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Freud claimed that his Psychology was Kantian, and there is much evidence to support this claim, especially insofar as his later work was concerned. There is, however, also evidence to suggest that he did not share many of Kant’s cultural and religious convictions, even in his later work. Thanatos for Freud, together with Eros, were terms borrowed from Plato, for the purposes of characterising and diagnosing the condition of those difficult to treat patients, whose symptom-constellation was puzzling for Freud, e.g. the compulsion to repeat something traumatic seemed to lie beyond the reach of explanation in terms of the pleasure principle. Freud thus began to explore the territory beyond the pleasure principle. The postponement of immediate gratification as a life-sustaining and enhancing strategy had long been a feature of the Greek principle of areté, and it too was an important component of the Kantian criticism of the utilitarian ultimate end -goal of the “pursuit of happiness”.
The Freudian Ego was given the task of coordinating the different requirements of the life and death instinct in our sensory motor contacts with the world, and whilst pleasure played some role in this effort of coordination, it was the Reality-Principle that the ego attempted to use in most of its work. The principle worked in the spirit of areté and diké as part of the attempt to integrate the demands of the superego into a holistic harmonious mental entity. Freud characterises the death instinct as lying both behind the compulsion to repeat, and as a strategy on the part of the patient to “restore an earlier state of things”, i.e. a strategy aimed at returning the patient to a state prior to that point in their life when the trauma occurred.
The Ego’s task, in general, is to lift the subject out of the state of narcissistic love(self-love). Narcissism obviously plays a role in the Kantian account of the subject thinking about the moral law, but making himself an exception to the obligation of the imperative(which he understands but fails to fully justify). The reason it took such a long time to discover the workings of Thanatos in the psyche of his patients, (in the labyrinth of our conscious, preconscious, and unconscious systems), is that the death instinct does not announce its presence, it works silently. The desire for death, that is, manifests itself not just in the compulsion to repeat but also in the tendency toward destruction. Freud is giving more content to the oracular prophecy, relating to mans tendency to bring down ruin and destruction upon himself. This is one argument for the death instinct being an anti-cultural instinct, and the reason for this might be contained in the following:
“The element of truth behind all of this…is…that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved and who at most can defend themselves if attacked: they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus”(Civilisation and its Discontents)
The issues being discussed in the above quote are the Christian imperatives “Love thy neighbour” and “love thy enemies” and what is being expressed is clearly a cynical view resembling the cynicism of Diogenes many centuries earlier, a view which may have been inspired by the Greek oracles concern for the creations of man. The Christian and Enlightenment messages of hope are overshadowed by a form of reasoning that points to the bitter facts we all experience–that people do kill each other, and use each other as means to their own selfish(narcissistic?) ends. Freud, therefore appears, at first sight, to have grounds for his form of argumentation, and it ought to be pointed out that Eliot’s poetry post-dates Freud but a reasonable hypothesis would be that Freudianism(on the basis of Freuds writings) would respond negatively to the religion in Eliot’s poetry and positively to the philosophy. One response by Freudians would involve seeing in the poetry the suspicious workings of defence mechanisms. In the work “Moses and Monotheism” Freud states the following:
“Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory world in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world which we have developed inside us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But it cannot achieve its end. Its doctrines carry with them the stamp of the time in which they originated, the ignorant childhood days of the human race. Its consolations deserve no trust. Experience teaches us that the world is not a nursery. The ethical commands, to which to which religion seeks to lend its weight, require some other foundations instead, for human society cannot do without them and it is dangerous to link up obedience to them with religious belief. If one attempts to assign to religion its place in mans evolution, it seems not so much to be a lasting acquisition, as a parallel to the neurosis which the civilised individual must pass through on his way from childhood to maturity.”
How, we might wonder, could Freud, the Kantian psychologist be so cynical about Religion? Kant sees religious belief and activity in terms of the motivated hopes of a rational animal capable of discourse. Firstly, we ought to note that Kant inclines toward the term “respect” to characterise and justify the way in which man ought to relate himself to other men. Respect is less of a passion, and more of an intellectual attitude than Love, signifying as it does a psychological distance in relation to the object of the attitude. Kant’s imperatives, therefore, would be “respect thy neighbour”, and “respect thy enemy” and in that spirit “do unto him as thy would be done unto”
Freud speaks in the above quote of the the importance for society that peace and tranquillity reign between oneself and ones neighbours, but he is less conciliatory about our relation to our neighbours if they behave like ones enemies, believing that areté(doing the right thing at the right time in the right way) and diké(justice) must regulate such a relation rationally, without any threat of violence.
We have Freud to thank for giving us account of the curious behaviour he described as “identifying with the aggressor” by which he meant that certain people wish to become like their aggressors in order to avoid the aggression these aggressors wish to inflict upon them. This tactic does not always work with aggressors, of course, but this might be the only choice available in certain circumstances. This behaviour, for Kant, would be tantamount to giving up ones freedom and dignity, and therefore can not be regarded as in accordance with any of the formulations of the categorical imperative. The Categorical Imperative, we ought to recall, is intended to ensure that we treat everyone(including ourselves) as ends-in-themselves.
Freud sees in his postulation of an internal agency he calls the superego, a means to control mans aggression toward his fellow man. The superego, on this account, is clearly a cultural instrument to curb aggressive behaviour, and Freud describes this in terms of it functioning like a garrison in a conquered city, but given the fact that its medium of operation is guilt and this guilt is partly the cause of his discontentment with his civilisation, the superego looks to be a negative agency. It is the mature ego that transforms this situation, by assimilating the functions of the superego into itself: sublimating areté under the broader perspective of the reality principle which manifest itself in attitudes of resignation in the face of Moira(Fate). This latter is the sign of what Freud called a strong ego.
Religion appeals to a father who demands that we identify with his holiness, and obey his commandments. This state of affairs, Freud argues, is a pathological phenomenon, and is a part of the long childhood of the species of man. For Freud, it is psychoanalysis, and not Religion, that is needed to identify the pathological mechanisms that prevent or slow down the growth process toward maturity: the growth toward being fully rational.
Yet there is in the “Four Quartets” what Freud would have regarded as wisdom, especially in the closing passages which refer to explorers returning to the beginning after having arrived at the end of their journey, and knowing the place for the first time. For Freud this process would involve the the Reality Principle which is used in the reality-testing of ones representations. Freud has the following to say on this theme:
“A pre-condition for the setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have been lost which once brought real satisfaction”(Negation, Freud)
Freud goes on to claim that the aim of reality-testing is not to find an object that is real for perception, but rather to re-find an object that has been lost. This, in its turn, involves a wish that the absent (perhaps loved) object return from a state of absence into a state of presence–an impossible state of affairs, of course in the case of the death of a loved one. In this case the re-finding of the object is impossible and a state of mourning supervenes, which ends in a state of resignation to the new state of affairs. If, in the course of our explorations, we do re-find the lost object, Eliot does not characterise this as a case for rejoicing, but rather uses the expression that we “know the place for the first time”. Using the term “know” conjures up the Kantian interpretation of the Garden of Eden narrative we referred to in a previous essay.
The Kantian message relating to the dangers of self-love is also elaborated upon by Freud in terms of a narcissism that is so self-destructive that it may, in the process of melancholia, prove destructive of the life of the self via an act of suicide. This involves the transforming of love for the self, to hate of the self, via a pathological defence mechanism in which the patent identifies with the lost object: an object which the patient may have ambiguous feelings for. In this case the death instinct returns the subject to an earlier state of things, namely an inorganic state of being.
Both Freud and Eliot believe that the so called “empire of suffering” is a vast empire overshadowing the operation of the pleasure-pain principle. Life is harsh, Freud argues, and this demands a Stoic Greek attitude which responds to the gestalt of Ananke rather than a utilitarian calculation of how to avoid the calculus of pain. The important part of this Greek response is the battle against illusion which is fought by embracing the knowledge of “The Good”—the foremost “Form” in Plato’s “Theory of Forms”. Freud’s response to the problems posed by the harshness of life is to evoke the “god” of “Logos” to assist us in the task of living. This too, can be seen as a rejection of the enthusiasm of Eliot and Kant for a divine author of the world. Logos assists us, in particular, to resolve what Freud refers to as the Oedipus complex of the species, enabling us to face up to the work that needs to be done more realistically— a project free from illusion and delusion. We are thus enabled via Logos to resign ourselves to Ananke, and in the process acquire a view of the world which is “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. We should recall here that the death of Socrates was in accordance with such a world view. Socrates viewed death as a Good, whether it be a dreamless sleep or a meeting of souls in a heavenly medium.
Art, is treated much more sympathetically than Religion in Freud’s writings. We have noted that Religion, on Freud’s view is riddled with pathological defence mechanisms, e.g. the compulsion to repeat(rituals) identification with the aggressor(the angry punishing God of the OT), the return of the repressed(our original sin) etc. Art , on the other hand is:
“the non-obsessional, non-neurotic form of substitute satisfaction”
Freud sees the defence mechanism of “sublimation”as harnessing our creative instincts in the name of Eros, a process which involves the postponement of satisfaction for Cultural purposes. The sensible power of the imagination inserted in the work of fantasy, however, is the medium for this artistic activity. Aristotle, in the context of this discussion, claims that the dramatist and the poet seek ultimately to produce a learning experience upon which supervenes a feeling of pleasure. Kant’s account of the creative is marginally more complex, referring to what he calls the “harmony of the faculties of the imagination and understanding”. There is, in this rather pleasant process, no great suffering requiring an attitude of resignation at the end: the work of art does not resemble the work of life in that respect. Indeed it is meant as the sketch of a solution to the problem of the harshness of life. Kant argues that the harmony of the faculties prepares the mind for the tasks of morality and he claims that beauty is the “symbol” of morality.
There is, in Freuds writings on Religion no reference to the kerygma or “call” of religion even if there is acknowledgement that it has served the purposes of culture in the past. There are, however references to both Plato and Kant in his later work. Epistemé, in the form of knowledge of the principles of psychoanalysis, complements the techné of therapeutic techniques, and it is clear that the Reality Principle is not merely an epistemological principle, but also requires the knowledge of “the Good” both Plato and Aristotle referred to in their reflections. Socrates, in his cell, waiting for the hour of his death, was resigned to his fate, and his knowledge of areté, logos, and diké were operative right up to the moment at which he was losing consciousness: a moment in which his last thought was to ask for a sacrifice to be made on his behalf to the Medical God, Aeschylus. Presumably this last gesture was a form of thanksgiving for “the good ” death that was about to occur. The last act of Socrates was, therefore, a religious act. Socrates was not as free as Freud felt, close to his death in England, after fleeing from the Nazis, but both figures represented in their different ways the importance of Logos and Ananke in approaching the end of their “examined lives”. Socrates died from a dose of hemlock and Freud from an overdose of morphine, so perhaps the final gesture of Socrates was not in vain and a prophecy of things to come.
Freud, the medical doctor, launches two specific attacks upon religion, the first against religious belief explaining the nature of the illusion involved in some of the elements of the system. The second attack is upon religious practice, especially the ritualistic aspect, which probably includes the communion of the Catholic mass. Illusions of religion connect to the capacity for desire, and Freud reflects upon the pathological character of various forms of self-fulfilment. It is also important to note that the Freudian criticism is not limited to analysing monotheism, but is intended to question all forms of religion, including the polytheism of earlier religions. It is not truth or knowledge that is at issue in many of his reflections, but rather the efficacy of religion in the economics of renunciations and satisfactions in the lives of men. Freud is well aware that the mere claim that both religious belief and religious rituals are pathological and fantasy-laden, is not sufficient criticism of these activities from a psychoanalytical point of view. In his criticism, Freud maintains that religion has both neurotic and psychotic components, but it is the latter element that he focuses upon in his analysis of the psychological mechanism of projection and its involvement in the construction of a spiritual world. We know that in his work “The Future of an Illusion” Freud claimed the origins of civilisation to be rooted in coercion and what he calls the “renunciation” of the instincts and he further doubts whether man has the capacity for organising society without the use of the above problematic methods.
Kant draws an important distinction between Civilisation and Culture and for him the latter is part of the project of actualising the potentialities of man, especially his rationality and freedom. We find a suggestion of this in Eliot’s “In my beginning is my end”, and in other reflections on wisdom, but Freud rejects this distinction between civilisation and culture, and like Diogenes in the dark shines a lamp upon the face of civilisation, only to conclude that it might not be worth the effort man puts into it. To sustain a culture, as conceived of by Kant, requires a considerable amount of work over a long, long period of time(one hundred thousand years). At the end of this process, Kant argues, man will find himself in a kingdom of ends. Freud’s response this would have been to simply point out that man is not fond of work, preferring instead to acquiesce to his passions. For the Greeks this work took place in the spirit of areté and diké and the Greeks were more positive than Freud on the issue of the possible control of the passions and the power of knowledge and work to bring cultural benefits. Kant, of course pointed out that even though man needs to have his passions controlled, he does not always want this to happen.Man, as a consequence does the minimum amount of work necessary to sustain his civilisation, but perhaps not enough to hasten his one hundred thousand year journey toward the kingdom of ends. He also is prepared to work because of his knowledge of what life is like in a state of nature without the benefits of living in a society.
In the early days of our communal existence Freud reflects upon the magical thinking that was used in the spirit of animism and he criticises this on the grounds of a failure of knowledge of oneself and ones capacities(epistemé). This quest for self-knowledge is part of Eliot’s project as can be seen in his earlier poetry, e.g. “The love song of J Alfred Prufrock”:
“No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two,
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool,
Deferential, glad to be of use,
Politic, cautious, and meticulous;
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse;
At times, indeed, almost ridiculous—
Almost, at times, the Fool.”
Prufrock, as Howard points out des not wish to be troubled by the question “What is it?” which is perhaps necessary if one, for example, wishes to understand ones relation to Time. Prufrock is the “patient ” wondering through half deserted streets, streets which lead to the posing of an overwhelming question for someone who measures out their life in coffee spoons. The poem animates even the fog into a cat-like creature, and creates a spiritual world in which death is personified without any mention of religion or God. Dante, however, provides a prelude to the poem. Sometimes in religious texts, a spiritual world is projected with more than a hint of paranoia(an angry and punishing Chronos or Yahweh) but Freud notes that in the case of the Greek gods, they were all subject to Moira or Fate and the oracles and poets believed that the gods too were subject to the demands of areté and diké. Freud highlights that, in the transition from animism to this latter state of affairs, there was a transition in which the people longed for a lost father– a longing that was in certain cases mixed with fear.
Freud notes that during his times, God was becoming an insubstantial shadow, as man began to become aware of the role his own powers played in the construction of his ideas and ideals. Kant, too, would have suspected that his own criticism of religion might result in such consequences, but his criticism was not a part of the wave of the technical progress of science. Rather, for Kant, his critique was a part of a growing realisation that God might indeed be an idea that is related to the power of practical reasoning about the moral order of the world. Freud, on the other hand, was a part of the wave of a science that appealed to a conception of theoretical reasoning, denying many categories of understanding/judgement and the critical application of the principles of reasoning. This rejection favoured sensory forms of contact with an essentially sensory world. This rejection would have been part of an illusory form of argumentation for Kant. He would not, that is, have subscribed to the modern emphasis upon the powers of perception and observation and the formulation of imaginative hypotheses based on pure sensory data. His view of sciences was tied to a world conception that rejects the view that the world is, as the early Wittgenstein put the matter, a totality of facts. Kant would have, in the context of this kind of debate, raised significant questions about how scientists believed we understand ought-statements, such as “Promises ought to be kept”. The argument that because, some or even many promises are not kept, that this fact suffices to challenge the universality and necessity of such a judgement and place it in a category of wish-fulfilments rather than with the fulfilment of ones obligations, would not have been accepted as a good argument by Kant This is not a valid form of argumentation and the Kantian objection to it is simple: theoretical statements are about a world that is so much more than a totality of facts, they are about a world that is categorically understood and rationally explained/justified. The explanations/justifications we espouse theoretically, are about events and their causation, and this is of a different kind compared to the explanations/justifications of judgements relating to the free actions of individuals and the activities of institutions. Wish-fulfilment judgements such as “I wish a particular promise would be kept”, are, in Kant’s system, a form of judgement regulated by the principle of happiness (the principle of self-love in disguise). Such judgements pay no role in the system of moral judgments we make about the moral order of the world. A politicians promises, of course could be of either of the above kinds of judgements, either a moral judgement or a judgement that is designed to ensure retention of power and position.
Freud agrees in the Future of an Illusion that Religion has served man well but many are nevertheless discontent and this has contributed both to feelings associated with a lost or absent God(Deus absconditus) and the accompanying response of “Good riddance!”. Freuds solution to the vacuum left by the retreat of the influence of religion is that we ought to embrace the god of Logos who has respect for the Reality Principle and never promises too much.