introspection. Beyond these recommendations the kind of investigation required for this voyage of self-discovery is obscure and the problem, from the Christian point of view, with these so-called secret Gospels, is that they transpose the theme of salvation through repentance of sins into a philosophical/psychological theme of enlightenment from illusion. Pagels suggests that this recommendation sounds more Eastern than Western but there is an argument to be made that we are on Platonic terrain. Pagels does, however, in the context of this debate raise an interesting hypothesis relating to the possible influence of the Brahmins who conceive of God as Logos or the light of discourse. The Gospel of John could well refer to this Eastern position or alternatively, it could refer to an awareness of the role of the language of sacred texts in the conversion or salvation process of individuals. One might wonder If it is the case that the Platonic ascent from the darkness of illusory images deep inside the cave to the enlightenment provided by the knowledge of the forms or principles of all existence might also be a constituent feature of understanding that language can be used to instrumentally communicate wisdom and knowledge. If this is the case then one might also wonder why the Aristotelian arguments against the Platonic theory of forms in the context of dualistic philosophical psychology and metaphysics were not considered as an extension of the Platonic rationalist position. One answer to this question is that the weakness of the theory of forms and various dualistic assumptions sufficed for many thinkers to abandon rationality as a power of mind and justificatory principle in favour of what Brett called the “lofty passions” or what we refer to as “spirit”(which of course is also a Platonic aspect of the soul). What is at issue in this abandonment of Rationality is not merely an academic affair relating to Academic areas of knowledge such as Mathematics, it is rather the issue of a form of life, the so-called examined life, which Plato argued in the Republic was a superior form of life to either the wealthy or political/spiritual life that both ultimately depended upon circumstances outside of themselves for their happiness. The Philosophers of the Republic, armed with the idea of the Good would have no attachment to the desires of the bodily appetites of the wealthy man or the desires of the spirited warlike man who fails to acknowledge his mortality and its meaning. The desire for understanding of the meaninglessness of external goals in the face of death was an essential part of the examined life that Socrates illustrated in his relation to his own execution by the Athenians. In his cell before his death we encounter no “lofty passions or emotions manifested by his accusers at his trial: only a steadfast stoical acceptance of the inevitable, an attitude that could only exist in someone who had responded with the entire spectrum of his intellectual and spiritual powers to the challenge of Delphic oracle to “know thyself”.

Socrates’ declared agnosticism over the issue of whether after his death he would continue to exist in any form may have been repeated again in the Gnostic doubt about the resurrection of the carnal body. The issue of death obviously brings man to the brink or limit of one’s self-knowledge. The fate of the physical body must have been clear for all but the ceasing to exist of one’s consciousness, the medium in which we conduct our investigations into all phenomena including death must have presented itself as the mystery of mysteries almost on a par with the mystery of the nature of God’s existence. Much more could be said about the role of Gnosticism in the History of Psychology but let us for the moment rest our case with an acknowledgment that until its historical origins are clarified we can only guess at the ultimate significance of this issue in this debate. Pagels suggests that Gnosticism may have been politically outmanoeuvred by the orthodox Christians. If this is the case then the connection of Gnosticism with the Hellenic influences becomes a victim of the realm of political Spirit in the political realm which is a far cry from the spirit of Eros in the NT that associated itself with the emotion of Love.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: The Stoics and Epicureans(Critique and Commentary of Brett’s “History of Psychology”)

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The abandonment of Aristotelian Rationalism occurred over a long period with many modifications along the way. The general political climate of this change was one of militaristic expansion on a scale never seen before in Europe beginning with Alexander the Great’s Empire building conquests followed by a second wave of Roman Conquests. It almost seemed as if the Platonic concept of spirit and Eros emerged during this period as more relevant to the needs of the times, transcending even the Hebraic concept of Laws and commandments laid down(in an instrumental “Spirit”) in literary texts in the name of justice. These texts were, of course, not like the texts of the works of Plato and Aristotle, to be perused because they manifested knowledge and wisdom as values in themselves, but were rather rhetorical devices designed to recruit and convert the minds of readers to the cause of personal salvation. The Gospels of the New Testament were similarly rhetorical yet somewhat less judicial and dogmatic: more concerned with the “spirit” of love and the universal ideal of the brotherhood of man living in a kingdom of God’s making. The New Testament was definitively a move away from the academic knowledge and wisdom of Plato and Aristotle. The Gospels narrate the life story of a simple “wise” man who himself uses stories and parables to lead lost souls to the path of salvation. In these texts we can find tales of the miraculous: virgin births, bringing the dead back to life, wandering stars etc punctuating a chain of events leading to a dramatic tragic end for this simple wise man who comes to be dubbed “the son of God”. In these texts, we find little concern for the essential natures of things or the rational justification of one’s belief and actions. Indeed what we instead find is the continuation of an abandonment of the achievements of Aristotelian Rationalism that began with the death of Aristotle. The understanding aimed at in Biblical texts was in no sense theoretical or even practical in the Platonic or Aristotelian senses. Literature in its rhetorical form had swamped both the academic fields of science and Philosophy. It cannot be denied that this literature contained words of intent but it was still the case that the primary intention of the text was instrumental or what Kant would term “technological”: a means to achieve a “spiritual” end largely disconnected to the categorical ends of Philosophy. A spiritual form of “other-worldly” justice transcended the rational principle constituted justice argued for by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The brotherhood of man- kingdom could not be achieved via military or economic means or even via academic ideas but rather via literary and rhetorical texts containing the “good news” of the Gospels. This phenomenon, it was assumed would be constituted in the private reading space of the individual with the aid of ceremonial and clerical “services” conducted in the “spirit” of the symbolic. We in our modern world can certainly recognize how real “news” has supplanted knowledge in the sphere of our everyday lives and how it has transformed consciousness from an externally oriented power into an internal self-obsessed attitude.

This movement toward the instrumental, rhetorical and technological use of language and thought had actually begun earlier in the Pre-Christian era. It is in this period that we see the two schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism emerging from the golden age of Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian Philosophy and Science. Professor Brett has this to say about the period in question:

“The death of Aristotle marked the end of an era. The Speculative restlessness of the Greeks declined like their city-states. Their theories were welded into successive philosophies of life, just as their states were welded into successive empires. Speculation for its own sake gave way to symbolic pictures which served to reinforce ways of living. Policies for living rather than theories about living commanded the interests of philosophers. The Stoics and Epicureans were preoccupied with the attainment of individual self-sufficiency as a substitute for the much-lauded self-sufficiency of the old city-states. Life had become something to be endured rather than enjoyed: the problem was how to endure it best. How could the individual fortify himself against oppression, revolution and social change? The Stoics advocated integrity of character, devotion to duty, humanity towards fellow sufferers, and the rigorous discipline of the will: the Epicureans sought an escape from the hazards of life in cutting down the possible sources of misery….they put forward different forms of individualism one of which reached its culmination in Kant, the other in the English Utilitarians.”

These are interesting observations indeed even when viewed from our modern perspective. Symbolic pictures, and products of the imagination replaced rational argument and the discipline of critical theorizing, Brett argues with considerable insight. No real philosophical analysis of the role and significance of pictures in our lives was undertaken until Wittgenstein introduced the criticisms of his own picture theory of meaning from his 1922 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. in this criticism, he maintained that pictures do not have an obvious determined meaning but rather can be interpreted in a number of different ways. Pictures are essentially ambiguous. Elisabeth Anscombe in her commentary on Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning uses the example of a picture of two stick men in fencing position with stick swords. She points out how the picture can be used to illustrate either how to stand or how not to stand. A picture of a man with a walking stick on a hill can either depict a man walking up the hill or sliding down the hill.

The above quote by Brett suggests insightfully how the concentration on, or obsession with individual self-sufficiency may have come about as a result of the loss of feelings of security connected with the Greek city-state. What we have seen subsequent to this loss may also be related to a positive phenomenon of the search for the next stage of communal life which may have to occur in a nation-state if mans potential is to be fully actualized. The actual forms the nation-state were to take after 1648 certainly paid scant attention to the theories and practical suggestions of Aristotle and even less and briefer attention to the political and ethical writings of Kant: these forms as we know resulted in two world wars and a number of uses of weapons of mass destruction in the twentieth century(signifying, according to the writings of Hannah Arendt, either a, or, the failure of the nation-state system). Life under other forms of government larger than the city-state had certainly proved to be problematic as predicted by the Greek city-state philosophers.

The suggestion by Brett that the Epicurean and Stoic responses to the loss of the city- state were similar, is, however, deeply problematic and overlooks a number of differences. The Stoic position, like the position of Kant, culminated in a far-sighted vision of the development of communities or societies, a position that posited the actualization of an ideal of a cosmopolitan man that transcended the relativistic consequences of individualism. This ideal for Kant lay one hundred thousand years in the future during a time when reason would be embraced by all the men of the species, thus acknowledging the limitations of all forms of community and life up until that time. Both Kant and the Stoics fixed upon the only realistic attitude to cope with such a state of affairs, namely the devotion to duty that Brett mentioned above. In neither of these positions is there any logical room for the relativism of an individual -based ethics as there is in Epicureanism which had its roots in both materialism and sophism. Here the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain was the perfect theory for an animal satisfied with the status quo of his communities and forms of life. Epicureanism was a philosophy that cannot see or explain the large-scale changes that were on the horizon of the times. The suggestion in Brett is that this position led to that of English and American Utilitarianism and the continued and sustained antagonism between these positions and the deontological position of Kant ought to have caused Brett to pause before issuing the judgment that the Epicurean and Stoic positions are similarly individualistic. Epicureanism and Utilitarianism are undoubtedly rugged individualistic philosophies and they would seem to allow, for example, a drug addict to continue his addiction to his inevitable death without any ethical intervention. For both the Stoics and Kant, allowing this suffering to go on without any ethical attempt to place the individual in the restricted environment of a drug rehabilitation program, would have been a dereliction of duty, a violation of the categorical imperatives insistence that suicide by someone incapable of using their rational powers is a form of practical contradiction of the meaning of life. There is no freedom principle operating in Stoic ethics because it too shared a form of commitment to determinism and a form of materialism(different to the Epicureans) but for Kant the freedom of the individual does not stretch to allowing that individual to remove a fundamental condition of his freedom, namely his life, without a good reason(the kind of reason only a wise man could give): especially not in the circumstances envisaged where the continued use of drugs have impaired the agents ability to use his powers of reason. Of course, the problem of people killing themselves with technologically produced drugs was not a problem during Stoic or Enlightenment times, at least not on the scale we experience today in our so-called modern societies. The Opium wars against China in the 1800s was a testament to the Epicurean and Utilitarian commercial spirit of Post Kantian times that dominated English politics and ethics and these wars and this spirit would have been odious to both Stoical and Kantian moral positions. This is not to deny the political problem of what a government ought to do in the face of such individuals who are jettisoning their rationality on the road to suicide. The question “Does a government have any responsibility or duty in relation to this scenario” is not easily answerable. Utilitarian or early non-Kantian liberalism would formulate the question thus: “is it the duty of the government to interfere coercively in the freely chosen life of the individual?” The reason the question is not easily answerable has nothing to do with the freedom of the individual but rather with the political fact that in Kantian political philosophy the individual is in a sense the government in our representative democratic systems and acting against himself might seem paradoxical. But, in fact, it is not in the least paradoxical, given the Greek model of the rational part of the soul governing the irrational part. Modern Liberal government tends to function on the principle that the law is used to regulate human activity only in circumstances where social or moral regulation ought to occur in the relevant social or moral community but for some reason does not. If, for example, there is literally no family or village community the addict is in some sense a part of, then one can on these principles wonder whether the responsibility or duty to act falls on the government. The status quo of our modern world allows the drug addict to kill himself if that is what he is determined to do. In Kantian ethics the position would appear to be clear: the responsibility is on anyone who finds themselves in contact with the drug addict to persuade them and/or help them to register in a drug rehabilitation programme. Is this then a contradiction between one system(the political) allowing the individual to kill himself, and another system(the ethical) trying to prevent him from so doing? It is probably more a sign of the respect the political system has for the ethical and moral systems of the community of human beings.

It is not clear how the addict would be regarded by the Church. It is clear on a strictly creationist theological position that the addict is being careless with the life and live body produced by Gods breath, if the Old Testament creation story of man is to be believed but if the addict denies that he is committing suicide this suggests that he is not quite conscious of what it is he is doing. The case in some respects seems to be different from that of someone putting a gun to their head or wading into an ocean to drown themselves. Whatever the grounds, the religious sanction is clear: the drug addicts life has been given to him and his therefore not his to dispose of if and when he pleases. There is in this system no space for the wise man weighing up all the arguments(which may include dying for one’s family or city or country or to avoid some greater shame) to decide that there is no further point to his life continuing. The Epicureans, on the other hand, would on the basis of their pleasure-pain principle (the two sovereign masters of man) have no problems agreeing to the act of self-centred suicide if the balance of pains outweighed the pleasures of the individual. This kind of self-centred hedonic calculus would not be sanctioned by either a Stoic or a Kantian account that indeed resembled the Stoic position which in its turn in certain respects resembled Aristotelian virtue theory. This is, of course, another reason to refuse to acknowledge any significant relation of similarity between the Stoic and Epicurean positions. Connected to the position of acknowledging the differences between the two positions is to see Epicureanism as the inheritor of the relativism of the Sophists at the same time as seeing Epicureanism as the father of the individualism of the modern age and modern life. A modern life is obviously, worth less when measured by a modern hedonic scale that somehow can justify the taking of an invaluable human life if painful consequences can somehow be seen to outweigh the sheer pleasure and wonder of living: as if these two different dimensions of our life can be measured on the same scale. On this unilinear scale life is not a gift from God or anyone else but rather a utility to be measured scientifically or symbolically pictured in our literary texts. On this account, my life is a possession to do with whatever I wish, dispose of, if and when I please. The modern art form -film- is filled with symbolic pictures of heroes without a cause sacrificing their lives in a scientific and literary vacuum similar to the vacuum created by the absence of reason that reigns in the world of the addict.

Brett then falsely equates individualism with humanism in another quote in which he seeks to exaggerate the similarities and discard the differences between the Epicurean and Stoic positions:

“Stoics and Epicureans alike are absorbed in the problem of the life of feeling: they acknowledge openly that mans whole being is concentrated in his passions and their thoughts centre upon the fact, whether they preach restraint or justifying indulgence. This is the new focus, the humanism of the new era.”

This is, to say the least, a contentious characterization of the Stoic school of Philosophy which is celebrated for its commitment to logic, knowledge, and cognition as distinct from “feeling and passion”. The reason why the Stoic preaches restraint, namely to be worthy of a flourishing life, might indeed be not worth the effort on the Epicurean (or Utilitarian) hedonic or “feeling” calculus since the pain might very well “outweigh” the pleasure. Yet surely one might wish to argue feeling must have some relation to our judgments! According to Kant’s Third Critique, “The Critique of Judgment” one can indeed speak cognitively about a feeling if that means “speaking with a universal voice” in the hope for assent in relation to others possessing the same feeling. This state of affairs appears to arise when the “cognitive” faculty of the understanding and the pre-cognitive imagination find themselves in some kind of harmonious relation to each other. No conceptualization is involved in this state of affairs but Kant insists that insofar as aesthetic judgment is concerned there should be a suitability-for-conceptualization of the form of the material involved in the judgment. There must, of course, also be involvement of what Kant calls the form of finality of our cognitive faculties: a form of finality that does not universalize the object of the judgment but rather universalizes the subject of the experience. My judgment is, for example, that everyone experiencing the harmony of the faculties of understanding and imagination caused by a landscape or work of art ought to find the experience beautiful and pleasing. There is, of course, no suggestion of any connection of this experience with pain in the context of a hedonic calculation.

It should also be pointed out in this context that the Stoical topoi of Physics and Ethics do not rest the case of their regulating principles on the feeling of pleasure or happiness. In both cases there is, on the contrary, an external question as to whether the truth-oriented beliefs involved are worthy of assent or dissent, whether that is, the concepts involved are truth and knowledge constituting or alternatively the conceptualization of actions in relation to the virtues of the flourishing life. It is clear in both these cases that we are dealing with conceptual justification connected to the assertibility of positions and the universalization of these positions. The Stoics in this context definitely manifested an epistemological commitment to justification by argument in terms of external criteria or standards which in turn entails that if one is possessed by passions this is caused by mistaken judgments concerning what is good and evil. This is clearly a break with the Aristotelian position which is more developmentally oriented towards a more inductive process of steering a middle course between two extremes of excess and deficiency: a process more in accordance with a dialectical form of logic in contrast to that pure deductive form of logic prized by the Stoic logicians. The Stoic position is however reminiscent of the Aristotelian biologically based definition of the human being in that it emphasises our animal nature, perhaps even more than Aristotle did. The Stoic position does not begin with biology however. It begins with the physics of the Cosmos and life emerges from this physical framework in accordance with certain deterministic principles. Human life reveals itself on this account not to be pleasure seeking or pain avoiding creatures but rather beings concerned with the constitution and preservation of our own nature. Our survival in an indifferent world pursuing its own telos will be related to whether or not we deserve to survive. This position clearly diminishes the role of feeling favoured by the Epicureans, in favour of a will to survive that includes a will to preserve one’s own offspring, a more complex task then is the case with other species of animal because of the fact of premature human birth and a long human childhood. This de-centring from ourselves for long periods of time is the beginning of the constitution of an ethical position which the Stoics characterize in terms of a series of concentric circles extending from the circle of our family, including our children to other people in close proximity or more distant proximity to ourselves and perhaps outward to everyone who shares this Cosmos with us. The circles are subject to two forces. Firstly, The indifference and perhaps consequent hostility of the forms of the Cosmos moving outside and affecting the development of the individual and, secondly, the forces moving outward from the individual to one of the outer rings of the system of circles manifested in the wise virtuous cosmopolitan man leading a flourishing life. Here we see an interesting interplay of what the Stoics regarded as the topoi of Physics and ethics. We can also detect the Stoic influence in Kant’s philosophy in the inscription we can find on his grave in Königsberg:

“Two things fill the mind with new and ever-increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me”(Critique of Practical Reason)

The Physics of this situation could perhaps be manifest in the near sun worship we encounter in the allegory of the cave from Plato’s Republic that acknowledges not merely the role of the sun’s light in the development of our eyes and perception but also its role in in the creation of optimal temperatures for the creation and sustainability of life on the little orb that orbits the sun in the greater Cosmos. Placing the will at the centre of this system was a master stroke in the development of Aristotelian philosophy and allowed Kant to formulate the good will as the fundamental and absolute good in his ethical system.

The Epicurean system with its commitment to a materialistic view of the Cosmos would have been rejected by both Platonists and Aristotelians although it has been argued that given the fact that the Stoics saw God as the determining centre of the fate of men, a thought that would be especially alien to the philosophy of Aristotle that respected both randomness(chance) and determinism operating in the events of a changing Cosmos. After the advent of Kant’s philosophy, we can now clearly see how determinism prevented the Stoics from explaining the relation of an individual will to the idea of freedom: a will that strives towards not just life and survival but towards a quality of life manifested in the flourishing life. Both Kantian and Aristotelian ethics would maintain that reason is the only road leading to this destination of the flourishing life. The Epicurean and Utilitarian principles of happiness and pleasure are regarded from the Kantian perspective as principles of self-love in disguise, principles attesting to the fact that the will of individuals acting in accordance with such principles remains within the inner concentric circle of self-interest. The combination of determinism and a form of materialism is however also present in the theories of the Stoics and this is elaborated upon in Kenny’s “New History of Western Philosophy”:

“God, according to the Stoics, is material, himself a constituent of the Cosmos fuelling it and ordering it from within as a “designing fire”(p307)

this is, indeed, a far cry from the Aristotelian conception of God as thinking about thinking or as primary form as opposed to primary matter. Paradoxically this materialistic truth-oriented deterministic conception of God, the divine, leads eventually to the Roman practice of divination which we suspect to be a very different practice to that of the universalization wise thoughts from their oracles. The Romans of course, thought self-centredly that all roads lead to that concentric circle formed by the polis of Rome and they sought in a very modern manner to exercise power over as much of the world as they could conquer, thereby ensuring, they hoped, their survival. This exercise of Empire building did not as we now know, succeed in achieving its materialistic ambitions through the exercise of its military might. The reason for this failure is due to the fact that power and war are fundamentally self-centred forms of activity, thereby violating the first principle of ethical philosophy that demands universal intent in all forms of ethical action.

There is, in Stoicism, very little reference to Aristotelian Metaphysics and more of a concern to transform Aristotelian epistemology to meet the attacks of the growing horde of skeptics and Cynics. In such contexts there is no reference to Aristotelian “First Principles” , “Form” or hylomorphic theory. The consequence for Stoicism is a very historical shipwreck on the rocks of materialism and determinism. The ship of Stoicism was, however, to be restored to seaworthiness by the ethical Philosophy of Kant that rejected both the relevance of materialism and determinism.

The absence of Justification in Modern Ethics: Aristotle, the Stoics, Christianity and Kant.

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Jonathan Lear in his excellent work “Aristotle: the desire to understand” points out that we moderns living in our modern world do not have resort to the kind of Universal justifications that we used 300 years ago under the auspices of Religion. According to Lear neither do we approach ethical issues as the Greeks did in the Ancient World by recourse to actively (through complex deliberation procedures), seeking the reasons for our actions and activities. Lear also claims that there are fundamental disparities between the Aristotelian and Kantian ethical positions. He claims that both philosophers would have found each other’s positions fundamentally flawed.

In relation to Lear’s first point, there is agreement that we moderns are generally not attuned to any particular kind of justification. Indeed the position we find ourselves in may be more serious. Under the auspices of a science that is theoretically obsessed by observation and experiment, we are inclined to believe that there is no universal justification for ethical behaviour: there is only a kind of subjective commitment which commands only accidental agreement. This position would, of course, for the Greeks, be anathema. Witness the bitter exchanges between the ethical relativists of the time and Socrates. Ruling groups ruling in their own interests was decisively dismissed as a form of justification by Socrates in book one of the Republic. Plato combats relativism with his theory of the forms in general and the form or idea of the Good in particular. Aristotle is clear that there can only be one universal end or “justification” to strive towards in one’s active life and that is a flourishing life: a life that all who are exercising their rationality must share. The route to this life for Aristotle was via the intellectual and moral virtues which amounted to the rational agent both deliberating correctly and then doing the right thing at the right time in the right way. It is not clear that Kant would have disagreed with any of these Aristotelian points. Lear translates “eudaimonia” as happiness but it is not obvious that this is always the best translation of Aristotle’s intent: a better translation might be “the flourishing life”, in which case Kant would probably agree that this is an important end if and only if the moral agent is worthy of the flourishing life: had, that is, lived his life virtuously. Kant’s ethics, like Aristotle’s, is also intimately bound to a (political) life of freedom in a cosmopolitan world without wars: a fact that Lear does not recognize. In other words, there is much that these two philosophers, parted by a period of 2000 years, would agree upon and that is due to the fact that Kant built much of his critical theory from the same anti-materialistic and anti-dogmatic rationalist commitments we find at the foundations of Aristotle’s metaphysics. There are differences of course and these may be due to the fate of Aristotelian thinking at the hands of Christianity. Lear claims that Christianity brought with it the focus upon intention at the expense of action. One could, that is, have a good heart but not be in any position to exercise one’s goodness because of the circumstances one was born into or finds oneself in. This is a correct observation but is not a fundamental characteristic of ethical action. In Aristotelian terms, the Christian is engaging in a deliberation process with all the complexity presented in Aristotle’s theory without finding the circumstances in which to perform his virtuous deeds. He may not be doing so autonomously and both Aristotle and Kant would object to this feature of the deliberation process and condemn it for being in some sense involuntary deliberation. Kant saw the need to claim ethical deliberation be free from dogma and authoritarian indoctrination but was able to retain his faith in a religious/philosophical God that functioned in a manner very similar to Plato’s idea of the Good from the Republic and also very similar to the Aristotelian God continually contemplating the essences or forms of the world. When we contemplate in a state of faith we are also capable of contemplating essences. This is particularly the case in our contemplation of ethical “forms” where the idea of God is evoked to ensure that we feel happy about being worthy of happiness as a consequence of our virtuous intentions and actions. The idea of Freedom, for Kant, however, in many ways replaced the religious idea of God and this signaled the Enlightenment’s conviction of the importance of political society in the developing of our rational potential(an idea he shared with Plato and Aristotle). Kant’s vision of a Cosmopolitan world suggests that he was not impressed with the idea of the nation-state set forth in 1648 (The Treaty of Westphalia) and this is a major difference between Kantian and Aristotelian ethical/political theorizing. In his eyes, the nation-state may have been a necessary stage on the road of our ethical and political evolution but it was not by any means the terminus of the process. Individuals need to find themselves in political environments where they are free to organize their souls in a manner appropriate to an imagined state of affairs in which each subject/citizen exercises their judgment in approving the laws of their community as mirroring the rationality of their own thoughts about the law. This for Kant was a state of affairs one hundred thousand years in the future which would replace the authority of the commandment system of religious systems: a state of affairs in which the organization of the souls of the citizens was absolutely in accordance with the demands of rationality. The formulations of the categorical imperatives also provided us with a description and explanation of fully ethical forms of behaviour which were logically universal and could function as logical justifications of the forms of virtuous behaviour Aristotle discussed in his ethical theory. Lear regards the categorical imperative morality of Kant as being all too formal but omits to mention the second very descriptive and concrete formulation: “So act that you can treat people never merely as means but also as ends in themselves”. This is very concrete in its description of how one ought to act towards one neighbours and others, and could easily be seen to be a consequence of Aristotle’s virtue theory. Kant and Aristotle would have agreed on how to use logic to clarify many of their ethical positions, in particular, the justification of ought statements such as “We ought to keep promises” in terms of seeing the world under the aspect of “the good” which entails knowing the universality of ought statements. For Kant, the fact that many make promises which they do not keep is irrelevant to the universality of what we ought to do. For him,  as for Aristotle, there were people whose souls were not sufficiently organized to understand the kind of universality involved in ought-statements . The argument, for example, that it is acceptable to break ones promise to another because many other people have in fact broken their promises to others, would indeed be a poor argument in both the eyes of Aristotle and Kant. The higher level argument that one person breaking their promise is sufficient to compromise the universality of “We ought to keep our promises” would also be dismissed as a confusion of the universality connected to theoretical reasoning with the universality connected to practical reasoning. Both Kant and Aristotle were very clear about the distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues.

We need however to investigate further the influence of Christianity upon the development of thought from the Greeks to the time of Kant and the influence of all these factors on our “Modern world”. In order to do this, we need to trace the development of attitudes and theories immediately after the death of Aristotle and before the time that Christ’s teachings became influential. Professor Brett in his “History of Psychology” has this contribution:

“The death of Aristotle marked the end of an era. The speculative restlessness of the Greeks declined like their city-states. Their theories were welded into successive philosophies of life, just as their states were welded into successive empires. Speculation for its own sake gave way to symbolic pictures which served to reinforce ways of living. Policies for living rather than theories about life commanded the interest of philosophers. The Stoics and Epicureans were preoccupied with the attainment of individual self-sufficiency as a substitute for the much lauded self-sufficiency of the old city-states. Life had become something to be endured rather than enjoyed: the problem was how to endure it best. How could the individual fortify himself against oppression, revolution and social change? The Stoics advocated integrity of character, devotion to duty, humanity towards fellow sufferers, and the rigorous discipline of the will: the Epicureans sought an escape from the hazards of life in cutting down the possible sources of misery. ….They put forward different forms of individualism one of which reached the culmination in Kant and the other in English Utilitarians.”

This looks like an account of the collapse of a belief in any form of universal good and it is certainly true that we can detect in our modern age the influence of an Epicurean individualism unsupported by any belief in the soul or character or any belief in the will and what it ought to do in the name of duty. The Stoic view of life and its connection to the Aristotelian theory of the organization of the soul, however, retained some universal commitment to universal ideas in what we today would call the ought-system of concepts in which we will to do what we ought to do. Kant incorporated many of the ideas of the Stoics into his ethical theory but he also integrated these thoughts and ideas with the categorical and universal aspects that can be found in Aristotelian metaphysical and ethical theory. There is no substance to the claim that Kant was committed to some kind of relativistic individualism or the kind of consequentialism embraced by the Epicureans. There is much to be said, however, for the view that the individualism of the Epicureans led directly to the consequentialist Pursuit of happiness doctrine of the Utilitarians. Bentham’s “two sovereign masters of pleasure and pain” was directly criticized by Kant in much the same terms that we can find in Plato and Aristotle.

The teachings of Christ were in no sense theoretical and appealed only to the individuals relation to God and not to universal argument. He exemplified the simple practical man with only his faith and belief. Nothing was mentioned of the history of theoretical thought or the theoretical thoughts of other thinkers in Christ’s teachings. There are of course assumptions about human beings but it is a total mystery as to where they originated from or indeed exactly what they were. We know that the Jewish- Alexandrian school played some part in the choosing of these assumptions. With the advent of Christianity, however, we encounter an almost complete substitution of the spiritual for the rational. Knowledge was no longer man’s province: it belonged to an all-knowing God who inspired prophets with his messages for the human race. There was no reference to the importance of the state or community to provide man with a higher quality of life. There was a reference to a universal “brotherhood of man” but it is unclear whether if one was not a Christian one could become a part of this “universal” brotherhood. It certainly did not appear to be a cosmopolitan brotherhood. The primary commandment was “love God above all else”. There is no mention of the role of knowledge or the importance of knowledge except in relation to “Knowing God”. Much of the Greek world was dismantled by Christianity. It is therefore not surprising that the idea of God was diminished in importance in favour of the idea of Freedom in Kant’s metaphysics of morals.

The Enlightenment philosophy of Kant attempted to row the philosophical boat back to the Greek shoreline but Kant’s Philosophy too was rapidly overcome by the practical individualistic spirit and theoretical scientific spirit of the Enlightenment. Our Modern World contains the threads of Greek and Kantian thought and these were revived by the work of the later Wittgenstein, the work of Heidegger(to some extent) and the work of Arendt(also to some extent). The consequence is that ethical thought in accordance with categorical universalistic dimensions had all but disappeared in the twentieth century and it is no coincidence that this was the century of two world wars and two mass annihilations of civilian populations via the use of weapons of mass destruction. The disappearance of the idea of justification might, then, be more important, than one might suspect.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Aristotle.

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Aristotle’s scientific work, according to Brett in his work “The History of Psychology”, is best characterised in terms of a methodology of observation and classification and a search for a definition that expressed the essence of whatever it was that was being studied:

“Explanation of the behaviour of a thing consists in referring to the essential properties of the natural kind or class of things to which it belongs, each class having its characteristic and invariant ways of behaving. Why do bodies fall or smoke rise? Because it is part of their essence to seek their natural places on the earth or in the heavens. Why do men make laws? Because rationality is part of their essence. Things do what they do because they are what they are. This is true but not very illuminating….Aristotle….substituted the logic of classification for Pythagorean mathematics as the key to the ground plan of nature. Qualitative distinctions were for him irreducible. Quality, not quantity was the basic category of reality.”

There is much that is problematic with the above characterization of Aristotle’s scientific work. Firstly, the search for definition referred to above was only a part of a wider search for explanation that for Aristotle was four-fold because he believed there are four kinds of explanation or four ways of explaining the nature of something that together constitute the knowledge we have of any object studied. Three kinds of explanation(final formal and efficient “causes”) all reveal the form of the object and one explanation, (the “material cause”) describes the particular material that is the bearer of “the form”. Material per se is just particular material and only identifiable in terms of the(universal) form it takes. This explanation-system is the epistemological aspect of Aristotle’s wider attempt as a “Scientist” to metaphysically or systematically study the world as a whole. Aristotle’s metaphysical position is embedded in his thesis that Being or Reality has many meanings amongst which one will encounter the category of the Substantial that is, as a matter of fact, as much a basic category of reality as the qualitative. The Substantial, for Aristotle, is of course not a property of a thing but rather something more like the principle of that thing’s existence. A substance is, according to Aristotle not dependent on anything else for its existence. Substantial change, for Aristotle, concerns the generation of substances (the bearer of all properties). The substantial principle of man, for example, is his rationality which manifests itself not just in the act of passing laws(the act of bringing laws into existence) but also in the theoretical activity of understanding the world as a systematic or metaphysical whole. Both of these types of activities are logically related to man’s essence and his form, and these claims are surely both true and illuminating. Furthermore, there is a conflation in much of modern science between the contexts of discovery and the contexts of Explanation/Justification. In the former when we discover qualities or measure quantities or relations, we answer “what” questions but once discovered we can also use qualities, quantities and relations in contexts of justification to answer “why” questions(“Why did the building collapse”, “because it was unstable”). In these kinds of explanations, qualities etc. begin to function like principles, giving reasons for the occurrence of events transcending their use as mere reports of observations or classifications.

Insofar as the claims relating to body’s falling and smoke rising to their so-called “natural places” are concerned these claims may be unhelpful characterizations of the Aristotelian idea of “final cause” or teleological explanations that in fact cannot be arbitrarily isolated from other types of explanations.

Brett continues the above line of inquiry by claiming the following:

“So few deductive consequences follow from saying that man is a rational animal because it is merely classificatory and incorporates no causal assumption.”

This is an unilluminating characterization of Aristotelian reflection on the essence and form of man that will definitively claim it to be substantially true that the formal, efficient and final causes or explanations are involved in any animal being a human form of an animal. There appears to be a fixation in the above quote on a perspectival view of “definition” that regards Aristotelian definitions as analytic truths constructed in an ivory tower far from the fields of observation and classification. Such a view believes there to be a realm of synthetic truths that alone can give us access to the truth about the world we dwell in. Aristotle did not divide truth up in such a radical fashion and like Kant would have insisted in response to such radical divisions that there are intermediate forms of truth(synthetic a priori truths) such as “Every event has a cause” that transcend experience and the context of discovery. Aristotle would have thought of such truth as substantial-truths belonging to the context of explanation/justification. Brett also claims that when we ask why men make laws that we do not want to be told that this is because he is a rational animal capable of discourse (which would be Aristotle’s complete definition of human being). We do not want, that is, to be given a barren analytical definition devoid of causal terms. This is obviously a position that rejects the entire metaphysical and epistemological apparatus of Aristotle’s theory without engaging it directly in the context of counterargument and justification. This is also a position that attempts for no good reason to reduce Aristotle’s fourfold explanatory schema to something simpler. Indirectly we are told that Galileo “consciously discarded” teleological causes” in favour of:

“Explanations in terms of the functional dependence of variables which had far greater deductive possibilities than Aristotelian explanation by recourse to qualitative classifications.”

This type of explanation must have been an exciting prospect for psychologically inclined scientists during the 1920’s when Brett’s work “The History of Psychology” was completed. Today almost one hundred years later this excitement, to say the least, has waned and it is commonplace for philosophers to evoke Aristotelian, Kantian, and Wittgensteinian objections to theories based on variable manipulating and measuring experiments that very often fail to produce evidence of causal relations between the variables. Brett complains that Aristotle in his conceptual reflections tells us what we already know. This complaint, as a matter of fact, is often leveled against the “functional dependence of variable” approach as is another more serious complaint that this kind of experimentally based theorizing often falsely posits causal relations where there none. Obviously, this counter-argument requires a more extensive critical discussion than can be offered here.

Brett, inspired by Galileo, then goes on to claim that Aristotle failed to make any “empirical contribution” to Psychology because of his limited grasp of the modern scientific method. We should remind readers in the context of such claims that Aristotle was one of the first empirical investigators of biological phenomena, using observation, classification, and dissection to build his biological theory. Brett does, however, reluctantly admit that Aristotle’s “conceptual contribution” to Psychology helped to provide arguments against materialistically inclined investigations:

“which included a demonstration of why mechanical types of explanation will never be of much use in Psychology.”

Brett appears to be unaware of the philosophical objection to his position which would claim that Causality is a conceptual category of thought, a cognitive attitude that we must adopt when investigating phenomena(that can be isolated from a whole and divided into causes and effects) in both the contexts of discovery and the contexts of explanation/justification. Causality can also, contra the view of Hume, be observed as is the case when we observe a builder building a house. This division, however, of psychological wholes into cause and effect may actually be a form of mechanization of the field of investigation that Brett complains is useless. After complaining about Hobbes and his mechanical theories Brett goes on to outline 4 of Aristotle’s metaphysical holistically-oriented assumptions presented in books one and two of De Anima:

“a)That soul is co-extensive with “life”

b)That soul is the actuality of a body furnished with organs

c) That the movements of such a body are to be explained in terms of its soul but that the soul itself is not moved.

d)That there are levels of soul which form a kind of hierarchy, the lower being a necessary condition of the higher, but the higher transforming the lower.”

Psuche is the Greek term discussed here and Brett displays in this discussion a lack of awareness of the hermeneutic difficulties in translating a foreign remote language. In 1943 we find, for example, Martin Heidegger in his lectures on Parmenides, claiming that psuche as a term is untranslatable by just any language. Latin translations of key Greek terms, he argues, have been particularly problematic and hindered serious research for centuries. Brett characteristically transforms this issue into an issue about definitions and writes:

“Aristotle insisted on the widest possible definition of “soul” and returns to the old Pre-Platonic pre-rationalistic view that soul is virtually the principle of all life”

The crucial term in the above quote is the term “principle” and this alone should suffice to reject the idea that Aristotle was merely attempting to define the term psuche. Identifying this term as denoting a principle is an important precursor to using the term in explanations that may or may not be encapsulated in definitions. Brett later retreats somewhat from this position when he claims that the soul is a species of “form” but again insists that Aristotle is attempting to classify the soul. In this discussion, however, he acknowledges the difference between the kind of explanation (involving principles and laws) that explains why physical bodies fall, orbit, etc, and the kind of explanation we require in Psychology:

“We can treat a man as a body and explain his movements in terms of physical laws if all we wish to explain is why he falls to the ground at a certain rate: for in this respect he is no different from a stone. But we distinguish jumping off a cliff “on purpose” from descending on top of a landslide. Jumping is something we do, whereas being swept away by a landslide is something that happens to us. The movements involved in jumping and slipping require a different sort of explanation”

In this specific discussion Brett, however, fails to connect the role of teleological explanation in particular and conceptual explanation in general to the specification of what, as he put it, is done “on purpose”

In relation to Aristotle’s claim “that the soul is the actuality of a body furnished with organs” we find Brett surprisingly evoking the category of substance that he had systematically avoided in his earlier discussion of the qualitative being the primary category of reality. In this context there is reference to the relations between matter and form as well as actuality and potentiality:

“The soul, therefore, must be substance in the second sense of form. It is the form of a natural body which has life in it as a capacity. Such a substance is actuality in the first sense. Body is dunamis or potentiality in relation to this capacity.”

The concept of “final cause” is finally acknowledged as important insofar as its relation to rationality is concerned: reason, it is argued, imposes a formula upon the efficient causes of desiring and wishing. This formula imposes the terms of means and ends as well as areté (doing the right thing in the right way at the right time) upon our desires and wishes. Brett then paradoxically, after having questioned the substantial category of reality and teleological explanations, claims:

“Surely Aristotle here indicated the sorts of concepts which are absolutely indispensable for accounting for anything which we call human action.”

Human action is obviously a rational power or potentiality connected conceptually with many other powers such as perception, memory, imagination, language as well as desire, wish, and reason. Given the interconnection of this schema of “powers”, the futility of a materialistically inclined behavioural account of action can immediately be appreciated. Psuche is a principle that moves the body,  and thought and consciousness is the medium in which such movement is initiated. Psuche also possesses powers or potentialities which are capacities to do certain things and it is absolutely absurd to postulate that capacity is something that can be moved or move. Brett has no difficulty in pointing out this logical objection in relation to capacity but not in relation to Psuche- the principle. Thought is in no sense a spatial entity. It has an essential relation to temporality and insofar as thought can then be said to possess parts, they would have the serial unity similar to that of a number. A thought occurs in a time and comes to rest in that time in accordance with its category and telos. If the thought is a belief it will aim at the truth and if it is an intention it will aim at the good action. The point of origin of such thoughts is in the soul. In a certain sense, the concept of action appears to be logically connected to the reason that regulates the action in relation to the rules of successful performance leading to an end. In other words, action is a value-laden concept in the way in which the concept of behaviour is not. This might account for the fact that it is behaviour and not action the contemporary Psychologist prefers to study: behaviour is easier to isolate as a variable and thus easier to manipulate and measure. The conceptual framework of action and its connection to a matrix of powers or capacities makes this task of observation, isolation, manipulation, and measurement much more difficult, if not impossible.

The conceptual framework of action forces us also to recognize the hylomorphic aspect of Aristotle´s theorizing in which both plant-like and animal-like functions contribute to the constitution of the human psuche. These functions will take different forms in different forms of life. The human psuche differentiates itself from other life forms through its possession of the powers or capacities of thought, discourse and reason. The form of life of a human being, therefore, will be very different to that of a higher ape. As we are no doubt aware, modern biology beginning with Darwin refused to acknowledge this significant difference between the higher apes and man that both Aristotle and Christianity insisted upon. In the Aristotelian account, powers build upon powers but the power of discourse accounts for much of the significant difference. This together with the way in which all powers are integrated into the life of man accounts for the superior form of life man leads in comparison with the life of higher apes. These powers, in turn, are situated in a wider framework of relations necessary for man to lead the good life. This framework begins with the cosmos and the constitution and connections of the divine heavenly bodies. The cosmos provides the conditions necessary for life of various forms and in particular for its highest human form that constructs city-states in order to lead the good life. The city-state, according to Aristotle organically evolved from the village and the family and the form of its existence is the final litmus test for the good of the individual:

“the life of the individual is the proximate universal by which we judge the standard of conduct or practice in the case of the individual, so the individual’s life is a universal that comprehends many species. The psychological functions embracing as they do the whole individual life are valued according as they further its excellence more or less.”

It is not certain that this paraphrasing of the power of the individual in terms of psychological functions is not essentially going to confuse the issue of what the good life or good city-state are in their essential constitutions. One of these so-called psychological functions is, according to Brett, sensation, which he claims is a discriminative faculty that perceives differences. and there follows a discussion of the subjective/objective distinction that is used throughout this work: a distinction Aristotle would have rejected as theoretically otiose. Aristotle’s account of the senses refers to his matrix of form and matter, and sensation in that context is regarded as a form of knowledge caused to come into existence by the motions that are assimilated by the sense organs and the body. These motions are then transformed by the sense organs into “knowledge” of qualities such as black, white, sweet, sour etc. The “form” of the black object becomes an element of the above knowledge state, received by the eye. The object has the power to influence the sense organ and the sense organ has the power to assimilate the form of the object. The form of the object is assimilated by the organ in “the act of sensation”. Brett then inserts into this discussion the modern idea of consciousness together with his earlier subject/object distinction:

“in all sensation an objective stimulus is the cause of a change which precedes through a medium into consciousness.”

These terms of subject/object and consciousness are not terms we can find in Aristotle’s writings but a stimulus proceeding through a medium into consciousness suggests passivity on the part of the subject rather than an “act”. If this is the case then it would seem to contradict the earlier assertion that psychological theorizing ought to be about what a subject does rather than what happens to him/her. Later, Brett refers to activity on the part of the sense organ but this is activity that is caused to happen by an external cause and may not as a consequence fall into the category of a human psuche causing itself to do things. The major difference between these two types of change is a metaphysical difference between things that cause themselves to do things(activity) and things that cause other things to become active. Even Kantian Philosophy in the context of such discussions claims that all representations in the mind be they intuitive or conceptual, are accompanied by an “I think”–an active process of thought. The experiencing of black, then, could be a passive affair in which the subject passively experiences(senses) blackness or it can be an active intuitive affair in which the blackness is intuited to be spatial, to be out there or enveloping me. The latter involves a cognitive attitude toward the blackness the former does not. This “I think” however should not be confused with the Cartesian Ego that stands in some relation of epistemological certainty to its own thinking and in some kind of opposition to the objects of representation. This Kantian “I think” is, on the contrary, an Aristotelian holistic idea of a continuously enduring Subject brought into existence by an act of generation and destined for ruin and destruction at the end of its life and who during the course of its life actively “reasons” about or “contemplates” true beliefs and good actions.

According to Jonathan Lear in his work “Aristotle; the desire to understand”:

“We are not satisfied to know, for example, that the heavens move in such a way: nor will we be satisfied to know a vast array of such fats about the phenomena. We want to know why the heavens move that way, why the phenomena are as they are. We are after more than knowledge, we are after understanding.”(p6)

Only principles provide us with that understanding and enable us to systematically connect and thereby understand phenomena and the facts about them. Thinking desires both knowledge and understanding and the human begins according to Aristotle, his contemplative life by being in awe of the heavens prior to the search for the principle(s) that explain why they are as they are. The state of awe and wonder subsides when we achieve the kind of understanding provided by explanations of the phenomena in terms of principles. This kind of explanation is, according to Aristotle, possibly more “scientific” then the kind of investigation that dedicates itself to accumulating the “facts” about the heavens. Both kinds of investigation are important but they are to be distinguished: the concepts and methods used in the context of discovery are significantly different (and yet related in some ways) to the concepts and methods that are used in the context of explanation/justification. Reason is obviously involved in both contexts. It is like the light of the fire in the cave and the light of the sun that transforms night into day. For Aristotle, man is the subject of awe and wonder and the claim in the context of explanation that he is the rational animal capable of discourse is an illuminating claim, especially in comparison with the chaos of accounts of man provided for us over the last 150 years since Psychology detached itself from Philosophy in order to make “progress” in the field of the knowledge of man. Brett is a disciple of this “new science” and wishes to place Reason “Inside” of man:

“For Reason is with Aristotle, as with Plato, a light within:it guides the footsteps of man on the daily paths of life, it illuminates the dark places of nature: in it is the birth of art, and it becomes ar last divine and immortal.”

For both Aristotle and his teacher Reason was something that brought light to the world and both would have thought that the attempt to place reason within man, and not in the discourse in the agora, or in the laws of the Callipolis was an unnecessary spatialisation of something that is a potential power that is only actualised under the right circumstances whether that be in the mode of theoretical belief or practical action and whether it be the beliefs and actions of the individual or of institutions such as the judiciary and religious temples. Reason is what we use to achieve a deeper understanding of the world and ourselves, an understanding that is so much more than the accumulation of the totality of facts about the phenomena we are studying. Reason stands mysteriously outside of the “inner”: a term so necessary for the scientist once he divides phenomena into the (inner) subjective and the (outer)objective.

Lear points out in the context of the above discussion that the term epistemé as used by the Greeks transcends the modern subject-object distinction that is so often used in epistemological discussions:

“Aristotle uses epistemé in two ways: first to refer to an organized body of knowledge, like geometry: second to refer to the state of the soul of a person who has learned this body of knowledge.”(p7)

Lear goes on to interestingly argue that the psuche (or soul or mind) is organized by this knowledge to such an extent that we, for example, call someone with knowledge of mathematics , a mathematician not just because they have something “in ” their souls non mathematicians do not have but rather because they are capable of using this power on occasion to help us understand the world through their mathematical proofs and explanations. Epistemé, for Lear, as for Martin Heidegger, is related to Being or Reality in a deeper way than the mere understanding that explanations provide. Reality itself, for Aristotle and Heidegger, reveals itself to those that systematically understand the world that may yet remain a mystery after the Mathematicians explanations come to an end. Heidegger criticizes Aristotle, as Lear does not, for talking about the many meanings of Being but failing to focus on its nature as presented by the idea of Aletheia (unconcealment). Heidegger’s comments may not apply across the board of all of Aristotle’s positions. For Aristotle, it is clear that there is a region of the systematic understanding of the world that is fundamentally reflective, i.e. concerned with the challenge of the Oracle to “know thyself”, something that can only be achieved in the “attempt” to understand understanding. For it can only be an attempt given the fact that for Aristotle, this self-reflective path leads to the first principle of all things, namely God. Our attempt to understand understanding thus is an attempt to understand God. Knowing thyself on the path of such reflection requires acknowledging man’s place in the great chain of Being. Part of this process involves understanding how Plato in particular regarded the Polis as related to the revelation of man’s nature and the unconcealment of Being(Aletheia). The Callipolis for Plato was literally a divine construction built with the divine part of ourselves that enlightened the Cosmos like a sun. Kant too saw the connection of the actualisation of (divine?) Reason in man in a vision of a Cosmopolitan world some hundred thousand years in the future: a world in which cosmopolitan men roam the earth and wars are a thing of the past. The period of one hundred thousand years rests upon an analysis of man himself that observes that man is only potentially and not actually rational and therefore although he needs a master cannot tolerate having an actual master deciding his fate. Kant then reflects upon the necessity for a universal philosophical education that will transcend this master-slave conception by making man a master of himself.

Brett’s scientific psychological account, having placed reason inside man, continues with the following reflection:

“The rational creature is conscious of the principle as well as of the impulse, and so becomes the subject of voluntary as well as of impulsive actions…there are in him the desires of the beast united with a reason that is godlike: in the relation of these two are contained the problems of the psychology of conduct.”

Lurking in the background of these reflections is, of course, the desire to isolate variables and connect causes and effects whether it be in the arena of impulse and the emotions or the arena of what he calls “conduct”.

Emotions obviously play an important role in man’s existence both for reasons of survival and for the achievement of what Psychologists call “the quality of life” which in their eyes can be achieved by the scientific regulation of pleasures and pains. Brett, in this context, refers not to action but pure movement and claims that sense images are exciting causes. The imagination is as a consequence of its role in the conjuring up of sense images in their absence, evoked in desire and anger to the specific exclusion of thought and reason:

“Desire has an emotional quality because it begins in the pain of want and ends in the pleasure of satisfaction. Anger, fear, and courage are types of feelings which are allied to Temper or the spirit of resistance: anger arises from the sense of wrong and seeks after revenge: fear is consciousness of danger with a prospect of ultimate disaster: while courage is the consciousness of danger accompanied by assurance of successful resistance. The remainder come under the general heading of Wish, and are attitudes of mind accompanied by imaginations of good or evil whether for oneself or for others. As wish is concerned with good and evil, the presence of the images of good and evil in each of these states justifies their position under this head.”

It appears from the above quote that, at least insofar as The Wish is concerned thought in some form(“imaginations of good and evil for oneself or others”) must be involved and this in turn surely means that the wish is amenable to the influence of reason. It should also, however, be recalled that the emotions in general, can also be pathological states and processes requiring “cathartic” treatments. The emotions of Pity and Fear, for Aristotle, were not necessarily pathological formations but they also required what amounts to (almost) medical intervention by poets using literary techniques(processes of thought) for their catharsis. The exclusion of thought to the benefit of imagination by Brett does not quite fit the phenomena we are confronted with in this field of inquiry.

Mental illness obviously interferes with both our sense of reality and our attempts to lead successful virtuous lives. Excessive fear and insufficient courage, if part of our characters, may be pathological conditions requiring education and sometimes therapy. Such therapy follows the principle outlined in the Greek oracular pronouncement “Nothing too much” and also the Aristotelian Principle of the golden mean. The imagination obviously plays a part in the formation of pathological states which are the results of sensory images and processes and not reason. Psychoanalysis attempts to use reason technically to bring about a therapy that enables patients to, if not understand themselves, at least accumulate facts about themselves of which they were perhaps unaware. Brett does not, however, mention Psychoanalysis in this context in spite of its obvious relevance. He continues instead to speak of conation, a notion which for him is related to behaviour or pure movement in a way which is difficult to understand:

“At its lowest level, conation is the immediate impulse to pursue or avoid. When this impulse is subjected to deliberation it is raised to the level of choice: for choice is rationalized impulse or conation based on rational deliberation. Thus a movement must be the outcome of two distinct processes according as the ultimate imagination which gives a picture of the end is the result of sense processes or of reasoning.”

The idea of freedom and someone being set free by rational deliberation obviously arises in relation to the above reflection but the insertion of the “picture of the end” may be a mischaracterization of the very universal thought about the end. This “picture theory” of psychological reflection takes us in the opposite direction to that of the required search for universal principles of action and emotion.

In the above quote it is a relatively simple matter to discern that he has divided the whole of action-in- a- context into the parts of cause and effect whether it be the division of impulsive movement, sense images, and imagination or the division of conduct into the elements of reason and imagination. Such division is obviously dictated by scientific method which demands the identification of independent and dependent variables. It is this kind of illegitimate division of a holistic complex of parts that also then demands a further division into what is subjective and what is objective. Both kinds of division would have been rejected by Aristotle in the context of practical action and practical reasoning about that action. The example we find Aristotle using in this context is that of a builder building a house, an activity that looks on the face of it as if it can be divided into two, namely the activity of the building and the completed product of the house. Aristotle also discusses another two activities, those of a doctor treating his patient and a teacher teaching his students and here it is perhaps not so easy to conceive of creative artistic activity and a completed “product”. One thing is absolutely certain and that is that in his descriptions and explanations of these three activities we encounter no attempt to isolate the holistic complexes of the builder building, the doctor doctoring, and the teacher teaching into independent and independent variables.

It is rather the form or principle of the change from, for example, there being an empty plot of land to there appearing a house built upon the land that Aristotle focuses upon. He reflects upon materialistic explanations that relate only to the material used in this process of change and comments that following the journey of the materials from the quarries and the woods to their manipulation by the builder(efficient cause) to the final finished product will never fully explain the change we have witnessed. For that, he argues, we would need to understand how the psuche is endowed with knowledge of the principles involved in building the house: for this understanding, we need to resort to explaining how the formal and final causes interacted with the material and efficient causes. The name for the knowledge that the builder has is techne(an instrumental form of knowing which utilizes tools in a context of equipmental involvements) but it is not certain that this “artistic” knowledge suffices for the theoretical knowledge the doctor and teacher require for the exercise of their professions. In these two situations, we may need to refer to epistemé. In the case of the doctor the telos or final cause is the health of the body of the patient and in the case of the teacher, for Aristotle, it is the health of the student’s soul that is at stake. In the latter case, we are definitely dealing with epistemé because at the end of the teaching the student must grasp the principles that are being taught, be they scientific, mathematical or philosophical. In this latter case the metaphors of “material” and shaping” are strained but we do say that we are forming these young minds if we are teachers.

It should not be forgotten that abstract and concrete forms are being transmitted in the polis. For the benefit of the polis the light of these forms enlightens the dark aspects of the polis as Plato’s sun enlightens the darkness of the Cosmos. Besides the transmission of concrete forms such as buildings(so important to the polis), built by citizens for citizens and the abstract forms of epistemé there is a third realm of forms whose transmission is vital to the polis, namely that which is produced as the consequence of sexual reproduction, namely children. Children will ensure the continuity of building, doctoring teaching and governing and thereby if this is done virtuously (in the name of aretè) hopefully ensure the continued existence of the polis.

Having divided action and conduct into parts we then see the consequence of such division for ethical understanding. Brett claims the following:

“..desire and wish and will are all harmonious in the complete character. This, as an ethical ideal, implies that the true good and the object of all from the psychological standpoint, the goodness and badness of the end, is not of primary importance. The question that belongs to Psychology is that of unity or coordination of impulses, not the question of the rightness of intention.”

So, we see the intentional ends of the house, the welfare of the patient, and the successful education of the student are not of primary importance for Brett as they are for Aristotle. This is an astonishing conclusion and appears to leave the realm of practical and theoretical reasoning curiously determined by hypothetical considerations. This we must point out is entirely inconsistent with the Aristotelian position. Brett continues his tactic of division and divides particular action from any universal to which it might belong and he ominously further claims that only rarely does the means and the ends of action form what he calls an “ideal unity” What does he mean here? That houses are not successfully built, patients only rarely cured and that teaching only rarely results in learning? This, of course, would seem to follow if intentions are merely subjective and the pure physically described movements what is truly objective. This is not, however in accordance with the logic or metaphysics of Aristotle who regarded intentions as the embodiments of the forms or principles of house building, health after treatment, and knowledge and wisdom imparted by teaching.

Our world is a world composed of principles and not the totality of facts or variables of the scientist.

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Plato

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Brett in his work “The History of Psychology” claims that Plato continued the epistemological tradition of the Sophists and Socrates and he also added that Plato ended up in a position that the Sophists and Socrates would not be sympathetic with. We argued in an earlier essay that it is misleading to place the Sophists and Socrates inside the same pair of brackets simply because there is clearly a natural and spontaneous antagonism between the assumptions of these two positions. It can also be argued that Platonic Philosophy is a natural and logical continuation of the development of Socratic philosophy and a prototype for his pupil’s Metaphysically based hylomorphic theory. Furthermore, Plato’s work is indebted to Parmenides, a fact that is underestimated in many classical and modern accounts  including A Kenny’s “A New History of Western Philosophy”:

“But while the (Platonic) realm of the Ideas is unchanging, it is not uniform or homogeneous like Parmenides Being: Being is undifferentiated and single, whereas there are many different Ideas in some kind of relation to each other. They appear to be hierarchically ordered under the Idea of the Good, which appears to trump any notion of Being(Republic 6, 509b). No doubt the other Ideas owe it to the Idea of the Good that they are ideas at all.”(p207)

The passage in the Republic that is referred to above(6,509b) follows:

“Therefore, say, that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good is not being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.”

Parmenides Idea of “The One” would actually have been a better comparison point for Kenny. Plato has not replaced “The One” by “The Good” but probably believed that they are in some sense logically identical in the way that Christians later came to identify God and “The Good”. The One, according to Parmenides includes both Being and not Being in very much the same way in which the Idea of the Good includes the idea of the not Good.

This area of reflection is right at the heart of the philosophical endeavour and it is not surprising therefore that instead of arguments for his position Plato produces three allegories amongst which is the allegory of the Sun in book 6 of the Republic where Socrates is arguing the following:

“Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the things known and provides the power to the one who knows is the Idea of the Good. And as the source of knowledge and truth you can understand it to be a thing known: but as far as these two are–knowledge and truth—if you believe that it is something different from them and still fewer than they, your belief will be right. As for knowledge and truth, just as in the other region it is right to hold light and sight sunlike, but to believe them to be the sun is not right: so, too, here,to hold these two to be like the good is right, but to believe that either of them is the good is not right”(Republic 6 508e)

This passage is highly suggestive of two facts that run contrary to the claims of Brett and Kenny, namely that Plato is very much concerned with Metaphysics and Ethics and their relation to epistemology. The line of development of the philosophy of the Sophists, therefore can not be seen to run through either Socrates or Plato. This is reinforced by appreciating the next link in this chain of continuation, namely the Philosophy of Aristotle that is equally antagonistic to the relativism and “scientific” pragmatism of the Sophists.  We also fail to find any commitment to subjective individualism of the kind one encounters in Sophist philosophizing in the Philosophy of Aristotle.

At least two other dialogues testify both to the metaphysical commitments of Plato and to his proto-Aristotelian positions in Politics and Science. In “The Laws” for example, Socrates has been replaced by an anonymous Athenian as the leading protagonist, and Philosophers have also disappeared from the government of the ideal Callipolis of Magnesia. Laws are no longer Parmenidean unchanging entities and even the best of them are open to reform. The Metaphysics of change has caused several waves of change that appears to have swept the Republic into the sea. Education is now the foundation of the political system and this can be seen even in the demand for pedagogical explanations of the laws as well as in the need to prevent impiety which sanctifies not only a proto-monotheistic Aristotelian God but also the human race.

“The Timaeus”  is a late work of Plato’s which deals, in metaphysical spirit, with the history of the Universe and life forms. In the beginning was chaos until the soul was infused into this “living chaos”. Life was, it is argued, present in some form in the chaos. It is clear that Aristotle’s matter/form distinction is anticipated in this work. In Raphaels “School of Athens” we find Plato holding this work whilst pointing upward toward the Good Creator. Form and principle for Aristotle are synonymous and although it is the case that Aristotle’s work the  “Metaphysics” opens with the claim “All men desire to know” much of this work is devoted to the answering of so-called aporetic questions, an activity which despite the claim that Being has many meanings, clearly is in search of the first principles of Philosophy.

Aristotle was also a significant figure in biology. The Timaeus provides a description of the body that must have clearly interested and Inspired Aristotle. Plato’s account is that the organism is embedded in a process of creation that is driven by a final end or telos. It is, for example, claimed that this creation process:

“divided the veins about the head and interlaced them about each other in order that they might form an additional link between the head and the body, and that the sensations from both sides might be diffused throughout the body.”

Plato is here, rather surprisingly, given his earlier arguments against materialism, giving us a material account of the body. He goes on to speak of Perception in terms of the motion involved in both the objects and the processes of activating the organs of the subject. Plato also surprisingly embarks on a discussion of the desire for nutrition as a fundamental activity of the composite body-soul. The soul part of this complex apparently has two creators: the rational part of the soul is the result of the creation of God and the lower irrational part(also divided into two parts) the creation of the demiurge. Thus is created a hierarchy of soul functions that we also find in Aristotle’s reflections on the soul. Desires arising anywhere in the hierarchy can in principle affect any other part of the hierarchy. The soul, too, begins its life in chaos and spends its life attempting to establish a state of equilibrium: a state that is always unstable because of a fundamental dependence upon the ever-changing Heraclitean external world. Out of this initial chaos at birth, sensation emerges as the organs in general(including the brain) and the organs of perception, in particular, establish relations with each other and with the external world. The sentient parts of the organism are obviously a key to the successful relationship with the external world. Sensations of pleasure and pain are caused when the “motions” a particular organ is subjected to, suits its receptivity function: pain arises when the organ is “irritated” by the external stimulus. These thoughts display a dual aspect approach to the person: firstly the organism is viewed as an object surrounded by an external world in flux and secondly, the organism is under the aspect of a causa sui of motions and activities in the world. Brett has this to say on this topic:

“From one point of view man is an organism in contact with the world around him, and he must, therefore, be studied as an object among objects, from another he is the centre of a world which may or may not have its objective counterpart, a world of ideas which must in some degree be subjective. In discussing perceptions we take up the cognitive aspect of man’s life and all that we should now call subjective, in a sense hardly appreciated by Plato.”

Brett is espousing a scientific notion of subjectivity that is not in accordance with what Parmenides and modern followers of Aristotle and Kant would call “The Way of the Truth” which must include the truths or knowledge we possess of man and his perception of, and reasoning about, the world. R. S. Peters in his edited version of Brett’s work, “The History of Psychology” discusses the scientific error of confusing thought about an activity with that activity itself, thus preferring a description of the activity to an explanation for the activity. In the context of this debate, sensations are certainly something caused to happen in relation to the body of a man, but under another aspect when a man perceives(pays attention to these sensations) he does so in accordance with ideas that partially determine the object of his perception. This latter perspective is clearly expressed in a number of Plato’s works: the physical oak tree that one may perceive “participates” in the idea or principle of the oak tree(i.e. what it is that makes the oak tree the oak tree that it is). Scientific objectivity assumes a beginning of knowledge in particulars and charts an ascent into the realm of generalization whereas Plato’s view is clearly that: whatever the nature of the origins of knowledge, the general cognitive attitude associated with knowledge is that which understands particulars in terms of general ideas or “forms” or principles. A principle is a generalization and belongs to the category of the universal: a principle is categorically related to its particulars. This is to be contrasted with scientific hypothetical generalizations that for example relate particular causes to particular effects. The major problem at issue, of course, is how to characterize the category of universal ideas. This issue is often mistakenly described in terms of causation, i.e. in terms of how it is that we come to acquire these ideas and Plato clearly ventured into this territory in his work, the Timaeus. Aristotle’s attitude toward these two aspects of investigation(man, the object, man the agent) is more complex and more transparent. Aristotle via his theory of change characterized four different kinds of explanations, two of which are concerned with man the object and two of which concerned with man the agent. Aristotle in his discussion of this “how” question related to the acquisition of knowledge couched his account in terms of the soul and its power to abstract from the differences between particulars that are experienced, thus focussing on the active agent rather than the passive object of this learning process.

Metaphysics is a holistic study and encourages the division of wholes into parts only if the parts retain important characteristics of the whole(in the way that characterizing man as a swarm of atoms does not). It is this relation of the parts to the whole that permits logical investigations to arrive at knowledge that cannot be reasonably doubted. If the soul is a principle the question that naturally arises is whether a principle can have parts that have characteristics of the whole. Both Plato and Aristotle believe this to be the case and are in agreement that there are logical arguments for dividing the soul into parts. The Republic contains an argument by Socrates to the effect that, if the soul did not have parts, the fact that a soul could both want to drink some water because it is thirsty and at the same time not want to drink the water because it might be poisoned, would be a contradiction. It is not a contradiction because the soul does have at least two parts. This same reasoning can be applied to generate a soul composed of three parts: Reason, Spirit, and Appetite. This logical reasoning is not moreover academically isolated from the world of experience. We can all see, Plato argues, forms of human life in which one of these parts dominate. In the wealthy man’s life, we can see the presence of the virtue of temperance or the vice of superfluity. In the spirited man’s life, we can see the presence of courage and ambition. In the life of the reasoning man, we can detect the presence of the virtue of wisdom. Plato’s allegory of the cave and the allegory of the divided line illustrate these forms of life by using a cognitive scale of imagination, belief, hypothetical mathematical knowledge, and categorical philosophical knowledge. Science, Plato would argue in defense of himself against the accusation of resorting to the subjective that the subjective belongs to a lower form of life than the philosophical-metaphysical knowledge required by the examined life led by the wise man. Science, in response, can always redescribe the abstract categorical in its own concrete hypothetical terms, and this is certainly happening when it comes to the interpretation of certain key judgments relating to the soul. One such judgment is the claim that the soul is immortal. We pointed out earlier the debt that Socrates owed to Anaxagoras and the categorical metaphysical claim that “All is mind”.  Many commentators have difficulty in understanding, for example, what is meant by “soul” or “mind” as these terms occur in the reflections on immortality by  Socrates in Plato’s Apology and the dialogue of the Phaedo. Kenny in his “New History of Western Philosophy” has the following to say on this issue:

“Socrates in Plato’s Apology appears to be agnostic about the possibility of an afterlife. Is death, he wonders, a dreamless sleep or is it a journey to another world to meet the glorious dead?…. The Platonic Socrates of the Phaedo, however, is a most articulate protagonist of the thesis that the soul not only survives death but is better off after death.”(p214)

In interpreting the passages in these dialogues Kenny, unnecessarily concretizes or reifies the soul instead of examining the possibility that a better interpretation of psuche is to regard it as a principle. The Timaeus characterizes the soul in terms of a hierarchy of functions all interconnected. The lower parts of the hierarchy are obviously connected to bodily desires and appetites and these are supposedly regulated by the principle or rule of temperance. Kenny, also, arguably, insufficiently appreciates the use of allegory or metaphorical language in the characterization of the whole and the relation of these parts to the whole and to each other. He claims, for example, in response to this quote from the Phaedo:

“Thought is best when the mind is gathered into itself, and none of these things trouble it–neither sounds nor sights nor pain, nor again any pleasure–when it takes leave of the body and has as little as possible to do with it.”

Kenny also makes the following claim:

“So philosophers in pursuit of truth keep their souls detached from their bodies. But death is the separation of the soul from the body: hence a true philosopher has throughout his life been craving for death.”(65C)

One can no more separate a principle explaining the behaviour of a human being from the body producing that behaviour than you can separate the law of gravitation from falling or orbiting bodies: or if you believe you can separate the principle from the matter than  this merely calls  for a metaphysical theory explaining the nature of this separation. Of course, it is the case that one can argue that Plato owes us more of an explanation for the relation of this principle to our human activities of perceiving, imagining, believing, knowing, reasoning etc. One can, however, perhaps better appreciate Aristotle’s replacement of Platonic allegory with theoretical explanations and justifications.

The words “another world” occurred in an earlier discussion and the question we need to ask in this context is: “if this is a metaphysical expression what is its meaning?”. One response to this is to deny that the statement is metaphysical. When Socrates died there is a sense in which he continues to survive in at least two non-metaphysical respects. He is, in a sense present now in this discussion and perhaps will be present forever in discussions in the future. His physical ancestors might also be with us. This world we now live in might for Socrates have been the other world Socrates was metaphorically referring to. It is also the case that it is not at all difficult to imagine Socrates in the company of Homer, Parmenides, Heraclitus Anaxagoras etc. as well as all the great philosophers that succeeded him. Of course, there is no sense in which Socrates is actually here with us and that is because we believe that he is dead and also that death is the end of that body which was sustained by the principle of Socrates. We still, however, have access to the principle of Socrates via our thought about him and our reflections on his philosophy. That he is not actually or concretely here and now present means that what is meant by his reflections is that he is imagining himself to be dead and imagining “another world”, a very reasonable metaphor in the circumstances.

In the dialogue Phaedo, Simius and Cebes felt that the Greeks of their time would reject the idea that the soul could survive the body. In the light of the above reflections, the cognitive attitude of these Greeks is probably founded upon the belief that the absence of activity in the current perceptible world entails the absence of the principle responsible for that activity. It does not entail that this principle can survive in some concrete form in the discourse of others about Socrates. Claiming, as some do, that Socrates that because Socrates was “imagining” another world and that this was, therefore, “subjective”  is not a helpful characterization of the cognitive attitude involved in this context.

For Plato, there are intermediate soul functions between the passive receptive functions associated with sensations and the more advanced functions that actively think about these affections. These intermediate functions include mental powers such as memory, mental association, emotion, and imagination. Emotions apparently are caused by violent motions or stimuli. Stimulation of sensation to the extent that the organ is well adapted to the stimulus produces a state of equilibrium or pleasure and these are the states we generally want to experience. These are referred to as “complete states”. They are recorded in memory, which produces ideas/desires for the purposes of recollection or repetition. these can be simple ideas such as the idea of water when we are thirsty or more complex ideas such as that of  “warm drink”. These states are obviously connected to cognitive states and attitudes because we know what we want. Brett has this to say on the issue:

“The body never has knowledge, however indispensable an instrument it might be to the attainment of knowledge in some cases:and therefore naturally the body is not the seat of desires or emotions. The soul, when affected by desire is in a condition essentially painful: for desire is consciousness of incompleteness. But there is no desire totally devoid of pleasure, for desire is a tendency to greater perfection, and that in itself, is pleasant.”

Needing or wanting may have its roots in the body but the consequent conscious desire is that which satisfies this corporeal need or want. The object that satisfies this desire, namely,  involves conscious reflection on a former experience. The mind recalls this object by means of an idea. In the “Way of Opinion,” there are false opinions that attempt to unite ideas that ought not to be united. Correct opinion unites ideas correctly but the result is not understood as part of the system of ideas it actually belongs to. It is this latter understanding that is involved in the “Way of the Truth”. In this hierarchy of functions, then, sensation and feeling(emotion) are obviously not at the level of knowledge in relation to the Way of the Truth because knowledge involves a systematic relation of ideas to each other. It is this systematic relation of ideas that is the foundation for the logical truth making relations established by the highest of the soul functions, namely Reason. The wise man, it should be emphasized, is the man who has perfected a large number of powers in the hierarchy of powers and this can be seen by those who know in the contemplative and examined form of life he leads. The wise man grasps and understands the ends of life that are embedded in a human nature that generates the goods of the virtues at various levels of the hierarchy of the soul’s powers. This final integration of the parts of the soul is expressed in the Greek term areté(virtue) which is the mark of the wise man who does the right thing at the right time in the right way. The wise man knows that his time will come to an end: he knows that is,  that in accordance with an ancient prophecy which has been confirmed by everything he knows, he will die. He furthermore knows and has reasoned his way to the conviction that there will be no further life after death. Death is a final end for all living things. He knows he can imagine another world but it will not be filled with bodiless spirits. The world he imagines will be filled with living things that will die and his presence will be metaphorical, something like a presence, but not a living breathing presence: it will be an imagined presence based on reasoning. When his religious friends tell him that he can expect another life after this one he knows that they are not actively using their imagination, their imagination is rather being used by a primitive desire or wish not to die. He knows they are phantasising

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition, and Consciousness: Part two The Sophists, Socrates and the Consciousness of method(Brett’s History of Psychology)

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Brett has a view of the Enlightenment which is distinctly Hobbesian/Humean and this is revealed particularly in his characterization of  Sophism:

“For the Sophists interpret their age in trying to restore the individual and assert his rights, and this element is common to all enlightenments, seems to furnish the peculiar flavour of their work.”

Brett then attributes this idea of a “self-determining agent” to Socrates and places him at the end of a line of Sophists which we assume must include Thrasymachus, who is generally regarded as one of the foremost figures reasoning in a manner Parmenides characterizes as “The Way of Opinion”. 

The most famous exchange between Thrasymachus and Socrates occurs in book 1 of Plato’s “Republic”. The topic of exchange is Justice and Socrates is in search of the truth and a definition. Thrasymachus inserts himself into the discussion aggressively and agrees to provide a definition that appeals to the popular status quo of governments that in fact in the name of justice pass laws that are in their own self-interest: a position that for Parmenides is a case of journeying along the path of opinion. Socrates subjects this attempt at a definition to a dose of elenchus and expresses surprise that Thrasymachus has perverted the course of the discussion by claiming that actions that are clearly unjust on any reasonable definition should be regarded as characterizing the essence of justice. Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of trickery after having made the announcement that Socrates does not have the resources to defeat him in open argument but Socrates eventually traps Thrasymachus in the jaws of a contradiction that relies on the assumption that all acts of justice require knowledge if they are to fulfill their intentions. If then, a strong government working in its own self-interests passes laws without knowledge, it is possible that the consequences that ensue might well turn out not to be in the interests of those that have passed the laws. Elenchus is a form of dialectical reasoning that is designed to arrive at the truth without contradiction and Thrasymachus probably believing that he has been tricked,  only participates sporadically and peripherally through the rest of the dialogue.

Earlier in his discussion of the Pre-Socratics Brett accused Plato of epistemologizing Philosophy. In relation to this point, it is certainly the case that the Republic is claiming that it is “knowledge of the good” which determines whether or not the rulers of a city-state will cause that city-state to fall into ruin. This hardly appears to be a controversial judgment or indeed anything to do with an individual self sufficiently correctly and justly acting in accordance with   Hobbesian “principle” of self-interest.

Brett continues his account by complaining about metaphysics and its endless generation of speculative hypotheses: 

“the eternal  circling of thought around the apparently unknowable”.

The above might be a comment not just on metaphysics but also on the way of opinion that produces a manifold of hypotheses in every so-called line of interest or tradition of inquiry.  Brett claims that metaphysics is in need of Sophism in order to “emancipate the intellect” of man.  From what do we need to emancipate man? The definitions of Socrates? Perusing the Platonic dialogues can it not be said that it is precisely the method of elenchus in search of a definition which revealed the essence of the subject of inquiry that enabled the mind to organize the proliferation of hypotheses in accordance with principles?

Placing Thrasymachus and Socrates in the same class of philosophers runs contrary to Plato’s characterization of these two antagonists as dialectical opponents. Brett does then admittedly claim that he is only referring to some of the Sophists and he specifically names Protagoras in the same breath as he characterizes Sophism as having ” arrived far enough on the road of development to demand some scientific explanation of knowledge”.

Socrates and Protagoras were contemporaries and in the Platonic dialogue entitles “Protagoras” we find Socrates arguing that virtue is not an instrumental/technological matter: it is not “scientific” in that sense. If to take the example of medicine, one is ill, one consults an expert, a doctor. In matters of virtue such as justice, on the other hand, Socrates argues that we do not need an expert, because we all understand the principles of the good that are involved. Protagoras’ immediate response is an appeal to mythology: Epimetheus whose task it was at the origin of living things to give man the powers he needed to survive, apparently forgot to give man any powers at all. Prometheus, his twin brother attempted to correct his brother’s error by stealing fire and practical(instrumental?) reasoning from the Gods. The race of man was notwithstanding these gifts on the brink of extinction thus forcing Zeus to intercede and send Hermes with the further “gifts” of shame and justice. To supplement this account that actually supports Socrates’ account as much as it does his own, he argues that we do not hold the ugly, the dwarfish or the weak-minded responsible for their actions because they cannot help not understanding what justice is. Protagoras adds a second argument that points out we do attempt to teach people who are unjust or irreligious and we expect them to learn what they do not know but need to know. Parents instruct their children and teachers continue this instruction. Not everyone, however, has the capacity to learn this skill(which Protagoras equates with learning to play the flute) and this it is claimed is evidence for the fact that what appears to be a part of human nature is not.

Socrates, as a result of the above argument, surprisingly appears to change his position and agree that virtue can be taught which is a position that must follow if the virtues are knowledge. Protagoras, on the other hand, believes that virtue can be taught because it is like a craft. But Socrates in other dialogues argues that although there is a sense in which knowledge can be learned it might not be possible to teach knowledge unless the right kind of mental work is done by the learner. This becomes clear in the dialogue of the Meno when Socrates via a series of leading questions “teaches” a slave boy the Pythagorean theorem. In relation to this accomplishment, Socrates means to establish that he did not impart this knowledge but the slave boy in some way using Socrates’ questions as a guide somehow “recollected” the Pythagorean principle from another and better world. It is difficult to interpret what is meant here but one suggestion is that the world of mathematics was being evoked in Socrates’ questions and the slave boy understood what he ought to in that world in order to answer Socrates’ questions. What this appears to illustrate is that the world of mathematics is an area of knowledge requiring understanding, a different kind of knowledge compared to that involved in the learning of skills. In the latter case the “measure” of the learning, to use Protagoras’ term is the production of an external object ” as a consequence” of the kind of knowledge involved. What Socrates appears to be objecting to here is that this kind of physical consequential knowledge is very different to the mental “understanding” of a principle in an area of knowledge(a different and better world).

In Plato’s “Republic” Glaucon, Plato’s brother, is not happy with the outcome of Socrates’ use of elenchus in the discussion with Thrasymachus. He insists that Socrates has not proved that knowledge of the good is necessary if one is to lead a flourishing life. He demands that Socrates prove that “The Good” is not just good in itself as Socrates has been trying to prove but that it also has good consequences. This then seems to be a logical culmination of discussions in earlier dialogues. Indeed Glaucon appears here to be the bearer of the mantle of Sophism and this demand appears to be the logical consequence of all the earlier exchanges between Socrates and the Sophists. Glaucon prior to this demand had argued that people only respect and follow the law because they are afraid of the consequences. Were they to possess the quality of invisibility and thus the impossibility of detection they would commit the most heinous crimes. Socrates, it is important to note here does not object to Glaucon on the grounds of truth, rather he merely claims that this behaviour based on a fearful reaction does not constitute “knowledge of the good”. It seems rather, to be following the Protagorean principle that virtue is the art of calculating or measuring the consequences in accordance with the pleasures one naturally seeks and the pains one naturally seeks to avoid. Modern scholars, in Socratic spirit,  regularly accuse Protagoras of being a relativist, especially in relation to his claim that man is the measure of all the things that are and of all the things that are not. This has not prevented ethical theorists from embracing consequentialist positions that have ignored the earlier Socratic objections and later Kantian objections that would appeal in the name of knowledge of the good to the understanding of the good intention. For Kant, it is the good intention that binds the “measure” to the chain of consequences that might flow from any action. It is indeed difficult to “measure” ethical circumstances such as the soldier throwing himself on a hand grenade about to explode. He saves some children but loses his own life. Obviously, any reasonable calculation would reveal the former to be a good consequence and the latter to be a bad consequence. The question that arises from such a “calculation” is: “Does the action, then, possess both characteristics(of the good and the bad) simultaneously? Or do we need recourse to the knowledge of the soldier to resolve this matter, the knowledge namely that he knew firstly  of the consequence of saving the children and desired that  and he also knew secondly of the consequence of the loss of his life and he accepted that(on the grounds of his own complex understandable reasons). We praise this act as virtuous because we know about his “knowledge of the good”. Contrast this with Glaucon’s “fear of the consequences”: a soldier fearful of the consequences would refrain from the action but would not be praised for preserving his own life(praising a soldier for such behaviour would be an example of an “inversion of values”). 

According to the Socrates of the Republic( The Socrates that Plato uses to convey his own theories), then,  it is this knowledge of the good that unites all the virtues into “One”. Aristotle  also felt the need to address Protagoras’s  relativism, The Epistemological  aspect of Protagoras’ philosophy is as Aristotle  puts it in  his Metaphysics:

“all beliefs and appearances are true”( IV 5 1009 6-9)

What this amounts to is that when A believes p to be p, it must be p and when q appears to be p, it must be p. This is clearly a violation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction which does not, by the way, deny that something can be p at one point in time, and q at another point in time. This possibility is explained by Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory in which the potentiality of q appearing to be p at one time but at another time revealing itself to be the q it actually is: here q is actually q in Aristotle’s First Philosophy.

Given the above discussion, it is unclear why Brett wishes to praise the Sophists for as he puts it “ushering in the spirit of scientific tradition”. This case only holds water because he paradoxically includes Socrates(who was no relativist) in the class of Sophists. The bonding together of these antagonists produces unnecessary complications unless one wishes to maintain that Science is not concerned with definitions that obey the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason: unless, that is, one wishes to in some sense claim that Science itself is hypothetical and relativistic). Brett does seem to focus on Science in the context of discovery and generally ignore the contexts of explanation and justification. Certainly, if one confines oneself to this context of discovery it is reasonable to point out that hypotheses might even contradict one another in this process. This suggestion is strongly supported by statements such as :

“The truth seems to be that there are no methodological recipes for being a  successful scientist”.

A curious statement given that methodology in the form of systematic observation, experimental manipulation, and measurement of variables in the search for causes is what is commonly taught in all science courses. Characterizing this matter in the form of a “recipe” is also a kind of Freudian slip because a recipe is obviously a kind of tool in the hands of a craftsman(the cook). Insofar as Protagoras is concerned, his “recipe” for investigation consists in the demand that we always check or “measure” every statement against the experience of Man. This is obviously good advice for particular causal statements but it might not be relevant if one is dealing with the essentially  conceptual statement “All events have causes”( the principle one uses in all scientific investigations). If Protagoras is suggesting that we verify the above in terms of the experience of Man it is not clear whether that can be done given the fact that it is a condition for the investigation of the experience of man. This, in other words, is the region of science best referred to as the context of justification.

Brett referenced enlightenment periods in his introductory remarks and  Kant is the philosopher par excellence from the Age of enlightenment. He argued forcefully in his “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals” for recognising a fundamental logical difference between the use of instrumental and technological reasoning used by, for example, craftsmen, and  the kind of categorical reasoning used for the understanding of a world “measured” by the true and the principle of non contradiction. Kant’s critical philosophy in many important respects supports the Socratic and Aristotelian positions and rejects the positions of many of the Sophists. For Kant, the instrumental good and the categorical good are obviously in some way related but they are distinctly different in that the latter has a universal and logical character and the former has a hypothetical and causal structure. Causal structures of action can tolerate, for example,  that one effect of a cause can be ethically bad(losing one’s life) and the effect of that effect be good(saving the children) thus permitting the judgment that the effects of a cause can be both good and bad. Categorical reasoning does not tolerate the above relativistic characterisation. As we noted instrumental reasoning is certainly possible in the context of discovery in Science and a corresponding hypothetical cognitive attitude is certainly appropriate in such a context. Once, however, we reach the level of a definition of a phenomenon this ought to be a categorical dimension in which the definition must be necessarily true and free of contradiction.

The above might explain why Kant could comfortably write about the Metaphysics of material Nature and the Metaphysics of Morals in the same categorical tone. Kant’s work on the  Metaphysics of material Nature discerns two levels of scientific activity that are independent of experience, namely the transcendental and the metaphysical. The Kantian would have no difficulty integrating the categorical justifications of the categorical imperative with the categorical justifications of Science, for example, “All events must have a cause”.  Regarding  Science in a verificationist experience based spirit as Brett does makes it impossible to generate an ethics congruent with our understanding of the good. Faced with such a prospect there are, of course, two alternatives: One can either relativize ethics or one can try as Kant did focus on the contexts of explanation and justification in ones characterization of Science. Some commentators would claim that our modern age has chosen the former of the two alternatives.

Brett’s final judgment on Socrates is that he impeded the development of the Science of Psychology and he goes on to  praise Aristippus for his contribution to what he calls the theory of cognition:

“In the sphere of cognition, he recognizes only the subjective state, the inner movement of which we are conscious and from that deduces the proposition that all knowledge is subjective, the thing remaining unknown and only the effects of its action being perceived. this seems clear from the fact that things appear differently to different people or to the same people at different times…he saw clearly that feelings as feelings have in themselves no distinctions of better and worse.”

Brett regards this last statement, namely that feelings are what they are, and not what they ought to be or not ought to be, a “psychological truth”. On this account, a man’s relations to his feelings can only be studied by recording their occurrence historically. At every time T if there is a particular feeling it is recorded. This is one possible consequence of the above psychological truth. There is here no context of justification, only a descriptive context of discovery in which the subject discovers the next feeling in a Heraclitean flux of sensations.  What has happened to the building block of knowledge in this account, namely thought? If Socrates is famous for anything it is surely nothing to do with his sensations that are only rarely recorded in Plato’s dialogues but rather everything to do with the systematic manner of his thinking: the way in which the Socratic  method explains or justifies his thoughts and the way in which thinking links up to what we ought and ought not to do and believe.  Indeed the very concept of thought we have inherited from our knowledge of Socrates via the stylus of Plato is that of talking to oneself, a dialogue with oneself which includes the context of discovery, as well as the contexts of explanation and justification. Plato’s dialogues are records of Socrates’ thoughts whether they be facts, explanations or justifications.

In support of this, Hannah Arendt points out in her writings about the Eichmann trial that the evil we attribute to this man might be relating to his inability to think in terms of what he ought or ought not to have done. Eichmann was not a man like Socrates who pursued truth, explanation, and justification. Socrates, argues Arendt, would not have murdered anyone, let alone millions of people, because his inner voice or daemon would not have allowed him to live  in peace with a murderer given the fact that the soul is structured in terms of the part that decides to do  things and the part that determines whether what has been decided, ought or ought not to be done . The self in conversation with itself also refers to the myth described in Protagoras regarding Hermes and his “gifts” of shame and justice(the “tools” of the Freudian superego). Arendt’s work was met with a storm of controversy from the Jewish community(Arendt was herself arrested by the Nazis for being Jewish) because it was not believed that the cause of evil was as banal as the absence of thought. This thesis is not difficult to believe if one possesses a clear picture of the nature of thought and its power.

The above appeal to Aristippus reminds one distinctly of Brett’s earlier account of Science as a story that has not yet proven to be false: a story is a recorded sequence of events. Is this a consequence of  Brett’s conception of part of the cultural inheritance from the Enlightenment : a good story about an individual?

A Philosophical History of Psychology, Cognition and Consciousness: Part One The Pre-Socratic Thinkers, Brett and Heidegger.

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Philosophy itself has a long history of seeking to follow the prescription “Ask of everything, what it is, in its nature”. This question has been high on the list of priorities in its own investigations of the soul, self, or person and very early on in the history of this inquiry the inimitable Greek philosophers convinced themselves and everybody else for centuries that the path of reason and truth and the search for  laws or principles of human nature were the necessary constituents of any serious investigation. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were in agreement that the investigation into the nature of man should not be so-called “content-driven” inquiries similar to those initiated by some of the Pre-Socratic thinkers, especially those inquiries that were undertaken by the more materialistically inclined investigators. Socrates is an interesting figure to refer to in this context because he began his philosophical investigations into the search for natural explanations for difficult to explain phenomena. Upon reading a work by Anaxagoras Socrates is reported(by Plato) to have turned his back on natural inquiries and begun his search for knowledge of the good and of the self. Anaxagoras is reported to have claimed that “All is mind”  and this was the first step on the road to Socrates’ conversion from the investigation of nature to the investigation of the realm of ideas and their relation to reason. The difference between the early and late investigations of Socrates is best illustrated in the scene of Plato’s dialogue Phaedo in which Socrates claims that the explanation for his plight of being incarcerated is not to be found  in the material movements of his body causing  him to  move to prison  but the explanation is rather to be found in the realm of ideas, in the reasons for his actions. Any investigation of this matter, if it was needed, would, therefore, focus upon what the person or his mind does, in,  that is, what is decided, what is willed as revealed to us in a context of explanation constituted of our cognitive attitudes and desires.

Brett in his work “The History of Psychology” claims that there are different categories of explanation. R S Peters in his abridged one-volume edition of the work has this to say on this issue:

“What we call Psychology is just an amalgam of different questions about human beings which have grown out of a variety of traditions of inquiry.”

Brett in his work actually claims three such broad  “lines of interest” but it should be remembered that the third and last volume of this work was published in 1921 at a time when Psychology had only ca 50 years earlier detached itself from Philosophy. These “great lines of interest”  are, firstly, the essential questions raised by Psychology, secondly, questions raised by the medical profession and thirdly, the questions raised by the theologians and the Philosophers. Placing theologians and philosophers inside the same pair of brackets does, however, raise some questions about the criteria that Brett may have used to define a ” line of interest”. Theology and Philosophy have certainly been asking different kinds of questions about the nature of man ever since Socrates used elenchus on the theologian Euthyphro in the Platonic dialogue of the same name. The reluctance or refusal of the Church to translate Aristotle’s works into Latin is probably another event suggestive of the difficulty of conflating theological and philosophical traditions of inquiry. Given these objections, it can reasonably be claimed that there are at least four lines of interest and that Philosophy can claim to be a unique line of interest/inquiry. Philosophical events after the publication of Brett’s work such as the rise of Analytical Philosophy of Science in general and Logical Positivism in particular also argue for a differentiation of philosophical from theological questions. on the grounds of a rejection of metaphysical explanations. Brett’s position interestingly rejects that there is some unique kind of object of interest or subject matter that defines the realm of Psychology.

R S Peters embellishes Brett’s account by making a point about the role of language in the activities of these “lines of interest”. Peters claims that in the tradition of thinking about man, language contains a background of ages of inductive reasoning about man’s nature. Language by this means has also shaped our assumptions and interests.

Perhaps in the light of the considerable developments we have seen in Psychological investigations in the twentieth century, there is a case for claiming that there are also a number of traditions of inquiry within this discipline, ranging from biological theorizing to Humanistic theorizing. There is, however,  an important philosophical distinction to be observed in this discussion and this is the Kantian differentiation between events that happen to a person and events initiated by the will of a person(when a person does something). R S Peters focuses upon this difference by drawing attention to the distinction between questions investigating the facts(what is the case) and questions investigating what ought to be the case, what we ought to do. The latter investigation moves us into a different universe of prescriptive discourse wherein we refer to judgments of appraisal and attitude, a very different universe of discourse to that wherein facts are described and even used for explanatory purposes. There is indeed a relation of relevance between these two universes of discourse(what is the case, and what ought to be the case) but there is no straightforward deductive relationship. This is a paradoxical relation from the scientific point of view considering the uncomfortable philosophical claim that it is the ought judgment which determines the interest and attitude we bring to bear on investigations into physical reality rather than the observations of physical reality solely determining the cognitive attitude we form of that reality. What is being referred to in this discussion are two different contexts: the context of justification and the context of discovery. The prescriptive ought judgment, for example, “One ought not to murder any other person” is the universal justification for the particular judgment that  “A ought not to have murdered B”. There is a confusion of the logical relationship between these two judgments when one places these judgments within a scientific context of discovery in which discovering the fact that A has murdered B suffices to prove the falsity of the universal generalization “One ought not to murder anyone”.

Prescriptive questions fall clearly into the domains of both Ethics and Philosophical Psychology and these are both ancient concerns and modern philosophical concerns. Many oracular judgments, for example. “Know thyself”  and “Nothing too much” were formative of the view that Ancient Greek Philosophy had of the appraisals we make and the cognitive attitudes we have formed of human beings and their activities.

The difference between ancient concerns and later philosophical reflection upon these concerns is that the latter involves asking a second-order type of question which asks, for example, whether the justification for the judgment “one ought not to murder anyone” is an appropriate justification. This request for a justification of a justification led to the type of critical philosophy that Kant argued for in which different formulations of the categorical imperative provided this second order justification of the justification. In the first formulation, we are provided with a universal law that motivates attitudes, judgments, and actions. the second formulation refers to a universal condition of the dignity of man and the third formulation refers to the legislative understanding of critical self-conscious citizens. It was obvious to Kant that scientific observation and the experimental manipulation and measurement of variables in the context of discovery have no place in the investigation of answering ethical questions. Kant would also claim that such a context of discovery would have only a limited role in the process of the formation of cognitive attitudes relating to what Plato and Aristotle called “The Good”.  Reference to the context of discovery would, for example, require the separation of a holistic meaningful unity of means and ends(which both must be good in the same sense) into two separate elements related by a causal mechanism for which a principle or law must be “discovered”. This position transforms ethics into a technological affair in which one of the elements must somehow justify the other: either the means must justify the end or the end must justify the ends. This kind of discussion does not take us to the critical self-conscious level that Kant claims is characteristic of ethical reasoning. In response to this accusation, ethical theories appeal to artificial procedures such as the capacity we possess for “introspection”. Another “mechanism”, even if it is psychological, unfortunately, does not answer the logical and conceptual questions posed at this second-order level.

There is much to be gained, then, in the application of critical philosophy to theories and claims made in all four lines of Interest/inquiry. This will involve examining the logical consistency of theories that involve the conceptual adequacy of factual claims as well as the adequacy and self-sufficiency or propositional explanation and justification. In this process it is important, however, to respect a natural categorical Aristotelian and Kantian distinction between what we human beings are in our essence(Aristotle’s  De Anima, Kant’s Anthropology) and what we ought to do in order to express that essence(Aristotle’s Ethics, Kant’s Practical  and Moral Critique’s). These metaphysical investigations predated those systematic scientific investigations that  R S Peters argues began with Darwin’s “Origin of the Species. It can, however, be argued that Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory helped us to comprehend the importance of our animal nature in the attempt to understand the concept of consciousness that emerged shortly after Darwin’s reflections at the moment when Psychology detached itself from Philosophy.

In this study, we intend to construct a philosophical commentary and critique of Brett’s “History of Psychology” using the investigations of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, O Shaughnessy, Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt, and P M S Hacker.

The Pre-Socratic Thinkers

Brett denies in the Introduction to this topic that Science is a “body of knowledge” that was formed by a “scientific method” and further claims that:

“It is more in keeping with the history of thought to describe science as the myths about the world which have not yet found to be wrong. Science had its roots partly in primitive pictures of the world and partly in primitive technology.”

We need, in evaluating the above quote, to remind ourselves of the fact that these thoughts were published in 1912, a period in which modern science was developing in many different directions yet still in its infancy given the fact that the Enlightenment Philosophical Kantian view of science was being disregarded as being “metaphysical”, a term which eventually became synonymous with “the mythical”. The Context of Explanation was regarded as generated exclusively out of the process of the context of discovery in which we discover “facts” and “generalizations” that go beyond the given facts. It was around this time that Bertrand Russell was constructing the concept of sense data as part of his logical/epistemological account of experience and as part of his professional refutation of the idealist philosophical position he had embraced earlier in his career. In short, this was a period in which the inductive context of discovery took precedence over the context of explanation and justification. It was a skeptical period in which dogma was identified with metaphysics and science adopted a hypothetical pose connected more with imaginative language than categorical reasoning. This was the state of affairs in which Brett made his claim that Science and myth were closely aligned. Kant would have categorically rejected such a position on the grounds that a product of the imagination may well be a part of the context of discovery as well as the art of storytelling, but it is not a faculty of mind directly involved in the propositional truth-conditional process of reasoning. 

Brett continues in his introduction to point to an interesting account that charts the development of speculative inquiry where..

“It is an interesting fact that detailed speculations about man were the last to emerge in the history of science. the heavenly bodies, the objects remotest from man, were the first objects of scientific interest. Speculation advanced slowly through the realms of the organic until the nineteenth century, detailed observations of animals paved the way for detailed and systematic observation of men.”

This is, from one point of view, an interesting example of collective amnesia, probably caused by an obsession with the context of discovery and observationalism. Brett appears to have forgotten, in these reflections upon the Pre-Socratic thinkers, the reflections of Aristotle and his detailed observations of animals including his discovery of some of the criteria for the classification of different forms of animals and different species. The phenomenon of Aristotle is particularly instructive insofar as we can clearly see its systematic structure in, for example, his 4 kinds of change, three principles of change and 4 kinds of explanations of change. We can also see how this structure is applied in very different ways to investigations involving the animal psuche and the human psuche respectively. This clearly indicates that animal forms of life and human forms of life demand different kinds of concepts for their description and explanation. One of the key differences being that human forms of life essentially instantiate the self-conscious activities of reflection upon the rightness and wrongness of human activities. Criticism, praise and blame are important aspects of the rational nature of man. At this reflective level, theoretical conceptual thought has a fundamental teleological aspect aiming at the truth in the realm of belief. Practical conceptual thought is similarly teleological, aiming at the good in the realm of action. One could of course, in the spirit of the hypothetical, conjecture  or imagine that animals can engage in self-conscious activities, imagine that they can  think and speak about the world in the way human beings do as one can also imagine superhuman divine beings demanding the attention and activity of humans being devoted to “divine causes”. Such feats of imagination, however, whilst being typically human will not compete with the activities of reason required for the bringing about of the Aristotelian teleological end of “Eudaimonia”, or the Kantian teleological end of “Freedom”. But what end, then, do these feats of imagination achieve? Kant in his “Critique of Judgement” speaks of the purpose of the imagination being to relate to the faculty of the understanding, preparing the materials that we experience aesthetically or intuitively for possible conceptualization. Myths and stories like the imagination aim teleologically at the pleasure which ensues when the faculties of mind of the sensibility, imagination and the understanding are in harmony. Myths and stories are essentially descriptive and only incipiently have explanatory power. The experiences described in these narratives are organized in accordance with what Freud referred to as the Pleasure-Pain Principle: a principle that regulates the emotions or what Kant calls the sensible aspects of our mind. Science, on the other hand, is concerned with the classification of experiences, the formulation of true judgments about phenomena in both conceptual and propositional terms, the principle of causation and the use of the faculties of the understanding and reason to arrive at the formulation of natural and moral laws.

Brett points out the futility of beginning the story of Psychology with the early Greek Cosmological inquirers and their attempts to answer a materialistically inspired question relating to what things are made of. Heraclitus, who is mysteriously only cursorily mentioned by Brett,  and Empedocles, who is mentioned at length, both wrote about the psychological elements of love and hate and Heraclitus’s fragments indicate a reference to a use of logic. For Heraclitus so-called opposites such as the road up and the road down are logically the same road and the continual change of the physical world demand an understanding of logos, the uniter of opposites.

Brett claims that

“The typically Greek contribution to the rise of science was, therefore, the speculative spirit and the love of argumentation.”

He argues interestingly that the spirit of speculation was lost in the Middle Ages and medieval scholastic discourse was instead dominated by the love of argumentation. Given the Cultural domination of Religion in both the East and the West it is not particularly surprising that a dogmatic attitude accompanied the scholastic love of argumentation, an attitude that detached itself from the perception of our constantly changing Heraclitean world. This attitude was more Platonic than Aristotelian. Aristotelian hylomorphism was predicated upon the search for what we can know about the changing world. An interesting fact to present in this context is the fact that the Church refrained from the translation of the works of Aristotle into Latin until ca 1200 AD thus placing Plato’s philosophy in a superior position of influence. This was undoubtedly a contributory factor to the dogmatic speculations of the scholastic philosophers of the medieval period. This historical fact could also account for the amnesia of Brett in relation to  Aristotle and his complex hylomorphic theory about man, a theory certainly grounded in systematic observation of the human form of life. The Aristotelian worldview with a man in a central position belies Brett’s claim that the cosmological materialistic view dominated speculation and observation until the advent of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution precipitated a wave of what Brett referred to as  the “detailed and speculative observation of men.”

Brett’s minimalization of the role of Aristotle in his “History of Psychology” is probably due to firstly, an inadequate Historical view of Greek Culture and secondly to the phenomenon of Latinisation of Greek Philosophy via the Latinisation of the Greek language.

Our understanding of man quite rightly may, in the end, be more Parmenidean than Heraclitean because Parmenides is the first philosopher to write about “The One”  in terms of the goddess, Aletheia. Aletheia, according to the continental philosopher Martin Heidegger is the Greek term for truth that he translates as “unconcealment” and contrasts it to the Greek term for “the false” which is “pseudos”. Pseudos is in turn translated by the Latin “falsum” which carries the meaning of “bringing to a fall”. Heidegger, in his essay on Parmenides, points to the fact that this “bringing to a fall” is in the realm of the essence of, “domination”, of overseeing. Verum in Latin has no connotation of bringing out of unconcealment and simply dogmatically means  “to be not false” and thereby leading us once again into the domain of domination, the domain of the imperial dogmatic command. Pseudos, on the other hand, according to Heidegger’s translation is..

“dissembling. Dissembling  lets something it sets out and sets up appear differently that it is “in truth”…(and) also unveils and hence is a kind of disclosure”(p44 “Parmenides” trans André Schumer and Richard Rojcewicz,1992)

Heidegger believes that the Latinisation of Greek thought as a critical element in world-historical development has produced many consequences for many aspects of our understanding of ourselves and the world we inhabit. In its place, we have not just the dogmatic militaristic imperialism of the Romans but also a Christian imperialism embedded in an ecclesiastical structure under the dogmatic command of a perfect Pope. Christian Imperialism includes ecclesiastical dogmatic interpretations of the teachings of Jesus Christ and ecclesiastical financial domination.

When the idea of “the false” actually dominates the meaning of the idea of “the true” we are confronted with an example of the infamous “inversion of values” that Hannah Arendt referred to in her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism”. The Militaristic dogmatic imperial Nazis and Communists sought to build world-empires not based on revelatory ideas but rather on an experience of “bringing to a fall”, an experience of domination. This conflated in an insidious way the epistemological function of a consciousness responding to Being or what  Parmenides called “The One” with an instrumental/ethical function of consciousness: this latter function is decisive for relativizing the Parmenidean idea of “The Good” we find in Plato’s Republic. Parmenides identified “the Good” with the True” in a way which precluded the relativism we encounter in the modern period that began with the Cartesian silence on ethical issues and continued with Hobbesian instrumental materialism. Kant’s Philosophy temporarily synthesized these positions integrating epistemological, metaphysical and ethical issues as a response to the modern cocktail of dogmatic rationalism and skeptical material empiricism. This very Greek Parmenidean/Platonic/Aristotelian synthesis, however, was rapidly undermined as the Enlightenment was swamped firstly by Hegel’s dogmatic idealism and then subsequently by a materialistic scientific-economic empiricism. The Modern Period was very much defined by this tsunami. Heidegger’s claim, then, that this whole process probably began with the Romanization of Greek Culture and the Latinization of the Greek Language is a plausible explanation for what many philosophers including Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas have called our “modern malaise”. 

Brett registers something of the above debate in the following claim:

“Parmenides had laid hold of thought and meditated on its nature, as Heraclitus had directed his attention to perception. Thought has a permanence which perception seems to lack: it has a stationary character in comparison with the qualitative changes of perception; it is more akin to Being, while perceptions are akin to Becoming. These are metaphysical rather than physical notions, and their influence,  as seen in the works of Plato, spend itself mainly upon theories of knowledge. Ideas about the constitution of man and of the soul are found in the fragments  attributed  to Parmenides but their importance is somewhat discounted by the fact that  they come in what  is called by Parmenides the Way of Opinion.”

Brett goes on to point out that Parmenides regarded man’s constitution as a mixture of elementary qualities and man’s mind a mixture of what Aristotle later would call matter and form in which mans thoughts are related to his bodily constitution. We see in the above quote the absence of reference to  Aristotle’s synthesis of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato and this might be a consequence of the failure to recognize the influence of the Romanisation of Greek Culture and the Latinisation of the Greek language. Heidegger’s thesis, of course, was not known to Brett given the fact that this thesis was first delivered in the dark days of  1942-43 in Germany. Much has also been made by Heidegger, and modern theorists, of Nietzche’s claim that “God is dead” and the characterization of man in terms of “will to power”. The chains of religion have been cast off and in the process, the Bible(this work of prophets, our ancient thinkers) was reduced to  “stories” contradicted by scientific “discoveries”.

Consideration of  the above Heideggerian thesis and his pupil Hannah Arendt’s condemnation of the modern age as being the womb of totalitarianism opens up a logical/metaphysical “space” for a cognitive attitude towards The History of Philosophy and The History of Psychology that seeks to restore a “thread of tradition” running from Greek Culture via the Enlightenment and onward to a modern enlightened attitude toward globalization. Such a space would supplement,  or neutralize the claim that globalization is principally driven by economic and scientific factors.

Both Descartes and Hobbes rejected the Metaphysics of  Aristotle and attempted to fill the ensuing philosophical vacuum with epistemological discussions of human nature and ethics. The above quote of Brett’s places the blame for the elevation of epistemological inquiry over other forms squarely on the shoulders of Plato thus minimizing the Platonic view of man as a fundamentally ethical being possessing a mind in need of regulation by Reason and Philosophy.

Brett rightly also refers to Parmenidean speculation that sensation must belong even to inorganic beings because, his argument goes, if this were not the case sensation would emerge sui generis with the advent of life and be inexplicable. This paradoxically places Parmenides in the materialist camp and it might be the case that Plato’s Philosophy was an attempt to move away from this position without falling into the bottomless pit of Becoming espoused by Heraclitus. Brett’s account of the position of Parmenides also includes, however, thoughts that Aristotle would develop in his theories :

“Mind is the product of the material constitution of the body, and the activities of mind, the thoughts vary in relation to the different constitutions  of men.”

Different thoughts vary with different constitutions is one implication of the above quote. This assumption is embedded in various modern Psychological personality coordinate systems. In one system (H Eysenck)we are presented with a longitudinal axis of stability-neuroticism and a latitudinal axis of extraversion-introversion. The theory is basically a coordinate system that will find a position for every individual. The philosophical assumption in this context is the general or universal position that an organ system of a particular kind is requisite for thinking, feeling etc to occur. The above coordinate system requires an individual to answer questions that of course require thoughtful answers. In Aristotelian terms, the above empirical constitutionally based personality theory would address the so-called materialist-cause of thought or thinking. The above theory proposed by Eysenck also appeals to factors such as the genetic determination of the constitution of human, animal, and plant life.

The above example illustrates well the relation of historical assumptions to present theorizing. Parmenides in his philosophical “poem” writes about “The Way of Truth”  and being led by the goddess of truth in search of the indivisible and holistic “One”. This, according to Heidegger is an expression  of a relation to Being or Reality in the spirit of what he called “unconcealment” (aletheia), a relation very different to the relation to Being expressed in the so-called “Way of Opinion” instantiated in the above claim of  Parmenides that mind is the product of the material constitution of the body.

Modern Psychology dwells in a world of variables, in particular in an environment where variables are manipulated and the effects are observed and measured. The Philosophical issue involved is, of course, historical and the question to raise is “Why has Modern Psychology embraced the assumptions of materialism/observationalism and the interpretative methodology of statistics(The Way of Opinion) rather than a principled approach as is instantiated by the theorizing of Freud (The Way of Truth).

This is, of course, a complex question and requires an understanding of a philosophical view of history. Heidegger’s view is that History is popularly conceived of as motion, events, and processes which happen and through which something comes to pass. This is a linear causal view that at best produces a history that is defined as the totality of facts about the past. Heidegger adopts a teleological view reminiscent of the teleological “cause” or “explanation” we encounter in Aristotle’s Metaphysical theory of change when he insists that History is more concerned with destiny and the transmission of essence or potential in an actualizing process. Man, for Heidegger, is the being for whom his very being is an issue and that issue involves unconcealment or the revelation of the Being of beings. This unveiling is the essence of the Parmenidean and Aristotelian concepts of Aletheia. Heidegger points to how, in the absence of this understanding, even great Historians such as Jacob Burckhardt resort to what he calls “the balancing of the books”: facts are given positive and negative weights and conclusions such as  Spengler’s the decline of Western Civilisation are produced from this method. Here too Biological assumptions lie behind the “calculations”. Spengler balanced the books of the facts and arrived at the telos of decline where the more cautious philosophical position would be that the end is uncertain for the West.

History, for the modern philosopher, has a meaning which is being revealed as part of the Way of Truth rather than the Way of Opinion Spengler has chosen. History must provide us with the Zeitgeist of an age. In relation to this search for the spirit of the modern age, Heidegger continues his account of the transformation of the idea of the truth. As we saw aletheia was Latinised  into Veritas and this, in turn, was transformed by medieval scholasticism into  “adaequatio, rectitudo,, and iustitia:

“and from there, to the modern certitudo. to truth as certainty. validity and assurance…The result of this transformation of the essence of truth which has prevailed for centuries in the Occident, is the event of the conversion of the essence of untruth, from the Greek pseudos to the Roman falsum …The correct use of the power of judgment is determined in reference to what assures mans self certainty.”(Parmenides p57)

This takes us to the gates of the Modern Period and the Philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes who himself objected to Cartesianism on materialistic grounds reminiscent of the Parminedean “Way of Opinion”.

Returning to Brett’s account of the Pre-Socratics we see him referring to Empedocles and his physiological theory of the relation of the blood to intelligence and thought. In perhaps what was one of the first  theoretical reflections upon consciousness we also are given an account of consciousness in terms of the temperature of the blood: sleep ensuing when the blood cools. We appear here to be  only incidentally in the realm of thought. Brett takes us closer to the realm of thought and the Way of Truth in his discussion of the work of  Anaxagoras:

“He finds from observation that men attribute actions to reasons, and this is sufficient to justify the assertion that reason is the starting point of the activity which has put in order the chaotic mass of original matter. Reason in this way becomes an immanent force that makes for order, itself pure and unmixed but the cause of all mixture, a power inherent in some things, and ruler and organizer of all.”

Yet Anaxagoras, too, gives his promising reflections a biological twist claiming that plant life is capable of reason and knowledge thus nullifying the suggestiveness of the above thoughts.

Democritus, the atomist and Pythagoras the mathematician/mystic that claimed that reality has a mathematical form and also believed in the transmigration of souls, are also mentioned as representatives of a scientific perspective.

This section concludes with an account of two Pre-Socratic thinkers who are classified as representatives of the medical perspective: Alcmaeon and Hippocrates. Alcmaeon claims that sleep is caused by the blood moving into the larger blood vessels. He also claimed that the soul is immortal and divine like the sun. Hippocrates is the more interesting figure, however. He believed that mental activity was intimately related to its physical substrate in such a way that a healthy body produces an intelligent soul: contrariwise, an unhealthy body can cause mental derangements. The brain is also an important part of Hippocrates’ reflections. Brett characterises  these reflections in the following way:

“Within the body, the brain occupies the most important place. From it proceed all the veins of the body:they spring up from this root and grow downwards branching out to various parts of the body. Here is the seat of intelligence: into the brain lead the various passages of sense, eyes, nose, ears.–If the brain receives a shock loss of speech, sight or hearing may follow: from wounds to the brain paralysis and death ensue.”

Brett fails to mention anything relating to the famous Hippocratic oath in this section and he also registers his disappointment with the way in which  dreams are characterised in one of Hippocrates’ short essays. Dreams, Hippocrates argues, belong to a special class of phenomena requiring interpretation and knowledge of a special science. Dreams can signal the presence of morbid conditions within the body because:

“There seems to be the idea that the soul discovers in sleep what in the waking state goes unnoticed. This amounts almost to the idea that a latent consciousness comes to the surface in dreams.”

These ideas are treated perfunctorily. Brett  claims these speculations to be wild and inaccurate characterisations of the proper causes of dreams. Hippocrates’s reflections on the brain surface again and again throughout the history of Psychology and Medicine most notably in Freudian times where we find, Charcot, for example  making similar claims in the name of Psychiatry. The science of the knowledge of dreams also resurfaces with Freud’s reflections on the interpretation of dreams in the book with the same name. 

In these Pre-Socratic medical thinkers accounts we see again the dialectic between the way of opinion and the way of truth. A dialectic  that will require the philosophising of Socrates, the dialogues of Plato, and the critical historically oriented reflections of Aristotle before a systematic synthesis worthy of the name “Psychology” can emerge.